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This dissertation provides the first comprehensive treatment of Leo Strauss’s studies of 
Thomas Hobbes during a period that extended from the early Weimar Republic to mid-
Cold-War America. I argue that we should regard Strauss’s Hobbes scholarship as part of a 
life-long engagement with liberalism, taking the form of a mutually informed relation: 
Strauss’s study of Hobbes fuelled his critique of liberalism on the one hand, while his 
critique of liberalism informed his study of Hobbes on the other. What began as a rejection 
of bourgeois liberalism and the search for an authoritarian corrective in the Weimar era 
became over time a cautious endorsement of liberal institutions as found in the post-war 
United States. I further show that Hobbes occupies not only a central place in Strauss’s 
criticism of the liberal political tradition, but in his critique of modern philosophy at large. 
This dissertation is thus not only about the development of Strauss’s views on Hobbes; it is 
also an exploration of Strauss’s broader conception of politics and philosophy and how he 
used Hobbes to theorize the political and intellectual climate of the times in which he lived. 
The method of proof is that of close textual analysis of Strauss’s Hobbes texts as 
illuminated by Strauss’s biography and the historical context. I explore the interplay of text 
and context by treating Strauss as someone for whom scholarship on the history of political 
thought was often at the same time a way of theorizing politics and addressing what he took 
to be pressing political and philosophical concerns. This combination of textualist and 
contextualist approaches to the study of political thought also contributes as a case in point 
to the greater meta-theoretical debate over how we, as political theorists, are to interpret 














This dissertation was long in the making. My psychoanalyst throughout graduate school, 
and now friend, Deborah Britzman, has said, following Freud, that thinking lessens our 
suffering. Thinking is on the way out of the university, together with the destruction of 
public education in general. We will all suffer as a consequence. The university must be 
defended. What was evident in the wake of the horror of World War II is today forgotten. I 
have been fortunate to have lived through a time in which thinking was seen as essential to 
our existence, and have had teachers that cared for science, knowledge, thought and the role 
of the university. I want this list of the people that influenced my intellect to be as 
exhaustive as the evidence in the dissertation.  
I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Martin Breaugh and David 
McNally, who both served on the dissertation committee and offered comments on the 
work, and from whose classes on Das Kapital and French democratic thought I learned a 
great deal. Then there is George Comninel, who generously chaired the defence, and who 
taught the storied seminar on the long history of the state that he inherited from his teachers 
at York, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood. Comninel’s focus on the state was shared 
by Leo Panitch, as was his emphasis on history. It was Panitch who introduced me to C. B. 
Macpherson—whose equal role in this project to that of Strauss was removed in the 
eleventh hour, as the dissertation had expanded beyond what was readable. I promised the 
external examiner, Daniel Tanguay, who was disappointed upon hearing this, to produce a 
book that brings their dialogue over Hobbes to light. I owe him that and more for his 
comments and spirited discussion over my manuscript. Kim Michasiw asked the larger 
questions at the defence. In the department, Jonathan Nitzan expertly taught us economics 
and how to read data. Scholars like Ross Rudolph do not come along any longer — his 
knowledge of Hobbes and erudition of 17th century England is second to none and his 
comments on chapter three of the dissertation helped frame the entire project. It was an 
honour to teach his treasured course on 17th century British thought and history after he had 
retired. Gregory Chin, Susan Henders and Sandra Whitworth helped to broaden my view of 
International Relations. Shannon Bell, Terry Maley, Richard Saunders, Dennis Pilon, 
Robert Albritton, Stephen Hellman, Greg Albo and Asher Horowitz enriched the 
intellectual life of the department. Then there is Marlene Quesenberry, without whom I 
would never have managed to navigate through the madness called institutional 
bureaucracy at York. Angie Swartz was the stern and caring department ruler. The 
department is now in the safe hands of Margo Barreto, who saw me through. Jlenya Sarra-
De Meo was always available. Carolyn Cross gracefully helped me with a little bit of 
everything and Ananya Mukherjee-Reed brought creativity into the department as chair. 
Liisa North is the model for what a scholar, activist and mentor should be. Nicole Short 
was a close reader of my Master’s thesis in Political Science. Stephen Gill supervised that 
Masters, as well as overseeing the beginning of the undertaking that is the dissertation that 
you now hold in your hands. We worked on many projects together. Isabella Bakker 
became one of my closest friends. And if it hadn’t been for Robert Cox, I would not have 
come to York in the first place. 
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Some of the most brilliant folks at York were in Sociology: Jesse Carlson, Elisabeth 
Rondinelli, and Steve LeDrew among them. In the department, my colleagues included 
Maita Sayo, Sune Sandbeck, Arthur Imperial, Sandy Hager, Joseph Baines, Jeremy Green, 
Adrienne Roberts, Steve Maher, Julian Von Bargen and Megan Dombrowski. Brad 
Horvath, Guntar Kravis, Natasha Ryan, and Zoja Smutny introduced me to Canada and 
gave me years of friendship. Barbara Godard took me under her wings and led me through 
my first Masters in Social and Political Thought. You were an institution in one person and 
created new fields of studies. You are missed. My other supervisor during that first year, 
John O’Neill, opened my eyes to the richness of Freud’s case studies. It was a good year: 
Susan Ingram, Frank Scherer, Engin Isin, Paul Antze and John Greyson made it all the 
more interesting. I wish also to thank Mavis Himes and the other psychoanalysts and 
psychiatrists in the Toronto Speaking of Lacan Psychoanalytical Group for many good 
workshops and conversations.   
At the University of Toronto, Edward Andrew’s wit, generosity and encouragement 
are widely known. Clifford Orwin’s course on Nietzsche was an eye-opener into the 
psychological aspect of philosophy. Both Frank Cunningham, and Ernesto Laclau, whom 
he invited to teach us for a semester, shared my appreciation for Macpherson. I have had 
many conversations with my friend Kanishka Goonewardena over the years. Randall 
Hansen and Till van Rahden taught a summer course at Humboldt in Berlin, and their 
section on assimilation informed parts of chapter two. My education obviously didn’t begin 
in graduate school; some of the most important of my teachers for my development entered 
earlier in the formative years.  
At Macalester College, Franklin Adler introduced me to the tradition of political 
philosophy. But the strongest influence, Kiarina Kordela, taught me how to read 
horizontally across texts and how to not simply narrate critical theory, but to make new 
theoretical arguments. I was also fortunate to have readers, artists and critics like David 
Martin, Clarence B. Sheffield, Jr., David Chioni Moore, Beth Cleary, Peter Rachleff, and 
most generous of them all, Ruthann Godollei, as teachers. Aaron Colhapp, Tanzeen Syed, 
Danny Schwartzman, Haris Aqeel and Catherine O’Sullivan became family. Amparo 
Menéndez-Carrión brought me to Latin America, where my training as a researcher 
continued in Uruguay. In Berlin, Catherine Toal and Théodore Paléologue showed me a 
different way to approach philosophy and literature. In high school, on the shore Fjord of 
Norway’s West land, Renée Danielson taught me how to read and write about literature and 
poetry. Sylla Cousineau taught us to think historically. Reidun Bergstrøm and Simon 
James-Eide taught us how to make art. Kjerstin Thelin was my first teacher back in 
Sweden.  
The dissertation project began at Cornell with Geoff Waite. He was my model as a 
thinker and became a friend. It was always exciting to read Geoff – divine madness (θεία 
µανία). Robert Pippin generously invited me as a fellow to the Committee on Social 
Thought at The University of Chicago. In Chicago, I benefited deeply from conversations 
with Heinrich Meier, a thinker in his own right, and his seminar on Strauss’s Thoughts on 
Machiavelli. The magnificent Nathan Tarcov spoke with me and helped develop my 
account of the Strauss and Macpherson connection. Or more precisely, without Tarcov, my 
dissertation would be much poorer. As a token of gratitude I decided not to cite him once; 
he speaks between the lines. I am also grateful to the archivists at the Special Collections 
Research Center at the University of Chicago Library for their help with the archival 
material of the papers of Leo Strauss. Not that far southeast from Chicago, Michael Zuckert 
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commented on the second part of chapter two in an earlier form. As did Hannes Kerber, 
who became my peer in Chicago and with whom I have had many exchanges over Strauss 
since. Korey Garibaldi and Renata Limon became companions in Hyde Park — we danced 
a summer. 
As anyone who writes a dissertation knows: there are rough stretches and Olena 
Lyubchenko was there through the longest dip. While her enthusiasm for Strauss and 
Macpherson might have lessened over time, her support never did. With no one have I 
spoken so much about thought as with Tania Espinoza. We will die so doing. Klas and 
Aldara (and Johan and Ebbe) Modin have become family, and it is foremost with Klas that 
I talk about natural science. Eric George, Christopher Malcolm and Ingar Solty have been 
intellectual companions since the early days. We share a passion for maintaining an edge in 
thought. Old-school Kiran Banerjee read and commented on the introduction with his usual 
care and we have shared a few laughs and adventures over the years. I owe a great deal to 
the meticulous Samuel Putinja for the texts we have collaborated on. My conversations 
about orthodoxy and the Torah while walking and biking with Daniella Seltzer have 
informed chapters two, three and six. Then there was our reading group at Athens Pastries 
on Plato and Aristotle in which, over the years, I slowly worked through Nicomachean 
Ethics and Meno together with Baris Karaagac, Paul Gray and Jordan Brennan. Our guide 
was the best scholar of ancient Greek thought that I have met, Stefanos Kourkoulakos. He 
read chapters three, four and five of the dissertation and we have had countless discussions 
about Strauss and philosophy over food. He was a de facto fourth committee member. 
Much the same could be said of Justin Sully—who corrected the tense of the entire 
manuscript and offered insightful comments when there was a need. I have shared parts of 
my life with Federico Helfgott and Katherine Pendakis, they both read parts of chapter two 
and the now deleted chapter three on Macpherson. Zilan Ghaleb Mohamad, Paul 
Mazzocchi, Laura Kane, Gabrielle Gérin are now close friends. Gabrielle Israelievitch, 
Brenda McComb and Elif Genc became family in Toronto. I also wish to thank Cornelia 
Heidegger for her hospitality and our conversations in and around Freiburg and the Black 
Forest. Margaretha and Gunnar Herrman, Eva and Luis Young were there from the 
beginning. Rei Terada and Eyal Amiran gave me support in the moment I needed it the 
most. Anne-Lise François was the best of intellectual distractions. Ian Balfour knows the 
sublime. The brilliant Ashli Mullen stepped in at the 59th minute of the 11th hour without 
me asking and did in a minute to the manuscript what mortals needs weeks for.  
Most important for the shaping of this dissertation is Stephen Newman, my 
Doktorvater. Thank you, Steve, for your professionalism, for your liberality, for your 
support, for everything. Getting comments back from Steve is like entering a boxing ring, 
but I learned to roll with the punches, and knocked him out in the 12th round. Or, at least, he 
made me believe so as he prepared and pushed me on my way into the future.  
Lastly, family was a product of 20th century Europe. My father’s parents were of 
Strauss’s generation and too old for me to remember their words. But I remember their 
beings. My mother’s parents were my greatest supporters and they left us too early. My 
father, Lars Dahlquist, who always makes arguments about everything (and I don’t seem to 
be able to stop either) taught me how to fix things, from wiring to sailing boats, and not the 
least, the art of – as Julia Willén would say – Gestaltung. Most of all, I want to thank my 
mother, Marianne Dahlquist, who spent her life in the service of the public good – in 
defence of the university, culture, nature and the welfare state – for her unwavering 
support. Without her, this dissertation would not exist. 
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“He [Strauss] wanted a decency in the sense of a respect for the text. If the authors of 
the great texts in the history of philosophy were worth studying at all, then they were 
worth studying as exhaustively as possible. […] You must never be so proud of your 
own prowess, your own technical prowess in particular, that you come to believe that 
what you have say is more important than what Kant or Hegel said. Now that’s not an 
easy point to understand and it even may be partly wrong; that is to say, if you’re 
going to be respectful to the great members of the tradition, won’t you end up being a 
mere disciple or a mere slave? How can you retain your integrity and the integrity of 
the text at the same time?”1  
  
In this dissertation, I undertake the first comprehensive analysis of Leo Strauss’s studies 
of Thomas Hobbes and the extended criticism of liberalism that, I argue, Strauss 
developed and deployed in the course of this engagement. Strauss refined his account of 
Hobbes’s philosophy over four decades, from the early Weimar years to the depth of the 
Cold War, making it one of his most enduring intellectual preoccupations and the center 
of his engagement with liberalism.  
Strauss was born into a Jewish home in a village near Marburg, Germany, and 
died three-quarters of a century later as a prominent professor of political science in 
Annapolis, Maryland; today he is considered one of the most influential and controversial 
political theorists of the 20th century. Strauss came of age during the Great War, 
converted to political Zionism in his late teens, and studied philosophy with some of the 
                                                
1    Stanley Rosen, “Interview with Stanley Rosen on Strauss as a teacher”, interview by Stephen Gregory, 
May 2011, 2, https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/interviews. 
 2 
most influential thinkers of his time; however, it was a lesser-known teacher, Julius 
Ebinghaus, professor at the University of Freiburg who introduced him to Hobbes’s 
philosophy in 1921.2 Strauss wrote his first text on Hobbes in the late 1920s while based 
at a Jewish research institute in Berlin. His interest in Hobbes only grew during this time, 
sending him first to Paris to study Hobbes on a fellowship a year before Hitler seized 
power, and then to London in 1934 to continue this research. Unable to find employment 
in Europe after his fellowships had expired, Strauss sailed for America in 1937. He lived 
first in New York, where he taught primarily at the New School for Social Research for a 
decade. It is for his tenure at the University of Chicago, where he arrived in 1948 and 
remained until the late 1960s, that he is best known. At Chicago, he developed a 
reputation in academic circles as a leading American conservative. It was also here that 
Strauss published his final studies of Hobbes and gave his final seminar on the 
philosopher in 1964. 
Strauss’s novel and highly influential interpretations of Hobbes’s thought have 
remained an enduring feature of his intellectual legacy. In approaching Strauss’s 
scholarship on Hobbes, I have applied Daniel Tanguay’s method in his Strauss 
biography, and aimed to understand Strauss as “he understood himself.”3 This was the 
interpretive method that Strauss would come to champion later in life and for which he 
became known.4 I discovered early on in my research that Strauss, in his studies of 
                                                
2    Eugene Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile: The Making of a Political Philosopher 
(Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2006), 21. 
3    Daniel Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, trans. Christopher Nadon (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2007), 2. 
4    Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: Revised and Expanded Edition, including the Strauss-Kojève correspondence 
edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 3-4. 
Jenny Strauss has also described her father’s hermeneutic as: “to understand the author as he understood 
himself” (Jenny Clay Strauss, “The Real Leo Strauss,” New York Times, June 7, 2003). The same 
hermeneutical principle was repeated in Joseph Cropsey, Harry V. Jaffa, Allan Bloom, Ernest J. 
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Hobbes in the 1930s and 1940s, however, sought to do more than understand Hobbes as 
Hobbes had understood himself. Because of this, I argue in these pages that Strauss, with 
the exception of his first and last insights on Hobbes, pursued his own political and 
philosophical projects through Hobbes. As a result, I explain the significance of Hobbes 
for Strauss’s politics and for his philosophical project, and how Strauss’s political 
commitments informed how he read Hobbes. This dissertation is thus not simply about 
the development of Strauss’s views on Hobbes; rather, it is also an exploration of 
Strauss’s broader conception of politics and philosophy and how he used Hobbes to 
theorize the political and intellectual climate of the times in which he lived. In particular, 
I show that we should regard Strauss’s Hobbes scholarship as part of a life-long 
engagement with liberalism, understood as a political regime, a moral and philosophical 
system, and an educational approach. Hobbes occupies a central place — if not the 
central place — in Strauss’s criticism of the liberal political tradition, as well as of 
modern philosophy and political thought at large. Over the years, he argued that Hobbes 
was the founder of liberalism and the modern natural right tradition; in this sense, 
Strauss’s work on Hobbes must be read as part of a broader critical engagement with the 
tradition of liberal political thought. While Strauss tackles liberalism in other parts of his 
scholarship, it is on “Strauss’s Hobbes” that my study is centered.   
In 1962, Strauss wrote: “We are not permitted to be flatterers of [liberal] 
democracy precisely because we are friends and allies of democracy.”5 Steven Smith has 
suggested that Strauss is not simply another “friend of liberal democracy,” but “one of 
                                                                                                                                            
Weinrib, and Thomas L. Pangle, et al., “The Studies of Leo Strauss: An Exchange,” The New York 
Books of Reviews, October 10, 1985. 
5    Leo Strauss, Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 24; first 
published, “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” in Education: The Challenge Ahead, ed. Scott 
Fletcher (New York: Norton, 1962), 49-70. 
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the best friends [liberal] democracy has ever had."6 The historical relationship between 
liberalism and democracy and the modern merger of the two intellectual and political 
traditions into a representative liberal democratic constitutional regime is complex. As we 
shall see, in his scholarship, Strauss is more precise in his various understandings and 
articulations of the meanings of liberalism than he is about democracy. Only later in life 
does he define democracy, but his conceptions of modern democracy and ancient 
democracy are not as exactly defined and he often uses “liberal democracy” and 
“democracy” interchangeably. Let it suffice for now to say that if friend is a helpful 
metaphor to describe Strauss’s relation to liberal democracy, it was a complicated 
friendship, one which can be said to have started out on the wrong foot, but grew deeper 
over time in regard to what Strauss conceived of as the liberal tradition, though less so 
with respect to the democratic tradition.  
Complicating the notion of a friendly relationship with liberal democracy is the 
fact that much of the secondary literature on the young Strauss asserts that the ‘European’ 
Strauss was a radical conservative critic of liberalism.7 Strauss’s extensive criticism in 
the 1920s and 1930s of cultural assimilation, political emancipation, liberal rights in 
general, liberal morality, liberal epistemology, and liberal ontology were advanced with 
the express aim of moving beyond liberalism. As a young political Zionist, however, 
                                                
6    Steven B. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, Politics, Philosophy, Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), ix. 
7    Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, translation by Harvey J. Lomax 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995); See Michael Zank, “Introduction,” in Leo Strauss: The 
Early Writings (1921-1932) (Durham: SUNY Press, 2002); Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of 
Exile; Heinrich Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, translation by Harvey J. 
Lomax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006); Nicholas Xenos. Cloaked in virtue: Unveiling Leo 
Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge Press, 2008); Laurence 
Lampert. “Strauss's Recovery of Esotericism,” in The Cambridge companion to Leo Strauss, ed. Steven 
B. Smith (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Susan Shell. “To Spare the 
Vanquished and Crush the Arrogant”: Leo Strauss’s Lecture on “German Nihilism,”” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Leo Strauss, ed. Steven B. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Strauss acknowledged Zionism’s debt to liberalism for the secularization process that 
made the modern Zionist project conceivable in the first place: to envision the creation of 
a Jewish nation state by human and rational means. With respect to Hobbes, Strauss 
controversially portrays him as the philosophical founder of liberalism — the first 
modern, bourgeois philosopher. I argue that the political dimension of Strauss’s criticism 
of liberalism, as it is specifically carried out in his work on Hobbes from the inter-war 
era, aims to provide the foundation for a non-liberal right-wing authoritarian political 
theory as an alternative to replace both liberalism and socialism, and after Hitler 
consolidated power, as an alternative to Nazism.  
Strauss’s thought on the liberal tradition, however, continued to evolve during this 
time. As I show, following Susan Shell and others before me, it is after his stay in 
England that Strauss first comes to support a particular strand of the liberal tradition in 
writing—the rule of law or constitutional tradition that he thought pre-dated the modern 
era.8 However, Strauss’s criticism of Hobbesian liberalism continues in his post-war 
writing on Hobbes, now emerging from a perspective grounded in a recuperation of a 
Platonic-Socratic conception of human nature and natural right and law. Strauss argues 
that Hobbesian liberalism is both contrary to human nature and suppresses what is noble 
to human society. In these post-war works on Hobbes, Strauss builds on the criticisms 
that he had formulated in the eleventh hour of the Weimar period, which portray Hobbes 
as the founder of liberal rights, or what he comes to identify after World War II as the 
modern natural right doctrine. The modern natural right doctrine, in Strauss’s view, 
historically evolved into historicism, nihilism and relativism, of which Nazism was a 
symptom. In the 1950s, Strauss expands his definition of liberalism to include the 
                                                
8    Shell, “Strauss’s on “German Nihilism,”” 191. 
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Socratic-Platonic philosophical tradition’s pursuit of excellence; that is, the cultivation of 
the human virtues — highest among the virtues being wisdom or philosophy — through 
what the ancients called “liberality,” which for the moderns involved the careful study of 
the great books.9 The British and American societies that Strauss experienced allowed for 
the study of the great books or the liberal arts.10 Political liberalism, or the liberal regime, 
can thus also be conducive to the pursuit of the highest good. 
Strauss’s criticism of the Hobbesian liberal tradition — or what he variously 
refers to as enlightenment or modern rationalism and individual right doctrine — from 
the perspective of a Socratic-Platonic rationalism, however, does not cease. Strauss 
adopts from Hobbes and the moderns the reason that he thinks it had become historically 
necessary to create the belief that political power or sovereignty is vested in government 
by the consent of the people. However, this excludes much of what is understood as 
ancient or modern democracy—both direct (ancient) and representative (modern). 
Ultimately, it appears that what Strauss described as the preferable constitutional regime 
during his American period approximates a form of elite or classical republicanism or a 
mixed regime in the guise of a liberal democracy: “a regime in which the gentlemen 
share power with the people in such way that the people elect the magistrate and the 
council from among the gentlemen [statesmen who are equipped by education, wealth 
and temperament] and demand an account of them at the end of their term of office.”11  
At the center of all his Hobbes’s studies — both before and after World War II — 
is the question of human nature. Leora Batnitzky is right when she observes that for 
                                                
9    See Leo Strauss, Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), x.  
10   Leo Strauss. “An Epilogue,” in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 326.  
11   Strauss, “Liberal education and Responsibility,” 15, emphasis added. 
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Strauss, “rethinking [human] nature is the central issue for rethinking politics.”12 The way 
Strauss rethinks human nature in his Hobbes texts elevates the state of nature to a place of 
intense scrutiny, asking: what causes the state of nature to be a state of war? Or, in other 
words, why does every individual incessantly seek ever more power over others? The 
answer that Strauss develops to this question provides him with ontological insights for 
his conceptualization of the political, and of the state, both of which he developed 
alongside and in response to the contexts of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and 
the Cold War. With respect to Strauss’s main contribution to the secondary scholarship 
on Hobbes, Strauss claims that his investigation of the motivations behind the incessant 
struggle for ever more power over others in the state of nature resolves the main 
contradictions in Hobbes’s doctrine between his natural science and his political science.  
1. 2. Contribution 
Strauss is still taken seriously as a student of Hobbes and broadly respected as thinker 
worth reading by both his scholarly critics and defenders. Over the last decades, an 
increasing number of studies of Strauss’s thought have appeared, a few of which have 
focused on the nature of Strauss’s engagement with Hobbes. There exists a concise 
introduction to most of Strauss’s studies of Hobbes by Heinrich Meier.13 Devin Stauffer 
has written on the evolution of Strauss’s understanding of the relation between Hobbes’s 
political theory, natural science and religion in three of Strauss’s works on Hobbes.14 
                                                
12   Leora Batnitzky, Leo Strauss and Emmanuel Levinas: Philosophy and the Politics of Revelation. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221n 56.     
13   Heinrich Meier, “Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage,” in Leo Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3: 
Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft und zugehörige Schriften—Briefe, ed. Heinrich Meier, with editorial 
assistance of Wiebke Meier (Stuttgart and Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2002), vii-xxxviii. 
14   Devin Stauffer, “Reopening the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns: Leo Strauss’s Critique 
of Hobbes’s ‘New Political Science.’” American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (May 2007): 223-
33; Devin Stauffer, “Strauss’s Discussion of Hobbes in What is Political Philosophy?,” Perspectives on 
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Robert Altman, Shadia Drury, David Janssens, Eugene Sheppard, Daniel Tanguay, and 
Nicholas Xenos, have, to various degrees, commented on Strauss’s work on Hobbes in 
their respective monographs.15 My dissertation complements this existing literature as the 
first manuscript-length study of Strauss’s entire Hobbes corpus, including unpublished 
material from the Strauss archive that has never been discussed before in the context of 
prior work on this subject. My study not only develops an account of Strauss’s 
scholarship on Hobbes, but it also contributes to advancing the broader debate over 
Strauss’s politics and his relation to liberalism and liberal democracy. Strauss provokes 
expressions of admiration and hostility like few other political theorists, as praise and 
insult are often hurled by his supporters and critics with little foundation. Strauss’s take 
on liberalism is fiercely debated, especially among Strauss’s Anglo-American followers 
and detractors. The stakes, however, seem higher among his American disciples, 
especially those who espouse a patriotic alliance to American republicanism and the 
constitution. The problem with an open scholarly debate on Strauss, as Robert Howse has 
pointed out, is that there is both a “cult” and a “sect” of Straussians, members of which 
resist open debate and the clear exposition of his philosophy.16 There are also detractors 
who judge or dismiss Strauss with little familiarity with his work and the context in 
which he wrote.  
This dissertation seeks to contribute to establishing ground upon which it is 
                                                                                                                                            
Political Science 39, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 87-91; Devin Stauffer, “Leo Strauss’s ‘On the Basis of 
Hobbes’s Political Philosophy.’” In Leo Strauss’s Defense of the Philosophic Life: Reading What Is 
Political Philosophy?, ed. Rafe Major (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).  
15   Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss; Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography; David 
Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens: Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss’s Early 
Thought, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 2008; Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the 
Politics of Exile; Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue; William H. F. Altman, The German Stranger: Leo Strauss 
and National Socialism (Lexington Books, 2010). 
16   Robert Howse, Leo Strauss: Man of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press 2014), 4-5. 
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possible to engage with and critically discuss Strauss’s political and philosophical views, 
as opposed to implicitly suggesting that his thought be clothed in mystery.17 Strauss is 
partly to blame for the abstruseness that has characterized much engagement with his 
thought: he is a complex thinker and at times a convoluted writer, a thinker who mainly 
wrote commentaries on other thinkers and their work. He is also best known for the 
rediscovery of a tradition of a multilayered style of writing in philosophical and religious 
thought, one that provided the reader with two different doctrines: an exoteric doctrine 
for the general audience or the censor, and an esoteric true teaching for the few. As a 
result, a number of scholars argue that Strauss practiced this art of writing in his own 
mature work, a position that introduces a number of important interpretive 
considerations. In turn, some Strauss scholars and disciples have sought to apply an 
exo/esoteric hermeneutic in their own work. The widely conflicting state of contemporary 
scholarship on Strauss is due to a combination of all these factors. 
Besides shedding light on Strauss’s thoughts about Hobbes and liberalism, the 
aim of this project is also to contribute to the general scholarship on Hobbes and 
liberalism. The latter seems especially pressing: beyond narrow scholastic and academic 
debates, the theoretical and political concerns that led Strauss to Hobbes still matter to us 
today. We still care about the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democracy, and we still 
have justified concerns, to paraphrase C. B. Macpherson, regarding the future “life and 
times” of the liberal democratic project. 18  Religious fundamentalism, authoritarian 
                                                
17   Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss; Thomas L. Pangle, Leo Strauss: An Introduction to His 
Thought and Intellectual Legacy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2006); Tanguay, Leo 
Strauss: An Intellectual Biography; Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens; Sheppard, Leo Strauss 
and the Politics of Exile; Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, Leo Strauss and the Problems of 
Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2014); Howse, Leo Strauss: Man of Peace. 
18   Macpherson, C. B., The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).  
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governance, and populist politics are all globally on the rise. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, explicitly authoritarian, far right, ultra-nationalistic and racist parties have 
reaped electoral success. In the Anglo-Saxon world alone, over the last few years we 
have witnessed a favorable referendum triggering Britain’s exit from the European Union 
and the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States, as well as the 
political rise of two self-identified socialists, Bernie Sanders, who ran for the Democratic 
Party’s nomination for president, and Jeremy Corbyn, the Leader of the Labour Party in 
the United Kingdom. Income inequality and the private capital share of the national 
product is similar today to what it was on the eve of the Great Depression, and the 
traditional socialist and social democratic parties (in or out of government) in the West 
are doing little to counter this trend. I do not draw historical comparisons between past 
and present in this dissertation. However, there are enough parallels between the situation 
in which Strauss found himself in the 1930s and today to warrant a reconsideration of his 
political analysis. This is particularly the case as Strauss had thought that a return to 
Hobbes was helpful to understand and criticize the political situation in Weimar 
Germany.  
Historical parallels can also be drawn between Strauss’s return to Hobbes in the 
decades after World War II and today: the present existential threat of the annihilation of 
much of the earth’s biospheres resembles the destructive potential of a thermonuclear 
Armageddon. There is also the rise of Russia and China as well as increasing discussion 
of the emergence of a “new Cold War.” Perhaps most pertinent for the immediate 
conjuncture, however, is Strauss’s analysis of, and opposition to aspects of German 
nihilism, or radical right-wing and counter-enlightenment thought, as exemplified by 
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Nietzsche, Schmitt and Heidegger. Their relativist philosophies posed an existential 
challenge to rationalism. Strauss argued that this relativist and nihilist worldview not only 
underpinned the Nazi revolution, but had also conquered the minds of Americans after 
World War II. In this regard, there is currently a great deal of talk about the relation 
between epistemological nihilism (“post-fact,” “post-truth,” “alternative-facts”) and rise 
of the right (such as Trump, the Tea Party movement, and the radicalization of the 
Republican Party over the last two decades in general) in which irrationalism has been 
seen to triumph over rationalism, climate skepticism over science, and so on.19 In 
responding to a parallel set of political phenomena and challenges that he found present 
in America, Strauss set out to revive and defend an ancient form of rationalism, while 
remaining deeply skeptical of enlightenment, scientific, or liberal rationalism. While I 
revisit and account for Strauss’s ideas in the context of his own understanding of the 
times in which he lived, I refrain from any attempts to directly apply his ideas to our 
time, despite the clear parallels I have just enumerated. That work is in the future, or is 
for someone else to undertake. However, the theoretical core of liberalism as introduced 
by Hobbes is, in Strauss’s definition, independent of historical developments in the 
modern period and thus equally relevant today as in the inter-war era and the Cold War.  
Another contribution that the present study makes relates to Smith’s observation 
that  
to a greater degree than other competing schools [Rawlsians, Habermasians, 
Arendtians], Straussians have sought to influence policy, to put their ideas into 
                                                
19   The type of nihilism in Trump's reuse of Regan’s slogan, "Make America Great Again!,” is captured by 
Strauss in an outline for his 1941 essay “On German Nihilism”: "On the affinity of progressivism to 
nihilism: progressivism leaves the aim undefined: it therefore opposes an indefinite No to a given 
order” (Leo Strauss, “German Nihilism”, ed. David Janssens & Daniel Tanguay: Interpretation, 26, No. 
3 (Spring 1999): 353-378, 356; with corrections by Wiebke Meier, Interpretation 28, no.2 (Fall 2000): 
33–34; original in Leo Strauss Papers, [Box 8, folder 15], Special Collections Research Center. 
University of Chicago Library.  
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practice, either directly through work in the government or indirectly through 
think tanks and other shapers of public opinion. In fact Strauss is widely regarded 
both by some of his friends and by this virtue all of his enemies as responsible for 
shaping the direction of the conservative movement in America.20 
 
My account of Strauss’s politics, his conception of the political, liberalism and socialism 
— as defined through his engagement with Hobbes — should thus be of interest to both 
conservatives (of whatever variety) as well as their various foes. Much ink has been spilt 
to link Strauss to neo-conservatism, especially after 9/11. Strauss’s disciples were linked 
to, or his legacy claimed by, members of the Bush administration, and especially, by Paul 
Wolfowitz, an architect of the Iraq war.21 A more recent example of Strauss’s influence 
in contemporary politics is Richard Spencer—one of the main spokespersons for the 
alternative right (alt-right) in the US. He recently named Strauss as one of his two main 
intellectual influences from his time as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago.22 
Whether or not this legacy is theoretically warranted (i.e., if there is a correspondence in 
ideas) is a different question. A study of Strauss’s influence on Spencer, and the 
alternative right in general, would need to account for how the movement’s main 
principles (such as rank order or inherited intelligence, protectionism, anti-egalitarianism, 
anti-democratic and anti-liberalism) correspond to Strauss’s preoccupation with human 
nature, natural intelligence and inequality, liberal democracy, and the closed society. It 
goes without saying that Strauss is far from the only one to have held these views, and 
                                                
20   Steven Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, Politics, Philosophy, Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 157. Xenos has made a similar suggestion about Strauss importance: “without hyperbole 
[…] in terms of the exercise of political power in the United States, this [Strauss] retiring professor may 
turn out to have been the most influential political philosopher of his generation” (Xenos, Cloaked in 
Virtue, 1).  
21   See for example: Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, 2; Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue; Drury, 
The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss; Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).  
22   Josh Harkinson, “Meet the White Nationalist Trying To Ride The Trump Train to Lasting Power”, 
Mother Jones online, October 27, 2016, http://m.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/richard-spencer-
trump-alt-right-white-nationalist.  
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thus any correlation between Strauss’s philosophy and the alternative right at-large is not 
necessary a causal one. However, the scope of this dissertation is not to provide an 
intellectual history of Strauss’s and Straussianism’s influence on politics and the 
academy; my contribution to these areas of research or larger debates is at best indirect.23  
A final contribution of this study is to the ongoing methodological debates over 
the merits of a textual analysis versus contextual approaches in respect to both the 
scholarship on Strauss and the study of the history of political thought in general. On this 
terrain, my study is less a theoretical contribution (meta-conversation) than a case in 
point. Strauss is generally known today as a textualist, as someone who approaches the 
history of political and religious texts through a close textual analysis, who takes into 
consideration the possible esoteric and exoteric layers of a text, or as someone who 
ultimately regards the tradition of political philosophy as a trans-historical conversation 
among philosophers over eternal questions. He defines this approach against what he 
viewed as the dogma of his time, the historicist worldview which, in one form or another, 
reduces past thinkers to mere expressions of the intellectual climate (or “caves,” as 
Strauss would call it later in life) of their time. He faults historicized studies for 
retroactively framing the thought of past thinkers in ways unknown to them, and for 
missing the trans-historical insights of their works. It is not, however, that Strauss asks 
the student of the history of political thought to extricate the thought of the thinker 
studied fully from his or her time. As Pangle has explained:  
In every society, in every historical situation, a somewhat different rhetoric, 
political sensibility, and psychological delicacy will be required; and, contrary to 
what is often said of Strauss, Strauss never ceased stressing that every text in 
                                                
23   For discussion of Straussianism see Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue; Zuckert and Zuckert, Leo Strauss and the 
Problems of Political Philosophy; Keenth L. Deutsh and John A. Murley, Leo Strauss, the Straussians, 
and the American Regime (Lanham, Md.: Rwman & Littlefield, 1999).  
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political philosophy must therefore be approached with a view to its primary 
addresses and hence with a view to the unique, concrete, historical situation and 
circumstances within which it emerged […] But what set Strauss apart from all 
conventional, historicist students of the relation between thinkers and their 
historical milieu was his insistence that the historical situation must be seen as it 
was seen by the thinker under study.24  
  
Strauss acknowledges that our awareness of the generally acceptable opinions of an age 
— and with that of which truths might be harmful for the philosopher, or his or her 
audience — is indispensable to understanding the division the author makes between the 
exoteric and esoteric dimension in his or her writing. 
Strauss’s textual approach is exemplified in the secondary literature by Meier’s 
scholarship.25 Meier argues that the heart of Strauss’s philosophy is not the quarrel 
between ancient and modern thought, but between theology and philosophy, or in 
Strauss’s later metaphorical terms, between Jerusalem and Athens. Meier’s penetrating 
textual analysis of Strauss’s oeuvre provides a compelling philosophical argument for 
this interpretation. However, I will stress other — more immediate and concrete — 
political intentions lying behind Strauss’s studies of Hobbes. With respect to Meier’s 
thesis regarding Strauss’s exchange with Carl Schmitt, in which Hobbes played a central 
role, I argue that Meier (in part) reads Strauss’s later perspective into this earlier work 
when he suggests that at the time Strauss relied on Socratic-Platonic rationalism to move 
beyond liberalism. I show that Strauss, in his book on Hobbes, appeals to biblical 
morality, and a pre-scientific phenomenological (or immediate experience) of human 
nature (following Husserl), and moral attitude (following Heidegger) which Hobbes’s 
                                                
24   Thomas L. Pangle, “Introduction”, in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: an Introduction to 
the Thought of Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), xviii-xix. 
25   See Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue; Meier, Leo Strauss and the 
Theologico-Political Problem; Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the 
Distinction between Political Theology and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
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adoption of modern naturals science contradicts. Indeed, I observe that it is not until later 
that Strauss brings together phenomenology with the Socratic rationalist method.  
In approaching Strauss’s scholarship on Hobbes, it is important to remember that 
Strauss began as a contextualist; that is, as someone who grounds his interpretation firmly 
within a historical context. Of course, the particularly historical factors that are 
emphasized in a contextualized study depend on the school of thought. Marxist 
historicists, for example, look at variables such a class interests, or the logic of 
capitalism, as the factors that (over) determine the political theory in question. The 
contextualized approach is best exemplified by Sheppard’s monograph on Strauss.26 His 
careful and extensive use of primary, chiefly biographical, sources from the Strauss 
archive is unparalleled in the field. On the basis of this archival work, Sheppard argues 
for reading the condition of the Jewish galut (exile), as well as Strauss’s experience of 
exile from Germany, into Strauss’s philosophical preoccupation with esotericism and the 
idea of the philosopher as an outsider to society, an interpretation that Sheppard advances 
despite Strauss never having explicitly stated, or implicitly revealed, that this was the 
case. In doing so, Sheppard’s relies principally on Strauss’s biographical and intellectual 
context to support his thesis, largely at the expense of engaging in a systematic close 
textual analysis of Strauss’s works themselves. However, this is an unavoidable 
shortcoming: a more extensive textual analysis would have been impossible due to the 
wide number of materials, debates, biographical and historical details that Sheppard 
covers in his rich book. 
                                                
26   Sheppard’s biography covers the first 50 years of Strauss’s life, up until his departure to Chicago from 
New York in 1949; overall, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, gives a detailed biographical sketch of 
the influence of Jewish and non-Jewish aspects of Strauss’s thought. 
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My own approach, which I discuss in more detail below, is derived from the later 
Strauss’s own proposed method to try to understand a thinker as he or she understood 
him or herself. Accordingly, my analysis is restricted to a close textual engagement with 
Strauss’s conscious intentions in his work—and by this I include both the implicit and 
explicit intentions. The historical context that I provide to support my approach is limited 
to an account of Strauss’s understanding of the political and intellectual context in which 
he lived and his work’s relation to that broader context. In other words, I strictly situate 
Strauss’s commentaries on Hobbes in relation to the historical situation as Strauss himself 
understood it, and thus not from an external, objective, or retroactive perspective. Thus, I 
do not give a symptomatic reading of Strauss in the tradition of Marxism and 
psychoanalysis. The larger historical and biographical context in which Strauss wrote is 
only drawn on when it is required to account for Strauss’s arguments in these texts.   
1. 3. Method 
Although not characteristic of all such methodologically informed research, genealogical 
studies — in which a scholar often appears to go hunting for passages that support a 
preconceived argument — are increasingly popular today. While cherry-picking 
quotations from an author’s corpus might make for a speculative article, such practice 
adds little to a deeper and comprehensive understanding of the thinker. This is especially 
true of Strauss, whose commentaries on past philosophical and religious thinkers are 
riddled with contradictory and inconclusive observations and arguments.27 Without a 
                                                
27   Xenos has that “Strauss’s writings are easy to figure out in the whole, but frustratingly clumsy to 
untangle in the particular. […] Strauss had perfected a style of plausible deniability. That style, evident 
in his books and articles written after his emigration to the United States, forces the commentator into 
lengthy, often tedious exegesis and convoluted lines of explication. The closer one looks at these 
writings, the more complicated they become without becoming more enlightening of anything but 
themselves. Although his many academic defenders do it all the time, Strauss cannot simply be quoted 
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developed understanding of the logic of the specific text in question, as well as a broader 
chronological view of the overall development of Strauss’s thought, little can be added to 
our knowledge of what he thought about a certain concept or a thinker, and how his 
thinking changed over time. Consequently, the aim of this project is to give a 
comprehensive account of the development of Strauss’s scholarship on Hobbes, and the 
criticism of liberalism contained therein.   
Unlike an approach grounded in analytical philosophy or normative political 
science, I do not seek to update or contest Strauss’s moral stance in light of present 
concerns. I do follow some cues from these schools of thought in my interpretative 
approach, however, in that I look for the structure and missing propositions that could 
make Strauss’s arguments logically consistent. To this end, my method is 
straightforward. I assess Strauss’s arguments against their own logic. I closely read and 
reconstruct Strauss’s texts to see if I can arrive at the same conclusions, and on this basis 
piece together the logical steps and propositions that are required for the main thrust of 
the argument to function. By doing so I aim to detect and trace out what is omitted for the 
argument to hold together, i.e., account for hidden premises and postulates. An author’s 
stated intentions are not always explicitly delivered in the text they frame, and often such 
statements are not the only things that the texts perform. This holds true of Strauss’s 
texts. I thus examine the internal logic of Strauss’s writings to arrive at his extra-textual 
concerns when these are not explicitly stated and thus risk what literary scholars calls the 
                                                                                                                                            
on a topic, because there is always a quote available that apparently says the opposite. When this is 
pointed out, the defenders invariably reach for the Rosetta Stone of plausible deniability: Strauss is 
being ironic. His gnomic utterances have therefore to be replaced into their total context, and that takes 
time” (Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, xi).  
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intentional fallacy.28 Any reader of Strauss proceeding in this manner soon runs into the 
interpretative difficulty of knowing how to separate Strauss’s own views from the author 
with whom he is engaging. There are three main layers to this complexity in Strauss’s 
Hobbes texts: (i) when Strauss interprets Hobbes’s doctrine in-itself, (ii) when he 
explicitly or implicitly disagrees with Hobbes, and (iii) when he advances his own 
political philosophy through his commentary. With respect to the last aspect, sometimes 
these intentions are not explicitly stated, while at other times they are stated, usually at 
the beginning or the end of his texts. However thorny the hermeneutic challenge of 
separating Strauss’s views from the thinker he is engaging, it is imperative that such 
distinction be made for the project at hand. 
In order to address these interpretive challenges, I have applied the late Strauss’s 
principle of interpretation to his own work. In so proceeding, I have sought to understand 
Strauss as he understood himself; and, in so doing, found that Strauss did not only 
attempt to understand Hobbes as Hobbes understood himself. If Strauss does more than 
provide an understanding of Hobbes as he understood himself, what exactly is Strauss 
doing in his studies on Hobbes?29 To answer this question, I advance the hypothesis that 
there were underlying political and philosophical motivations that influenced Strauss’s 
interpretations of Hobbes. I am not the first to make this observation; Meier has argued 
that Strauss does philosophy by commenting on past philosophers: “For anyone who 
seriously studies his oeuvre, the focal point becomes the intention that the philosopher 
Strauss pursues when he directs undivided attention, so it seems, to the history of 
                                                
28   I am grateful to Justin Sully for pointing this out, June 2018. 
29   Ross Rudolph helped me to formulate this line of reasoning, December 2015. 
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philosophy and presents his philosophy in the guise of interpretations of past writings.”30 
Strauss indeed presents his philosophy through his studies of Hobbes’s thought. In this 
regard, Hobbes emerges as a key figure in Strauss’s account of the history of political 
thought: first as the founder of liberalism as well as the modern (or enlightenment) 
esoteric writer par excellence, and after the war, as the founder of modern natural right. 
Hobbes’s doctrine of the state of nature also provides Strauss with a window into the 
study of human nature and contemporary politics.  
Indeed, I argue that it is only in his first and final studies of Hobbes that Strauss 
predominantly seeks to strictly approach Hobbes as Hobbes understood himself. In this 
regard, my understanding of Strauss differs from that offered by David Janssens, who 
states that: “For Strauss, only the text and nothing but the text seems to matter, or more 
precisely: nothing but the thoughts contained therein. References to the historical context, 
both of the past and of the present, are very rare indeed.”31 Pace Janssens, I contend that 
this observation does not hold for Strauss’s studies of Hobbes. In his first freestanding 
article on Hobbes,  “Some Notes on the Political Science of Hobbes [Quelques 
remarques sur la science politique de Hobbes: à propos du livre récent de M. Lubieński]” 
(henceforth, “Notes on Hobbes”), Strauss explicitly indicates that it was present political 
concerns that lead him to investigate what could be learned from Hobbes. 32 Moreover, 
references to the present and to a larger historical context are not absent from Strauss’s 
                                                
30   Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, xiv. 
31   Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens, 1. 
32   Leo Strauss, "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Hobbes: à propos du livre récent de M. 
Lubieński" [“Einige Anmerkungen über die politische Wissenschaft des Hobbes”] translation by 
Alexander Kojève, Recherches philosophiques, 2 (1933): 609-622. In English translation, “Some Notes 
on the Political Science of Hobbes,” in Leo Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion and Related 
Writings, trans. Gabriel Bartlett and Minkov Svetozar (Chicago - London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), 121-136.  
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Hobbes texts more generally. Indeed, such engagements with contemporaneous political 
and philosophical concerns are to be found front, back, and center within most of 
Strauss’s texts on Hobbes.  
Since my study is faithful to the hermeneutics of the later Strauss, my analysis 
does not proceed in applying an alien method to his thought. Sheppard has pointed out 
that in an “extract attached” to Strauss’s 1921 dissertation, The Problem of Knowledge in 
the Teaching of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi [Das Erkenntnisproblem in der 
philosophischen Lehre Jacobis], Strauss apologized for not presenting “’Jacobi-in-
himself’ but rather takes a ‘non-Jacobin approach.’”33 In contrast, here I seek to present 
Strauss-in-himself. In proceeding in this manner, I acknowledge that the tidy divide 
between textualized and contextualized approaches in Strauss’s mature work has a 
complex beginning. In his 1936 monograph on Hobbes, The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, Strauss traces the development of Hobbes’s life and 
work, and places it against the backdrop of historical events, as well as the class and 
religious formations of seventeenth century Europe. Influenced by G. F. W. Hegel, 
Ferdinand Tönnies, and Alexander Kojève, Strauss historicizes Hobbes. Consequently, in 
this treatment, Strauss places Hobbes within his historical context, taking seriously 
Hobbes’s political and class alliances. He reads Hobbes’s philosophy as the first 
bourgeois philosophy. Unlike the young historicist Strauss, however, I do not provide a 
symptomatic reading of Strauss’s thought as the unconscious expression of a specific 
class interest. My contextualization is restricted to how Strauss consciously understood 
                                                
33   Quotation in Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, 22. For original see Leo Strauss, Das 
Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis in Leo Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften 
Band 2: Philosophe und Gesetz: Frühe Schriften, ed. Heinrich Meier, with the editorial assistance of 
Wiebke Meier (Stuttgart and Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 1997), 297. 
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his own time (including class formations and consciousness) and how this understanding 
influences his study of Hobbes, rather than to show how his thought and alliances 
reflected a specific class position. 
Some readers might wish for a correction of Strauss’s reading of Hobbes, but such 
an intervention is not necessary for the purposes of this study. As I have explained above, 
there are other ways to dissect how Strauss differs from Hobbes. This is an important 
methodological point: I make no claim to know Hobbes better than Strauss, who himself 
spent large portions of his illustrious career poring over Hobbes’s writings. The same 
assumption applies to any other thinker that Strauss engages with that I turn to in the 
course of this study. I do not intend or aim to correct his interpretation of, let us say, Plato 
or Aristotle, Schmitt or Heidegger. When a proper name does appear, it should be 
assumed to be strictly in the shape of Strauss’s “Hobbes,” or Strauss’s “Heidegger” 
unless explicitly otherwise indicated. My approach is thus also different from the 
Cambridge School, with its conceptual and linguistic analysis of synchronically located 
texts. I only engage with the texts and thinkers that Strauss himself dealt with, and when 
doing so, strictly in the manner in which he understood their work. As a result, I am not 
concerned with placing Strauss’s work in the context of the general scholarship on 
Hobbes at the time, or in offering my own interpretations of the contributions of the 
scholars that he engages with. My study is therefore immune to the complaint that it has 
gotten Hobbes or any other thinker wrong, whereas Strauss got it right. Indeed, anyone 
familiar with the secondary literature on Hobbes is aware that the field is highly 
contested, and thus the task of asking the right Hobbes to stand up is far from a 
straightforward one. This point is important to emphasize in order to avoid the objection 
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that what I detect as extra-textual intentions in Strauss’s interpretation are simply due to 
the fact that my interpretation of Hobbes differs from his. My study is of course still open 
to the criticism that I have misinterpreted Strauss’s reading of Hobbes or any other 
thinker.  
This brings us to a final general point about my approach; I intentionally avoid 
taking up the debates of Strauss’s time (with the exception of debates that Strauss himself 
entered with other scholars) or the historical scholarship on key facets of the period in 
which he lived. In doing so, I largely eschew any sustained engagement with the 
historiography of fascism or socialism or liberalism. These are highly contested fields of 
study that fall beyond the ambit of this project; the point of my dissertation is not to set 
the historical record of Strauss’s context straight, or to analyze the debates to which he 
contributes, or to evaluate whether or not Strauss makes fair use of the texts he reads. 
Rather, the aim is to account for the theoretical core and purpose of Strauss’s studies of 
Hobbes, to focus on how he understood Hobbes’s thought, and, when the logic of 
argument requires it, to consider how he understood the contemporary or historical 
components that he relies on to complete his argument. 
Strauss himself paid some attention to larger academic debates over Hobbes in 
general, and used the arguments of specific author's’ texts to further his own 
interpretation of Hobbes, as well as his own political and philosophical project. 
Accordingly, a significant part of his published scholarship on Hobbes is a series of 
commentaries or reviews of the work of other scholars. The most important of these 
interlocutors were the German political theorist and professor of jurisprudence Carl 
Schmitt, the Polish philosopher (and later British educator) Zbigniew Lubieński, the 
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French philosopher Raymond, and the Canadian political theorist and economist C. B. 
Macpherson. Having engaged with the above authors, I have not found that the scholarly 
reception of Strauss’s Hobbes texts around the time in which they were published would 
add much to my argument, with the exception of Macpherson’s appropriation and 
disagreement with Strauss’s work.34 The latter entered into an extended, though relatively 
neglected, exchange with Strauss on Hobbes that began with Macpherson’s 1945 essay 
“Hobbes Today” and ended with Strauss’s 1964 review of Macpherson’s The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke. A few months before the 
review was published, Strauss taught a seminar on Hobbes that included Macpherson’s 
book as required reading. Macpherson, like Strauss, used Hobbes to further his own 
political project: the case for a socialist (and later, libertarian socialist) theory of 
obligation. However, in line with the earlier interpretative rules that guide the approach 
of this project, I limit my comments on Macpherson, in the same way that I treat the work 
of Schmitt, Lubieński, and Polin, to how Strauss understood and responded to his work.  
The most valuable commentaries on Strauss’s Hobbes texts, and more generally 
on Strauss’s life and thought, have been written over the last two decades. I engage with 
this literature and state clearly when I agree or disagree with the author in question. 
However, I never adopt concurring conclusions as my own propositions, except when I 
have worked through the texts that they refer to and reached a conclusion that aligns with 
theirs. Specifically, in the first part of chapter two, I consult the historically and 
theoretically informed scholarship of Sheppard, Michael Zank and Tanguay, whose 
respective works on the young Strauss’s Zionist and Jewish thought, and its context, is 
                                                
34   Michael Oakeshott, “The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis by Leo Strauss,” 
Philosophy 12, no. 46 (April 1937): 239-241. Oakeshott’s review of Strauss’s The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes remains the best overall exposition of this text to date. 
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unparalleled.35 I also draw on Tanguay’s interpretation of Strauss first book, Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion. In the second part of that chapter, I both converge with and diverge 
from Meier’s philosophical interpretation of Strauss’s commentary on Schmitt.36 In 
chapter three, I arrive at a similar conclusion regarding Strauss’s investigation and use of 
vanity as that which marks human nature as moral evil as that proposed by Xenos in his 
polemical and penetrating book on Strauss.37 However, I disagree with Xenos over the 
role of fear in Strauss’s own political vision, and argue that Strauss dropped vanity as a 
moral category after he adopted a version of a Socratic-Platonic virtue ethics. In the same 
chapter, I also challenge the dominant framing of Strauss’s intellectual trajectory, as 
presented by both Xenos and Janssens, with respect to Strauss’s criticism of liberalism in 
his work on Hobbes. In chapter four, I enter into conversation with an additional number 
of leading scholars in the field beside Sheppard, Xenos and Tanguay, including Hanes 
Kerbal, Joel Kraemer, Laurence Lampert, Robert Pippin, Stanley Rosen, Susan Shell, 
Michael Zuckert and Catherine Zuckert. In the concluding chapter, which examines 
Strauss’s final insight on Hobbes and his exchange with Macpherson, I proceed largely 
unaccompanied by other interpreters into largely unexamined terrain. Only Stauffer and 
Meier have commented — and then only briefly — on Strauss’s final writing on Hobbes. 
Pangle has pointed to the exchange between Strauss and Macpherson and Jules 
Townshend has briefly discussed Macpherson’s debt to Strauss. 38  My account of 
                                                
35   See Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography; Zank, The Early Writings; Sheppard, Leo Strauss 
and the Politics of Exile. 
36   Meier, The Hidden Dialogue. 
37   Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue. 
38   Jules Townshend, C. B. Macpherson and the Problem of Liberal Democracy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000): 32-33; Pangle, “Introduction,” in The Rebirth of Classical Political 
Rationalism: an Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), ix; Pangle, Leo Strauss: An Introduction to His Thought and Intellectual Legacy (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 100.  
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Strauss’s final work on Hobbes, and his exchange with Macpherson, is thus without a 
significant counterpart in the secondary literature.  
Finally, a few words on how I present my work. In 1940, Strauss wrote that 
“Heidegger made it clear, not by assertions, but by concrete analyses — the work of an 
enormous concentration and diligence — that Plato and Aristotle have not been 
understood by the modern philosophers; for they read their own opinions into the works 
of Plato and Aristotle.”39 Whereas I can only aspire to Heidegger’s “concentration,” I 
have aimed at a “concrete” analysis of Strauss’s texts, rather than resort to “assertions”.40 
Accordingly, I never simply state my own conclusions or findings without textual 
evidence. There is a great deal of that in the secondary literature, independently of 
whether or not the writer has earned the trust of the reader. My textual evidence, and each 
step of the argument, is thus readily available for the reader to scrutinize. To avoid the 
trap of an idiosyncratic interpretation, and conceptual imprecision, I have largely 
confined my terminology to Strauss’s. I seek to present and recreate Strauss’s argument 
consistently and systematically using his terms and concepts. While Strauss’s Hobbes 
texts often spread out in different directions, my focus is on the main aspect of his overall 
argument. In presenting my case, I have tried to capture the suspense of thinking, as it 
moves and unfolds through its own internal logic. Nevertheless, each chapter’s 
introduction provides a broad overview of the chapter’s argument.   
When looking at the corpus of an author, the development of his or her thought 
over time is always in danger of getting lost. Such questions of when and where matters 
                                                
39   Leo Strauss, “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 49, no. 4 
(1940): 115-139, 134-35, emphasis added. 
40   Leo Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” in The Rebirth of Classical Political 
Rationalism: an Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, ed. and introduction Thomas Pangle 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989), 28. 
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for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, Strauss’s thoughts on Hobbes change over 
time, as he builds on and revises his previous interpretations. On the other hand, his 
interpretations of Hobbes change in relation both to the political and epistemic context in 
which Strauss wrote, as well as in respect to the overall development of his thought. To 
capture these important dynamics, I trace the transformations of Strauss’s different 
studies of Hobbes. In doing so, I resist the temptation to read the later Strauss into the 
younger—a tendency that I find common among commentaries on Strauss; indeed, 
Strauss is himself guilty of this tendency in some of his autobiographical remarks. 
Finally, I would like to remind the reader that when we look at the past with the hindsight 
of how history unfolded, it is important to try to see Strauss then and there, as separated 
from what we today know about the course of historical events as well as of Strauss’s 
subsequent legacy.  
With all this in mind, I have structured the dissertation chronologically so as to 
make the evolution of Strauss’s thought clear, and the textual evidence readily presented 
to the reader diachronically. Chapter two covers the period from Strauss’s birth to his 
departure from Germany in 1933. Chapter three covers 1933-1936, the years Strauss 
spent as a research fellow in France and England. Chapter four deviates from the other 
chapters in that I reach both forward and back in time to account for Strauss’s discovery 
and understanding of esotericism, as well as the overall shift in the orientation of his 
thought that this represented. The main focus of chapter four, however, is on texts 
produced between 1940 and 1953, after he had immigrated to America. The final chapter 
covers the decade from 1954 to 1964. 
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1. 4. Overview of chapters  
In Chapter Two, I argue that Strauss’s first study of Hobbes in Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion (1930) was on the one hand, informed by his Zionist concern with the relation 
between religion and politics, and on the other, a genuine attempt to investigate Hobbes’s 
political philosophy. I then turn to show that insights from both his writing on Zionism 
and Hobbes informed his 1932 review of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, in which 
Strauss appealed to Hobbes to advance Schmitt’s critique of liberalism.41 Writing at the 
time of the disintegration of the Weimar Republic, Strauss was seeking the ground for an 
alternative to liberalism in his commentary on Schmitt. 
In the 1920s and mid-1930s, Strauss rejected bourgeois liberal democracy, first in 
favor of the creation of a Jewish state, and then in favor of a more authoritarian approach 
to politics in Germany and elsewhere. I will argue that his engagement with Schmitt was 
most productive in this respect. In Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss saw a way 
of addressing an inherent weakness of liberalism: its attempt to negate the fundamental 
antagonisms of politics. However, Schmitt’s immanent or relativistic conception of the 
political did not suit Strauss. Rejecting Schmitt’s conception of the political on grounds 
of its dependence on group enmity, or bellicose nationalism, Strauss discovered in 
Hobbes’s state of nature an anthropological qua metaphysical ground for the political that 
he argues adheres to the moral principle of the political Right.42 He takes from Schmitt 
the idea that politics is defined by deadly conflict and aligns Schmitt’s friend-enemy 
distinction with Hobbes’s description of the natural antagonism between individuals in 
                                                
41   Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, translated an introduction by George Schwab (Chicago 
– London: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
42  With the use of the term “metaphysics” here, as contrary to Schmitt’s immanent conception of the 
political, I refer to an essentialist view of human nature, and should thus not be confused with a 
transcendental system or Plato’s metaphysics. 
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the state of nature. Strauss reads Hobbes as positing a universal human nature as the 
ground of the political, which in its essence is conflict of individuals with one another. It 
is the state of nature’s (in Kant’s words) “unsocial sociability” that drives individuals into 
collective life and demonstrates the need for an authoritarian social and political order.43 
This grounding in human nature, Strauss argues, transcends the liberal world-view that 
human culture is independent from human nature and points toward an unliberal 
morality. 
In Chapter Three, I suggest that Strauss’s publications on Hobbes in the 1930s 
that followed his commentary on Schmitt were developed with two primary aims: (i) to 
further critique and move beyond liberalism, and (ii) to ground a right-wing authoritarian 
alternative to liberalism, socialism, and Nazism. I will show in this chapter that Strauss’s 
study of Hobbes fuelled his critique of liberalism on the one hand, and that his critique of 
liberalism drove his study of Hobbes on the other. 
Liberalism, as well as socialism, Strauss argues, puts faith in rationality, progress 
and education, or the good of human nature, over the evils of humans. To move beyond 
liberalism, according to Strauss’s criteria as unpacked by both Meier and Xenos before 
me, one must establish that human beings are morally evil by nature, whereas Hobbes’s 
natural scientific view of man presents humans as educable or good. In The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (1936), Strauss presents a pre-scientific 
Hobbes, whose view of human nature is on display in the state of nature. Hobbes’s main 
invention, Strauss argues, is not his application of a natural scientific method to the study 
of politics; rather it is that he introduces a new bourgeois morality. The basis for this, 
                                                
43   Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” in Political 
Writings, translated by Nisbet, H.B., and edited by H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 44.  
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Strauss argues, is that Hobbes attaches a natural right to life and grounds his theory of 
political obligation on the fear of violent death, a fear that ultimately tames human pride 
or vanity. However, the reason why the state of nature is a state of war according to 
Hobbes’s pre-scientific view, Strauss argues, is because the human animal is the only 
animal that is vain. Strauss defines vanity in Hobbes as the incessant seeking of ever 
more power over others because one derives pleasure from the other’s recognition of 
one’s superiority. I argue, as Xenos before me, that it is because individuals are vain by 
nature that Strauss (departing from the later Hobbes) considers them to be morally evil. 
To unpack this claim, I explain what it is that Strauss means by moral evil and argue that 
he has transposed a Biblical morality onto human nature. This becomes, for Strauss, the 
moral-ontological foundation upon which to erect an authoritarian political alternative to 
liberalism.  
In Chapter Four, I suggest that Strauss’s interpretation of Hobbes changes after 
World War II in order to fit his account of (i) the history of political philosophy as a 
quarrel between ancient and modern philosophy and (ii) his discovery of the tradition of 
philosophical esotericism. More specifically, I argue that Strauss’s criticism of liberalism 
continues in his post-war writing on Hobbes from the perspective of his recuperation of a 
Socratic-Platonic conception of rationality, human nature, and natural right. During and 
after the war, Strauss set out to defend rationalism, and specifically ancient rationalism 
against the German nihilism and historicist tradition of thought that had made inroads 
into the United States. To do so, Strauss divorces his earlier coupling of morality with 
nature, and instead attaches rationality to nature. He demotes morality to an exoteric 
function — a conventional prerequisite for the maintenance of social order. It is against 
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this return to classical philosophy that Strauss assesses, criticizes, and utilizes Hobbes’s 
political philosophy after the war. Strauss cast Hobbes as the modern esoteric writer par 
excellence; that is, as someone who writes for the enlightenment of everyone, and hides 
his thought for fear of religious persecution only. Contrary to his Hobbes, I suggest, like 
Joel Kraemer and Tanguay before me, that Strauss promotes and adopts an ancient 
esoteric tradition of reading and writing that is premised on a natural rank of human 
intellectual capacities.44 
In his first essay on Hobbes after the war, “On the Spirit of Hobbes’s Political 
Philosophy” (1950), Strauss builds on the criticism that he had first formulated before the 
war, which portrays Hobbes as the founder of liberal rights, and what he refers to as the 
doctrine of modern natural right. Strauss argues that Hobbes was the first to subordinate 
natural law to natural individual right. As Tanguay has pointed out, the shift of primacy 
from obligations or duties to rights is what prompts Strauss to declare that Hobbes is the 
founder of liberalism.45 However, Strauss makes a distinction between liberal theory, 
which he argues originates in Hobbes’s natural right doctrine, and a liberal regime, 
defined by constitutionalism. I suggest that Strauss in the late 1930s becomes a supporter 
of the rule of law, or what he thinks of as classical liberalism. After the war, Strauss 
embraces a limited version of liberal constitutionalism, while still criticizing the liberal 
doctrine he argues originated in Hobbes.  
In Chapter Five, I suggest that, in his last studies of Hobbes, Strauss comes 
closest to following the hermeneutical principle he champions throughout his late 
                                                
44   Joel L. Kraemer, “The Medieval Arabic Enlightenment”, in The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, 
ed. Steven Smith (New York: Cambridge Press, 2009), 137-70; Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual 
Biography. 
45   Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, 102, 106. 
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writing: to understand Hobbes as he understood himself.46 Whereas some of his findings 
on Hobbes still inform his criticism of liberalism, his final studies of Hobbes have less to 
do with his own politics and overall philosophical project than we find in his earlier 
work. Yet, Strauss’s take on Hobbes’s observations on human nature continued to inform 
his view on politics and the state. In “Notes on Hobbes” and The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, Strauss used vanity to argue that humans are morally (non-innocently) evil by 
nature, against the anarchist position — to which he claimed both liberalism and 
socialism belong — that human nature is either good or educable. The anthropological 
insights about human nature that Strauss extracts from Hobbes — the view that the 
human animal is a proud and nasty creature, if no longer morally evil in his return to 
Hobbes after World War II — still prove that coercion is required to assure political 
obligation. Following his post-war project to alter the liberal regime from within, Strauss 
argues at the height of the Cold War that liberals should thus abandon the view of human 
nature as good.  
In his last essay on Hobbes, “On the Basis of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 
Strauss alters the understanding of the relation between Hobbes’s natural science and 
political science that he had developed in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, and then 
revised in Natural Right and History. From the latter, Strauss maintains the position that 
Hobbes’s natural scientific view of the whole (the physical universe in its entirety), 
however faulty, supports Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine. In this final essay, 
however, Strauss also presents the argument that the main contradictions in Hobbes’s 
thought (i.e., the incompatibility between Hobbes’s political theory or natural right 
                                                
46   His interpretation still reflected his own philosophical views and interest to some extent, but Strauss did 
not deliberately seek to use Hobbes primarily as a vehicle to put forth his own philosophy. 
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doctrine and his account of human nature and behavior), first arises when Hobbes applies 
his natural science to the study of the physical nature of humans, as opposed to the 
universe as a whole. Strauss suggests, as he had already done in The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes, that the natural scientific view of human nature cannot account for the 
antagonistic behavior described in the state of nature. He upholds his argument from the 
1930s that the reason why each individual in the state of nature incessantly seeks ever 
more power over others is vanity. In so arguing, Strauss arrives at the conclusion that 
Hobbes’s view of the human animal as the peculiar vain animal has its origin in the pre-
modern philosophical view of human nature, as opposed to Hobbes’s natural scientific 
perspective. However, in the final insight in What is Political Philosophy (1959) and the 
Seminar on Hobbes (1964), Strauss, contrary to all his earlier studies, suggests that vanity 
and fear are derivative of Hobbes’s scientific description of the human animal as the 
animal that is capable of “causal thought”. 
1. 5. Notes on texts, translations and archival material 
Strauss’s original texts were written in German and English and some of his articles and 
books were first published as translations. For the existing translations of Strauss’s earlier 
German writings, I make use of J. Harvey Lomax’s translation of “Notes on Carl Schmitt, 
The Concept of the Political [Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des 
Politischen]” (henceforth, “Notes on Schmitt”) and Elsa M. Sinclair’s translation of 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion.47 Sinclair also translated from the German manuscript, 
                                                
47   Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,” in Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and 
Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, translation by Harvey J. Lomax (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1995): 88-119. First published, Leo Strauss, Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des 
Politischen, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 67, No. 6 (August–September 1932): 732–
749; Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, translated by E. M Sinclair, and with a new preface by 
Strauss (Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press, 1997). First published as Die Religionskritik 
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Strauss’s 1936 book, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis.48 I have 
also relied upon two collections of translations: Zank’s Leo Strauss: The Early Writings 
(1921–1932) and Gabriel Bartlett and Svetozar Minkov’s Hobbes's Critique of Religion 
and Related Writings.49 For other original texts, I have used the Leo Strauss archive in the 
Special Collection Research Center of the University of Chicago and Meier’s three 
volumes of Strauss collected works.50 In the case when I use an existing translation of 
Strauss’s German texts, I have included the German original in closed brackets if a word 
is translated inconsistently or if this is necessary to provide conceptual clarity, and if I 
alter a translation, I note the change. If not otherwise stated or indicated by the works 
cited, translations are mine. In the final chapter, I make use a course, “Seminar on 
Hobbes,” given in the Winter Quarter, 1964, in the Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. In 2011, Nathan Tarcov, Director of the Leo Strauss Center, 
generously gave me access to an incomplete transcript from the seminar, which I 
corrected against the recorded audio tracks — the document from which I quote here.51 I 
have also used the Leo Strauss archives for Strauss’s letter correspondence.  
What follows is a list of Strauss’s main texts on Hobbes considered in the 
dissertation: his first discussion of Hobbes’s philosophy appeared in Spinoza's Critique of 
Religion [Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft 
                                                                                                                                            
Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft Untesuchungen zu Spinozas Theologish-Politischem 
Traktat (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1930).   
48   Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, translation by Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963). The German manuscript was published first in 1965: Leo Strauss, 
Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1965). 
49   Zank, Leo Strauss: The Early Writings; Leo Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion and Related 
Writings. 
50   Leo Strauss Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library; Leo Strauss, 
Gesammelte Schriften Band 1: Die Religionskritik Spinozas und zugehörige Schriften, ed. by Meier, 
Heinrich with the editorial assistance of Wiebke Meier (Stuttgart and Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2008); Leo 
Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 2; Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3. 
51   Leo Strauss, “Seminar on Hobbes,” given in the Winter Quarter, 1964, in the Department of Political 
Science, University of Chicago, mp3, 16 sessions, http://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/courses. 
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Untesuchungen zu Spinozas Theologish-Politischem Traktat] (1930).52  Strauss’s first 
freestanding piece on Hobbes was a review essay of a book by Zbigniew Lubieński, 
“Some Notes on the Political Science of Hobbes [Einige Anmerkungen über die politsche 
Wissenschaft des Hobbes]” (henceforth “Notes on Hobbes”), translated into French by 
Alexandre Kojève and published in France in April of 1933 with the title, “Quelques 
remarques sur la science politique de Hobbes: à propos du livre récent de M. 
Lubieński.”53 During the first half of the 1930s, Strauss also worked on a series of 
manuscripts on Hobbes that were never completed or published: “The Political Science of 
Hobbes: An Introduction to Natural Right [Disposition: Die Politishe Wissenschaft des 
Hobbes Eine Einfuhrung in das Naturrecht]” and a “Foreword to a planned book on 
Hobbes [Vorwort zu einem geplanten Buch über Hobbes]”, and an unfinished book 
manuscript of just under one hundred pages, Planned book on Hobbes [Geplanten Buch 
über Hobbes], written while still in Germany.54 In Paris, Strauss began another book-
length manuscript, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion: A Contribution to Understanding the 
Enlightenment [Die Religionskritik des Hobbes Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der 
Aufklärung] (henceforth, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion), which he kept working on after 
                                                
52   Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, translation by E. M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of 
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Religion and Related Writings. 
54   Leo Strauss, Planned Book on Hobbes c) Einleitung, Kapitel I and II, 97 pages 1930-1931. Leo Strauss 
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first two texts: “The Political Science of Hobbes: An Introduction to Natural Right” and “Foreword to a 
planned book on Hobbes” are translated by Bartlett and Minkov in Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of 
Religion and Related Writings. 
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moving to London and Cambridge in 1934.55 Strauss’s inter-war studies of Hobbes 
culminated in the publication of his monograph, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its 
Basis and Genesis (henceforth, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes), in 1936.56 The 
German manuscript of the book, Hobbes’ politische Wissenshaft in ihrer Genesis 
[Hobbes’s Political Science and its Genesis] was finished in London and Cambridge 
1934-35 and translated into English by Sinclair, under Strauss’s supervision. The German 
original was published first in 1965, as Hobbes’s Political Science [Hobbes’ politische 
Wissenschaft].57 Over two decades later, Strauss gave Hobbes his full attention again in a 
1950 article “On the Spirit of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy”. 58  The article was 
reproduced with additions as part one of chapter five, “Modern Natural Right,” in 
Strauss’s 1953 book, Natural Right and History.59 Strauss’s final major piece on Hobbes 
was a review essay, “Les fondements de la philosophie politique de Hobbes [On the Basis 
of Hobbes Political Philosophy” (henceforth, “On the Basis”), of a book, Politique et 
philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes, by Raymond Polin.60 Just as his review of Lubieński, 
the essay was translated into French and published in Paris. The article is reprinted as 
chapter seven, “On the Basis of Hobbes Political Philosophy”, of What is Political 
Philosophy? And other Studies (1959) (henceforth, What is Political Philosophy).61 
Strauss wrote two shorter book reviews of books on Hobbes: “Review of C. B. 
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Macpherson: The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke” 
(henceforth, “Review”) and “Review of Samuel I. Mintz’s The Hunting of Leviathan: 
Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes”62 The Macpherson review was reprinted as chapter thirteen in Studies in 
Platonic Political Philosophy, a book that Strauss was working on when he died in 1973, 
and which was posthumously published a decade later, in 1983.63 Beside his 1964 
seminar on Hobbes, Strauss also taught three courses on Hobbes during his tenure at the 
University of Chicago: Winter quarter 1950, “Hobbes’s The Citizen;” Autumn Quarter 
1953, “Seminar in Political Philosophy: Hobbes’s Leviathan;” Autumn Quarter 1956, 
“Seminar in Political Philosophy: Hobbes.”64 Transcripts are available from the 1953 and 
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Strauss’s Weimar Hobbes and Liberalism 
 
 
2. 0. 1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate Strauss’s views on liberalism and Hobbes and how he begins 
to understand the connection between the two in his earliest work on the subject. I first 
look at Strauss’s Zionist writings in the 1920s in order to dissect how Strauss understands 
liberalism; how his thoughts on the relation between politics and religion inform his first 
study of Hobbes; and how his criticism of political Zionism inform his 1932 review of 
Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. It is necessary to briefly take into account 
Strauss’s contribution to Zionist debates in the 1920s in order to introduce my close 
reading of Strauss’s first engagement with Hobbes and his use of Hobbes in his criticism 
of liberalism.  
In approaching these texts, I engage with the scholarship of Sheppard, Tanguay 
and Zank. Their studies show that Strauss’s association with political Zionism reveals a 
mistrust of the liberal state and liberal rights, and that political emancipation and cultural 
assimilation had in Strauss’s view, led Jews to forget their collective identity. Yet, 
Strauss also acknowledges that political Zionism, which aimed to restore to the Jews a 
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nation, owed its existence to liberalism: it was due to secularization that the creation of a 
Jewish state could be envisioned through human intervention. However, we shall see that 
Strauss arrives at the insight that political Zionists, who were eager to found a Jewish 
state by rational means, had abandoned the core of their Jewish identity. Instead, political 
Zionism depends, for Strauss, on anti-Semitic enmity for the formation of a collective 
Jewish political association. To address this shortcoming, Strauss argues that in order for 
the Jews to see themselves as a distinct people in their own right, they must cling to 
religion, because this is what authentically distinguishes the Jews from other gentile 
nations. However, as Tanguay has pointed out, Strauss arrives at an irresolvable dilemma 
that an authentic neo-orthodox Zionist position must insist, like traditional orthodox 
groups, on waiting for “divine intervention” for the return to Zion, and as such is 
incompatible with political Zionism that advocated for human intervention.65 
The conflict between a politics reliant on reason and a politics grounded in 
religion is also evident in Strauss’s first discussion of Hobbes in his first book, Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion, published in 1930. Strauss here presents Hobbes as the first modern 
critic of religion and the founder of a purely rational political contract, independent of 
religion. In this book, I will argue, Strauss also begins what became a hallmark of all his 
texts on Hobbes: he reads morality into Hobbes’s state of nature, or more precisely, into 
individuals’ behavior prior to the social contract. Here, I am in accord with Tanguay who 
has argued that, in his Spinoza book, Strauss detects a moral genealogy that informs what 
Strauss identified as the tradition of the Epicurean critique of religion. The underlying 
aim behind the Epicurean critique of religion is to attain tranquility. In Hobbes’s case, it 
is specifically to preserve life and to accommodate material pleasure. In his commentary 
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on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss adds that the attitude that informs 
Hobbes’s moral attitude is liberal bourgeois. It is this bourgeois innovation that Meier has 
in mind when he argues that Strauss, in his commentary on Schmitt, both points out the 
flaws in Schmitt’s reliance on Hobbes to critique liberalism, and uses Hobbes’s 
conception of the state of nature to advance Schmitt’s critique.66 In the words of Tracy 
Strong, “The approach taken by Strauss and Meier consists in arguing that Schmitt, while 
attempting a radical critique of liberalism, remains within the liberal framework.”67  
In the second part of the chapter, I unpack the claim that Schmitt remains within 
this “liberal framework,” or in Strauss’s own words, the “horizon of liberalism.” 68 More 
precisely, I follow Meier in arguing that Strauss demonstrates how Schmitt’s concept of 
the political falls back into what I, for heuristic purposes, identify as a liberal thought 
horizon and a liberal moral horizon. To make his case, I will suggest that Strauss 
dismisses Schmitt’s understanding of Hobbes as the antidote to liberalism, arguing that 
Hobbes, despite his proposed absolutist state, is the founder of liberalism. The reason 
Strauss gave for this is that Hobbes attaches an indefeasible natural right to the 
preservation of life and makes any obligation to the state conditional on this right. I also 
build on Meier’s suggestion that Strauss finds Schmitt’s conception of the political, in its 
most important aspect, analogous to Hobbes’s state of nature. Identifying a 
correspondence between Schmitt’s conception of the relation between friend and enemy 
and the individual antagonism described in Hobbes’s state of nature allows Strauss to 
turn to human nature to escape the liberal thought horizon, and outlines a means of 
                                                
66   Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, translation with an introduction by George Schwab 
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escaping the liberal moral horizon that he continues to explore in his consequent work on 
Hobbes. I, however, diverge from Meier’s suggestion that Strauss tacitly brings to view a 
concealed theological dimension underlying Schmitt’s conception of the political. 
In order to transcend liberalism in his engagement with Schmitt, Strauss was on 
the hunt for an illiberal morality (contra Hobbes) to serve as the ground for a right-wing 
authoritarian political theory. While Strauss agrees with Schmitt that enmity is central to 
the political, he does not think it sufficient as a ground for a right-wing authoritarian 
theory of the state. Strauss recognizes in the groundlessness or relativism of Schmitt’s 
theorization of the political Strauss’s own earlier theorization over the shortcoming of 
political Zionism. On this basis, Strauss asks Schmitt to reconsider his theoretical 
dependence on bellicose nationalism — namely that, in Meier’s words, the formation of 
political association is dependent on political disassociation or enmity — for Schmitt’s 
right-wing authoritarian political theory. He suggests instead that the real divide between 
left and right comes down to whether or not human nature is perceived as morally good 
or evil. The foundation for an authoritarian theory is the moral evil of human nature, as 
opposed to liberalism, which conceives of human nature as good. In this context, Strauss 
defines moral evil simply in contradistinction to animal evil: animals are rapacious, or 










2. 1. 1. Political Zionism, assimilation and emancipation 
Born 1899 in Kirchhain, a rural town near Marburg, Kurhessen, Strauss grew up in a 
religiously observant, and relatively well-to-do, Jewish family. His parents Hugo Strauss 
and Jennie David ran a small agricultural business. After his graduation from the 
gymnasium in 1917, he went on to serve in the military as an interpreter in Belgium. 
Strauss had begun his own academic studies at the University of Marburg in 1919. He 
also studied in Frankfurt am Main and Berlin before completing his dissertation, The 
Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophical Doctrine of F.H. Jacobi ["Das 
Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen Lehre Jacobis"], at the University of Hamburg 
in 1921 under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer, whose neo-Kantianism had left little 
impression, beside disagreement, on Strauss.69 With his doctorate in hand, Strauss left for 
Freiburg to attend Edmund Husserl’s lectures. In Freiburg, Strauss began to attend the 
seminar on Aristotle taught by Heidegger, who came to influence Strauss more than any 
other living philosopher. He “followed Heidegger back to Marburg, where he befriended 
the new crop of students of philosophy, among them most prominently Hans Georg 
Gadamer and Karl Löwith,” but also, importantly, for his study of Hobbes, Gerhard 
Krüger.70  
At the end of his life, Strauss said that he was “converted” to political Zionism at 
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age 17. He had joined the Jüdisher Wanderbund Blau-Weiss, a militant middle-class 
political Zionist youth organization.71 He wrote polemical articles on Zionism that 
appeared in “some of the most important organs of the Jewish culture of renewal” 
between 1923-1928.72 Sheppard has argued that there are two main themes in Strauss’s 
oeuvre which can be traced back to this period: his “conservative, if not radical-
conservative, critique of liberalism and the centrality of the problem of galut [Jewish 
exile].”73 It is in his take on the problem of galut that Strauss’s criticism of liberalism 
first takes form, in its relation to cultural assimilation and legal emancipation.  
Unlike France, full civic emancipation of German Jewry was not achieved in the 
1848 revolution. It was a gradual process, but by the time Strauss emerged as a political 
Zionist voice, the German Jews had been emancipated, becoming, in formal political 
terms, equal German citizens before the law, and many had assimilated.74 Assimilation 
can be described as a two-way process in the case of Jews in Germany: assimilation 
requires a departure from the religious community into the culture of the host nation as an 
individual, and it requires acceptance by the dominant national (Christian) community. 
While civic emancipation ended legal exclusion, it did not stop institutional and cultural 
anti-Semitism. Discrimination had remained in the Second Reich, most conspicuously in 
a government “policy” blocking Jews from higher positions within “the military, in the 
court system, in the administration of the state, and other key areas,” including the 
university.75 While this form of institutionalized (state-sponsored) anti-Semitism eased 
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after the Great War, private anti-Semitic sentiments increased in the Weimar era.76 
Suspecting that the liberal contract between the German state and German Jewry 
had set aside enmity only temporarily, Strauss advocated for the creation of a Jewish state 
as the only permanent solution to anti-Semitism or what Strauss later called the “Jewish 
problem.”77 For Strauss, like Theodor Herzl (one of the founders of political Zionism) 
before him, it was the enmity within the host nations that compelled the Jews to become a 
nation. Over thirty years later, Strauss’s quoted Herzl to this effect: “‘We are a nation—
the enemy makes us a nation whether we like it or not.’”78 Strauss agreed with Herzl that 
Jews needed their own state to defend themselves against their enemies.  
In his first publication in 1923, “Response to Frankfurt’s ‘Word of Principle,’” 
Strauss noted that while both Zionism and assimilation formed a “single front” against 
the galut — seeking to “normalize” Jewish existence — their respective political solutions 
to the Jewish problem were opposed. 79  Assimilation sought the absorption of the 
“individual” into a normal political existence of the host nation, whereas Zionism sought 
a “collective” Jewish nation state.80 Assimilation was an insufficient solution in Strauss’s 
eyes. In “The Zionism of Nordau,” published in 1924, Strauss stressed that “[i]n the 
galut, the Jewish people lived as a Luftvolk [people living on/in the air]—it lacks the 
ground beneath its feet in both the literal and figurative senses, and it depends on all of 
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the contingencies of the behavior of other people […] Assimilation takes away from the 
Jews self-assurance of ghetto life, and gives them instead the illusionary surrogate of trust 
in the humanity of civilization.”81 Sheppard explains, the “Jews in Germany who are not 
consciously national Jews, in Strauss’s view, have simply forgotten the fundamental 
condition of galut. They have placed their hopes in a cultured world and the security of a 
liberal state that leaves behind the intolerance, persecution, and enmity, all of which Jews 
had suffered in the premodern age of superstition.”82 Sheppard further points out that “the 
complement to this postulate in Strauss's non-Jewish politics is that liberals and socialists 
have forgotten that human beings are inherently evil and that politics must take into 
account this underlying fact.”83 As we will see at the end of this and the subsequent 
chapter, Strauss’s attempt to prove that “human beings are inherently evil” is key to 
understanding his interpretation of Hobbes and his criticism of liberalism in the 1930s.   
On the basis of this pessimistic view of human nature, Strauss mistrusts liberal 
morality, with its rights of man, as the principle for nationhood. The secular bond of 
society is premised on universal human morality. Liberal civilizational ideals, Strauss 
states in his essay on Nordau’s Zionism, are ultimately expressions of secularized 
Christianity. It is the universalist ideals of the French revolution, Strauss argues in 1923, 
which “largely gave rise to [legal/political] emancipation.”84 He views the enlightenment 
ideals of reasonable toleration as illusions; and thus, holds that Jews will never be safe in 
a liberal state with a non-Jewish majority. It is in contrast to the false illusion of 
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individual assimilation that political Zionism proposed a collective solution to the galut: a 
Jewish nation-state, realized only by means of “real politics [realpolitik].”85 In his Zionist 
writings from this time, Strauss calls upon the German Jews to take their destiny in their 
own hands and end the condition of the galut.86 Yet, Zank concludes that Strauss was 
more interested in the theoretical principles than “acute political content” and thus his 
writings from the time were “typical of the middle-class intellectualism of the German 
Zionism youth movement of early 1920s.”87 
In “The Zionism of Nordau,” Strauss also addresses the international obstacle to 
the establishment of a Jewish state. He separates political Zionism of the Blau-Weiss 
from Georg Landauer and Max Nordau’s socialism. Strauss backs Herzl’s tactics of 
intrigues, as practiced through the art of covert actions or “underhandedness,” against 
Nordau's “honesty,” “decency” and “loyalty” politics, and notes: “The sympathy for 
socialism as well as the antipathy for secret diplomacy have the same roots”.88 Socialists, 
like Landauer and Nordau, were enlightenment rationalists who had embraced Kant’s 
dictums against secret diplomacy.89 In “Ecclesia militans,” Strauss notes that after World 
War I, England “had an interest in a favorably disposed Jewish public,” and “[w]ith the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917, in which the British crown recognized its support of the 
Zionist quest for the establishment of a ‘Jewish homeland in Palestine,’ the sought-for 
extrication from Europe had become a realistic political option, but the process of its 
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realization was still delayed.”90 To speed up the process, Strauss agrees with Herzl: 
“playing off of power against power” is necessary for the Zionist cause, “as it is in the 
case of all politics.”91 And for a Jewish state to finally come into “existence,” Strauss 
argues that the movement must be “entering into reality,” by means of, “land and soil, 
power and arms, peasantry and aristocracy.”92  
2. 1. 2. Cultural and religious Zionism 
While Strauss considers assimilation an unsatisfactory solution to the galut, and political 
emancipation as the source of a false sense of safety in the mid-1920s, he argues that it 
should not be forgotten that political Zionism owes its existence to liberalism: political 
Zionism was born out of assimilation and political emancipation, which are 
preconditioned on the secular break between the state and church.93  
Strauss unpacks this historical process in his 1924 essay on “Paul de Lagarde,” in 
which he looks at the Jewish question through the lens of one of its enemies — an 
Evangelical anti-Semite.94 With Lagarde, Strauss asks: “How was it possible for the Jews 
to become emancipated in Germany?”95 Lagarde, Strauss argues, retains Bruno Bauer‘s 
position that “[a]s long as Jews hold on to the religious Law, they cannot become 
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Germans.”96 Jews, according to this argument, cannot subscribe to a universal moral 
principle of nationhood, since “[e]xclusiveness is the meaning of the Law [of the Torah], 
consequently, as long as the Law is in effect, no amalgamation with the host people is 
possible.”97 Political Zionism evolves out of assimilation in that it must also break the 
covenant with God so as to advocate for the creation of a Jewish state by human means.98 
The problem is that according to orthodoxy, “[i]n the galut, Zionism and Messianism 
coincide, inasmuch as the return to Palestine is expected to be the work of the Messiah, 
something miraculous and to-be-prayed-for, something not to be prepared for 
rationally.”99 Thus, Strauss suggests, that “[t]he alliance of Zionism and Orthodoxy will 
have to be replaced by the alliance of Zionism and liberalism.”100 By liberalism here, 
Strauss means the process of secularization, which allows for the creation of a Jewish 
state to be thought of, and acted upon as a rational process.  
The political Zionist atheistic proposal to break with orthodoxy was not without 
its own problems. In “The Zionism of Nordau,” Strauss also confronts the Messianic 
Zionism that opposed the rationalism of political Zionism. For Nordau, “[i]n Zionist 
matters, theology has no say; Zionism is purely political.”101 Strauss, however, finds 
Nordau’s political Zionism insufficient, since it does not provide a positive identity for 
the people of Israel. Political Zionist, Strauss claims, in Tanguay’s words, “had forgotten 
that the Jewish nation is more than a simple political entity.”102 The development of 
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cultural Zionism tried to amend this shortcoming by construing a positive identity based 
on shared Jewish culture. However, as Tanguay has suggested, Strauss thought that 
cultural Zionism was internally contradictory: 
According to cultural Zionism, it is not enough to have a Jewish state; such a state 
must also be filled with a Jewish culture, for, as Strauss indicated, ‘the Jewish 
state will be an empty shell without a Jewish culture which has its roots in the 
Jewish heritage.’ The internal contradiction of political Zionism is to want a 
Jewish state without taking into consideration that Jewish heritage which has in 
fact up till then justified the existence of the Jewish people. Cultural Zionism 
aspires to overcome this contradiction by asserting the need to revive the Jewish 
heritage. Yet, according to Strauss, cultural Zionism does not itself escape from 
contradiction. By interpreting the Jewish heritage in terms of ‘culture,’ or as a 
‘product of the national mind,’ it betrayed the very spirit of that heritage. More 
precisely, it interprets that heritage by means of categories that are themselves 
foreign to Jewish thought. That interpretation therefore remains a prisoner of the 
categories of modern philosophy—in this particular case, of Hegel and the 
German historicist tradition.  // Thus cultural Zionism does not understand the 
Jewish heritage as it always understood itself, that is, as a gift of divine revelation, 
and not as the product of the history of human beings. Cultural Zionism fails to 
recover the original meaning of the Jewish heritage. According to Strauss, logic 
dictates that cultural Zionism that truly understand itself becomes religious 
Zionism.103  
 
Since neither political Zionism, nor cultural Zionism had succeeded in binding the Jewish 
nation together according to its original criteria, Strauss looked at religious orthodoxy as 
a unifying force that might provide a sufficient existential footing: a nation under the 
Torah and the Talmud, the revealed law. If the Jews are no longer seen as the chosen and 
exiled people under the patriarchist authority of the Torah, then the authentic, positive 
and exclusionary identity for a Jewish nation is lost. The political paradox that arises here 
is that if it accepts the authority of the Torah, the Jewish state will be the work of 
Messiah at the end of days, not the work of the human will. Political Zionism owes its 
existence to cultural assimilation, and to science, the idea that humans should intervene to 
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create the Jewish state; the authentic national group identity of the Jewish nation, 
however, is tied to religious orthodoxy. The contradiction between political Zionism, 
with its roots in secular or atheistic liberalism, and the necessity of orthodox belief that it 
nevertheless depends upon for an authentic social glue is a problem Strauss grapples with 
and cannot not resolve at this time, wavering between different solutions in his polemics. 
This conundrum led Strauss to propose a Zionism in which religion remains a 
decisive feature, but also one which takes into account the historical development of 
liberalism. In his “Comment on Weinberg’s Critique” from 1925, Strauss responds to 
“Zionism and Religion,” a text in which Hans Weinberg criticizes Strauss for being a 
defender of orthodoxy. Strauss writes: “the Zionism that I would like to characterize as 
primarily political Zionism is liberal, that is, it rejects the absolute submission to the law 
and instead makes individual acceptance of traditional contents dependent on one’s own 
deliberation.”104 In his first political Zionist article from 1923, “Response to Frankfurt’s 
‘Word of Principle,’” Strauss suggests that the contradiction between belief and unbelief 
could be surpassed by individual deliberation. He describes the historical conditions for 
this possibility to have arisen: “’Belief’ may still be decisive, yet belief is no oracle but is 
subject to the control of historical reasoning.”105 Inverting his dissertation’s observation 
that Jacobi had proved that enlightenment rationality (and its critique of orthodoxy) rests 
on an act of belief, Strauss proposes that a “rational” and “‘explicit’ act of faith must take 
the place of the belief in God.”106 Strauss acknowledges the radical nature of his proposal 
for a rational ground for faith, noting that indeed, this would have been “absurd in the life 
of the earlier times [in which “life” and “belief” were inseparable], but that is 
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unavoidable given the needs of the contemporary Jewish situation.”107 He thus proposes 
that a bare minimum of religion is needed to establish a Jewish state: the explicit, rational 
act of faith must include a minimal doctrinal substance — a belief in God, and a 
meaningful observance of the law.108  
This radical proposal was short-lived. Tanguay, taking his clue from Strauss’s 
1962 American preface to the English translation of his first book, Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion (1930), argues that Strauss was not satisfied with the neo-orthodox variants of 
Zionism, and thus began to consider whether a “genuine return to orthodoxy” was 
possible.109 More specifically, Tanguay argues that Strauss turns to Spinoza’s critique of 
religion precisely in order to assess whether the enlightenment criticism of orthodoxy was 
sound, since the latter rested to such a large extent on Spinoza’s shoulders.  
Tanguay shows that Strauss concludes that Spinoza does not theoretically refute 
orthodoxy. This conclusion, in Tanguay’s reading, rests primarily upon Strauss’s 
assessment of Spinoza’s positivist critique of miracles as the external evidence (as oppose 
to inner belief) of the existence of God for believers and none-believers alike. This 
insight, however, does not, in Tanguay’s view, turn Strauss into a believer. Strauss 
appears to abandon his case for a religious Zionism (rational or orthodox) in one of his 
final Zionist texts, a 1928 review of Freud’s The Future of an Illusion that was published 
in the same year that Strauss completed the Spinoza manuscript. 110 Here, Strauss 
endorses Freud’s case for “radical atheism,” arguing that “unbelief and belief” are 
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incompatible.111 Political Zionism, Strauss argues in the review, must “ground itself in 
unbelief” or “reason.”112 Thus, at this moment in time, Strauss moves away from the idea 
of a rationally willed act of faith or a return to orthodoxy, and toward an advocacy for a 
rationalist and “atheistic foundation to Zionism.”113  
It is also in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion that we find Strauss’s first commentary 
on Hobbes. One of the book’s central themes is the role of religion in politics. As we 
shall now see, Strauss contrasts Hobbes’s exclusively rational social contract with 
Spinoza’s theory of political obligation that relies on religion to secure obedience to the 
state. In the chapter and in other passages devoted Hobbes in Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion, I will show that Strauss is unpacking Hobbes’s thought with a genuine interest 
to dissect its parts, while also seeking to uncover the moral outlook that informed 
Hobbes’s criticism of religion and his political philosophy. While there is no substantial 
assessment of the validity of Hobbes’s critique of religion of the kind Strauss offers in the 
case of Spinoza, I will argue, in line with Tanguay, that Strauss’s analysis is aimed at 
detecting a moral incentive behind Hobbes’s philosophy, forming part of a broader 
historical “moral genealogy of the critique of religion.”114   
2. 1. 3. Hobbes’s critique of religion  
In 1925, Julian Guttman, the director of the Academy of Jewish Science (Akademie für 
die Wissenschaft des Judentums) in Berlin, had recruited Strauss to study Spinoza’s 
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biblical criticism and “edit a jubilee edition” of Moses Mendelssohn’s writings.115 Strauss 
would remain employed at the Academy until 1931. In 1928, Strauss completes the book 
manuscript on Spinoza’s criticism of religion at large, situating Spinoza in the long 
history of religious critiques. The first of Strauss’s reflections on Hobbes's thought 
appears in the book’s fourth chapter, devoted entirely to Hobbes, and in chapter nine, 
“The State and the Social Function of Religion,” the title theme of which echoes the 
dilemma he wrestled with in his Zionist article.116 Strauss not only investigates the 
relation between state, politics and religion, but also looks at the place of natural science 
and its relation to both religion and politics in Hobbes’s philosophy — nexuses that 
become central to all Strauss’s future studies of Hobbes and to which I will return 
throughout the next three chapters. 
 In the book, Hobbes is introduced as Spinoza’s precursor in the “modern criticism 
of religion.”117 Hobbes, Strauss writes, is the first to advance an “explicit analysis of 
religion,” by which he means that Hobbes tracks the source of religion to “human 
nature.”118 It is “[t]he explanation of religion in terms of human nature,” Strauss argues, 
which forms “the complement and culmination of [the] [Epicurean] critique of religion” 
prior to Hobbes.119 Strauss offers a reason for Hobbes’s new approach: “If the critic finds 
himself in radical opposition to religion, he cannot rest content with merely refuting the 
teachings of religion, so that religion and critique of religion still seem in principle to 
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belong to the same plane of thought.”120 Rather than refuting the teaching of religion, 
Strauss suggests, Hobbes gives a psychological explanation for the source of religion. 
Hobbes thus “uncover[s] the origin from which the whole complex of fallacious thinking 
characteristic of religion arises.”121 
 Hobbes, Strauss argues, traces the root of natural religion to a natural curiosity 
innate to all humans. Strauss defines this natural curiosity as a striving for knowledge of 
causes.122 It is this curiosity that distinguishes humans from animals in their capacity to 
observe causal chains. The human capacity to contemplate causation is the “origin” of 
both religion and science.123 Strauss thus argues that Hobbes perceives religion and 
science as two fundamentally “opposed attitudes of mind.”124 Science and religion, 
however, are opposed attitudes of the same mind, in that both are expressions of the 
natural curiosity unique to the human animal. Science and religion are opposed workings 
of the mind, however, in that “[t]he opposition between science and religion is primarily 
an opposition not of content but of method, the opposition of methodical and 
unmethodical thought.” 125  Strauss thus concludes that for Hobbes science is 
“fundamentally” a “method.”126  
 Like Epicurus, Strauss observes, Hobbes holds that religion arises from the 
unmethodical search for causes. Religion connects fortunate or unfortunate events to a 
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responsible “being.”127 The reason for this, in Strauss’s account of Hobbes’s philosophy, 
is that pre-scientific humans, “living as they do in ever-present anxiety due to their lack 
of knowledge of the causal relations linking all things, assume as cause of good and evil 
fortune invisible powers, gods. The gods originate as offspring of human fear.”128 
Science, contrary to religion, explains, predicts and even produces future outcomes. In 
Strauss’s account, fear is thus either eased by science's explanations and predictions and 
control of natural phenomena, or magnified by religion’s ignorance of the real cause 
behind these events, wrongly correlating them to gods or a God. It is in light of the search 
for a scientific method, Strauss suggests, that Hobbes’s critique of religion develops, 
making his criticism of religion epiphenomenal to the pursuit of a natural scientific 
method.129 In contrast to the “prejudice” that motivates Epicurus’s critique of religion — 
religion produced false hope that thwarted the individualistic and apolitical striving for 
hedonistic tranquility — Strauss argues that the motivation behind Hobbes’s scientific 
critique of religion is his “analyzing and defining” science.130 Having traced the origin of 
religion and science to human nature, Strauss proceeds with his analysis by pointing out 
that Hobbes separates the seeds of religion from the culture of religion—pagan and 
revealed religions.131  
2. 1. 4. The political aspect of Hobbes’s critique of religion  
It is first when Strauss begins to speak of the culture of religion that it becomes clear that 
he thinks that Hobbes’s critique of religion is not merely a by-product of natural science 
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or physics.132 Hobbes also approaches religion from the vantage point of political science. 
Strauss describes a distinction among the sciences, between natural science and political 
science in Hobbes’s system of thought. The difference relates to their respective method 
and aim. The method of natural science or physics is “proof (deduction),” while political 
science relies on “experience.”133 Whereas Strauss makes little of this distinction in the 
Spinoza book, the methodological differentiation between natural science and political 
science becomes central to all Strauss’s later work on Hobbes. The importance of the 
difference between natural science/physics and political science for Strauss at this time 
concerns their different aims: political science deals with “misery,” while physics is 
concerned with “happiness.”134 I will return to this distinction in detail later. The pressing 
issue for Strauss is how Hobbes envisions his political science, as a response to both 
revealed religion and ancient moral philosophy. Let us look at the former first.  
Strauss observes that Hobbes’s claims that for the pagans “religion was part of 
politics,” while for revealed religion, politics was part of religion.135 More specifically, 
pagan cultures create and allow for religious practices that support the principle of rule, 
but are incapable of supporting the idea that the people would rebel against the earthly 
ruler/s based on religious belief. With the rise of revealed religions this changes: 
“Revelation, the second path opened to the culture of natural religion with its basis in fear 
and dream, makes politics a part of religion. It thus, if we understand Hobbes aright, 
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reverses the natural relationship which was realized in paganism.”136 Revealed religion 
introduced a split between spiritual and temporal power, Strauss explains: 
 This distinction, which in paganism was in principle avoided, and was introduced 
only by the Jews, originates in the belief in spirits, which is part and parcel of 
natural religion. This distinction entails that within the realms of the Christian 
kings there is yet another realm, a realm of ghosts and spirits that walk in 
darkness. Religion thus leads to the absurdity that every citizen within the realm 
must obey two powers. It is a threat to the stability of the state that some subjects 
obey the temporal power, which is visible, and on which plays ‘the fierce light 
which beats upon a throne,’ while other subjects maintain their allegiance to the 
spiritual power, in whose favor there speaks the greatest fear, the fear of spirits 
and of eternal damnation.137  
 
The wickedest effect of a belief in spirits is civil war, when it conflicts with the laws of 
the temporal Sovereign. 
The response to (and role of) revealed religion in politics, Strauss argues, features 
differently in Hobbes’s theory of the state than Spinoza’s. While the two agree that true 
scientific causality must be separated from the faulty methodology of religion, Strauss 
argues that Spinoza “recognize[s] religion as an essential means for the maintenance of 
the state,” since commandments are observed by the “multitude only from the belief that 
the commandment is the directly ‘revealed’ word of God.”138 In other words, Spinoza 
recognizes the necessity of having the civil laws identified with the revealed word of 
God. Strauss further suggests that Spinoza’s reliance on religious authority is predicated 
on his distinction between “wise men” and the “vulgar” many, who are incapable of a 
rational contract.139 Strauss points out that no such intellectual separation is at play in 
Hobbes’s thought, and therefore, “there is no necessity for recourse to religion,” because 
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the political “bond” is rational.140 Every individual has the same rational ability to enter a 
political covenant. Hobbes’s political contract is independent of religion; it is grounded in 
human rationality alone. The concept of sovereignty that Hobbes introduces is designed 
through the rational agreement of all parties to the contract to obey an absolute 
Sovereign. Individuals do not need to be shepherded into the commonwealth by divine 
command because reason alone is sufficient to persuade them of the benefits of belonging 
to a state.141  
Strauss argues that it is the fear of a violent death that is the affective ground for 
the individual’s rational conduct. It is the fear that arises from the anticipation of a violent 
death in a state of nature — an anarchic state without a Sovereign power or law, in which 
the weakest individual can kill the strongest — that convinces all individuals to enter a 
social contract. “Reason” in Hobbes’s account, Strauss writes, is the “provident outlook 
on the future.”142 The rational contract is formed because individuals fear a possible 
violent death. Fear is thus intimately connected with reason. Once the covenant is 
formed, Strauss argues, the citizens “honor” the contract because, all things considered, 
the cost of breaking the contract (the return to the state of nature) is always greater than 
the disadvantages of subjecting oneself to the authority of an absolute ruler.  
Despite Hobbes’s case that each individual has a natural capacity for rational 
reflection and conduct, revealed religion remained the political issue of his time. Whereas 
some citizens obey temporal powers, “other subjects maintain their allegiance to the 
spiritual power, in whose favor there speaks the greatest fear, the fear of spirits and of 
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eternal damnation.”143 The problem Hobbes faced was that religion was more seductive 
than science. Far too many were still moved by fear of invisible spirits and eternal 
damnation. Far too many thus acted contrary to their rational self-interest, i.e., were not 
affected by the fear of violent death, and were thus unconvinced by Hobbes’s natural 
scientific refutation of spirits and eternal damnation. To “counter” the remaining “threat, 
contained in revealed religion, to public peace,” Strauss points out that Hobbes also 
engages in a non-scientific critique (grounded in neither physics, nor political science) of 
Christianity. 144 The aim of Hobbes’s political exegesis of the Bible is to show that “the 
distinction between the spiritual and the temporal power is absurd.”145 To convince 
citizens to obey the corporeal Sovereign only, Strauss points out that Hobbes is the first 
to separate the clergy’s teaching from the bible and argue that the true teaching of the 
bible is that “obedience must be given to temporal powers.”146 Hobbes then, Strauss 
notes, moves on to discuss the authority of the scripture as well; or more precisely, 
Hobbes “sets out to demonstrate that the authority of Scripture is grounded not in 
Scripture itself, but exclusively in the command given by the temporal power, and is 
dependent on the temporal power.”147 It is with the question of which authors of the bible 
hold most authority that Strauss ends the chapter on Hobbes. He notes that Hobbes, 
unlike Spinoza, stresses the authority of the scripture prior to the story of Moses. The 
backhanded reason for this is to rally support for his radical proposal that the right to rule 
resides in the social contract, and not in paternal authority or a divine right of 
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succession.148  
It is thus not only due to Hobbes’s quest for a natural scientific method, but also 
due to his “political preoccupation” that he wrestles with religion.149 Unlike Spinoza, in 
Strauss’s account, Hobbes looks at revealed religion as a historically temporary 
problem—a problem that would go away with the success of the enlightenment: “Only 
when the fear of spirits is well and truly expelled from men’s mind is peace assured, as 
well as the loyalty of the citizen to his country.”150 Spinoza, on the other hand, Strauss 
argues, holds that the general populous will never abide by a purely rational political 
contract because there is an inescapable difference between the rational capacity of the 
wise few and the many. Religious commands will always be required to assure obedience 
among the general population. The difference between Spinoza and Hobbes over the role 
of religion in politics, in the final analysis, thus boils down to their view of human nature.  
Judging from Strauss’s 1928 Zionist article on Freud, Strauss seems to have 
arrived, in the process of completing his Spinoza book, on the side of Hobbes’s case for a 
purely rational basis for a political contract, or at least for the formation of a Jewish state. 
During the 1920s, Strauss wavered between the position that the political community 
needed religion (in order to form a national identity and as a principle for obedience) and 
his agreement with Hobbes’s that, due to secularization, a rational and atheistic political 
proposal was possible. Strauss openly atheistic proposal in 1928 turned out to be 
temporary: Tanguay has shown that Strauss in his study of Maimonides and other Jewish 
and Arabic mediaeval enlightenment thinkers in the 1930s found a solution that could 
solve the contradiction between a rational and atheistic position and the need for religion. 
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As I will return to in Chapter four, by the late 1930s, Strauss seems to have adopted in 
part Spinoza’s position that belief is required for social and moral cohesion and order for 
the populous, and that the atheistic rational view must be kept a secret from the many. 
But that is to jump ahead. Let us stay with his analysis of Hobbes for now. Having 
outlined the scientific and political dimension of Hobbes’s philosophy in relation to 
religion, Strauss further investigates Hobbes’s conception of human nature and its 
relation to revealed religion and science. What informs this discussion is Strauss’s 
attempt to read a moral dimension into Hobbes’s state of nature. Unlike Spinoza, who 
equates right to might and does not make a moral distinction between human actions in 
the state of nature, Strauss argues that Hobbes connects right with acts oriented at self-
preservation only.  
2. 1. 5. Morality and the striving behind the quest for ever more power over others 
The project of reading a moral distinction into Hobbes’s state of nature informs all of 
Strauss’s studies of Hobbes and, as we shall see in the next chapter, becomes the key 
aspect of his understanding of liberalism. Strauss states that the “essential content of 
Hobbes’s moral philosophy is the peaceable attitude.”151 Hobbes, he argues, defines the 
“essence of man” as being concerned with “self-preservation.”152 Reason is equated with 
the individual’s self-preservation, and the raison d'être of the state is “peace and 
security.”153 The two most important laws of nature (rational precepts), Strauss argues, 
are the stipulation that individuals should seek peace and the stipulation that the contract 
should be honored. The contract is the rational agreement by which individuals transfer 
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their natural right or liberty in the state of nature to a Sovereign in order to secure peace. 
Based on this, Strauss argues, contrary to Hobbes's own assertion that it is the agreement 
between parties to the social contract (the obligation owed to all other contracting parties) 
and the Sovereign’s command that distinguishes “justice” from “injustice,” that Hobbes 
conceives of a moral distinction at play already in the state of nature.154 Strauss thus 
opposes the idea that Hobbes’s natural right is disconnected from morality, and suggests 
instead that the natural right of individuals in the state of nature is limited to rational 
actions in accord with self-preservation:  
[N]atural right, as seen by Hobbes, is truly adapted to the founding of right and 
the State: it is itself a legal concept. When he teaches that justice and injustice, 
and right and wrong, have no place in the state of nature, he is saying neither 
more nor less than that on the basis of natural right as of a reasonable and 
intelligible claim, every man may, as he thinks fit, use all means for preserving 
his life, that every man may rightfully apply any act to any other. The difference 
in value between damage done to another ‘in accord with right reason,’ i.e., in 
self-defense, and such damage done ‘for the sake of vainglory and a false estimate 
of power’ — the difference in value between the root of justice and the root of 
injustice — is not canceled by the authorization, founded in natural right, to do 
anything whatsoever to anyone whomsoever. Rather than being canceled, it is 
asserted.155   
 
Strauss here accounts for the two different motivations of individuals who deliberately try 
to harm each other in the state of nature, drawing a distinction between unjust and just 
behavior in the state of nature despite the fact that Hobbes explicitly denies that such is 
the case. How exactly does Strauss make his case? 
As we saw in the passage quoted above, Strauss identifies two strivings behind 
the war of all against all in the state of nature: (i) the vain striving for reputation and (ii) 
the rational striving for self-preservation. Both strivings have their “foundation in the 
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striving after pleasure.”156 To strive for something, however, is not the same as actually 
obtaining the thing that is desired: attainment depends on one’s power. Hobbes defines 
power as the “sum total” of the “means at the disposal.”157 However, to this initial 
objective definition of power, Strauss adds a relational definition of power: “in any 
conflict between two human beings for the same good, the excess power of one 
contestant over the other is decisive, that excess is power simply.”158 Not the sum total, 
but the remaining sum or “excess” power after one individual’s means are subtracted 
from another’s, is power simply. The definition of power as excess is representative of 
the condition in which individuals in the state of nature are at war with one another. It is 
through his interpretation of why individuals are in competition with one another in the 
first place that Strauss connects the two different strivings for ever more power over 
others in the state of nature to a moral distinction between justice and injustice. 
2. 1. 6. The striving for reputation and the root of revealed religion 
The source behind the first will for ever-more power over others in the state of nature, 
Strauss writes, is an “irrational striving” for “honor,” “reputation,” “fame,” and is 
captured by one term: “vanity.”159 The vain striving for reputation is met by the 
attainment of “excess” power. The reason for this it that the “[r]ecognition of this excess 
or superiority [of power] by others is called honor.”160 Thus the desired end — the 
striving for reputation/honor — is inseparable from the means (the power) to attain it.161 
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This, Strauss argued, is a “reversal” of a “natural relationship” between means and ends, 
in that it is the power itself that brings happiness; power is no longer a means to an end 
(happiness) but has been transformed into the end itself, that which it was meant to attain. 
The end has thus become the perpetuation of power for the sake of reputation qua 
(excess) power. Acquired reputation/honour is the excess power one holds over another 
individual, and therefore the striving for reputation is always for power over others. It is 
thus not because the state of nature is a zero-sum game (i.e., resources are scarce and 
therefore competed for) that every individuals incessantly seeks for ever more power over 
others; rather, the war of all against all is the result of the fact that vain individuals must 
obtain more power than their competitors for their vanity to be satisfied. 
To make the case that there exists a moral distinction in the state of nature despite 
Hobbes’s explicit statement to the contrary, Strauss argues that the striving for reputation 
is a deviation from the quest for material goods, since the recognition of a person’s 
excess power is an immaterial object of desire. Using Hobbes’s materialism as the 
standard, Strauss argues that vanity is an “illegitimate” striving for power since it 
provided the means to illusory “pleasures of the mind.”162 Strauss contrasts the striving 
for “immaterial” or “non-sensual” objects to satisfy immaterial “pleasures of the mind,” 
on one hand, with the second motivation behind the incessant striving for power over 
others, on the other: the “rational” striving for power as such, in which power remains a 
legitimate means to attain a “material” or “sensual good” for the pleasure of the body.163 
The distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate striving in Strauss’s discussion 
depends on whether the pleasure attained was material (body) or immaterial (mind), as 
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well as on the ontological status of the object desired. Strauss then ties this materialism to 
reason. Reason is defined as that which is concerned with bodily self-preservation: what 
is rational is what preserves life. In accord with this aim, vanity or the striving for 
reputation is thus contrary to reason since it is immaterial, not life enhancing, and results 
in a war of all against all. For this reason, Strauss states: “Reason does not justify, but 
indeed refutes, all striving after reputation, honor, fame”164  
Importantly, Strauss points out that Hobbes also ties vanity to the source of 
revealed religion. Vanity manifests itself as gloriatio [glory]: “Gloriatio is the basis of 
prophecy, of the claim to revelation.”165 Revealed religion is thus the result of curiosity, 
fear and dreams, infused by vanity: one’s illusion of attracting the attention of spirits.166 
Since vanity is at the root of revealed religion (next to natural reason, fear and dreams) 
Strauss argues: “Religion is rejected [by Hobbes] as a creation of vanity, desire for status 
and reputation, overestimation of one’s own power, the tendency to over-tender self-
assessment.”167 So what about the rational desire to self-preservation?  
2. 1. 7. Rational striving for power as such and the root of physical science 
There are two rational strivings, Strauss suggests, or, two “justified” “determinants of 
willing”: (i) the rational desire for “domination over things” or “power as such,” of which 
natural science is an expression, and (ii) the “desire for security,” of which political 
science is an expression. 168  Physics (i.e., natural science), he wrote, is ultimately 
concerned with happiness (produce happiness through the cultivation of nature).169 
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Political science is ultimately concerned with misery (as to overcome the state of nature). 
Natural science or physics “serves man’s dominion over things”, while political science 
serves peace.170  
 Strauss explains that, for Hobbes, “happiness” “consists in the limitless increase 
of power over men and over things.”171 In Hobbes’s moral philosophy, Strauss points out 
that unlike his ancient predecessors, “there is no highest good, no final goal for desire, for 
life itself is desiring. But there remains nevertheless, a primary good, a conditio sine qua 
non of all other goods: life, bare life itself.”172 The “primary” good is thus to be alive. 
“The work of reason justifies the continuing process of advancing from one desire to the 
next, from attainment of the one object desired to that of the next object desired, with a 
view to the fact that man strives not only toward the unique pleasure of the moment, but 
toward ensuring enjoyment in the future.”173 The rational striving is to ensure future 
material enjoyment. To obtain present and future “material good” excess power is 
required; and thus, Strauss argues, just like the illegitimate vain striving for reputation, 
“[t]he legitimate striving after pleasure is [also] sublated into striving after [excess] 
power.”174  
What Strauss refers to as the striving for power as such was the legitimate striving 
for ever more power over others.175 It is impossible, Strauss further notes, to distinguish 
between self-defense and aggression in the state of nature, since in a competitive situation 
goods are “maintained only through the acquisition of more power.”176 “Reason, the 
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provident outlook on the future thus justifies the striving after power, possession, gain, 
wealth, since these provide the means to gratify the underlying desire for the pleasures of 
the senses,” which procures the “comfort and convenience of life.”177 It is out of this 
striving, Strauss argues, that natural or physical science grows. For the decisive means to 
acquire the comfort and convenience of life is physics.178 Physical science thus exists “for 
the sake of power”: that is, as a vehicle to realize a comfortable life through the scientific 
domination of nature, and to do that requires (excess) power. Yet, unlike in the case of 
vanity, the rational quest for excess power does not become the end in-itself but remains 
a means to an end (that of material survival and comfort).  
The vain immaterial striving for reputation is considered illegitimate from the 
viewpoint of the rational striving for ever greater power, whose end is to attain future 
material goods for the maintenance of life. Vanity is unjustified striving, since the quest 
for reputation is a striving for power over others and thus leads to the greatest of all evils 
— violent death (the premature end of life). But so too does the rational and scientific 
striving after power. Individuals who act to secure their self-preservation (in accord with 
reason) are forced to enter into in competition with each other over scarce resources. It is 
impossible to distinguish between self-defense and aggression in the state of nature, since 
in a competitive situation goods are “maintained only through the acquisition of more 
power.”179 The rational “striving after power of enjoyment of things turns into striving 
after power over other men”, which, just like the vain striving for excess power, leads to 
war against all.180 Perhaps it is helpful to think of the situation as an inverted invisible 
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hand: while in Adam Smith’s conception, the aggregated self-interested actions of 
individuals result in the unintended overall good of the community, the opposite is the 
result in Hobbes’s state of nature: the aggregated result from individuals acting according 
to their rational self-interest is a war of all against all. Unchecked rational striving undoes 
its life-enhancing purpose, and thus the “distinction between [rational] striving after 
power and [irrational] striving after reputation loses its importance.”181 Science can be 
used to life-enhancing ends, but if left to its own devices, the natural scientific pursuit — 
the limitless quest for ever more power (the domination over both things and individuals) 
— results in a war against all.182  
The rational striving to maintain present and future material goods “is however 
entirely illusory, as it leads to the war of all against all, in other words to a state in which 
the preservation of life and health becomes impossible.”183 Here, Strauss seems to 
suggest that both vanity and the rational striving for limitless power as such are 
illegitimate, since they both lead to a violent death. If this is the case, it is not the type of 
ontic source (bodily/material or mind/immaterial) or the ontic quality of the object 
desired (material or illusory/immaterial), or whether or not the striving is rational or 
irrational motivated, but the end result that differentiates justified from unjustified 
striving. Nevertheless, Strauss maintains that there is a moral distinction between rational 
and irrational striving in the state of nature: “But that Hobbes even at this juncture still 
sees the root of evil in the striving after reputation is shown plainly enough by his 
opposing the due evaluation of one’s own power, reason, desire for security, fear of death 
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by violence to the inanis gloria et falsa virium aestimatio.”184 The source of all just acts 
in accordance with self-preservation is rational; the false estimation of one’s power is not.  
Based on this definition, Strauss suggests that the “natural right” is “the rational 
human behavior in the state of nature,” while the striving for reputation is not a “natural 
right” because it is “contra-rational.”185 How then does Strauss come to argue that 
Hobbes secures self-preservation in accord with reason? 
For this cause, it is a command of right reason to seek peace. And this is the 
fundamental ‘law of nature’ as distinct from the right of nature. The meaning of 
this distinction is that natural right is the expression of human behavior in accord 
with reason in the state of nature, while the laws of nature are the expression of 
the conditions which underlie the transformation (required by reason) of the state 
of nature into the civilized state.186 
 
Strauss here suggests that both natural right and the law of nature are in accord with 
reason, but in the state of nature the natural right or rational pursuit for ever more power 
over others leads to a state of war, while the behavior in accordance with the rational law 
or command of nature (to seek peace) results in a social contract (peace) in which 
individual self-preservation is secured. Individuals in the state of nature, Strauss then 
explains, surrender their striving for excess power and to act in accordance with the 
rational precepts that secure life due to the “desire for security,” their “fear of violent 
death,” and “through regard of the fragility of the human body.”187  
2. 1. 8. Political science: the striving for security of life and fear of violent death 
It is with the striving for security that Hobbes’s political science enters the discussion. 
The aim of Hobbes’s “civic” philosophy is peace — which ultimately concerns the 
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maintenance of the primary good or “bare life,” not theory per se; and it is for this reason 
that Strauss argued Hobbes refers to political science as anthropology.188 While physics 
was concerned with the primary good — namely, human survival — Strauss argues that 
political science is concerned with the primary evil: death by violence.189 Given the fact 
that humans are mortals (i.e., that death is inevitable) and that Hobbes tells his readers 
that death is at times preferable over misery, Strauss argued, it is not death per se that 
constitutes the greatest misery; rather, it is the violent death in “pain” in particular. 190 
The emphasis is not on the sensation of pain (as in a painful “violent death”); 
instead, Strauss pointed out that for Hobbes “expectation of future evil is called fear.”191 
The point is that a violent (painful) death is a premature death. A violent death is 
considered the greatest of evils since it ends life prematurely and with that the continuous 
motion of attaining pleasure. Fear so understood requires a rational calculation. Outside 
of the person’s actual death, only the fear of a violent death halts the limitless striving for 
domination over others. In the state of nature everyone fears violent death since the 
“constitution of the human body is so frail, that even the weakest man may kill the 
strongest, and that easily.”192 The foundational covenant of Hobbes’s artificial state is 
prompted by the universal fear that arises when the weakest is able to kill the strongest 
with ease. Fear of violent death, Strauss argues, “sublates” both vanity and the rational 
natural right to act in whatever way is necessary to survive, into the first law of natural—
to seek peace:  
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In the final instance what is of primary concern is ensuring the continuance of life 
in the sense of ensuring defense against other men. Concern with self-protection is 
the fundamental consideration, the one must be fully in accord with the human 
situation. This is the origin of the distinction made between (moral) good and 
(moral) evil. The fear of death, the fear of death by violence, is the source of all 
right, the primary basis of natural right.193   
 
The vain striving for excess power over others in the state of nature, Strauss argues, 
“characterizes the arrogant man,” while the recognition of equal vulnerability and hence 
fear, “characterizes the modest man.”194 Mutual fear of a violent death is the ground for 
“moderate” reasoning, which Strauss in his 1936 book on Hobbes, defines as the 
bourgeois consciousness. But this discussion is for the next chapter. For now, let me 
conclude this first part with the key insight from Strauss’s first text on Hobbes that came 
to inform his exchange with Schmitt. 
  Strauss’s Hobbes conceives of the striving for ever more power over others and 
things in the state of nature as at once an irrational, vain striving for excess power, and a 
rational striving for power as such to secure future sensual goods. When the two strivings 
are left unchecked, as they are in the state of nature, a war of all against all results, in 
which every individual runs the risk of a violent death at the hands of others. A third 
desire, the striving for security, or inversely expressed as the aversion or fear of a violent 
death, brings all individuals to reason. Instrumental rationality leads individuals to follow 
the first rational law of nature: to seek peace. Peace is kept by honoring the contract 
under all circumstances, as postulated by the third law of nature. From the mutual fear of 
a violent death, individuals thus form a social contract to secure their long-term interest. 
The social contract is thus formed to guarantee self-preservation. As we shall now see, 
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turning to Strauss’s engagement with Schmitt, it is upon his argument that Hobbes 
attached an individual right to self-preservation in the state of nature, and through which, 
that Strauss develops his claim that Hobbes is the founder of a liberal morality and liberal 
civilization. In so doing, Strauss shifts from identifying the origin of liberalism in 
Christianity to finding it in Hobbes. We shall see that in his engagement with Schmitt, he 
is less concerned with the Zionist project, than with the Weimar Republic at the time, and 
liberalism in general, and the prospect of an authoritarian alternative. Yet, the insights 
from his search for a foundation of a Jewish nation-state will inform his criticism of 




















2. 2. 1. Schmitt’s concept of the political 
Strauss returned to Hobbes in “Notes on Schmitt,” written April-May 1932. Here, Strauss 
identifies Schmitt as a right-wing authoritarian critic of liberalism. Strauss’s main 
objective in this review-essay is to devise a conception of the political beyond a liberal 
horizon, from which all that is liberal has been stripped. 195 At the beginning of his 
review, Strauss restates Schmitt’s ambiguous proposition in The Concept of the Political: 
“‘the concept of the state presupposed the concept of the political.’”196 Strauss then asks 
“Against what opponent does the political emerge as the basis of the state?”197 The 
answer is liberalism. Liberalism is, for Strauss, the “movement” in which the spirit of our 
modern age, characterized by “‘neutralization and depoliticization’” has “gained its 
greatest efficacy.”198 Liberalism has put the state into question insofar as “liberalism is 
characterized precisely by the negation of the political.”199 Why?  
For Schmitt, in Strauss’s understanding, the procedural processes of a liberal, 
constitutional, representative-democratic state (i.e., the separation of power into a 
representative legislative branch that make laws after deliberation and vote, an elected 
executive that implements these laws and governs, and an independent judiciary which 
adjudicates private and public disputes) such as the Weimar Republic are intended to 
neutralize substantive political differences, so as to assure “agreement and peace at all 
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costs.”200 The overall purpose of this formal procedure is to guarantee the shared interest 
of the constituents: security of life and prosperous living, for which end international co-
operation and trade are seen as instruments to increase the wealth of the nation. Opposing 
the liberal state’s neutralization and de-politicization of the political, Schmitt argues that 
the political is defined by a “friend and enemy” distinction, which amounts to an 
insurmountable difference between groups — indiscriminately arising from any type of 
human disagreement — over which the opponents are willing to engage in a life-and-
death struggle. 201  The political antithesis between dissociated political associations 
expresses an existential enmity between groups that no arbitration, hearing, sub-
committee recommendation, parliamentary debate, vote, court room ruling, peace-treaty 
or alliance can neutralize, but is only potentially resolved in a violent conflict that 
demands of the individual the decision and readiness to sacrifice his or her life when the 
group’s “existence” is threatened.202  
From the outset of the 1930s, in the wake of the Great Depression, political 
differences were not neutralized and were not prevented from assuming increasingly anti- 
and extra-parliamentary expressions. The two anti-parliamentarian political parties, the 
National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) and the Communist Political Party (KPD), 
had won a decisive share of the popular vote in the federal elections of 1930 and 1932. 
Party politics were hardly confined to the institutions of the state, as the paramilitary 
group of the Nazis, the SA (Sturmabteilung), and that of the Communists, the RFB (Roter 
Frontkämpferbund), violently clashed in the streets. The Weimar constitution allowed the 
administration of the Chancellor to govern through presidential emergency decrees 
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without prior approval from the legislative body. Presidential governing became the order 
of the day, beginning with the appointment of Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor on March 
29, 1930. It was against this backdrop that Strauss wrote his review of Schmitt’s Concept 
of the Political, in which he, like Schmitt, held that “liberalism” had failed in Germany.  
Published in August-September of 1932, “Notes on Schmitt” was Strauss’s last 
publication before he left Germany for Paris, less than a year before the Nazis seized full 
control of the federal state under the leadership of Hitler, and introduced “legal and extra-
legal anti-Semitic actions [that] rendered him [Strauss], for all practical purposes, an 
exile.”203 Since political liberalism had “failed” in Germany — though to speak of 
“political” liberalism or a liberal “state” is for Schmitt, as for Strauss, a contradiction in 
terms — in his “Notes on Schmitt,” Strauss argues that the alternative state, the unliberal 
state, “can be understood only from the position of the political.”204   
But there are problems with Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss argues. 
Schmitt fails to free the concept from its liberal trappings, and thus remains within the 
                                                
203  Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, 54. Strauss left Germany for Paris on a Rockefeller 
Fellowship in the fall of 1932, “[a]fter Schmitt personally saw to the publication of Strauss’s 
commentary on his own Concept of the Political, he wrote a strong letter of recommendation on behalf of 
Strauss, successfully securing a fellowship for him to conduct research abroad on Hobbes” (Sheppard, 
Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, 56). According to Meier, Schmitt’s letter was based on a draft of 
the never completed 1931-32 Planned book on Hobbes (Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, ix).  
Letters by Cassirer and Guttmann did also accompany the application (Green, Philosophy and the Crisis 
of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought, 4). In a letter to Schmitt from Paris on 
July 10, 1933, Strauss wrote: “I would like to inform you that the Rockefeller Fellowship, which I 
essentially owe to your evaluation of the first part (submitted to you) of my studies on Hobbes, has now 
been awarded to me for a second year” (The letter is translated in Meier, The Hidden Dialogue,128). The 
extension that began October 3, 1933, enabled Strauss to continue his study of Hobbes in London and 
Cambridge. On April 26, 1934, John. V. Van Sickle (at the European Office, Paris, of the Rockefeller 
foundation) informed Strauss that the fellowship had not been extended for an additional third year (Leo 
Strauss Papers [Box 3, Folder 8] Special Collection Research Center, University of Chicago Library). 
Instead, as R. H. Tawney notes in a letter dated February 20, 1936, “Cambridge gave him [Strauss] a 
studentship for two years [1934-36], which is now expiring” Leo Strauss Papers [Box 3, Folder 14] 
Special Collection Research Center, University of Chicago Library).  
204  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 92, emphasis added. 
 75 
“horizon of liberalism.”205 Schmitt, according to Strauss, devises his concept of the 
political polemically, and as such, in dialectical opposition to liberalism, it is the relation 
between the two — rather than their difference — that appears decisive. It is a defect that 
Strauss set out to correct. I follow Meier in arguing that Strauss demonstrates how the 
difference between liberalism and Schmitt’s conception of the political dissolves in two 
ways. As I will unpack below, Strauss suggests that Schmitt’s definition of the political is 
trapped in a liberal worldview of thinking about all aspects of human life as different 
provinces of culture. For purpose of clarity, I will refer to this dimension of Strauss 
understanding of liberalism as the liberal thought horizon. When Strauss extricates 
Schmitt’s political ontology from the liberal thought horizon, by arguing that the deadly 
enmity between friend and enemy is what makes the political authoritative in relation to 
the other domains of culture, the concept of the political still remains trapped in liberal 
morality, or what I will call for clarity, the liberal moral horizon. The reason for this, 
Strauss argues, is that Schmitt’s existential conception of the political as defined by the 
orientation towards the “readiness to die” is only the inverse of the liberal moral horizon 
as defined by an overarching interest in security of life, and which Hobbes, according to 
Strauss in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, had negatively and affectively expressed as the 
avoidance of violent death.206 
To get out of the liberal moral entrapment, Meier has argued that Strauss presents 
two potential alternative unliberal metaphysical grounds for the political: first, a 
transcendental foundation that Strauss argues covertly grounds Schmitt’s political 
distinction between friend and enemy. It is this hidden metaphysical “center” of 
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Schmitt’s thought, Meier suggests, which makes Schmitt a political theologian. 207 
However, I am not fully convinced by Meier’s argument that Strauss detects a 
transcendental foundation behind Schmitt’s conception of the political. For one, as we 
shall see, by replacing the Hobbesian existential horizon of violent death with religious 
faith, the notion of a political-theological conception of the political seems to fall back 
into the liberal thought horizon insofar as the deadly enmity no longer defines the 
political as authoritative. This brings us to the second unliberal metaphysical ground for 
the political; namely, human nature, which Strauss advances as his own (metaphysical) 
ground. Strauss attempts to shift from Schmitt’s immanent/anti-metaphysical/groundless 
conception of the political (or according to Meier, hidden providence, or “metaphysical”) 
to the plane of human nature by turning to Hobbes; more precisely, by arguing that 
Schmitt’s political antagonism is in essence analogous with the natural antagonism found 
in Hobbes’s state of nature. It is toward human nature in the state of nature that Strauss 
looks for an unliberal morality as the foundation for the political and a non-liberal state.  
2. 2. 2. The liberal thought horizon 
The problem Schmitt faced in his polemical attack on liberalism, Strauss argues, is that 
although political liberalism in Germany had been largely defeated, the “systematic of 
liberal thought” remained persistent and that the liberal worldview remained total and 
pervasive.208 Meier shows that Strauss, in praising Schmitt as being “wholly alone,” not 
only in his awareness of this difficulty, but also in formulating the task that lay ahead, is 
also alerting him to his shortcomings. Strauss notes that Schmitt seeks “to replace the 
‘astonishingly consistent systematics of liberal thought’ by ‘another system’, namely, ‘a 
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system that does not negate the political but brings it into recognition.’”209 Yet, since the 
“‘systematics of liberal thought’ has ‘still not been replaced in Europe today by any other 
system,’ it is to be expected that he [Schmitt], too, will be compelled to make use of 
elements of liberal thought in the presentation of his views.”210 And thus, for Strauss, 
Schmitt’s conception of the political remains within the liberal thought horizon. How 
exactly? 
Strauss first addresses liberalism in respect to the dominance of “liberal thought” 
— exemplified by the work of Strauss’s former professor at the University of Marburg, 
Paul Natorp — which Strauss defines as a “philosophy of culture,” in which the genus of 
culture encompasses “the totality” of “‘human thought’” and action,” divided into 
“‘provinces of culture,’” such as the “aesthetic,” the “moral,” and the “economic.”211 
Strauss thus treats liberalism as more than a species of political thought, seeing it instead 
as a worldview encompassing the whole of social life. Like a Nietzschean horizon, this 
whole is all pervasive and Schmitt cannot avoid thinking within its parameters. These 
various provinces of culture are defined as relatively “‘autonomous’” from one another, 
each having its own criteria of assessment.212 The “ultimate” distinction in the moral 
domain is “good and evil;” in the aesthetic domain it is “beautiful and ugly;” in the 
economic domain it “useful and harmful.”213  The political, according to Schmitt’s 
classification, is located as a species alongside the others and given its own criterion: the 
opposition between “friend” and “enemy.”214 So defined, the concept of the political 
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remains within the liberal thought horizon, insofar as the political remains a species of 
culture. Having pointed out this conceptual short-coming, Strauss is ready to offer 
Schmitt a hand out of the liberal entrapment, as Meier points out, by “pay[ing] more 
attention to what distinguishes Schmitt from the prevailing view than to the respect in 
which he merely follows the prevailing view.”215  
That which distinguished Schmitt’s view from the prevailing view lies not in an 
exhaustive account of the political, Strauss argues, but in what is specific to the 
political.216 The “criterion” for Schmitt’s concept of the political, Strauss argues, is the 
“distinction between friend and enemy,” and the “essence,” or what is “specific” to the 
concept of the political, is that the enmity between friend and enemy is potentially 
deadly, by being oriented towards the exceptional state of emergency, “war,” in which 
there is a “real possibility of physical killing.”217 It is this essence that locates the political 
beyond the liberal thought horizon insofar as the political antagonism potentially could 
arise out of any type of conflict within an autonomous domains of culture, when the 
enmity between two groups is intensified to the degree that it calls for the negation of the 
other group’s existence and is thus “total.”218 In this way — when the opponents’ 
readiness to kill and be killed defines a disagreement within any domain — the political 
becomes “authoritative”: it overrules any specific criterion, and as such, Strauss argues, is 
a “fundamental” or “existential” category rather than a “‘relatively independent domain’ 
alongside others.”219 The political is immanently caused; it is the existential threat — the 
willingness to kill and die — posed by the distinction between enemy and friend that 
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defines the political.220  
When cast as authoritative in Strauss’s understanding, Schmitt’s concept of the 
political transcends the horizon of liberal thought, but, in so doing, Strauss argues, 
remains within the liberal moral horizon. In Meier’s words, its “orientation” to death, 
which is the inverse of liberalism's “orientation” to life in that neither of the two is 
qualified with respect to the question of the “right life,” or what it is that “ultimately 
matters for man.”221 And therefore the affirmation of the political as such is the 
“affirmation of fighting as such, wholly irrespective of what is being fought for.”222 From 
within this view of the political as immanent, “he who affirms the political as such 
respects and tolerates all ‘serious’ convictions, that is, all decisions oriented to the real 
possibility of war.”223 Schmitt’s immanent definition of the political is thus inverted 
liberalism in that it replaces a liberal preference for life, for “peace” as secured by the 
procedural “legal order,” with an “orientation” towards violent death, towards “the real 
possibility of war.”224 So defined, the concept of the political remains within the liberal 
moral horizon. Since “the affirmation of the political as such proves to be a liberalism 
with the opposite polarity,” Strauss argues that Schmitt “remains trapped in the view that 
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he is attacking.”225 The “affirmation” of the political as such, Meier argues, disregards an 
unliberal morality, while the answer to the question of a “right life” qualitatively 
identifies what is being fought over, and above all, the materiality of life.226 So what 
makes a right life; or in other words, what makes something worth killing for beside 
survival?  
2 .2. 3. Political theology; the transcendental ground 
It is in answer to the question of a moral principle that transcend life and death that Meier 
suggests Strauss reveals in Schmitt's texts a hidden religious morality. Meier argues that 
in “Notes on Schmitt”, Strauss restores an unliberal morality (against a “neutral” 
conception of friend and enemy as empty signifiers that can assume any referents) to 
Schmitt’s concept of the political by revealing that it does indeed matters for Schmitt who 
the enemy is and what is “being fought for.”227 He suggests that it is God who determines 
the natural enemy (the referent).228 Religious faith is that which is being fought over.229 
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of the Jewish people to the Torah” (125). And the “weapon, or the trick, of Orthodoxy is to try to force 
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The “hidden” ground of the political is thus, transcendental (or in Meier’s words, 
“metaphysical”), not immanent: “Schmitt embarks upon his confrontation with liberalism 
in the name of the political, and he pursues it for the sake of religion.”230 By his own 
understanding then, Meier suggests, “Schmitt is a political theologian.”231 Schmitt’s 
“faith in revelation” is the preposition or ground for the concept of the political.232 Meier 
concludes that Strauss in his review identifies the intention and the disguised objective of 
the author of The Concept of the Political. 233  While Schmitt never expressly 
acknowledges that his conception of the political was grounded in religion and that he 
sees the friend-enemy binary as an antagonism between rival faiths, Meier argues that in 
the third and final edition of The Concept of the Political (published in the summer of 
1933), Schmitt “conducts a hidden dialogue with Leo Strauss,” by silently incorporating 
Strauss’s comments, and “disclos[ing] more of his identity as a political theologian than 
he had revealed in 1927 or 1932.” 234   
Along the lines of his claim that the criterion for the political ontology that 
Schmitt polemically advanced — the distinction between friend and enemy — is 
“metaphysical,” Meier explains that the political decision between friend and enemy, in 
any given historical circumstance of emergence, is a response to the “command” that 
absolute “obedience” to God requires. Concrete moments in history call for a decision 
                                                                                                                                            
presupposition,” something that Strauss asserts, could “never be obtained by the majority of 
contemporary Jewry” (125, emphasis added). The dogmatic presupposition is the belief in revealed 
religion; as identified and attacked by Breuer, in what Strauss calls a political “weapon,” — a genuine 
“political publication” (125).  
230  Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, 30, emphasis added. 
231  Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, xiv.   
232  Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, xiv, xv. 
233  Meier account as proof that after the publication of his book, The Hidden Dialogue, Rudolph Sohm 
informed him in 1988 that Schmitt in mid-1930 had said the following about Strauss’s “Notes on 
Schmitt”: “You’ve got to read that.  He saw through me and X-rayed me as nobody else has” (Meier, The 
Hidden Dialogue, xvii).  
234  Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, 50; The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction 
between Political Theology and Political Philosophy, 68, emphasis added. 
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between faiths — between “God” and “Anti-Christ”/”Satan.” 235 And it is as the act of a 
political theologian, Meier argues, that we should see Schmitt’s public decision to join 
the NSDAP on May 1, 1933—the same year that the final edition of The Concept of the 
Political appeared.236 Whatever it was that informed Schmitt’s decision to join the 
National Socialist party, it was a decision unknown to Strauss, who resided in Paris at the 
time, oblivious to the fact that he had, as a Jew, been decisively marked as a public 
enemy by Schmitt.237 Schmitt’s political decision in favor of Hitlerism (according to 
Meier, over “Satan”) was, according to Jacob Klein, also the private reason why Schmitt 
never responded to the letter Strauss sent him from Paris.238 
An assessment of the accuracy of Meier’s disclosure of Schmitt’s hidden theology 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is for others to quarrel over what kind of Grand 
Inquisitor Schmitt was. The concern here is thus not with Schmitt's conception of the 
political or political theology per se, but only with Strauss’s understanding and 
modification of Schmitt’s concept of the political. I agree with Meier that Strauss sought 
to complete Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, and that Strauss holds that Schmitt’s concept 
of the political fell back into the liberal moral horizon when extricated from the liberal 
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thought horizon. I am not, however, as stated earlier, fully convinced by Meier’s 
argument that Strauss identifies a hidden theology behind Schmitt’s conception of the 
political. I agree with Meier that Strauss calls for a metaphysical and moral ground for 
the political — as we shall see in a moment — and I follow Meier in arguing that Strauss 
turns to human nature, by the means of Hobbes, to find that ground. But if it is God who 
for Schmitt determines the political enmity and assigns the “natural” or “providential” 
enemy, it is religion, not the political, that is supposedly authoritative — decisive and 
divisive. 239 Even if Meier is right that Strauss detected a theological bias behind 
Schmitt’s conception of the political, it is certain — and on this point Meier and I agree 
— that it is not a stance that Strauss as an atheist finds satisfactory. Neither that which 
Meier defines as Schmitt’s hidden (unliberal) moral political theology, nor his open and 
immanent (liberal-moral) political ontology, satisfies Strauss in answering why the 
political antagonism arises in the first instance. He accepts Schmitt’s conception of what 
the political is — the mortal antagonism — but not why it arises.  
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2. 2. 4. Political philosophy; on the plane of human nature 
Strauss shares Schmitt’s aim to radically critique liberalism. It is to this end that Strauss 
seeks to make Schmitt’s case — his concept of the political — as strong as possible, 
Meier argues, by tying it to the plane of political philosophy.240 I agree with Meier that 
Strauss sets about discovering a metaphysical ground for the political, which he finds in 
human nature. To do so, Strauss shifts the ground of the political from the plane of 
immanence to human nature by turning to Hobbes.   
In order to reorient the investigation away from the liberal philosophy of culture 
in general, Strauss poses and answers the question: What is culture? Against liberal 
thought, which he argued divides human thought and actions into independent domains 
(species) and furthermore, understands culture itself (the genus) to be autonomous, 
Strauss argues that culture is not independent or sovereign from nature: culture “is 
certainly the culture of nature.”241 Culture, he argues, can either build on our natural 
attributes and dispositions, i.e. “the nurture of nature,” or, as in the case of liberalism, it 
can “fight” or try to “conquer” what it understands as a disordered nature.242 Independent 
of the question of whether culture cultivates or fights nature, Strauss argues that nature is 
a necessary cause for the existence of culture. From this perspective, he infers that when 
culture is seen as its own “sovereign creation” — as it is in liberal thought — that nature 
is “forgotten.”243  
Strauss argues, however, that Hobbes does not forget nature. Nor does Strauss, 
who reminds his readers that the “presupposition of culture is primarily human nature; 
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and because man is by nature an animal sociale [social animal], the human nature on 
which culture is based is the natural social relations of men, that is, the way in which 
man, prior to all culture, behaves toward other men.”244 He is aware that for Hobbes, 
“man is by nature” precisely not a social animal, but an asocial, or anti-social being.245 
But for Strauss, who sided with Aristotle (and Heidegger) against Hobbes on this point, 
anti-sociality is still a social relation.246 Put in this light, Schmitt’s conception of the 
political, defined by the potentiality of physical killing — and “not in actual fighting; but 
in the known disposition thereto” — is resonant of Hobbes’ state of nature (status 
naturalis) qua state of war (status belli).247 The criterion of the political — the political 
enmity between friend and enemy — Strauss argues, reflects the natural social 
antagonism between individuals described in Hobbes’s state of nature.248 Adopting 
Schmitt’s terminology, Strauss thus asserts that Hobbes’s state of nature “is the genuinely 
political status.”249  
While arguing that Hobbes’s state of nature and Schmitt’s concept of the political 
are in essence identical, Strauss accounts for a compositional difference between the two, 
as well as a formal difference. The first difference is that the war of all against all in 
Hobbes is between individuals, while in Schmitt's concept of the political enmity occurs 
between groups. By transposing Schmitt’s concept of the political to Hobbes’s state of 
nature, Strauss individualizes the political. The second, and formal, difference between 
Schmitt's concept of the political and Hobbes’s state of nature is what puts the first fully 
                                                
244  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 98, emphasis added; see also Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, 32. 
245  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 98. 
246 Strauss. Planned Book on Hobbes. Leo Strauss Papers, [Box 15, Folder 2], Special Collections Research 
Center, University of Chicago Library.  
247  Meier, The Hidden Dialogue, 32.   
248  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” “Notes on Hobbes,” 98. 
249  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 98-99. 
 86 
at odds with liberalism. Namely, that while Hobbes’s purpose is to overcome or “negate” 
the state of nature, Schmitt’s “affirmation of the political is the affirmation of the state of 
nature.”250 As Strauss writes: “It follows that the political that Schmitt brings to bear as 
fundamental is the ‘state of nature’ that underlies every culture; Schmitt restores the 
Hobbesian concept of the state of nature to a place of honor.”251 Schmitt, however, 
according to his immanent conception of the “political as such,” argues that all political 
“concepts, ideas and words” are historically specific and “polemical,” paralleling 
Hobbes’s rhetorical use of the state of nature, but, Strauss argued, for the opposite 
reason.252 While Schmitt sets out to restore the political and critique liberalism in a liberal 
world, Hobbes set out to found liberalism in an unliberal world.253  
To negate the solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short existence in the state of 
nature, Hobbes proposes in the Leviathan that each individual consent, together with all 
other individuals, to enter into a covenant, under an absolute, inalienable, and 
indefeasible Sovereign on the basis that each surrenders their natural right to all things. 
The subjects sanction the Sovereign’s power on the condition, Strauss argues, that the 
“securing of life is the ultimate basis of the state.”254 And here Strauss introduces a key 
insight that is absent from Spinoza’s Critique of Religion: the citizens’ obedience to the 
state is conditioned by the state’s protection of the life of the citizens. Hobbes’s sovereign 
might demand that its citizens die as soldiers on a battlefield, or exact capital punishment 
for crimes committed. However, Strauss argues that the citizens are not morally obliged 
to obey secular commands that negate their own self-preservation: “Therefore, while man 
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is otherwise obliged to unconditional obedience, he is under no obligation to risk his life; 
for death is the greatest evil.”255 The natural right to life is thus not annulled by the 
introduction of the rational natural laws or precepts in which the unconditional liberty to 
exercise whatever means needed for survival is forgone by the individuals’ own decision 
to enter into a covenant:  
The right to the securing of life pure and simple — and this right sums up 
Hobbes’s natural right — has fully the character of an inalienable human right, 
that is, of an individual’s claim that takes precedence over the state and 
determines its purpose and its limits; Hobbes’s foundation for the natural-right 
claim to the securing of life pure and simple sets the path to the whole system of 
human rights in the sense of liberalism, if his foundation does not actually make 
such a course necessary.256 
 
Each individual's natural right to self-preservation is the first spring of a liberal doctrine 
that Strauss argues leads to Schmitt’s characterization of liberalism as “‘de-
politicization’” and as the withering away of the state. In liberal civilization — a 
“pacifist,” “international” society of individuals, a “‘partnership in consumption and 
production’” — the rational rules of commerce and “‘the economic technical 
centralization’” replace the political strife over insurmountable differences also between 
national entities.257 And due to “this very fact,” Strauss asserts that Hobbes “is the 
founder of liberalism.”258  
But even though Hobbes builds his authoritarian state on the negation of the state 
of nature, Strauss points out that: 
Hobbes differs from developed liberalism only, but certainly, by his knowing and 
seeing against what the liberal ideal of civilization has to be persistently fought 
for: not merely against rotten institutions, against the evil will of a ruling class, 
but against the natural evil of man [die natürliche Bosheit des Menschen]; in an 
                                                
255  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 100.   
256  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 100-01.   
257  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 108.   
258  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 100. 
 88 
unliberal world Hobbes forges ahead to lay the foundation of liberalism against 
the — sit venia verbo — unliberal nature of man, whereas later men, ignorant of 
their premises and goals, trust in the original goodness (based on God’s creation 
and providence) of human nature or, on the basis of natural-scientific neutrality, 
nurse hopes for an improvement of nature, hopes unjustified by man’s experience 
of himself.259  
 
Liberals' “trust in original goodness (based on God’s creation and providence)” stipulates 
that humans by nature are good, and their “natural-scientific neutrality” holds that 
humans by nature are educable. For Schmitt, in his polemic against the “Left,” Strauss 
argues, the “ultimate [political] quarrel occurs not between bellicosity and pacifism (or 
nationalism and internationalism) but between the ‘authoritarian and anarchistic 
theories.’”260 Strauss further claims that this is an argument over whether man is by 
nature good or evil: “[t]he quarrel between the authoritarian and the anarchistic theories 
concerns whether man is by nature evil or good.”261 While a theory of the state in 
accordance with an understanding of human nature as moral evil is authoritarian — the 
“foundation of the Right” — a theory of the state in accordance with an understanding of 
human nature as good — the foundation of the “Left” — is liberal or socialist.262 Since 
Hobbes puts individual liberty, as a natural right, prior to obedience, Strauss argues that 
Hobbes, like Spinoza, denies sin.263 When Hobbes sees the “natural evil of man” in the 
state of nature, it is thus understood as animal evil, “innocent evil,” “dangerous” but 
“educable.”264  
And once one understands man’s evil as the innocent ‘evil’ of the beast, but of a 
beast that can become astute through injury and thus can be educated, the limit one 
sets for education finally becomes a matter of mere ‘supposition’—whether very 
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narrow limits, as set by Hobbes himself, who therefore became an adherent of 
absolute monarchy; or broader limits such as those of liberalism; or whether one 
imagines education as capable of just about everything, as anarchism does. The 
opposition between evil and good loses its keen edge, it loses its very meaning, as 
soon as evil is understood as innocent “evil” and thereby goodness is understood as 
an aspect of evil itself. The task therefore arises – for purposes of the radical 
critique of liberalism that Schmitt strives for – of nullifying the view of human evil 
as animal evil and thus innocent evil, and to return to the view of human evil as 
moral baseness.265   
 
Thus, contrary to Hobbes and Spinoza, Meier argues, Schmitt must hold — “for purposes 
of the radical critique of liberalism that he strives for” — that humans are morally evil.266 
Meier suggests that Schmitt’s concept of the political thus presupposes the theological, in 
which humans are evil due to original sin, not as a “goal,” but in order to “provide a 
foundation for its own [the political’s] necessity.”267 In contrast, Strauss argues that 
Hobbes “understood man as ‘evil like the beast’” and thus “evil as innocent ‘evil.’”268 
Innocent evil only confirms the “dangerousness” of humans. However, a Right-wing 
authoritarian political theory — be it theological (Meier’s Schmitt) or non-theological 
(Strauss) — must assert human evil as distinctly human and moral. 
There are thus two interconnected conceptions of the political at play in Strauss’s 
commentary on Schmitt’s text: (i) the friend-enemy distinction that is oriented toward 
“dire emergency” and (ii) “the natural evil of man”, which Strauss argues is the principle 
or the “ultimate foundation of the Right.”269 The dynamic of this double nature of the 
political is revisited in a letter Strauss wrote to Schmitt from Berlin on September 4, 
1932. In the letter, Strauss stresses that Schmitt’s additional distinction between Left and 
Right — that between “internationalist pacifism and bellicose nationalism” — was 
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“incompatible” with the ultimate foundation of the Left-and-Right distinction, which 
Strauss identifies as “anarchy versus authority.”270 Strauss asks Schmitt to account for the 
collapsing of “authoritarian order” with “bellicose nationalism,” as it could “hardly be 
wholly accidental.”271 He then offers an abbreviated version of what could be the linkage 
between authoritarianism and nationalism.272 Because “man is moral evil” (the principal 
for a Right-wing authoritarian theory of the state) he needs dominion. However, 
dominion can be “established” only if there exists a national political community, which 
requires the friend-enemy distinction insofar as an “association of men is necessarily a 
separation from other men,” and this requires bellicose nationalism.273 As we saw in the 
first part of this chapter, this was the case for political Zionism, for which political 
disassociation was required for political association/identity to form. Strauss initially felt 
that political Zionism was lacking and turned to religion for a ground for the Jewish 
nation, before abandoning this quest in the late 1920s.274 Strauss thus holds that Schmitt’s 
proposition that the “concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” cannot 
be meant to suggest that the political provided a “constitutive principle” of the state, but 
is only “conditional.”275 The task that remains incomplete for Strauss at the end of “Notes 
on Schmitt,” is that of grounding a morality of good and evil in human nature for the 
concept of the political to be (i) constitutive of, and (ii) transcend the liberal moral 
horizon.  
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Meier argues that for Schmitt, as a political theologian, since human evil is 
something “known” through faith, then, at their very best, “philosophy” or 
“anthropology” can only confirm what is already known by faith and thus they are not 
“decisive.”276 And if human evil is known through faith, Schmitt, Meier argues, does not 
need to entertain the “‘question of the natural qualities of man.’”277 Implied by Meier is 
that Strauss (a “political philosopher”) contrary to Schmitt’s view from within political 
theology, must precisely “entertain” the “‘question of the natural qualities of man.’” 278 
Meier argues that shifting attention away from Schmitt’s transcendental ground, to the 
plane of human nature — moving, in other words, from political theology to political 
philosophy — Strauss is able to uncover a different source behind political enmity and 
moral evil. In order to replace theology with a study of human nature as the ground for an 
unliberal morality the answer of what it is in human nature that makes “man evil” must 
be given. I agree with Meier that Strauss must, and as we shall see in the next chapter, 
also comes to entertain the “natural qualities of man” in order to prove that the human 
animal, unlike other animals, is evil by nature.279 Independently of whether or not Meier 
is correct about Schmitt’s hidden theology, he is thus right in that “[t]he quarrel between 
the authoritarian and the anarchistic theories [which] concerns whether man is by nature 
evil or good,” takes an “anthropological” turn in Strauss consecutive studies of Hobbes in 
the 1930s.  
2. 3. 1. Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that Strauss’s concern with the relationship between 
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religion, politics and philosophy informs his early writings. He initially finds political 
Zionism wanting, and first advocates for religion as the ground for Jewish nationalism. 
However, in 1928, Strauss seems to have adopted Hobbes’s political rationalism when he 
argued for a purely rationalist Zionist political project. However, Strauss never trusts 
liberal rights, or the rational liberal contract as capable of repressing the natural evil of 
man, nor (as we see in his commentary on Schmitt) does he think it is desirable. In his 
review of The Concept of the Political, Strauss reads Hobbes in light of Schmitt, and 
presents Hobbes as the unacknowledged founder of liberalism whose lessons — that the 
human animal is antagonistic by nature — have been forgotten and ignored by later 
liberals. Motivated by some of the same concerns that motivate Schmitt, Strauss delivers 
a sympathetic critique of Schmitt’s concept of the political by reference to Hobbes’s 
political theory. He adopts Schmitt’s concept, but attempts to modify it to better serve the 
purpose of criticizing liberalism. He then sets about discovering what he thinks is an 
adequate ground for the political and finds that foundation in human nature. 
Strauss’s interpretation of Hobbes is thus informed by his larger political and 
philosophical commitments. He uses Hobbes to point the way toward an alternative to 
liberalism. As we shall see in the next chapter, Strauss’s aim is to clear the ground for a 
right-wing authoritarian political order in accordance with a moral ontological 
understanding of human nature, something that we have seen Strauss begins, but does not 
complete, in his essay on Schmitt. If the concept of the political is to transcend the liberal 
moral horizon, human moral evil has to be differentiated from innocent animal evil. It 
was the insight that Schmitt’s political antagonism is in important respects analogous 
with the natural antagonism in Hobbes’s state of nature that allows Strauss to seek an 
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answer to the question of why the political antagonism arises in the first place. Once the 
correspondence between Schmitt’s political antagonism and the natural antagonism in 
Hobbes’s state of nature has been established, Strauss, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
can return to Hobbes and raise the question anew: why is the state of nature a state of 
war?  
In “Notes on Schmitt,” Strauss withholds an explanation as to why it is that all 
individuals incessantly seek to increase their power over others that he accounted for in 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion: vanity and the rational pursuit of power. The most 
theoretically plausible reason for this is because Hobbes’s scientific view of human 
nature does not adequately differentiate, neither psychologically nor morally, between 
humans and animals. Hobbes’s scientific view of the human animal presents human 
nature as innocent as animals — human beings might be nasty, but they are not morally 
evil — and hence educable and good. The assertion that humans are by nature evil could 
thus not be established by appealing to Hobbes in the way Strauss had presented 
Hobbes’s anthropology in “Notes on Schmitt.” In the next chapter, we shall see how 
Strauss solves this problem by differentiating between a scientific and pre-scientific view 












Strauss’s Critique of Liberalism; 
Vanity and Evil in Hobbes 
 
 
3. 0. 1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we observed how Strauss aligns Schmitt’s political enmity with 
the antagonism in Hobbes’s state of nature in the early 1930s, and in so doing, in 
Strauss’s view, grounds the political in human nature. In the final paragraph of “Notes on 
Schmitt,” Strauss states his “principal intention” for having engaged Schmitt in the first 
place:  
The critique introduced by Schmitt against liberalism can therefore be completed 
only if one succeeds in gaining a horizon beyond liberalism. In such a horizon 
Hobbes completed the foundation of liberalism. A radical critique of liberalism is 
thus possible only on the basis of an adequate understanding of Hobbes.280   
 
I will suggest in this chapter that Strauss in his consequent studies of Hobbes in the 1930s 
sets out to complete his radical critique of liberalism by locating the cause behind why 
the state of nature is a state of war. The answer to why the state of nature is a state of war 
(and by extension, why the political antagonism arises in the first place) lies in the answer 
to why each individual incessantly strives for ever more power over others.  
                                                
280  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 119.   
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I will argue that in “Some Notes on the Political Science of Hobbes” (henceforth, 
“Notes on Hobbes”), published in 1933, Strauss locates the cause behind the natural qua 
political antagonism in vanity. To philosophically demonstrate the ground for a right-
wing authoritarian state and move beyond the liberal horizon, Strauss has to establish 
“the natural evil of man [die natürliche Bosheit des Menschen]” as distinctly human and 
moral.281 I suggest along the lines of Xenos that the demonstration of why humans are by 
nature morally evil is presented in Strauss’s 1936 book, The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (henceforth, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes).282 
However, I disagree with Xenos’s supporting argument that in order to show that humans 
are “naturally evil,” Strauss “reconstitute[s] the pre-liberal moral universe that Hobbes 
attempted to erase and, ultimately, to resuscitate a pre-liberal notion of natural law.”283  
The consensus in the secondary literature — contrary to Strauss’s own claim — is 
that Strauss held that an “adequate understanding of Hobbes” was not sufficient to 
accomplish the move beyond the liberal moral horizon.284 Janssens, sharing Xenos’s 
position, describes the final paragraph in “Notes on Schmitt” as “somewhat deceptive” in 
that it “suggest[s] that adequately understanding Hobbes is both the necessary and the 
sufficient condition for gaining a horizon beyond liberalism,” while in fact Strauss had 
“already begun to recover the horizon beyond liberalism within and against which 
Hobbes founded liberalism and the modern concept of culture; the horizon of nomos or 
law as a ‘concrete binding order of life,’ common to revealed religion and Socratic-
                                                
281  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,”101; original in Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 225.  
282  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 57. 
283  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 57. 
284  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens,146. See also Peter Minowitz, Straussophobia: Defending Leo 
Strauss and Straussians Against Shadia Drury and Other Accusers (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2009), 181-82, 213n 18; Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 19.  
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Platonic philosophy.” 285  Janssens further argues that “only through a recovery of 
Socratic-Platonic political philosophy” was it possible for Strauss “to develop a moral-
political outlook on human evil without reverting to a hidden religious framework as in 
the case of [Carl] Schmitt.”286 Janssens pulls support for his claim from Strauss’s semi-
autobiographical preface to the 1965 English edition of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, in 
which Strauss identifies a “change in orientation” after his own realization that a return to 
the ancient thought was possible when writing “Notes on Schmitt.”287   
Contrary to Janssens and Xenos, I advance the hypothesis that in The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes Strauss transposes a Biblical morality — without its transcendental 
foundation in God — onto human nature in his conception of human evil. What Strauss 
writes about Heidegger, in his semi-autobiographical preface to Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion, rings true also of the tension on display in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: 
Heidegger “wishes to expel from philosophy the last relics of Christian theology,” but 
instead “he interprets human life in the light of ‘being towards death,’ ‘anguish,’ 
‘conscience,’ and ‘guilt’; in this most important respect he is much more Christian than 
Nietzsche. The efforts of the new thinking to escape from the evidence of the Biblical 
understanding of man, i.e., from Biblical morality, have failed.”288 As we shall see, 
Strauss in his book on Hobbes, like Heidegger, casts man’s morality, the question of 
human evil [böse] in terms of guilt [Schuld]. Like Heidegger, Strauss does not escape 
Biblical morality in his inter-war writing on Hobbes. Unlike much of the secondary 
                                                
285  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens, 146. 
286  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens,144, emphasis added. 
287  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 31. The biographical preface was written in 1962. “Notes on 
Schmitt” was included in the appendix to the first (published in 1965) English edition of Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion, and consequently removed from the 1997 paperback edition.  
288  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion,12-13, emphasis added.  
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literature, I will not pay much heed to what Strauss has to say retrospectively about his 
younger self, at least not until we have arrived there chronologically. Instead, I will take 
the 1932 Strauss at his word, and make it this chapter’s hypothesis that he does indeed 
mean that a radical critique of liberalism that moves beyond its moral horizon — having 
already overcome the horizon of liberal thought with his return from culture to nature — 
is “possible only on the basis of an adequate understanding of Hobbes.” 289   
This is the objective and direction repeated in “Notes on Hobbes,” Strauss’s first 
publication after he had moved to Paris in the fall of 1932: “whoever wishes to engage in 
either a radical justification or a radical critique of liberalism must return to Hobbes.”290 
In Paris, Strauss began to work on a manuscript with a working title similar to his 
Spinoza book, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion: A Contribution to Understanding the 
Enlightenment (henceforth, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion).291 He stopped working on the 
manuscript in 1934, a few months after moving to London, and never completed it.292 
Later that year, Strauss gained access to the Hobbes papers, held by the Cavendish family 
in Chatsworth. By this time, Strauss had also abandoned his Planned book on Hobbes, 
that had swelled to two chapters of approximately 100 pages.293 Strauss had sent parts of 
the manuscript to Schmitt to use as backdrop for a recommendation letter for the 
                                                
289  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 119.   
290  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 122, emphasis added. 
291  Published posthumously first in Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3; in English translation, Strauss, 
Hobbes’s Critique of Religion and Related Writings, translated by Bartlett and Minkov. Chicago - 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
292  Meier have suggested two reasons why Strauss never completed his manuscript on Hobbes’s critique of 
religion. The first practical: the difficulty in finding a publisher discouraged him from completing 
another German manuscript on Hobbes. The other theoretical: in a letter to Krüger in December 1935, 
Strauss writes that he will postpose his study of Hobbes in order “to gain clarity first of all about the 
history of Platonism in the Islamic and Jewish Middle Ages” (Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 
14).  
293  Leo Strauss, Planned Book on Hobbes c) Einleitung, Kapitel I and II, 97 pages 1930-1931. Leo Strauss 
Papers, [15, Folder 2], Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library 
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Rockefeller Foundation that the latter wrote on Strauss' behalf.294 Strauss’s study of 
Hobbes culminated in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, published in 1936. The 
original German manuscript, Hobbes’ politische Wissenshaft in ihrer Genesis [Hobbes’ 
Political Science and its Genesis] had been completed the year before, in 1935, the same 
year that Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and 
His Predecessors [Philosophie und Gesetz. Beiträge zum Verständnis Maimunis und 
seiner Vorlaufer] (henceforth, Philosophy and Law) was published by a Jewish publisher, 
Schoken Verlag, in Berlin. Due to the difficult publishing situation in Germany for a 
Jewish author, Strauss could not secure a German publisher for his book on Hobbes. 
Eventually, Clarendon press in Oxford accepted the non-English manuscript for 
publication and Sinclair translated the book under Strauss’s close supervision.295  
In the previous chapter, I showed that Strauss’s discussion of Hobbes in Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion identifies three human desires in Hobbes’s philosophy, and adopts 
Schmitt’s conception of the political as defined by a concrete antagonism, but not 
Schmitt’s explanation behind the way enmity arises. In this chapter, I will turn to 
Strauss’s subsequent work on Hobbes, “Notes on Hobbes” and The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes, to track the way his early engagement with Hobbes, described in the previous 
chapter, evolves and transforms. In “Notes on Hobbes,” I will argue, Strauss:  
(i) Reduces human natural desire [cupiditas naturalis] to a singular appetite: 
vanity [Eitelkeit].  
                                                
294  Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, ix.  
295  Some significant alterations to the final English version were made, including an extensive addition on 
Hobbes’s discussion of the importance of foreign policy comparatively to Plato and Aristotle. I discuss 
this inclusion at the end of this chapter. The German original was published first in 1965, as Hobbes's 
Political Science and its Genesis [Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis], with the inclusion 
of a new German forward that I address in chapter five.  
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(ii) Argues that vanity is the moving cause behind the incessant striving after ever 
more power over others, and thus the primary cause behind the natural qua 
political antagonism in the state of nature (i.e., why the state of nature is a state of 
war).   
Since vanity causes strife, Strauss asserts that vanity is the “domain” of the “political,” 
whilst its antithesis, the fear of violent death, is the root of the “economic.”296 In “Notes 
on Hobbes,” Strauss proposes that Hobbes’s rational and peaceful commercial 
commonwealth is grounded in depreciation of the political by the negation of the natural 
(Hobbes) qua political (Schmitt) antagonism, which is caused by vanity—man’s 
irrational natural desire. He construes out of vanity (first “thesis”) a principle of 
sovereignty and obedience to a Sovereign grounded in every citizen’s fear of violent 
death (his “antithesis”). He depicts this dialectic as beginning as an external struggle 
between two opponents that are blind to all but their own vainglory, which subsequently 
turns inwards, into an inner struggle between vanity and fear in each individual. Fear of 
violent death must conquer vanity for Hobbes’s social contract to form. The strife in the 
state of nature is neutralized by a universal rational agreement dictated by the rational 
laws of nature [lex naturalis] prompted by a common fear of violent death. Hobbes’s 
artificial state is built upon every individual’s repression of his or her own unliberal 
natural desire. It was foremost against the unliberal part of human nature, Strauss argues 
in “Notes on Hobbes,” that liberalism “fought” to “institute” itself.297  
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss revokes his judgment in “Notes on 
Schmitt” that Hobbes conceives of humans as innocent [unschuldig] animals by turning 
                                                
296  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 135. 
297  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 122. 
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to the unliberal underbelly of the frightened contractual citizen. He divides Hobbes into 
the scientific Hobbes, who deduces his physiological premises for political philosophy 
from modern natural science, and the young pre-scientific Hobbes, who draws political 
insights from “self-observations.”298 Observation and experience of others and self is the 
method that Strauss identifies as adequate in observing the natural qualities of man.299 
These observations, in turn, Strauss argues, are informed by a new morality.300 What the 
young Hobbes observes becomes the moral basis for Hobbes’s political philosophy: this 
basis is an antithesis between the unliberal or aristocratic passion — “vanity” — and its 
liberal or counter passion — “fear of violent death.” It is the self-consciousness of fear of 
violent death, he argues in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, which forms a “modern” 
“bourgeois” “moral attitude.” 301  On this ground, Strauss contests the legal 
positivist/relativist view of Hobbes — that justice is a matter of an arbitrator deciding 
over competing interests, and is determined by the disputing parties abiding by an agreed 
contract as stipulated by the third law of nature — by arguing that only acts, including 
acts in the state of nature prior to the covenant, that are motivated out of a fear of violent 
death are morally just, since only these secure self-preservation. In other words, he reads 
                                                
298  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 3, 134. 
299  Strauss’s suggestion that Hobbes’s portrayal of human behavior in the state of nature reflected an 
immediate experience of oneself and the world prior to natural science, and that Hobbes’s subsequent 
scientific view of human nature negated this pre-scientific knowledge of human nature, is influenced by 
Husserl’s phenomenology. This insight about Hobbes’s method is first described in Strauss, Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion, p. 87; and in the 1931-32 unpublished manuscript, Planned Book on Hobbes: 
“Political science is possible as an independent science because it is based on its own principles and 
these principles are known through experience.” In the manuscript, Strauss crossed out the definition of 
experience that followed: [“by the experience of one, who observes his own (emotions) movements”, 
“through the experience of one, who examines his own emotion”, through self-awareness, self-
observation and self-examination (Co VI 7 and I.,J).] (Strauss, Leo, Planned Book on Hobbes. Leo 
Straus Papers, [Box 15, Folder 2], Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, 
translation by Samuel Putinja and Karl Dahlquist. 
300  In addition to Husserl, as I will return to in the second part of the chapter, Strauss is here influenced by 
Heidegger, suggesting that there is an a priori moral attitude that informs the phenomenological 
perception/experience of self and others. 
301  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 102, 108, 114-116, 120. 
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morality back into Hobbes’s state of nature by differentiating between, on one hand, the 
motivations that underlie Hobbes’s conception of right of nature [jus naturale] — 
oriented toward self-preservation and thus in accord with natural reason [ratio naturalis] 
— and, on the other, natural desire [cupiditas naturalis], which aims at harming others 
and is not only pre-rational but contrary to natural reason and thus impermissible. The 
moral quality of vanity, however, Strauss argues, is only visible in Hobbes’s 
anthropological view of human nature. This “vitalistic” view is different from Hobbes’s 
later scientific view that yields an equally mechanistic explanation of both human and 
animal appetite.   
Strauss claims in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes that when Hobbes initially 
assigns vanity as the cause behind the war of all against all in the state of nature, it is 
intended as a moral judgment. Hobbes’s moral judgment on vanity remains within the 
liberal moral horizon since vanity is judged against the horizon of self-preservation. In 
the Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss asserts that it is due to vanity that man by 
nature is morally evil.302 Recall that in “Notes on Schmitt,” Strauss argues that since 
Hobbes places a natural right to life prior to all obligations, humans must be free without 
sin. In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss thus alters his earlier position that, for 
Hobbes, humans are innocently evil like animals, not morally evil by nature. “Guilt” 
(“Schuld”) is the term Strauss uses to differentiate between “innocent [unschuldig]” 
animal evil and moral “non-innocent/guilty [schuldig]” human evil. He asserts that 
humans are by nature morally evil because they are vain: because they seek to harm other 
individuals for the pleasure derived from contemplating one’s own supremacy. This 
definition of vanity, as with the demonstration of human evil, must be detached from 
                                                
302  See also Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 60. 
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Hobbes’s bourgeois morality—determined by the liberal horizon of death. To address the 
objection (as seen for example in the work of Janssens and Xenos) that Strauss adopted 
his conception of evil from the ancients, I will show that Strauss’s assertion that man by 
nature is evil is made without recourse to ancient natural law and Socratic conceptions of 
vice.  
In the 1936 English translation of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss 
subsumes both “vanity” and “violent death” under the word “evil.” In the original 
German manuscript, Hobbes' Politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis, he uses three 
German words that are all translated in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes as “evil”: 
“übel,” “böse” and “schlechten.” To support my claim that Strauss’s case that humans by 
nature is evil is made without recourse to ancient natural law, I will show in this chapter 
Strauss applies these first two terms in a precise and philosophically distinct way, and 
only the first adjective (“böse”) to mean moral evil. Strauss uses “böse” only when he 
speaks of vanity, from which he derives that “man is by nature evil [so ist der Mensch 
von Natur böse]” He locates the origin of moral “evil [böse]” in vanity. Human evil 
(“böse”) so defined originates in human nature, and is independent of the transcendental 
realm, as well as Hobbes’s moral horizon of death. Vanity — the peculiar human and 
infinite striving — provides Strauss with the philosophical ground of moral evil. He uses 
“übel” when he argues that violent death is for Hobbes the “greatest evil [grösste Übel]” 
(in Latin “summum malum”), meaning the worst thing that could happen to a human 
being — something inherently undesirable, or more precisely, the foreclosure of future 
desiring and any pleasure derived therefrom. However, in this context, “evil [Übel]” is 
not devoid of moral connotation as it is, in Strauss’s analysis, moral category for Hobbes, 
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in that it is contrary to natural reason, which is always directed at self-preservation. 
Finally, Strauss uses “schlechten/das Schlechte” when he writes about Aristotle and 
Plato’s virtue ethics, and not as a moral judgment. “Schlecht” is translated as both “evil” 























3. 1. 1. Human nature and militant liberalism 
“Notes on Hobbes” was Strauss's first publication after he arrived in Paris, in the fall of 
1932. The article was translated into French by Alexandre Kojève, whom Strauss had 
befriended in Germany, in the early 1920s. Like “Notes on Schmitt,” “Notes on Hobbes” 
engages the work of a contemporary Polish scholar; in this case, Zbigniew Lubieński’s 
book, The Foundations of Hobbes’s Ethical-Political System [Die Grundlagen des 
ethisch-politischen Systems von Hobbes], which had been published in Germany just 
before Strauss left for Paris.303 Strauss remarks from the outset of “Notes on Hobbes” that 
Lubieński’s book was “written with a purely scientific intention,” as if “completely 
untouched by the spiritual and political movement [Die Bewegung as the National 
Socialists called themselves] that so stirred the country in which the book appeared in the 
year of its appearance.”304 While Strauss both credits Lubieński and follows him in 
leaving aside present “prejudice” when taking on Hobbes, Strauss’s reason for this was to 
learn not only about Hobbes’s thought, but importantly also about present “political 
opinions,” which he noted could not be learned by his contemporaries.305 Contrary to 
Lubieński, Strauss was not “untouched” by the “spiritual and political movement” that 
attacked the Weimar Republic, an attack, he notes, that was not based on “divine 
                                                
303 Zbigniew Lubieński. Die Grundlagen des ethisch-politischen Systems von Hobbes (Munich: Reinhardt, 
1932). 
304  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 123.   
305  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 123.   
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right.”306 In Hobbes, Strauss sought a political alternative to liberalism and the Weimar 
Republic.  
From the outset of the essay, from the right-wing atheistic perspective of 
“intellectual probity,” Strauss dismisses both “rule based” on “divine right” and 
“Bolshevism” as political alternatives to liberalism, for being “half-
solutions.”307 Bolshevism is a half-solution, in that Bolshevists, like socialists, sees 
human nature, like the liberal, as “good,” or “educable,” and thus not only leaves “the 
first principle of liberalism uncontested,” but adopts it as its own.308 Therefore, Strauss 
writes, the socialist critiques, “for all the opposition as to final consequence — represents 
a merely immanent critique of liberalism.”309 It is an immanent critique in that socialists 
share the liberal moral-ontological principle that humans by nature are good or educable, 
while disagreeing over ends. Strauss’s had returned to Hobbes to complete a radical 
critique of liberalism that not only was to transcend the immanent socialist critique, but 
also the religious critique of liberalism.310 In contrast to Meier’s Schmitt, Strauss writes, 
“Hobbes was ‘absolutiste sans être théologien’ [absolutist without being a theologian],” 
or without being “religious” in “general.”311 If a critique of liberalism was to transcend 
— in my classification from the previous chapter — both the liberal thought and liberal 
                                                
306  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 121.   
307  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 121. Strauss sides with this atheistic outlook from “intellectual probity” of 
many of Germany’s radical conservatives. This “new atheism”, Tanguay explains, “represented the 
position of the Enlightenment with a radicalism hitherto unknown. Nietzsche had turned the critical 
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century. 
308  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 121.   
309  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 121-122.  
310  See Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, 101-102. 
311  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 121.  
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moral horizons (discussed in the previous chapter) that Strauss identifies in “Notes on 
Schmitt,” the following two criteria would need to be met:   
(i) The political antagonism in the state of nature must be proven to have its 
source in human nature, prior to any cultivation;  
(ii) For the criticism of liberalism not to be immanent, it must be demonstrated 
that humans are morally evil by nature. This is the moral-ontological foundation 
or condition for a right-wing authoritarian state that Strauss identified in his 
exchange with Schmitt.  
As we shall see, Strauss establishes the former (i) in “Notes on Hobbes” (examined in 
this first part of the chapter) and the latter (ii) in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
(examined in the second part of the chapter).  
To his French reading audience, Strauss dubs Hobbes, just as he had to his 
German-language readers of “Notes on Schmitt,” the “founder of liberalism,” though 
now with the added qualification that he is not a “proper liberal.”312 From the outset of 
the article, he takes pains to pre-empt the anticipated objection that Hobbes’s political 
absolutism disqualifies him as the founder of the liberal tradition. Strauss argues that it is 
possible to learn more from Hobbes about the foundation of liberalism than from any 
other subsequent liberal thinker precisely because Hobbes is not a “proper liberal.” While 
the absolutism of Hobbes’s Leviathan unmistakably contradicts a liberal constitutionally 
divided state, Strauss asks his readers to “remember […] that the egalitarian principle 
underlies all of his arguments.” 313 He explains Hobbes’s egalitarianism as follows: 
[T]he natural right taught by him [Hobbes] fully possesses the character of an 
inalienable human right; that the opposition between a military and an industrial 
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313  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 122, emphasis added.   
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state of human society, with the latter unambiguously affirmed, is expressed by 
him with sufficient clarity; one should recall his denial — on the basis of the 
egalitarian principle — of paternal, and affirmation of maternal, power over the 
child and the complete equality of rights of the sexes that is recognized thereby as 
a given; his teaching about civil marriage and dispensability of oaths; his ideas 
about university governance and — above all — his critique of religion.314 
 
That Hobbes was the first to advance an inalienable human natural right — and, in so 
doing, paved the road to liberal civilization and universal human rights — Strauss had 
already argued in “Notes on Schmitt.” What Strauss identifies in the passage directly 
above as the most representative point of Hobbes’s liberalism, his critique of religion, he 
had begun to detail in his book on Spinoza and would continue to explore this 
problematic in his never completed manuscript on Hobbes’s Critique of Religion. The 
main obstacle liberalism has to “fight its way through,” in an “unliberal time,” he now 
proposes, is not “the old power of the Church and the feudal state;” instead, the greatest 
resistance against liberalism comes “above all from human nature itself.”315  
In Strauss's assessment of Hobbes’s critique of religion in his book on Spinoza 
and in his review of The Concept of the Political, he points to human nature as the 
ground for both religion and the political. In “Notes on Hobbes,” Strauss proposes that 
Hobbes is “the first to provide […] a radical justification for liberalism,” which “does not 
engage in open or secret borrowings from the religious tradition,” and thus the foundation 
Hobbes lays for liberalism is not shared with the religious tradition.316 The foundation for 
liberalism is not shared with the religion insofar as the religious tradition perceives of its 
own ground as providential, while Hobbes’s founds his social contract on human nature 
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alone.317 Liberalism is constituted against the unliberal part of human nature for the 
purpose of the protection and preservation of the individual’s life. As I will detail below, 
Strauss makes Hobbes the founder of liberalism because humans are not by nature 
liberals. By nature, pace Hobbes, humans are inclined to vanity, which prompts conflict 
and results in the war of each against all. Vanity must be tamed. A function in human 
nature must be found that will perform this end. That principle, according to Hobbes, in 
Strauss’s accounts, which we are about to explore, is fear of violent death. It is the 
unliberal part of human nature that liberalism overcomes with Hobbes’s construction of a 
new bourgeois moral consciousness grounded in fear of violent death. From fear of death, 
individuals will choose to erect an absolute state, which in turn will use its power to 
“educate” citizens (through law, education, and more generally the creation of a liberal 
“culture”) to reject vanity and live fearful, peaceable, bourgeois lives.  
Hobbes’s absolutist state is thus required to discipline the unliberal part of human 
nature to avoid civil strife and secure a peaceful and prosperous society. This makes the 
absolutist Leviathan state a precursor to the liberal state. Whenever threatened, Strauss 
argues, liberalism must revert to its “absolutist beginnings” as developed by Hobbes: 
“Hobbes's absolutism is in the end nothing but militant liberalism in statu nascendi [in 
the state of being born], i.e., in its most radical form.”318 Strauss thus turns the main 
objection against seeing Hobbes as the “founder of liberalism” (his absolutism) into the 
leading evidence for the proposal and so concludes that Hobbes's “espousal of absolutism 
                                                
317  Liberalism and religion share foundation, however, according to Hobbes Epicurean critique of religion 
that Straus details in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, in that religion, like liberalism, had its source in 
human nature. 
318  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 122.   
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does not at all contradict his liberalism.”319 It follows from this insight, Strauss notes, that 
“whoever wishes to engage in either a radical justification or a radical critique of 
liberalism must return to Hobbes's” political thought.320 
3. 1. 2. Natural desire and natural reason 
In order to uncover the foundation of Hobbes’s political thought, Strauss argues that a 
reader of Hobbes must first resolve the symptomatic contradictions therein by way of 
identifying his “authoritative” or “authentic” doctrine from two mutually exclusive 
alternatives.321 The contradiction in Hobbes’s thought, Lubieński had argued, results 
from an inadequate separation in the application of Hobbes’s adaptation of a new 
“scientific method” from the “traditional rationalism” of Plato and Aristotle.322 While 
Strauss agrees with Lubieński that one of the two mutually exclusive doctrines is indeed a 
new scientific method; contrary to Lubieński, he argues that this scientific aspect of 
Hobbes’s thought was inauthentic, and that while Hobbes’s thought is somewhat 
intertwined with ancient rationalism, this tendency is also inauthentic. The authentic 
tendency in Hobbes’s thought, Strauss claims, is an attempt to break away from platonic 
rationalism. In this, Strauss follows Tönnies, who holds that Hobbes formulates his 
“deepest anthropological and political thoughts” prior to the discovery and application of 
natural science to the study of politics, and thus “Hobbes conceived his view of man and 
of the state independently of natural science and only subsequently attempted to ground it 
in a natural-scientific way.”323 Hobbes’s “authentic,” pre-scientific view of “man and the 
state” expresses itself in a “unified, single, and indivisible fundamental outlook that 
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expresses a single fundamental will; and this impression is so strong that the observation 
of the numerous contradictions in Hobbes’s writing cannot stand against it.”324  
To identify this new attitude, Strauss turns to Hobbes’s theory of political 
obligation and Lubieński’s treatment thereof. He departs from the tripartite typology of 
natural strivings (the vain striving for power, the rational or scientific striving for power, 
and the striving for security) enumerated in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion and reduces 
human desire to a singular natural striving: “in Hobbes’s view the natural desire of man 
is at bottom a striving for ever greater glory; that is, according to Hobbes’s conception of 
glory, it is vanity.”325 Strauss argues that vanity is the cause behind the striving for ever 
more power over others in the state of nature and thus (pace Schmitt) vanity is the root or 
the “domain” of the political.326 Strauss opposes Lubieński, who equates “natural desire” 
with a “vague” conception of “life advancement,” while agreeing with Lubieński that 
Hobbes equates “rational good [ratio naturalis]” and “natural right” with “self-
preservation.”327 Hobbes attaches natural right to self-preservation, and since Hobbes’s 
natural right is based on a subjective claim prior to and independent of any objective 
natural law order, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s new moral attitude is anti-Platonic.   
                                                
324  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 124. Strauss enumerates these contradictions as follows: “the 
uninterrupted, restless, ever-growing striving for power and honor an ever greater power and honor as 
general inclination of all men: the impossibility of beatitudo [bliss]; the denial of science as a goal in 
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325  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 129, emphasis added.   
326  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 135. Vanity, is in effect, described here as a first and determining or 
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causality to describe Hobbesian vanity. 
327  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 129. 
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While Strauss agrees with Lubieński that Hobbes equates self-preservation and 
the moral good with rationality, he also asserts, contrary to Lubieński, that man’s natural 
desire is “pre-rational” or “irrational” in its striving for “acquisition of power and 
honor,” which is, drawing from Tönnies, “identical” with the “‘natural inclination of men 
to harm each other.’”328 The natural desire for acquisition of power and honor runs 
contrary to self-preservation inasmuch as the consequence of men seeking to harm one 
another in the course of pursuing ever more power for themselves is a premature and 
violent death for everyone. Human natural desire is thus not in accord with, but in 
opposition to the rational good. In Strauss’s view of Hobbes’s new morality, a striving for 
ever more power and honor can only be considered morally good if motivated by rational 
deliberation, directed at self-preservation, and thus in “accord with natural right.”329 Only 
a few individuals act rationally in the state of nature, as it is contrary to every person’s 
natural desire. Strauss approves of Lubieński’s classification of Hobbes as a “moralist,” 
by ascribing a moral legal right to self-preservation, but he thus also holds, contrary to 
Lubieński, that “self-advancement” is not man’s natural desire. The practical problem of 
ensuring obligation in Strauss’s rendition of Hobbes is thus for Strauss as follows: How 
to override a natural desire (vanity) to harm others. Or to put it slightly differently, how 
to get individuals in the state of nature to act in accordance with the rational precepts that 
secure life, when “man is by nature wolf to man.”330    
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3. 1. 3. Obligation and the fear of violent death 
Beside his disagreement with Lubieński over the meaning of natural desire in Hobbes, 
Strauss’s other objection levelled at Lubieński concerns Hobbes’s theory of political 
obligation. Lubieński, he argues, puts the question of obligation at the center of his 
analysis so as to show how Hobbes’s “natural-scientific” or empirical framework is 
compatible with his theory of obligation.331 Lubieński argues that preservation of life is 
the highest good and the ground for obligation. The inadequacy in positing self-
preservation as the greatest good, Strauss counters, is apparent if the inverse expression 
of self-preservation is considered: that is to say, if Lubieński is right in positing that self-
preservation is the greatest good, then death, by being antithetical to life, is the greatest 
evil.332 The view of death as the greatest of all evils, Strauss argues, is contradicted by the 
fact that Hobbes at times states that death is preferred over life, and in such instances, 
death is “counted among the goods” and thus self-preservation of life cannot be an 
“absolute and irrefutable demand of reason.”333 Individuals have a natural right to act 
with regard to self-preservation, but are not obliged to preserve their lives. The problem 
in translating Hobbes’s natural right to self-preservation into a universally applicable 
ethics then is that the preservation of life is a subjective liberty, not an objective and 
binding obligation, and thus Strauss states that self-preservation “cannot quite be the 
norm of a universally valid ethics.”334 He proposes instead: “the content of obligation 
consists not in the means for the preservation of life generally, but in the means for the 
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preservation of life against the attack of other men.”335 It is fear of “‘life-threatening 
danger’” which makes obligation “compulsory.”336 Only fear of a violent death succeeds 
as the norm for a universally valid ethics, whereas fear of a natural death fails. The 
reason for this is that natural reason, directed at the rational preservation of life, is an 
insufficient ground for political obligation since humans are in the last instance motivated 
by their passions (i.e., not rational calculations). For reason to be operative it must be 
grounded in the strongest of the passions. 
 For an obligation to be categorized as moral, however, Lubieński argues it must 
be in accord with reason. In this and the view that according to Hobbes rationality is 
defined as being in accord with self-preservation, Strauss agrees with Lubieński. Thus, an 
obligation grounded in fear is immoral since its foundation is in a passion. In order to 
solve this problem, Strauss contends that Lubieński distinguished between two 
conceptions of fear in Hobbes’s political thought: an “‘intellectual’” or “logical” fear and 
a “psychological,” “compulsive” fear.337 The former (intellectual or logical fear) is “far-
sighted” and demarcated by the “horizon of violent death” (i.e. the liberal moral horizon) 
and thus moral; the latter (affective fear) is “shortsighted” and “without a horizon” and 
thus immoral.338 Opposing this distinction in Lubieński’s reading, Strauss argues that 
“[a]ccording to Hobbes, there is only one ground of obligation: fear of violent death as 
the fear that defines man completely from top to bottom.”339 Following Tönnies, Strauss 
argues that the logical and psychological motives for obligation coincide. To fit the 
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criteria for moral theory of obligation (as being in accordance with reason) fear of violent 
death must be both affective and rational: “the rational consciousness of obligation 
constitutes itself in foreseeing something frightening, or rather the most frightening thing 
there is, namely, violent death.”340 Strauss provides an account for why the fear of violent 
death is partly affective and partly rational, both “psychological” and “logical.”  
3. 1. 4. The dialectics of Hobbes’s teaching on obligation 
To adjoin passion with reason, Strauss tells a dialectical story of a generic “blinded” 
person, a mentally adolescent boy, who is trapped in a man’s body, “moves” out of the 
“state of nature” and finally becomes an “enlightened citizen of the state.”341 The two 
dialectical poles between which this educational story unfolds are vanity and the fear of 
violent death. The vain “striving of man to please himself through being recognized by 
other men as their superior,” necessarily leads the boy into a struggle for superiority.342 
Blind to the limits of his powers, the vain boy seeks “mastery over all men.”343 In the 
encounter with another person’s power, the boy learns not only the relative limit of his 
own powers, but also, and more significantly, the absolute limit to his power as he 
becomes cognizant of a potential deadly resolution to the strife. It is the “experience” of 
“danger” that instils in us the greatest of all fears, the “fear for a violent death.” The 
effective “fear of that death” coincides with the “recognition of violent death as the 
greatest evil.”344 Strauss has two of his conceptions of Hobbesian rationality coinciding 
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here: the capacity of foresight and the preservation of life. Humans are by nature 
educable in that the vanity of our adolescence is tamed by fear.345   
It is for this reason that Strauss later crowns fear of violent death the “majesty” of 
passions, since it alone has the capacity to conquer man’s singular natural desire.346 It is 
fear of violent death that brings about the “rational minimal demand,” which restricts 
vanity’s “maximal demand” for “ever greater triumphs.”347 It is fear of violent death that 
educates the vain boy to lay down his claim to all things, and by free will become a 
contractual citizen of an artificial state. It is fear of violent death that effectively compels 
the individuals to observe a set of rational natural law precepts that ensure security from 
fatal danger. The aim or purpose of the Hobbesian state is thus to secure the safety of 
each citizen against the “attack by other men” and it is thus in accord with natural 
reason.348 A citizenry whose self-consciousness is determined by fear of violent death 
forms the state. It is fear of violent death that is the affective and inverse expression of 
the bourgeois preference for life; that is, the liberal moral horizon (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) as I identified in “Notes on Schmitt.” The basis of the bourgeois 
pacifist virtues is rooted in fear of violent death, which leads Hobbes, Strauss argues, to 
dismiss any ancient or aristocratic virtues that are expressions of vanity and antithetical to 
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peacefully living, such as “courage” or “honour.”349    
This psychological description complements Strauss’s legalistic argument that 
Hobbes is the founder of the liberal civilization advanced in “Notes on Schmitt.” The 
limit of each citizen’s obedience is legally and morally demarcated: the natural right to 
preserve one's life is in accord with both natural reason and a liberal moral attitude, 
which places an unalienable right to life prior to any natural law command. The latter 
grows from the former: the natural right to life limits the state’s command for obedience 
when the citizen’s life is at risk. Although Hobbes’s Sovereign is not included in the 
social contract, and thus is absolute and not subjected to the rule of law, and although 
citizens’ rights to property are not out of reach of the Sovereign’s power, his command 
for obedience in matters that risk the life of his subjects is nevertheless not binding on the 
citizen, whose first right of nature is to preserve his life.350 Before a social contract is 
formed, each individual is fully free to act as he wishes; but the free individual is a dead 
man walking, as is every individual in the state of nature. Hobbesian liberty, if 
unrestricted by law, is a kiss of death. The trade-off is one in which liberty is exchanged 
for life. 
In Strauss's rendition, Hobbes’s citizens are then psychologically compelled by 
fear to adhere to a covenant. The covenant is rational in respect to both definitions of 
reason that Strauss sees in Hobbes: the covenant is (i) grounded in foreseeing a violent 
death and (ii) guarantees self-preservation and is thus in accord with natural reason. 
Every individual’s natural right to self-preservation is the first spring in a liberal doctrine 
that Strauss argues leads to the de-politicization of the political as citizens are not obliged 
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to risk their life as the political relation requires. He adds to this legalistic argument, 
Hobbes’s liberal ontology of human nature, in that humans are educable by fear. 
It follows from what I outlined above that I agree with Xenos, who argues that 
Strauss in his interpretation of Hobbes places vanity at the root cause of fear. I am not 
convinced, however, by Xenos’s argument that Strauss adopts Hobbes’s use of fear as the 
principle of rule at this point in time — the principle for rule being identical with 
obedience — for his own political vision. Xenos writes that for Strauss: “The aim of the 
state is to impose peace on a recalcitrant human nature. It is, in [Strauss’s] formulation, to 
realize the principles of the political Right.”351 Xenos is prone to make this suggestion 
because the overall aim of his book is to associate the philosophical views articulated by 
Strauss himself with the neo-conservative ideology promulgated by the self-described 
“Straussians” who he argues populate Washington-area think tanks and hold government 
posts and promote fear-mongering.352 If Xenos is correct that Strauss adopts fear as the 
principle of rule (the principle for Hobbes’s authoritarian/militant liberalism), Strauss 
would then in 1932 (i) have adopted the bourgeois consciousness and remained within 
the liberal moral horizon that he sought to transcend, and (ii) have subscribed to the 
anarchistic (liberal/socialist) view that humans are educable. The taming of human nature 
with the fear of violent death marks Hobbes doctrine as bourgeois. It would thus be 
contradictory if Strauss tried to escape the liberal horizon (as Xenos also claims) by 
adopting the very principle of rule (obedience for protection against a violent death) that 
Strauss identifies as the foundation for liberalism. Xenos’s argument implies that Strauss 
thus abandons the moral-ontological foundation for a right-wing authoritarian state he 
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identifies in his exchange with Schmitt (as discussed in the previous chapter): that 
humans by nature are evil and hence not good or educable. And this is even before 
Strauss has provided (which he does first a few years later in The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes) the philosophical articulation/proof of the very position Xenos says he has 
abandoned: that human by nature is evil because they are vain. This is to put the plow 
before the ox. It would be closer to Strauss’s intention at this time to consider the answer 
to a question he had raised in a 1931 outline (unpublished) to a proposed book, The 
Political Science of Hobbes: An Introduction to Natural Right: “Why not founding of the 
State on vanity” alone? 353  
3. 1. 5. The political and the economic as the domains of vanity and fear 
Implicitly based on the structural correspondence between Schmitt’s conception of the 
political antagonism and Hobbes’s state of nature, Strauss asserts that since vanity being 
the cause of the war of all against all in the state of nature, vanity is the “domain” of the 
“political.”354 Fear, on the contrary, is the domain of the economic as it wills the rational 
agreement.355 Vanity and fear in this moral anti-thesis “characterize the two opposite 
ways of human life”: the “political” and the “economic” way, the aristocratic and the 
liberal-socialist way:  
It is to the opposition so understood, which is never again developed as purely, as 
deeply, and as frankly as it is by Hobbes, that one must go back if one wishes to 
understand the ideal of liberalism, as well as socialism, in its foundation. For each 
battle against the political in the name of the economic presupposes a preceding 
depreciation of the political. But this depreciation is carried out in such a way that 
the political, as the domain of vanity, prestige, the desire for importance, is 
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opposed, either in a veiled or in an open manner, to the economic as the world of 
rational, ‘matter-of-fact,’ modest work. 356  
 
Economics — rational rules of commerce and modest work — replace political strife; or, 
as Strauss’s points out that Schmitt puts it: ““liberalism is characterized precisely by the 
negation of the political.’” 357  Fear of violent death defines the liberal mindset 
“completely” and “is in accord with the outlook of defense, of a modest life, of working 
in the rank and file.”358 Strauss adds that the “ideal” of socialism is determined by the 
fear of violent death as well, and thus complements his view that liberalism and socialism 
are two sides of the same coin on the basis of their shared “anarchist” view that human by 
nature is “good” or “educable.”359 The socialist ideal was contrasted by the reality that 
had played out since the end of the Great War: beside parliamentary opposition to liberal 
and fascist parties, it had not escaped Strauss that many socialists, beside communists, 
were also engaged in a life-and-death street struggles against extra-parliamentary, fascist 
and Right-wing paramilitary groups across Germany. Fear of violent death could hardly 
be said to determine the consciousness that was informing the actions of these socialists. 
What Strauss had in mind was that the socialist ideal was tied to economic rationality and 
thus linked backwards to the fear of violent death. Socialists, like liberals, in Strauss's 
view, aimed to create a pacifist and stateless world order without political divisions. The 
radical left was concerned with physical lethal violence only as a means: democratic 
socialist as a defensive strategy for survival in times of existential threat, or as in the case 
of the communists, violent revolution as an offensive strategy to transition into a post-
capitalist world. 
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The Marxist concern underlying both socialist and communists in this moment — 
the end for which they strived — was the overcoming of indirect structural economic 
violence — class domination and exploitation — which they rendered political. Marxist 
political economy identified in capitalist states an economic class division that over-
determined politics and divided the bourgeois nation. While this division had its roots in 
economics (the private property regime and capitalist mode of production) only political 
action through the state was widely seen as capable of undoing the capitalist regime. The 
class division between the owners of the means of production and the wage-laboring 
class was also recognized as trans-, or inter-national due to the fact that capitalism was an 
international economic system. Nor was the class struggle — whether violently or 
peacefully/constitutionally pursued — confined by national borders. Working class 
political alliances were drawn not (only) along national borders, but along class divisions. 
This is important to stress in order to understand the overall political context in 
which Schmitt polemically designs his conception of the political and Strauss his critique. 
Schmitt develops his concept of the political in part to counter the Marxist conception of 
the political. It is thus in reaction, not only to what both Schmitt and Strauss view as 
liberalism's negation of the political (segmented by rational international trade and peace 
agreements and liberal state institutions), but also to counter the Marxist (political 
economic) conception of the political that Schmitt separates political enmity from 
economic class division by advancing an ontology of the political independent of any 
underlying economic division.360 Whereas the Marxist conception was internationalist, 
Schmitt’s concept of the political is nationalist. Schmitt’s argues that political group 
association are formed in relation to enemies and the most relevant political actors are 
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nations. In so doing, Schmitt intended to drive a conceptual wedge through the 
unification of the proletariat on both a national and international basis (the same role 
World War I had played practically), as well as to counter the neutralization extra-
economic inter-state rivalry advanced by liberal institutions such as the League of 
Nations.361  
In his conception of the political, Schmitt does not, however, simply replace the 
Marxist economic substructure of the political — class division and struggle — with an 
analogous conceptual schema that aligns the friend-enemy distinction along national 
borders. Instead, his concept of the political is immanent or groundless — squarely 
within the anti-metaphysical tradition. In Strauss’s view, this leads to the shortcoming 
that he had addressed in his letter to Schmitt (discussed at the end of the preceding 
chapter) in the late summer of the previous year; namely, that Schmitt’s political right-
left distinction relies on “bellicose nationalism” for encircling a sphere of “dominion.”362 
Strauss points out that the political, as Schmitt defines it, is not a condition of the nation-
state; instead, as Meier clarifies, group disassociation is required for association and a 
sphere of dominion to form. In other words, an external or internal enemy (such as ‘the 
Napoleonic French,’ ‘Communists,’ or ‘Jews’) is required for a political friendship unit to 
form. The folding together of right-wing authoritarianism and bellicose nationalism, 
oriented at internal and external enemies in Schmitt’s account, is apparent in the 
historical rise of the Nazis. At a time when the Weimar Republic was “failing 
conclusively,” anti-Semitism and racial social division came to form core principles of 
the movement that seizing power out of the Republic’s failure. Needless to say, these 
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events posed a threat to Strauss as a German Jew. Strauss’s re-conceptualization of the 
domain of the political in “Notes on Schmitt” and “Notes on Hobbes” provides a 
Hobbesian account of the political in which extra-political bellicose nationalism is no 
longer required to establish the sphere of dominion of a Right-wing authoritarian state. In 
places of Schmitt’s bellicose nationalism, it is a conception of human nature as moral evil 
that grounds the political for Strauss. 
In “Notes on Schmitt,” Strauss aligns the political antagonism with the Hobbesian 
state of war. In so doing, Strauss both individualizes this political antagonism and assigns 
it a trans-historical cause in human nature. Strauss thus roots Schmitt’s friend-enemy 
distinction in a natural antagonism between individuals, not groups. This re-conception 
of Schmitt’s distinction is apparent in “Notes on Hobbes,” where Strauss isolates vanity 
as the transitive cause in human nature for why the state of nature is a state of war and 
thus makes vanity the domain of the political. In this account, a collective dissociation is 
not required for political association when the political is rooted in individual vanity, 
which in principle transcends national borders and racial difference. Schmitt’s “collapse” 
of an “authoritarian order” with “bellicose nationalism” is thus rendered needless in 
Strauss’s political ontology, since vanity substitutes for bellicose nationalism as the 
precondition for dominion. As Strauss notes in the margin of his personal copy of 
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political: “National world-rule […] can be expressed without 
nationalism proper: cf. Dante’s Monarchia endorsing the claim of the Roman nation to 
world empire.” 363  Strauss thus uses Hobbes to argue from a conservative 
metaphysical/anthropological position that one need not cultivate a bellicose nationalism 
in order to ground a right-wing authoritarian state as an alternative to liberalism. 
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In Strauss’s Hobbesian modification of Schmitt’s conception of the political, the 
political is “necessary because it is given in human nature [vanity]” and it is conditional 
for the state. However, the political so defined is not yet foundational for a Right-wing 
authoritarian state for the reason that Strauss has not yet proved that the political domain 
arises because of “the [moral] natural evil of man”—the criteria for the “ultimate 
foundation of the [political] Right.” 364 The political provides the condition of a right-
wing authoritarian state only if Strauss can demonstrate that it is due to vanity that man is 
by nature evil. Yet, before Strauss was able to present a constitutive principle of the state, 
it became clear that the disassociation of Right-wing authoritarianism from Nazism’s 
bellicose and anti-Semitic nationalism had, with Hitler’s seizure of power on January 30, 
1933, and extension of his extra-constitutional powers, become an existential question for 
Strauss.365 The destruction of the liberal democratic Weimar regime and its replacement 
by an anti-Semitic authoritarian dictator did not find favor with Strauss.  
In a letter to Karl Löwith in Italy, May 19, 1933, Strauss wrote from Paris that he 
“see[s] no acceptable possibility of living under the swastika [Hakenkreuz]; that is to say, 
under a symbol that says to me nothing but: you and your kind, you are all by nature 
subhuman and therefore true pariahs.”366 Later in the same letter, Strauss lists the 
principles of the ground upon which to “protest” against the “new right-wing Germany” 
and its Führer: 
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the fact that the new Right-wing Germany does not tolerate us says nothing 
against the principles of the right. To the contrary: only from the principles of the 
right, that is from fascist, authoritarian and imperial principles, is it possible with 
decency, that is, without the laughable and despicable appeal to the droits 
imprescriptibles de l’homme to protest against the shabby abomination [meskine 
Unwesen]. I am reading Caesar’s Commentaries with deep understanding, and I 
think of Virgil’s Tu regere imperio . . . parcere subjectis et debellare superbos 
[To rule the empire… spare the subjected and war down the proud]. There is no 
reason to crawl to the cross, neither to the cross of liberalism, as long as 
somewhere in the world there is a glimmer of the spark of Roman thought. And 
even then: rather than any cross, I’ll take the ghetto [lieber als jegliches Kreuz das 
Ghetto]. 367    
 
In “Notes on Schmitt” and “Notes on Hobbes” Strauss traces back the origin of the 
“inalienable human rights of man” to Hobbes’s bourgeois conception of natural right. In 
his Zionist polemics, he had framed liberal political emancipation as secularized 
universalist Christian values—a position from which he had not wavered. It would thus 
have been intellectually dishonest for Strauss to crawl to “the crosses [Kreuze]” of 
Christianity and Liberalism to avoid the swastika [Hakenkreuz]. Furthermore, Strauss 
sees no need for it as “long as anywhere in the world there is a glimmer of the spark of 
Roman thought.” If the protest against Hitler is possible “only from the principles of the 
right, that is from fascist, authoritarian and imperial principles”—then the question of 
how these principles are different from those of the Nazis must be answered. 368 
Xenos's answer is that all “three principles” of “fascist, authoritarian and imperial 
                                                
367  Shell, “Strauss on ‘German Nihilism,”” 185; original in Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 625. For 
different interpretations of this letter see Sheppard, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile, 60-63; Xenos 
Cloaked in Virtue, xv-xvi, 15-17; Shell, ““Leo Strauss’s Lecture on ‘German Nihilism,’” 185-188; 
Altman, The German Stranger: Leo Strauss and National Socialism, 229-231. Most significantly for the 
argument at hand is my disagreement with Altman’s claim that “das meskine Unwesen” is a reference to 
“Jews”. Altman notes that Smith, Werner Dannhauser, Richard Wolin and Sheppard argues that “das 
meskine Unwesen” is a reference to Hitler, and Minovitz and Benjamin Lazier to the “Nazis or Nazism 
generally” (Altman, The German Stranger: Leo Strauss and National Socialism, 229). 
368  Shell has pointed out that Löwith in his reply disagrees with Strauss’s inclusion of fascism in the right 
on the basis of fascists’ democratic principle. The authoritarian leader embodies the 
homogenous/democratic will of the people.  
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rule” are grounded in Strauss’s notion of “dominion.” 369 The principle of dominion, the 
“common denominator” of these principles, he states, drawing from John McCormick, is 
“rule through fear.”370 As I explained above, I disagree. Strauss’s argument in “Notes on 
Hobbes” is that the foundational principle of liberalism is fear of violent death. 
Furthermore, if it is correct that Strauss thought, as Xenos argues, that the National 
Socialists ruled “through fear, and it, too, was based on a grouping of friends and 
enemies,” then fear cannot be the principle that differentiates Strauss’s proposed right-
wing alternative to Nazism.371 Xenos concedes as much in his next sentence, in which he 
claims that the “foundational principle” of the Nazis “was not the inherent evil of the 
human being [which in Xenos’s argument necessitates fear] but rather race and it thus 
excluded Strauss and Löwith.”372 While Strauss had not yet at this time accounted for 
why human beings are by nature inherently evil — this he does first in The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, to which I turn to shortly — Xenos is right in identifying race, 
figured in the concept of Volksgemeinschaft as the community of a ruler race, as the 
principle underlining Nazi rule. The Nazis collapsed Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction 
with bellicose nationalism built around the understanding of Volksgemeinshaft and the 
concept of Lebensraum — the racist justification of the aggressive conquest of territory 
for the use of the superior German Volk — which came to influence both domestic and 
foreign policy of the Third Reich. The principle of the right that Strauss envisions as an 
alternative to Nazism is lacking in bellicose nationalism and it is one not based on fear or 
                                                
369  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 59. 
370  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 59; John P. McCormick, “Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo 
Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany.” Political Theory 22, 
no.4 (November 1994): 619-952. 
371  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 59. 
372  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 59.   
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racism, and thus more like the principles of the Roman Empire before its 
Christianization, or Mussolini’s Italy at this time.373 
In Virgil’s verse that Strauss refers to in the passage above — “May you 
remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with an empire. These will be your arts: to impose 
the custom of peace, to spare the subjected and war down the proud” — Xenos detects a 
right-wing “formula for reconstituting Jewish communities in subordinate but protected 
pre-Enlightenment, imperial form [in Germany] (i.e., “to spare the conquered”).”374 If 
this is the formula that Strauss had in mind, then his “deeper” understanding of Caesar’s 
Commentaries had Virgil’s advice surpass the Roman’s policy towards Judaism that 
Strauss describes in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion: “the powerful Romans tolerated 
every type of religion within their city with the exception of Judaism, in which the 
obedience to a mortal king was forbidden.”375 It was precisely vanity or pride (to be war 
down by the Romans) that Hobbes, Strauss argues in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, pins 
down as the main root of revealed religion and the Jewish refusal to recognize a mortal 
king. However, the secularization of the Jewish principle of obedience to include a 
                                                
373  Xenos suggests that Strauss holds that “a properly Fascist movement such as the Italian one was to be 
distinguished from National Socialism by the absence of a racial component (as opposed to a national 
one) and its promotion of a premodern corporatist social program” (Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 17). 
Xenos also provides additional circumstantial evidence of Strauss’s support for Italian fascism: “In his 
memoir, the philosopher Hans Jonas, who knew Strauss since their student days, says of him that he 
was an early supporter of Mussolini, albeit when Mussolini was free of anti-Semitism” (Xenos, Cloaked 
in Virtue, 149n 55. Xenos reference is to Jonas, Hans, Erinnerungen. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 
2003, 262). And Zank writes that “In Paris Strauss connected with Charles Maurras of the fascist Action 
Française, and even after the Nazis took power in Germany he lamented in a letter to Karl Löwith that 
he was fed up with the Jewish expatriate intelligentsia and wished he could return to Germany, even if it 
meant living in a ghetto. Strauss’s embrace of ‘pagan-fascist’ political principles are attested for the 
early 1920s, when he was a political Zionist fighting first cultural Zionism from the stand-point of 
orthodoxy and then religious Zionism from the standpoint of atheism, and there is no evidence that 
Strauss ever turned from the tough Jabotinskyite political ‘realism’ to which he had ‘converted’ at the 
age of seventeen to any sort of ‘idealism’” (Zank, The Early Writings, xi).  
374  The full quotation from Virgil’s Aeneid is translated by Altman, The German Stranger: Leo Strauss and 
National Socialism, 227n 11; Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue,17. 
375  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 96, emphasis added. 
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secular Sovereign (as to spare the subjected), as we saw in the previous chapter, had done 
little to convince anti-Semites (like de Lagarde) that assimilated Jews should be spared; 
quite the opposite: anti-Semites argued that the German Jewry had to be purged, and with 
them, in de Lagarde’s words, the “‘Jewification' of the German spirit.”376 And while 
Strauss’s earlier engagement with Zionism had alerted him to the existential danger of 
Schmitt’s relativist conception of the political as embodied by the Nazis (for whom 
identity relied on political dissociation from an enemy), he could not have imagined the 
horrors and scale of the final solution. It is thus possible that Strauss’s appealed to 
Virgil’s verse for a policy on the Jews in Germany after the rise of Hitler. In contrast to 
Xenos, Susan Shell has suggested that it was first in England that Strauss discovered an 
understanding of Roman thought that could actually serve as bulwark for the Jews against 
the Nazis. I will examine Shell’s claim in the next chapter; for now, I will turn to 
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3. 2. 1. England and the quest for moral evil 
Strauss left Paris for London in January of 1934, along with his wife and her son. He 
soon favored England over France.378 In March, three months after arriving in England, 
he moved north to Derbyshire after the Duke of Devonshire made arrangements for 
Strauss to access some manuscripts by Hobbes there.379 He arrived in Cambridge as a 
research student at Sidney Sussex College in January 1935.380 In a letter written to 
Kojève on May 9, 1935, Straus described the foreword to Philosophy and Law, which 
had recently been published as part of the celebration of the eight hundredth anniversary 
of Maimonides’s birth, as “very daring” and the “best thing” he had “written” to date.381 
The book had been prepared with a view to apply for a professorship at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem.382  He added: 
In the meantime my study of ‘Hobbes's Political Science in its Genesis’ is 
finished.  I believe that it is good. Other than the study [Greek Mathematical 
Thought and the Origins of Algebra] by Klein […], it is the first attempt at a 
radical liberation from the modern prejudice. On several occasions I refer to 
Hegel, and do not fail to mention your [Kojève’s] name. The study will appear in 
                                                
378  Steven Smith, “Leo Strauss; The Outline of a Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, 22. 
379  “The duke of Devonshire had granted Strauss access to unpublished documents from Hobbes’s period 
with the Cavendish family at a castle in Derbyshire.” (Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 6). In a 
letter to Kojève in April 9, 1934, Strauss writes: “I may perhaps(!) have found Hobbes’s hitherto 
entirely unknown writing—a collection of 10 essays, the first five which deal with vanity and related 
phenomena” (the letter is transcribed, translated and annotated by Victor Gourevitch On Tyranny, 
Revised and Expanded Edition, including the Strauss-Kojève correspondance, ed. by Victor Gourevitch 
and Michael S. Roth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 225). These unknown writing of 
Hobbes was written under pseudonym. Two months later, after having “read and studied” the 
manuscript, Strauss writes Kojève in June 3, 1934, it is “absolutely certain” that Hobbes is its author 
(227). The archivist at Derbyshire contested the authorship and thus to avoid controversy Strauss did 
not make the manuscripts integral to his argument. 
380  Steven Smith, “Leo Strauss; The Outline of a Life,” 23. 
381  In Gourevitch and Roth, On Tyranny, Revised and Expanded Edition, including the Strauss-Kojève 
correspondance, 230. Strauss, Philosophy and Law, first published as Philosophie und Gesetz. Beiträge 
zum Verständnis Maimunis und seiner Vorlaüfer (Berlin: Schocken, 1935).  
382  Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 2, 363. 
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the first volume of my posthumous works, since no German publisher or English 
translator can be found.383  
 
Three days later, on May 12, 1935, Strauss asked Gadamer and Krüger for help to “get 
the writing placed somewhere in a German speaking country.”384 Nothing came of it and 
it was not until 1965 that the first German edition of the book appeared. Instead, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, saw to the translation and final publication of the manuscript in 
1936, with the English title, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis. 
385 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, builds on “Notes on Schmitt” and presents 
Hobbes as the first modern philosopher. Repeating his view in “Notes on Hobbes,” 
Strauss argues that Hobbes’s political philosophy is “the most important testimony to the 
struggle which has been fought against the aristocracy in the name of bourgeois 
virtue.”386 He advances the criticism of liberalism and socialism that he had first 
developed in “Notes on Schmitt,” by arriving at moral and ontological insights through 
Hobbes’s view on human nature.387 He lays bare in his account of Hobbes’s prescientific 
description of vanity the moral-ontological piece needed to supersede the liberal moral 
horizon and constitutional state: humans are morally evil due to human nature alone, i.e., 
independently of both a transcendental guarantor and the horizon of death 
                                                
383  Strauss, On Tyranny, 230.  
384  Leo Strauss, “Letter to Gadamer and Krüger on May 12, 1935,” translated by Bartlett and Minkov in 
Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion and Related Writings, 159; original copy in Strauss, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Band 3, 443-447. 
385  The Political Philosophy of Hobbes was instrumental in securing Strauss a teaching position at the New 
School of Social Research in New York in 1938. R. H. Tawney, Christian socialist, economic historian 
and political theorist, wrote a glowing recommendation letter for Strauss in 1938.  
386  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 126. 
387  Repeating an argument from “Notes on Schmitt,” the justification Strauss gives is that Hobbes’s 
doctrine of “man and state” is the “ideal of civilization in its modern form, the ideal both of the 
bourgeois-capitalist development and of the socialist movement, was founded and expounded by 
Hobbes with a depth, clarity, and sincerity never rivaled before or since” (Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes,1).   
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(Hobbes/Liberalism). Or, as Xenos has put it, “Strauss’s argument favors a return to a 
view of the human being as naturally evil, and not innocently so.”388 In making such 
return possible, Strauss modifies his earlier claim in “Notes on Schmitt” that Hobbes 
viewed human evil as innocent animal evil.389 He makes this alteration by differentiating 
human evil from animal evil by making the case that in Hobbes’s prescientific view of 
the passions there exists an absolute ontological distinction between human and animal 
desire. Exploring this further development of the distinction between human and animal 
desire over in this section, I will first show how Strauss sees in vanity (i) the 
psychological cause to why the state of nature is a state of war and (ii) the origin of 
human evil. Thereafter, I address Janssens’s (and by extension, Xenos’s) conjectural 
hypothesis that the vantage point from which Strauss asserts that man by nature is evil is 
informed by Socratic-Platonic natural law. In the concluding section, I return to assess 
Xenos’s hypothesis that Strauss adopts fear as the principle of obedience in light of his 
comparison of Hobbes’s political science with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. For reason of clarity, I begin with a brief sketch of 
Strauss’s approach and his case for Hobbes as the first philosopher of the bourgeoisie in 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 
3. 2. 2. Strauss’s approach 
In the draft version of a lecture on Heidegger, delivered nearly twenty years later in 
Chicago (in the early 1950s), Strauss writes of the development of philosophical thought 
in Germany in the early 20th century. This recapitulation helps introduce Strauss’s 
                                                
388  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 57. 
389  Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt”, 110.  
 131 
approach in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, already underway in “Notes on 
Schmitt”: 
It was Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology which became decisive: 
it became so precisely because that criticism consisted in a radicalization of 
Husserl’s own question and questioning. Briefly, Husserl once said to me, who 
had been trained in the Marburg neo-Kantian School, that the neo-Kantians were 
superior to all other German philosophical schools, but they made the mistake of 
beginning with the roof. He meant the following. The primary theme of Marburg 
neo-Kantianism was the analysis of science. But science, Husserl taught, is 
derivative from our primary knowledge of the world of things: science is not the 
perfection of man’s understanding of the world, but a specific modification of that 
prescientific understanding. The meaningful genesis of science out of 
prescientific understanding is a problem: the primary theme is the philosophical 
understanding of the pre-scientific world, and therefore in the first places the 
analysis of the sensibly perceived thing. According to Heidegger, Husserl himself 
began with the roof: the merely sensibly perceived thing is itself derivative; there 
are not first sensibly perceived things and thereafter the same things in a state of 
being valued or in a state of affecting us. Our primary understanding of the world 
is not an understanding of things as objects but of what the Greeks indicated by 
pragmata. The horizon within which Husserl had analyzed the world of 
prescientific understanding was the pure consciousness as the absolute being. 
Heidegger questioned that orientation by referring to the fact that the inner time 
belonging to the pure consciousness cannot be understood if one abstracts from 
the fact that this time is necessarily finite, and even constituted by man’s 
mortality.390 
 
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss first argues — like Husserl against the 
neo-Kantians — that Hobbes’s “fundamental view of human life” is independent, and 
comes prior to his discovery and application of a modern science. Hobbes’s view of 
human life derives from a primary knowledge of the world: from a “pre-scientific” 
observation of self and others and the “actual experience of how men behave in daily life 
and in ‘public conversation.’”391 Strauss adds that “[t]he experience, underlying Hobbes’s 
                                                
390  Strauss, “Introduction to Existentialism,” 28-29, emphasis added. 
391  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. x, emphasis added. The German manuscript reads: 
“Political philosophy is independent of natural science because its principles are not borrowed from 
natural science, are not, indeed, borrowed from any science, but are provided by experience [die 
Erfahrung], by the experience [die Erfahrung] which every one has of himself, or, to put it more 
accurately, are discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge [die Selbsterkenntnis] and the self-
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view of human life, must, in its turn, be traced back to a specific moral attitude.”392 He 
thus follows Heidegger’s radicalization of Husserl’s questioning, suggesting that it is not 
Hobbes’s “pure consciousness” that observes the world. It is a repetition with a 
difference, however, as Hobbes’s understanding of the world, Strauss argues, is not 
framed merely “by man’s mortality” per se; but a moral bourgeois consciousness 
determined by the horizon of fear of violent death.   
It is in Hobbes’s observations of human life prior to his adoption of modern 
science, with its amoral or neutral conception of the striving for power, that Strauss 
excavates a moral foundation of Hobbes’s political philosophy.393 At the core of this 
moral attitude, Strauss locates the antithesis vanity-fear that he had identified in “Notes 
on Hobbes.” In a letter Strauss wrote to Gadamer and Krüger in May 12, 1935, he 
explains: 
The leading outlook in Hobbes is characterized by the fundamental antithesis of 
vanity and fear of violent death, and the inner connection between the two sides of 
this antithesis brings out, ever more emphatically, that this antithesis is intended 
morally, and that, as well as why, Hobbes shies away from its moral 
understanding.394  
 
As the subtitle of the book (The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis) 
indicates, it is the “genesis” or development of this moral “basis” that Strauss traces 
throughout Hobbes’s written corpus. The adoption of science obscures the way in which 
“Hobbes’s political philosophy rests not on the illusion of an amoral morality, but on a 
new morality, or, to speak according to Hobbes’s intention, on a new grounding of the 
                                                                                                                                            
examination [die Selbstprüfung] of every one” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 7; Strauss, 
Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 20). 
392  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, x.  
393  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, ix, 5.   
394  Strauss, “Letter to Gadamer and Krüger on May 12, 1935,” 160, emphasis added. 
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one eternal morality.”395 This new and trans-historical morality, Strauss argues, is 
Hobbes’s bourgeois answer to the classical question of man’s “right way of life”; that is, 
a life lived in peace and material prosperity.396 The aim of Hobbes’s bourgeois state is to 
secure the life of its citizens; a ground for existence stipulated by the natural right of each 
individual to preserve his or her life.  
For Hobbes obviously starts, not, as the great tradition did, from natural ‘law,’ i.e. 
from an objective order, but from natural ‘right,’ i.e. from an absolutely justified 
subjective claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order, or 
obligation, is itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation. […] For, by starting 
from ‘right’ and thus denying the primacy of ‘law’ (or, what amounts 
fundamentally to the same, of ‘virtue’), Hobbes makes a stand against the 
idealistic tradition.”397  
 
Every important contradiction in Hobbes’s work, Strauss suggests, arises because the 
“traditional conceptions [of Natural Law] are not appropriate to [Hobbes’s] 
fundamentally untraditional view, and the conceptions provided by the modern science 
are not congenial to a view of human life originating in a moral attitude.”398 It is by 
means of one of these contradictions that Strauss re-evaluates the question of man’s 
moral status in Hobbes’s corpus and in general.  
3. 2. 3. The first bourgeois philosopher  
The moral antithesis vanity-fear serves to explain three different levels of human affairs 
in Strauss’s account of Hobbes as the founder of the artificial bourgeois state: (i) 
psychological: from vanity to a fear of violent death; (ii) political: from the pre-political 
state of nature to civil society; (ii) historical: moving from aristocratic feudalism and 
religious authority to bourgeois and secular modernity. The three levels correspond to the 
                                                
395  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 15, emphasis added. 
396  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 1. 
397  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, viii. 
398  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, xi, emphasis added. 
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resistance that Strauss had previously argued, in “Notes on Hobbes,” liberalism had to 
“fight its way through”: first and foremost, “human nature”, as well as “the old power of 
the Church and the feudal state.”399 The weapon used on all fronts is the fear of violent 
death.  Let us now examine these three levels of human affairs one by one: 
 
Against human nature 
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss aligns Hobbes’s two 
postulates of human nature — “natural appetite” and “natural reason” — with the 
moral antithesis vanity-fear.400 Natural appetite is “reduced” to vanity and natural 
reason “to the principle of self-preservation.”401 Natural reason is insufficient to 
restrain vanity since “natural appetite” is dominant. To make reason potent (i.e., 
capable of enforcing norms that ensure a peaceful commonwealth), Hobbes 
grounds reason in fear of violent death — the only passion that “conquers” and 
“convinces” vanity.402 In other words, Hobbes plays one passion against the other, 
fear against vanity, in order “to draw up a political philosophy which will from 
the outset be in harmony with the passions.”403   
As a vain individual enters into a struggle with another person, the 
imaginary perception of his or her own power may or may not correspond to 
reality — determined as this matter is by the outcome of the contest. The struggle 
is initially for the other’s recognition in which the combatant who recognizes the 
                                                
399  Strauss, “Notes on Hobbes,” 122, emphasis added.   
400  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 10-17, 113, 154.   
401  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 15. 
402  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 103, emphasis added.   
403  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 103.   
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other’s superior power feels “slighted.”404 Insult is turned into “hatred” when 
physical harm is inflicted. This is the step missing in the description of the 
dialectical story from “Notes on Hobbes”: hatred turns the striving for the 
opponent’s recognition into a desire to kill him. A life-and-death struggle unfolds 
and awakens the subject to a potential violent death in the hands of the other. The 
“struggle-over-life-and-death” corresponds to what Strauss identifies as the 
essential relation of enmity in Schmitt’s conception of the political.   
Strauss casts fear of violent death as a pre-rational passion that is 
“symmetrically” opposed to vanity, but that causes reason and prudence:  
Not the rational and therefore always uncertain knowledge that death is the 
greatest and supreme evil, but the fear of death, i.e., the emotional and 
inevitable, and therefore necessary and certain, aversion from death is the 
origin of law and the State.  This fear is a mutual fear, i.e. it is the fear 
each man has of every other man as his potential murderer.  This fear of a 
violent death, pre-rational in its origin, but rational in effect, and not the 
rational principle of self-preservation, is, according to Hobbes, the root of 
all right and therewith of all morality.405  
 
With this, Strauss explicitly adds a theory of causality to the relation between fear 
of violent death and natural reason: the pre-rational fear of violent death is the 
affective cause of natural reason that is in accord with the rational laws of nature. 
Silently dropped from the dialectical story, however, is the reliance on reason and 
the associated capacity to foresee a violent death.406 In rearticulating the natural 
right for self-preservation into its own affective cause, Strauss relies on Hegel’s 
“authority” for a definition of the bourgeois self-consciousness as being defined 
                                                
404  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 20. 
405  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 17-18, emphasis added.  
406  We become aware of the prospect of dying violently in the hands of others first after we enter into the 
struggle for ever more power over others. In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss provides for 
two definitions of reason that are operative in Hobbes: (i) the capability to foresee the future, and (ii) 
that which is in accord with self-preservation. The ability to foresee the future is required for fear to 
attach itself to a prospective violent death.  
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by the fear of violent death.407 In Strauss’s own words, he “attempted to show” 
that “Hegel’s analysis of the bourgeois corroborates the identity of Hobbes’s 
morality and bourgeois morality.”408 
The reason why every individual fears violent death is that they are each 
equally at risk of dying at the hands of another, according to Hobbes’s emphasis 
on a natural equality that stipulates that the weakest can kill the strongest. When 
fear of violent death is shared by everyone, it is “exalted to a principle”; and it is 
only at this point that Hobbes’s “new [bourgeois] philosophy become 
possible.”409 Fear of violent death makes man reasonable: “bourgeois virtue, the 
right life of man is understood exclusively as an emanation of his right self-
consciousness.”410 Former enemies decide to secure their own self-preservation 
(which is in accord with natural reason) by adhering to the rational precepts 
enumerated in the laws of nature (i.e., a set of obligations in accord with natural 
reason).411  
It is the potentially deadly antagonism that defines the essential relation in 
both Hobbes and Schmitt’s state theory in Strauss’s account. It is the readiness to 
kill and die, he argues, that sets the political apart from all other domains of 
culture in Schmitt’s conception. Similarly, in Strauss’s reading of Hobbes, violent 
death becomes the ground for the political covenant when attached to fear. There 
                                                
407  Strauss, “Letter to Gadamer and Krüger on May 12, 1935,” 162.  
408  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 122.   
409  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 102.   
410  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 128. 
411  The first two natural law precepts stipulate that each individual should seek peace by surrendering their 
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are two state resolutions to the state of war accounted for by Strauss: (i) 
despotism, the natural state in which one of the combatants surrenders and 
recognizes the other’s superiority (a ruler-ruled relation that Strauss calls “natural 
dominion”); and (ii) the Hobbesian artificial state, in which all men surrender 
their rights to an absolute Sovereign (the ruler—ruled relation that he calls 
“artificial dominion”).  
The artificial state, which is as such more perfect, arises when the two  
opponents are both seized with fear for their lives, overcome their vanity 
and shame of confessing their fear, and recognize as their real enemy not 
the rival, but ‘that terribly enemy of nature, death’, who, as their common 
enemy, forces them to mutual understanding, trust, and union, and thus 
procures them the possibility of completing the founding of the State for 
the purpose of providing safeguards for the longest possible term, against 
the common enemy.412  
 
As a result of the transposition of “enemy” from the opponent onto the “common” 
and objective and potential consequence of enmity (violent death) the struggle-
unto-death is aborted, and Schmitt’s political antagonism neutralized by the 
creation of an artificial, bourgeois state against human nature. 413 
 
Against feudal aristocracy  
As Hobbes came of age, Strauss argues, he turns from an appreciation, to a 
critique of aristocratic virtues: “the genesis of Hobbes’s political philosophy is 
nothing other than the progressive supplanting of aristocratic virtue by bourgeois 
virtue.”414 In his mature political work, Hobbes links all aristocratic virtues to 
vanity and all bourgeois virtues to fear of violent death. In respect to vanity, 
Strauss explains, “a man’s honour is the recognition by others of his superiority 
                                                
412  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 22, emphasis added. 
413  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 21-22. 
414  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 126, emphasis added. 
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over those others […] All emotions or actions which arise from consciousness of 
superiority are ‘honourable.’” 415  Pride and glory are the “consciousness of 
superiority,” and when it is “well founded” (i.e. not imaginary, but reflecting 
reality), this consciousness of superiority becomes “magnanimity.”416 Hobbes 
rejects all aristocratic virtues since they are grounded in vanity.417 “Because 
Hobbes finally recognizes fear of violent death as the basis of all virtues, he must 
finally question every obligation which causes man to risk his life.”418 Thus any 
virtue inconsistent with peacefully living is no longer perceived as a virtue: 
“courage” and “generosity” are thus dismissed, and by the time Hobbes published 
De Cive in 1642, the conclusion that fear is the “sufficient motive for all right 
behavior” includes times of war.419 Alongside the ideals of “justice and charity,” 
Hobbes “recognizes only industry and thrift.”420 It is “in the movement from the 
principle of honour to the principle of fear, [that] Hobbes’s political philosophy 
comes into being.”421  
Hobbes’s moral teaching is the moral of the “middle class.”422 Whereas 
Hobbes blames the Presbyterian clergy and the middle class for the outbreak of 
the civil war in the Behemoth, Strauss argues that his attacks are directed “by no 
means the middle class itself, its being and its ideal”; his attack is directed at their 
                                                
415  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 50. 
416  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 50-51. 
417  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 113-114. 
418  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 114, 127-28. 
419  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 113, emphasis added.   
420  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 120. Recognition of any other virtue is due to Hobbes’s 
“entanglement in the tradition” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 132). 
421  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 128, emphasis added. 
422  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 117.   
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“policy” only.423 In disobeying Charles I, and supporting the revolution, the 
middle class acted contrary to their own “private gain.”424 The bourgeois rely on 
the Sovereign to secure the “condition of its existence,” of “body and soul, which 
the bourgeois cannot itself guarantee.”425 Domestic peace is the precondition for 
“private property and private profit.”426   
In contrast to industry and thrift, war is no certain means of securing well-
being […] war should be waged only for defence, and to this end it is best 
to maintain a mercenary army. Thus the relationship between ‘Leviathan’ 
and subject is changed to its opposite; the sovereign power is the hireling 
of individuals, who apply themselves to just and modest self-enrichment, 
who buy and sell labour like any other commodity, and who also can pay 
for the work of their defence…427  
 
Hobbes is a bourgeois philosopher in a society governed by capitalist market 
relations: Hobbes “takes it for granted that ‘a man’s Labour also is a commodity 
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing.’”428 Strauss argues that 
Hobbes’s political philosophy is a philosophical defense of the rise of the 
bourgeois civilization: “Not only does Hobbes not attack the middle class which 
is sensibly aware of its own interests, he even provides it with a philosophical 
justification, as the ideals set up in his political philosophy are precisely the ideals 
of the bourgeoisie.”429  
 
Against religion 
As we have seen, Strauss argues that Hobbes puts forth a universal and 
applicable rationality grounded in an aversion potentially shared by everyone: fear 
                                                
423  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 118. 
424  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 118. 
425  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 121.   
426  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 118. 
427  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 120, emphasis added. 
428  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 118.  
429  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 118. 
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of violent death. Hobbes’s political theory is impotent without a predominant fear 
of violent death, the affective cause that ensures self-preservation. 430  In 
maintaining this position, the challenge Hobbes faced in his time is that fear of 
violent death was that for many not the only — and often not the determinant — 
passion that swayed them to action in a given moment. Fear of afterlife (of the 
eternal damnation of the soul) moved many individuals to take up sword more 
than violent death restrained them at the time — a fact which England’s religious 
and civil wars are a testament to. In the unpublished, largely complete 
monograph, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, Strauss states unequivocally that the 
critique of Scripture, or revealed religion “in general,” is the “conditio sine qua 
non for the ultimate safeguard, if not for the original possibility, of Hobbesian 
politics.”431 Strauss explains: 
Hobbes’s politics is […] indissolubly connected with his critique of 
religion: religion is the enemy of this politics. For this politics is based on 
the axiom that violent death is the greatest evil [gewaltsame Tod das 
grösste Übel ist]; religion, by contrast, teaches that there is a greater evil 
even than violent death, namely, eternal punishment after death in hell; 
religion therefore denies the foundation of Hobbesian politics. Hence, this 
politics remains questionable as long as the teaching of religion is not 
refuted: it is dependent on the critique of religion.432 
 
Hobbes struggles with revealed religion over what object fear is attached to. 
Hobbes’s disavowed motivations centered on the afterlife in favor of (bourgeois) 
motivations centered on fear of death in this world. He must transfer the fear of 
eternal damnation to violent death for his “politics” to work. Hobbes’s political 
                                                
430  “Among the passions he [Hobbes] pays particular attention to vanity and fear. The view which guides 
this selection is the relationship of the passion to reason, or more accurately, the fitness and unfitness of 
the various passions, to function as a substitute for impotent reason” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes, 130).    
431  Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, 73.   
432  Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, 26, emphasis added; German original in Strauss, Gesammelte 
Schriften Band 3, 271.    
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doctrine depends on public enlightenment and his writing thus works against the 
kind of esotericism — the divide between the few wise and the many vulgar — 
that Strauss identified in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion. If Hobbes’s scientific 
materialism fails to convince his readers that immaterial spirits do not exist, 
Strauss argues, in all his three presentations of his political philosophy (Elements 
of Law, De Cive, and the Leviathan), “with a double intention [Hobbes] becomes 
an interpreter of the Bible, in the first place in order to make use of the authority 
of the Scripture for his own theory, and next and particularly in order to shake the 
authority of the Scriptures themselves.”433 Hobbes first attacks scholastic theology 
in order to make use of the Scripture’s authority to secure obedience to an 
undivided corporeal civil Sovereign among believers of various denomination and 
independent sects. He then questioned the authority of the Scripture itself.434 
3. 2. 4. Vanity: the cause for the state of war and proof of human evil 
At the outset of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss returns to the problem of 
human evil by staging a contradiction in Hobbes’s corpus with help from Rousseau: 
As Rousseau’s polemic against Hobbes sufficiently proves, there remains [in 
Hobbes] the antithesis between the assertions that man is by nature good (more 
                                                
433  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 71. 
434  This order of division follows the order of presentation in Hobbes’s Critique of Religion:  In the first 
part, Strauss argues that Hobbes attacks the “theologian’s opinion about revelation” on the “basis of the 
scripture,” as if he had been a believer in revelation (Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, 33). In all 
his three “political theological” treaties, “Hobbes declares that unconditional obedience to the secular 
power is the bounded duty of every Christian, in so far as that power does not forbid belief in Jesus as 
Christ” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 72). Until the return of Christ, all that is “needed 
for salvation is the belief in Jesus as Christ” and that the temporal Sovereign is obeyed and rule supreme 
in a Christian commonwealth (72). In the Leviathan, Hobbes’s final political work, Strauss argues that 
Hobbes refutes the immortality of the soul for the resurrection of the body after the second coming of 
Christ (72). The soul, as Strauss puts it in Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, is inseparable from the body 
and thus not an “incorporeal substance” (Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, 45).  In the second 
part, Strauss shows that Hobbes turns from the Church and theology to what the two former 
“acknowledge… as unconditional binding Scripture” to critique it by attacking the source of the 
scripture in revelation, prophets, and miracles” (33-34).  
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accurately, innocent) and that man is by nature evil (rapacious) [daß der Mensch 
von Natur gut (genauer: harmlos), und daß er von Natur böse (raubsüchtig) 
sei]”.435   
 
Strauss immediately confirms — altering his views from “Notes on Schmitt” — that it is 
the latter antithesis (i.e., man is by nature evil) that is at the heart of Hobbes's political 
philosophy, “without” which it “would lose all its character.”436 He locates the answer to 
why man by nature is morally evil in the answer to the question why all individuals in the 
state of nature incessantly seek ever more power over others. Strauss answers this 
question anew by splitting Hobbes into a young prescientific and a mature scientific 
Hobbes.437     
In Hobbes's mature “scientific” or “mechanistic conception” humans and animals 
are both viewed as self-moving, directed by sense impressions. The only thing that 
differentiates humans from animals is that the former have reason at their “service.”438 
Reason is here defined — the first of two definitions given in The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes — as the capacity to “envisage the future” and “for this very reason he [the 
human being] is not like animals, hungry only with the hunger of the moment; but also 
with future hunger, and thus he is the most predatory, the most cunning, the strongest, 
and most dangerous animal.”439  
It is in the young Hobbes’s “anthropological” view of human desire that Strauss 
finds a definite distinction between human and animal desire. This “vitalistic conception 
is based not on a general scientific theory, but on insight into human nature, deepened 
                                                
435  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 3; German in Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 15. 
436  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 3. 
437  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 7-10. 
438  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 9. 
439  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 9.  
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and substantiated by self-knowledge and self-examination.” 440  The quality that 
differentiates human desire from animal desire in the young Hobbes’s “anthropological” 
view, lies not in man’s unique capacity for rationality, but in man’s “irrational” desire. 
Human desire is different from animal appetite in that it is “innate” and “infinite” and 
thus not determined by external objects, while animal appetite, on the contrary, he argues, 
is externally motivated by sensory perceptions, and subsequently finite because the 
finitude of external objects.441 Contrary then to finite animal desire (determined and 
limited by external objects), human desire in Hobbes’s anthropology is self-originating 
and “has its basis in the pleasure which man takes in the consideration of his own power, 
i.e. in vanity. The origin of man’s natural appetite is, therefore, not perception but 
vanity.”442 More specifically, the vain desire is for the other’s recognition of one’s 
“superiority of intelligence.”443 The vain individual does not strive to attain external 
objects or ends besides the pleasure derived from the contemplation of others’ 
recognition of one’s own superiority: “man’s natural appetite is nothing other than a 
striving after precedence over others and recognition of this precedence by others….”444  
It is through this psychological description of vanity that Strauss accounts for why 
the incessant struggle for power is always over others and thus why the state of nature is 
a war of all against all: “Every man is for that very reason the enemy of every other man, 
                                                
440  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 9, emphasis added.  
441  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 11, emphasis added. The distinction drawn in Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion between human desires for material and immaterial objects is here sketched onto an 
animal-human dichotomy. The pleasures of the “senses and the flesh” is “limited and confined” in the 
present, and shared with animals, while the striving for “power” and “reputation,” and “honor,” which 
is “limitless” and future oriented, “take on independence over against the seeking after the sensual 
pleasure” (Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 88-89). 
442  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 11. 
443  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 26, emphasis added. Illusory self-perception of one’s own 
capabilities, in particular, “mental,” intellectual prowess.   
444  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 11, emphasis added. 
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because each desires to surpass every other and thereby offends every other.”445 The 
pleasure attained by contemplating one’s own superiority is only obtained by engaging 
another person and thus vanity is the first and primary cause behind the antagonism in the 
state of nature. Strauss therefore concluded “the war of everyone against everyone arises 
of necessity from man’s very nature.”446 The consequence of all men seeking ever more 
power over others is a “‘warre of every one against every one.’”447 The famous sentence 
from the Leviathan does not end at “every one” however, but concludes: “this is also 
consequent: that nothing can be unjust [in the state of nature].”448 Contrary to Hobbes's 
explicit and nominal assertion that it is the contractual agreement between two parties to 
the social contract that differentiates just from the unjust, as enumerated in the third law 
of nature, Strauss argued that the pre-scientific Hobbes had conceived of a moral 
distinction in the state of nature so that “the unequivocal distinction between just and 
unjust intentions holds even for the state of nature, and is, therefore, absolute.”449 
Whereas all actions in the state of nature are just subjectively on the ground that any 
action can be said necessary for self-preservation and thus in agreement with the natural 
right of each individual, Strauss argued that not all motivations are just.  
There are two motivations behind the striving for ever more power over others in 
the state of nature according to Strauss in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.450 Besides 
the vain striving, there exists in the state of nature a rational will for power. There are 
                                                
445  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 12. If vanity was not a natural desire shared by all (as he 
waivers on this point), but the majority, the outcome of the many vain individuals striving for ever more 
power over others resulted in a state of nature qua state of war in which everyone, not only was forced 
to strive for ever more power, but feared for their life due to their mutual vulnerability.   
446  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 12. 
447  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 22. 
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449  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 24.   
450  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 15. 
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individuals who rationally engage in the struggle-onto-death due to fear of violent death 
when there is no other way out. Rational offence is the only defense in a situation in 
which the desire of vain individuals (who are not yet disciplined by fear of violent death) 
require the other’s submission.451 Strauss assigns a moral division between good and evil 
to these two motives: “The striving after power [das Machtstreben], as human striving 
after power, is always either good [gut] and permissible [erlaubt] or evil [böse] and 
unpermissible [unerlaubt].”452 It is “good” and “permissible” to rationally strive for 
power to secure one’s life. It is “evil” and “unpermissible” to strive for power due to 
vanity.453 In accordance with this binary, Strauss claims that Hobbes gradually came to 
the conclusion that there exists only one just intention: “Not pride, and still less 
obedience, but fear of violent death, is according to him [Hobbes] the origin of the just 
intention.”454 The “confession” of one’s “weakness,” when “unconcerned about his 
honour [rooted in vanity], this alone is fundamentally just.”455 Moreover, attaching a 
moral distinction to these two different motivations permits Strauss to argue that there is 
individual moral conscience: “Hobbes’s last word is the identification of conscience 
[bourgeois] with the fear of death.”456 The rational striving for self-preservation is a 
coerced decision in good conscience, as it is rooted in the fear of violent death and thus 
determined by the liberal or bourgeois moral horizon. Whereas the striving after power 
over others is both rational and irrational, only the irrational striving is a “natural human 
appetite”: 
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Only the irrational striving after power, which is found more frequently than the 
rational striving after power, is to be taken as a natural human appetite. For the 
rational striving after power rests on already rational reflection and is for that very 
reason not natural, i.e. not innate, not in existence prior to all external 
motivations, to all experience and education.457  
 
It is in this irrational and natural/innate motivation that Strauss unearths the proof that 
man is by nature evil: “According to Hobbes’s view, the motive of this striving is man’s 
wish to take pleasure in himself by considering his own superiority, his own recognized 
superiority, i.e. vanity.”458 It is because “man by nature finds his pleasure in triumphing 
over all others [der Mensch also von Natur durch Triumph über alle anderen sich selbst 
gefallen will],” Strauss asserts: that “man is by nature evil [so ist der Mensch von Natur 
böse].”459  
His earlier conclusion in “Notes on Schmitt” — that Hobbes conceives of humans 
as innocent (i.e. not guilty/innocent) animals (i.e., none-morally evil by nature) — is thus 
revoked.460  While the young Hobbes, in Strauss’s portrayal, judged the morality of an 
action was determined retroactively i.e., whether the motivation is fear of death (ensuring 
self-preservation) or vanity (leading to war), Strauss judiciously stops short of asserting 
that vanity should be judged as morally evil because it results in violent death. With this 
decisive adjustment of Hobbes’s moral-ontology, Strauss’s own moral-ontological 
demonstration of human evil, in the domain of the state of nature (qua Schmitt’s 
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vanity, and not “perception” that is the “basis” for man’s “irrational striving for power,” that is, “man’s 
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political), transcends Hobbes’s liberal moral horizon — defined by an overarching 
interest in security of life/fear of violent death — and provides the foundation for a 
Right-wing authoritarian state. 461  Strauss’s conception of vanity exceeds the 
technical/scientific or neutral definition of the striving for power as merely a means to 
attain an end. In this, he agrees with the younger Hobbes. Vanity is then Strauss’s moral-
ontological qua metaphysical answer — an answer that is formulated as a transitive cause 
— to what wills the will to power.462 
Strauss points out that in the Leviathan, Hobbes’s “final presentation” of his 
political philosophy, “vanity”/glory is enumerated as the last on the list of three causes — 
after “competition” and “diffidence” — of violence in the state of nature.463 The reason 
for the diminished importance of vanity, Strauss argues, is Hobbes’s adoption of modern 
science as a method to investigate things political. In Strauss’s account of Hobbes’s 
response to the charge by his contemporaries that he had asserted that man is by nature 
morally evil, we find Strauss’s own earlier view of Hobbes in “Notes on Schmitt” 
repeated: “Because man is by nature animal, therefore he is not by nature evil [von Natur 
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463  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 13.  
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böse], therefore he is an innocent [unschuldig] as the animals; thus vanity [Eitelkeit] 
cannot characterize his natural appetite [Also: weil der Mensch von Nature ein Tier ist, 
darum ist er nicht von Natur böse, darum ist er so unschudlig wie die Tiere; daher kann 
nicht die Eitelkeit seine natürlishe Begierde charakterisieren]”464 To the Strauss of a few 
years later, writing The Political Philosophy of Hobbes from England, this is the 
scientific Hobbes speaking, having shied away from his moral view on human nature.465 
The mature Hobbes scientifically portrays vanity as an appetite common to both humans 
and animals, and as a consequence, humans appear by nature morally innocent 
[unschuldig], without guilt.   
In laying the foundations of his political philosophy, Hobbes puts vanity more and 
more into the background in favor of innocent competition, innocent striving after 
power, innocent animal appetite, because the definition of man’s natural appetite 
in terms of vanity is intended as a moral judgment.466  
  
What Hobbes represses due to his adoption of a scientific view of human nature is both 
the significance and moral status of vanity, the human nature cause behind the natural 
antagonism in the state of nature: “with the progressive elaboration of his natural science, 
vanity, which must of necessity be treated from the moral standpoint, is more and more 
replaced by the striving for power, which is neutral and therefore more amenable to 
scientific interpretation.” 467  As a consequence, “the moral basis of his political 
philosophy becomes more and more disguised, the farther the evolution of his natural 
science progresses.”468 Strauss concludes that Hobbes does not “dare to uphold the 
consequence or assumption of his theory”, of “the reduction of man’s natural appetite to 
                                                
464  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 14; Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 27. Sinclar has 
translated Begierde as “appetite” rather than “desire”. 
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vanity;” that is, the moral judgment that “man is by nature evil [so ist der Mensch von 
Natur böse]”469  
Contrary to the scientific Hobbes, Strauss, however, does dare to reassert 
Hobbes’s moral judgment, not only as a commentator on the pre-scientific Hobbes’s 
emphasis on vanity, but also in regards to human nature per se: “But he [Hobbes] is no 
better able than any other to make us [wie] forget that man does not happen to be an 
innocent animal [daß der Mensch eben kein unschuldiges Tier ist].”470 Strauss speaks 
here in his own voice when he asserts that humans are not an innocent animal 
[unschuldiges Tier], but guilty [schuldige]. He casted man’s evil [böse/das Böse 
Menschen] in terms of biblical category: guilty [schuldige]. He differentiates his own 
views from the later, scientific Hobbes, by putting forth his own moral judgment on the 
nature of man, which was sufficient to remind “us” (fellow right-wing authoritarians) not 
to forget that the human animal, unlike all other animals, is morally evil (i.e., non-
innocent) by nature.471 In “Notes on Schmitt” and “Notes on Hobbes,” however, Strauss 
argues that those who subscribe to the anarchistic view of human nature — i.e. liberals 
and socialists, who focus on humans’ natural competitiveness, instead of vanity as the 
cause for why the state of nature is a state of war — either forget or deny that humans are 
by nature evil. 
                                                
469  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 12, 13, emphasis added.     
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of Chicago Press, 1988), 14). 
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3. 2. 5. Strauss’s moral attitude  
I have argued that Strauss attaches Biblical morality to human nature by asserting that 
humans are, due to their vanity, morally guilty, not innocently evil like animals.472 A 
contrasting hypothesis is suggested by Xenos and Janssens, who argues that at the time of 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes Strauss had adopted a Socratic-Platonic moral-
political point of view of evil. Only through a recovery of Socratic-Platonic political 
philosophy was it possible for Strauss, in Janssen’s words: “to develop a moral-political 
outlook on human evil without reverting to a hidden religious framework as in the case of 
Schmitt. According to Socrates’ well-known dictum, ‘virtue is knowledge’ and thus vice 
is based on ignorance.”473 Janssens is thus here suggesting that Strauss came to equate 
vice (ignorance) with evil.474  
To address Janssens and Xenos’s claim, it is of additional help that Strauss in fact 
discusses a Socratic-Platonic conception of good and evil in The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes’s final chapter. In this final chapter, “evil” is mentioned three times and in all 
cases translated from the German word “schlecht,” which is also translated as “bad” (but 
never “evil”) elsewhere in the book. Strauss does not use “böse” in this chapter — the 
German word he uses consistently when he speaks of vanity to assert that “man is by 
nature evil”475 In one of these three cases, Strauss in fact gives a definition of vice/evil as 
                                                
472  Strauss thinks (in agreement with Hobbes) that human beings are vain and contentious by nature and 
take pleasure in the abasement of others. This, according to Strauss, marks them as naturally morally 
evil and guilty. 
473  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens, 144, emphasis added. 
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Philosophy of Hobbes, 140-41. In Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 160-161); (ii) In regard to 
Hobbes’s preference for exact science over moral arguments over good and evil since they are the 
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ignorance, which concurs with Janssens’s definition of the Socratic-Platonic moral-
political outlook: “‘good,’” Strauss writes, “is in every respect contrary of evil that which 
is completely free from evil [was dem Schlechten in jeder Hinsicht entgegengesetzt, vom 
Schlechten gänzlich frei ist]. The result of this reflection is confirmed by what men also 
say: that the good is virtue and wisdom.”476 If Strauss had adopted a Socratic-Platonic 
view that evil is only understood as ignorance (i.e., we do evil because we do not know 
what we are doing), and thus as a privation of the “‘good [wisdom],’” then: (i) as he 
writes in “Notes on Schmitt,” “the opposition between evil and good loses its keen edge”; 
(ii) Strauss’s “moral-political outlook” on evil falls under the anarchistic view that man 
is by nature educable and thus good by nature (this assessment, of course, supposes that 
individuals are susceptible to education in the first place); and (iii) what are we to do with 
the fact that Strauss’s only definition of human moral evil by nature is in relation to 
human vanity in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes?477 Strauss references to “schlecht” 
as vice/bad in Socratic-Platonic tradition in the final chapter provides inconclusive 
ground for asserting, like Jannsens and Xenos, that Strauss had adopted a Socratic-
Platonic “moral-political outlook on human evil.” 478 The moral outlook through which 
Strauss asserts that “man is by nature evil [so ist der Mensch von Natur böse]” due to 
their vanity (and thus “guilty [schuldige]”) is more akin to Biblical religion than Socratic-
Platonic philosophy. Strauss’s assessment that Heidegger had not freed himself from 
                                                                                                                                            
“origin of all strife and contradiction” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 144; Strauss, 
Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 164); and (iii) in regard to the ancient definition of good as “completely 
free from evil [vom Schlechsten ganzlich frei ist]” (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 145; 
Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 164). The other places in the final chapter, “The New Political 
Science,” in which he uses “Schlecht” in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, are: 131, 140-141, 160-
161. 
476  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 144, emphasis added; Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 
3, 164. 
477  Strauss, ““Notes on Schmitt,” 110. 
478  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens, 144, emphasis added. 
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theology thus applies in some measure also to the author of The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes. 
What then remains of Janssens’s claim that Strauss “already begun to recover the 
horizon beyond liberalism within and against which Hobbes founded liberalism and the 
modern concept of culture; the horizon of nomos or law as a ‘concrete binding order of 
life,’ common to revealed religion and Socratic-Platonic philosophy”?479 A great deal. I 
have argued that Strauss begins to recover a horizon prior to the rise of liberalism from 
which he compares Hobbes’s modern conception of an individual natural right with the 
ancient natural law (the “right of the state”) that demands obedience in accordance to 
“natural or divine law.”480 It is from this pre-liberal horizon that Strauss, in the final 
chapter of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, compares Hobbes’s bourgeois morality 
and the accompanying natural right/claim with Aristotle’s. He notes for example: 
“Hobbes in his enumeration of good things mentions life as the first good in the first 
place, whereas Aristotle mentions happiness in the first place and life only in the 
penultimate place.”481 The higher ranking of goods other than basic survival (with which 
Strauss agrees), however, does not play a role in Strauss’s attempt to identify in Hobbes 
an unliberal human nature and morality, and his claim that humans are by nature morally 
evil due to their vanity. Strauss completes his critique of liberalism, or moves beyond the 
liberal moral horizon, through (in his terms) an adequate understanding of Hobbes’s pre-
scientific ontology or anthropology. More precisely, Strauss derives the moral-
ontological insight that humans are evil by nature from Hobbes’s phenomenological 
observations of our unliberal nature. Between the book’s covers there are two moral 
                                                
479  Janssens, Between Jerusalem and Athens, 146. 
480  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 156 
481  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 132. 
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frameworks at play: one Biblical, the other that of a kind of ancient virtue ethics. On the 
question of moral evil (as the ground for an authoritarian and unliberal state), Strauss 
applies the former in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, but he was in the process of 
adopting the latter, as we shall see in the next chapter.  
3. 3. 1. Conclusion: constitutive principle and domestic policy 
In this chapter, I have argued that in his main study of Hobbes, The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes, Strauss seeks to complete a radical critique of liberalism by moving beyond 
the liberal horizon according to the criteria he had previously identified in “Notes on 
Schmitt” and clarified in a letter to Schmitt on Sept. 4, 1932, repeating it again in “Notes 
on Hobbes”: The moral ground for the right-wing authoritarian state ontologically lies in 
the unliberal quality of human nature which marks us as evil by nature. He solves this 
problem by arguing that Hobbes’s pre-scientific or anthropological definition of vanity 
proves that humans are by nature morally evil, hence not educable. His suggestion that 
Hobbes’s portrayal of human behavior in the state of nature reflects an immediate 
experience of oneself and the world prior to natural science, and that Hobbes’s 
subsequent scientific view of human nature negates this pre-scientific knowledge of 
human nature, was influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology. We have seen that Strauss 
supplements this argument by drawing on Heidegger’s addition to Husserl; that there is 
an a priori moral attitude that informs the phenomenological perception/experience of 
self and others.  
 Whereas Strauss agrees with Hobbes’s anthropological observation of vanity, and 
argues that due to vanity man is evil, he disapproves of the bourgeois moral horizon 
informing the pre-scientific Hobbes’s moral judgment on vanity, and the remedy (the 
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principle of rule) in fear of violent death. The question why people would obey the 
Sovereign in a right-wing authoritarian state remains unanswered at this stage in Strauss’s 
writing. Xenos argues that Strauss favors a return to human moral evil because he has 
adopted, from Hobbes’s bourgeois contract, fear as the principle of rule. This claim is 
contradictory to Strauss’s right-wing authoritarian moral-ontology (i.e., if the foundation 
is fear as the principle for obedience then you have accepted that humans are educable) 
and it is not textually verifiable.  
Thus, the two main problems that remain unresolved at the end of The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes are the question of obedience or legitimacy and the internal policy 
of the state. Whereas a conception of the political as grounded in vanity necessitates 
authority and a sphere of dominion without national enmity, it is not constitutive of the 
internal policy of the state, and lacks a principle for obedience that transcends the liberal 
view of human nature as educable. To assess Strauss’s pursuit of a conception of the 
political that is ranked above the state and provides its constitutive principle, it is useful 
to consider a comparison Strauss draws between Aristotle and Plato’s political thought 
and Hobbes’s in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes’s final chapter. Strauss mentions 
this comparison in a 1935 letter to Kojève, in which he describes The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes as “a first attempt at a radical liberation from the modern 
prejudice.”482 In lieu of such return to the ancient, Strauss raises the question: “’Who or 
what shall rule?’” He answers that prior to modernity it was the “Law.”483 For priests, he 
explains, this meant revealed Law; for the ancient philosophers, it was the rational 
                                                
482  The letter is transcribed, translated and annotated by Gourevitch, Victor, On Tyranny, Revised and 
Expanded Edition, including the Strauss-Kojève correspondence,  230. 
483  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 158. 
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law/order in nature, which entailed that the rational should rule: “reason justifies 
dominion.”484  
Since justification is far from automatically ensuring implementation, Strauss 
raises the question of whether inferior men would obey on the ground of an intellectual 
order of rank alone. It is a question that requires that the inferior “recognize” the 
“superiority” of the intellect of those fit to “rule” in the first place.485 Hobbes had made 
this problem all the worse, Strauss adds, since he denies “considerable difference in 
reasonableness.”486 It is worse after Hobbes because the problem of “sovereignty” only 
first arises with Hobbes’s anthropology that asserts equality of reasonableness. Who 
should rule when there exists no “natural superiority”?487 Strauss assigns the problem of 
obedience — not withstanding all its historical specificity in Hobbes’s time — a 
theoretical cause in Hobbes’s denial of “the existence of a natural law, that is, of a natural 
standard” of rule.488 Hobbes grounds sovereignty in the will of each and every citizen to 
expressively sanction the authority of an absolute Sovereign out of fear of violent death.   
It is thus not without some difficulty that Strauss brings the question of the 
durability of ancient rationality for practical politics back as a practical solution: he 
argues that Hobbes disqualifies classical rationality as impotent when it came to ensuring 
norms that guaranteed peace. Hobbes, he argues, holds that while classical rationalism is 
competent in arriving at moral precepts, it is incompetent in ensuring that these norms are 
obeyed.489 Hobbes turns to history for tested solutions to “man’s disobedience.” 490 He 
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487  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 159. 
488  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 165. 
489  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 101. 
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abandons his historical studies only when he discovers a new philosophy that solves the 
problem of applicability by augmenting reason in passion.491 It is due to this founding in 
passion that Strauss argues that Hobbes’s rationality breaks with classical “rationalism”: 
whereas Hobbes’s right of nature is in “accordance” to reason (i.e., it secures survival), it 
is “dictated” by passion (i.e., the fear of violent death).492 What is the basis for Strauss’s 
case — contra Hobbes — for a return to classical rationality for matters concerning 
political philosophy? Such a return would need to function not simply as an ideal but also 
as a theory that works in practice, not only in the ideal Kallipolis, but also, say, in Europe 
in the 17th century, or the 1930s. 
In his search for an answer, Strauss notes that for Plato there are two kinds of 
reasons: one “good” and one “necessary” — the former dialectically pursues the question 
of the good, the latter is instrumental — while for Hobbes there exists only instrumental 
reason. Hobbes, he argues, never questions the end of the state; that is, securing peace. 
Hobbes never questions the good of that aim, or the necessity of political science in the 
pursuit of that end. Hobbes’s right way of life, or ideal, is a life lived in security and 
relative prosperity for all. It is with the aim of guaranteeing peace, Strauss argues, in a 
three-page paragraph that was added to the English translation of The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes that Hobbes gives primacy to “foreign policy” in a critical turn 
against “classical political philosophy”:  
While for Plato and Aristotle, in accordance with the primary interest they attach 
to home policy, the question of the number of inhabitants of the perfect State, that 
is, the limits set to the State by its inner necessity, is of decisive importance, 
Hobbes brushes this question aside in the following words: ‘The Multitude 
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sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, 
but by comparison with the enemy we Feare….’ 493  
 
The required size of the state is for Hobbes defined relationally to the strength of one’s 
enemy. Contrary to Hobbes, the state in Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception is not 
relationally defined by the strength of one’s enemy, but by an optimal natural number 
determined in regard to the nonrelational essence of the polis.  
For both Plato and Aristotle “internal policy” is thus independent of, and prior to, 
foreign policy:  
The view of classical rationalism, that only reason justifies dominion, found its 
most radical expression in Plato’s saying that the only necessary and adequate 
condition for the weal of a State is that the philosophers should be kings and kings 
philosophers. That amounts to stating that the setting up of a perfect 
commonwealth depends on exclusively on ‘internal policy’ and not at all on any 
conditions of foreign policy.494  
 
The standard for Plato and Aristotle’s regime and right life is the order in nature. 
Hobbes’s substitution of ancient natural law (or virtue) for natural right to life breaks 
with Plato and Aristotle’s view that the order state should reflect the order in nature that 
exceeds both the individual’s nature and his individual preferences.    
At the end of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss is thus beginning to 
look with Plato and Aristotle for a conception of the political that also provides a 
constitutive principle for the state’s internal order. Whereas moral evil is the prerequisite 
for a right-wing authoritarian state, it is not constitutive of the internal “order” of the 
state. Strauss had yet to outline and investigate the principle for the constitutive aim and 
order of his unliberal theory of the state. The question of whether less rational individuals 
                                                
493  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 162-163; The reason for this inclusion, Meier argues, was 
due to a discovery reported in the 1935 essay “Maimonides and Alfarabi,” 86n 77; and Meier, How 
Strauss became Strauss, 369: Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 2, 162.    
494  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,161, emphasis added. 
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would agree to obey the few wise also remained unanswered. In the next chapter, I will 
turn to Strauss’s return to classical political philosophy and ancient natural law in his 
search for a conception of the political and theory of the state and obligation. Strauss’s 
return to classical political philosophy will also lead me to his thoughts on the aim and 
order of the state, which his neo-Hobbesian modification of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political could not provide. This solution Strauss finds in medieval and ancient political 
philosophy: civic morality or religion for the many, rational atheism for the few 
philosophers that seek wisdom. However, clues to this answer are already discernible in 
his work on Maimonides from this time, in which he also had revisited the question of 
Zionism.  
In 1935, the year Strauss completed the German manuscript of The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, he writes about his own outlook in Philosophy and Law that 
brings to mind for him the contention between reason and revelation at the centre of the 
previous chapter: “A Jew who cannot be orthodox and who must consider purely political 
Zionism, the only ‘solution to the Jewish question’ possible on the basis of atheism, as a 
resolution that is indeed highly honorable, but not in earnest and in the long run, 
adequate.” 495 Zank’s comment on this passage serves well as the bridge into the next 
chapter: 
But surely one could not be an atheist and an Orthodox believer at the same time! 
Could there be a synthesis of revealed religion and modern historical 
consciousness? Strauss’s answer is: No. But there should be such a synthesis! 
Strauss’s answer is: such a synthesis can only exist at the expense of the truth of 
religious belief. It would be atheism in disguise. Can one not be a Jew in the full 
sense, just by virtue of seeking the well-being of the Jewish nation? Strauss: but is 
not nationalism a modern European rather than a truly Jewish value? So what is a 
Jew to do? In the statement cited above, Strauss formally ends his association 
with the Zionist movement, and he does so at the very moment when the Jewish 
                                                
495  Strauss, Philosophy and Law, 38. 
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state had become a matter of greater urgency than ever before. But he also 
formally acknowledges that he can no longer be Orthodox. What is left for him to 
choose? This is the point at which Strauss turns to Maimonides, to his Muslim 
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4. 0. 1. Introduction 
In early 1937, Strauss left Britain and sailed for America, the country where he would 
live until his death. His first home was in New York City, where he had been offered a 
position as a Research Fellow in the Department of History at Columbia University. The 
following year, Strauss became a visiting researcher at the New School for Social 
Research, where he was promoted to professor and remained for a decade.497 In 1948, 
Strauss left New York to accept an endowed Professorship at the University of Chicago. 
In his first year in Chicago, he delivered the annual Walgreen Lectures, which introduced 
Strauss to a larger audience, and included a lecture on Hobbes. This was his first work on 
Hobbes since the publication of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. The lecture was 
published as an article in 1950, “On the Spirit of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy 
[henceforth, “On the Spirit of Hobbes”] and then slightly revised as part one of chapter 
five, “Modern Natural Right,” in Natural Right and History (1953), the book version of 
                                                
497  Strauss also taught courses at other institutions of higher learning across the East coast. Strauss wife, 
and her son, arrived on New York a few months before the war began. Strauss’s father died of a heart 
attack in 1943. His sister passed away of illness in Egypt in 1942. Strauss adopted her daughter Jenny, 
after that her father passed away in 1944 in illness or suicide. No one beside Jenny, in Strauss’s 
immediate family, survived the holocaust. 
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the lecture series.498 In this chapter will ultimately assess the Walgreen lecture and its 
published form in order two answer two questions: how does Strauss’s interpretation of 
Hobbes change in the decade after World War II, and how does his criticism of liberalism 
evolve in relation to his altered understanding of Hobbes. In order to give an account of 
the former, it is necessary to take a larger view of Strauss’s intellectual development 
during and after the war. 
Almost fifteen years had passed between the 1936 publication of The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes and his return to Hobbes in the late 1940s. In the intervening years, 
Strauss published a series of essays on esotericism and ancient and medieval political and 
religious (primarily, Judaic and Islamic) thought. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes exposes a tension between two strands in Strauss’s 
thinking, between the younger Strauss who looks to moral evil as that which necessitated 
and legitimated dominion, and the later Strauss who sides with the ancient emphasis on 
reason, as that which justifies political authority. In this chapter, I will show how, 
following World War II, Strauss moves away from the former to assume the latter 
perspective. Strauss no longer speaks of a biblical moral conception of human evil in 
terms of guilt; instead, Strauss adopts an ancient virtue ethics, in which the pursuit of 
theoretical knowledge is seen as the greatest good or the only just activity of the political 
community. 
In chapters two and three, in conversation with Meier, Sheppard and Xenos, I 
argued that Strauss’s interpretation of Hobbes is forged in connection with his effort to 
critique liberalism and to ground a right-wing authoritarian alternative to liberalism, 
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socialism and Nazism. For the criticism of liberalism not to be immanent, and to establish 
the ground for a right-wing authoritarian state, Strauss needed to demonstrate that 
humans are morally evil by nature. Strauss’s reading of Hobbes prior to World War II is 
thus informed by his need to find that the humans are by nature morally evil, a teaching 
he finds in the young, pre-scientific Hobbes’s conception of vanity. When he returns to 
Hobbes after the war, Strauss is no longer seeking a moral ground for an authoritarian 
right-wing regime in Hobbes’s anthropological observations of the passions. He now 
detaches morality from human nature and, with that, evil from vanity, delegating the 
description of a moral or normative order from the field of philosophy to that of political 
philosophy. Philosophers, according to his acquired understanding of medieval Jewish 
and Islamic thought and ancient philosophy, put into question the moral or normative 
foundations of the city (the society in which they live) in private, and advocate in public 
for an exoteric moral order for the many in the city to live in accordance with.  
Nevertheless, Strauss argues in Natural Right and History that philosophy 
remains concerned with discovering supra-human or eternal principles of right. Tanguay, 
who has argued that Strauss becomes a Socratic sceptic over time, has pointed that 
Strauss in Natural Right and History holds that philosophy is possible if there are 
permanent questions, natural right is, however, only possible if there are permanent 
answers to the permanent questions, which requires knowledge of all the parts or the 
“whole” or the universe.499 Strauss never provides a philosophy of the whole. Tanguay 
argues that, as a “zetetic,” Strauss doubted that such philosophy of the whole could ever 
exist: 
What this means is that genuine Platonism reveals itself more by a particular cast 
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of mind than by adherence to some metaphysical doctrine or complete system of 
knowledge. The cast of mind of the genuine Platonist is zetetic in the sense that in 
the quest for wisdom ‘the evidence for all solutions is necessarily smaller than the 
evidence of the problems.’ Philosophy is not to be confused with the science of all 
beings since it is not itself this science or even completed wisdom, but rather the 
attempt to attain that science. Certainly, the essence of philosophy is theoretical. 
But the movement that carries the philosopher toward contemplation is not itself 
integrated into the science of all the beings: it is eros.500 
 
Despite this, the promise of a natural right nevertheless remains in so far as while 
philosophers do not agree over the whole there is still the possibility that there is a 
metaphysical structure, which “existence,” Plato’s “Athenian Stranger,” Strauss writes in 
the early 1960s, “tries to demonstrate”.501  
The greatest challenge to this view in Strauss’s mind is the anti-metaphysical 
tradition, starting with Nietzsche and culminating in Heidegger, for whom nothing is 
“eternal,” and which radically questions the foundation of classical philosophy from the 
standpoint of historicity.502 Against Heidegger, Strauss suggests that the evidence of an 
unchanging standard of right is that people in all times and places have argued over what 
is right and wrong. Strauss, after the World War II, advocates for a Socratic 
phenomenology that begins with everyday opinions over conflicting conceptions of 
justice and other notions (as in the Plato’s dialogues) and are, in the process, replaced 
with knowledge. The claim in regard to Strauss’s phenomenology and ethical foundation 
that I will substantiate in this chapter, however, is that Strauss operates with the notion of, 
and attaches a right to, the natural human, rational capacity for theoretical wisdom that 
only a few possesses, independently of any metaphysical proof for this position at this 
time.  
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Philosophy, as Strauss applies it after World War II, both takes it bearing from 
and is oriented toward the study of human nature. One of the things that remains the same 
from before the war is thus Strauss’s continuous appeal to human nature. What has 
changed, however, is the aspect of human nature that Strauss emphasizes: his focus shifts 
from vanity (passion) to reason. Strauss returns to human nature, or what is “natural in 
man,” no longer through Hobbes’s observation, but rather through the philosophy of the 
ancients. It is now by appeal to reason, not vanity, that Strauss distinguishes humans 
from animals, and furthermore, humans from humans: the few wise from the many 
vulgar. He recuperates what he had framed in early work as a Platonic-Socratic 
understanding of human nature, rationality, and natural right. It is against this return to 
classical philosophy that Strauss assesses, criticizes, and utilizes Hobbes’s political 
philosophy as a counterpoint.    
In his first essay on Hobbes after the war, Strauss is little concerned with 
understanding the political and polemical contexts in which Hobbes wrote as he had been 
in the 1930s. In place of these earlier concerns, the backdrop for his study of Hobbes after 
World War II becomes his overarching account of the historical trajectory of political 
philosophy and its departure from classical antiquity, and Hobbes’s role therein. The 
development of his analysis of Hobbes after World War II reads at once as a product of 
the influence of pre-modern thought on Strauss, on one hand, and a consequence to his 
reaction to historicism, nihilism and relativism, on the other. We shall see that as the 
politics of his day become less of an immediate concern for Strauss following the war, his 
study of Hobbes’s egalitarian natural right, and what he identifies as its ancient roots, is 
increasingly undertaken from the perspective of Socratic-Platonic philosophy. The fact 
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that Strauss assesses Hobbes’s philosophy in light of the tradition of Socratic-Platonic 
philosophy is, however, not an automatic proof that this is a view he shares. Strauss could 
account for a view without subscribing to it, just as Plato did not necessarily agree with 
all — or any — of his characters. In part one of this chapter, I will therefore establish that 
Strauss adopts with a Platonic-Socratic explication of reason, human nature and natural 
law and right, before I examine his essay on Hobbes.503  
Due to the reorientation in his thought, Strauss quietly retracts some of his key 
arguments from “Notes on Hobbes” and The Political Philosophy of Hobbes and 
advanced a few new ones in “On the Spirit of Hobbes.” Most significantly, Strauss writes 
little about vanity during this period, and no longer asserts that it is due to vanity that 
humans are morally evil by nature; also absent from Strauss’s post-war work is the 
thought of the young pre-scientific Hobbes, which Strauss had excavates in The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes to build his case that the basis of Hobbes’s political thought was 
his pre-scientific view of human nature, and not the new scientific method that the mature 
Hobbes applies to the study of politics. Instead, Strauss makes a full reversal, now 
introducing Hobbes’s political philosophy as reflective of modern natural science, which 
opposes monotheistic and Aristotelian teleological worldviews. It was this non-
teleological worldview, Strauss comes to argue, that informs Hobbes’s natural doctrine 
and his conception of an inalienable natural right to life. Strauss argues that Hobbes is the 
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first to subordinate natural law to a natural individual right.504 The shift of primacy from 
obligations or duties to rights is what prompts Strauss to declare that Hobbes is the 
founder of liberalism, in his words, “the power of the state finds its absolute limit in 
[individual] natural right and in no other moral fact.”505 
There is a great deal written about Strauss’s relation to liberalism. While few 
scholars question Strauss’s anti-liberal ire of the inter-war years — from his criticism of 
assimilation to his commentary on Schmitt — some, like Howse, seek to tone down what 
they find extreme in Strauss’s exchange with Schmitt (see chapter two and six), and the 
letter to Lövith (see chapter three).506 Zuckert and Shell have pointed out, however, that 
what troubles Strauss’s liberal critics most is not his anti-liberal stand in the interwar 
years, but rather his rediscovery of esotericism. In Shell’s words: 
What especially arouses them [Strauss’s liberal critics] is his later claim to have 
rediscovered a tradition of “exoteric” writing, formerly common among 
philosophers forced by the threat of persecution to hide their deepest thoughts. 
According to Strauss, that tradition reflected the natural and ineradicable tension 
that obtains between philosophy as an unimpeded search for knowledge and the 
needs of the political community. A concomitant distinction between the “many” 
and the “few,” and a related allowance for “noble myths,” has further fuelled the 
suspicion in some quarters that Strauss’s thought — despite his many statements to 
the contrary — is deeply hostile to liberal democratic principles. In the view of 
some, his overt expression of patriotic loyalty to the principles of his adopted 
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country was merely the mask under which he hid a powerful antipathy to all things 
democratically liberal.507 
 
In the years before and during the war Strauss deepened his understanding of esotericism. 
Philosophical esotericism is the use of a double rhetoric through which two groups of 
readers, the few and the many, are communicated two different teachings in one and the 
same book: “a popular teaching of an edifying character, which is in the foreground and a 
philosophic teaching concerning the most important subject, which is indicated only 
between the lines.”508 I will suggest that the precondition for Strauss discovery of the 
esoteric/exoteric art of writing is grounded in an elitist view of human rationality. This 
same view informs Strauss’s adoption of the classical or Platonic-Socratic natural law 
tradition. Hobbes emerges in the trajectory of Strauss’s discovery of esotericism as the 
counterpoint to pre-modern esotericism. Hobbes’s perspective is based on a view of 
human equal rational capacity, and with that, the eradication of the need for esoteric 
communication. To Strauss, Hobbes is the representative par excellence of the radical 
modern European enlightenment, who wrote esoterically only to avoid religious and 
political persecution, and whose ultimate goal was popular enlightenment. 
There is controversy around whether or not Strauss wrote esoterically himself, 
and if so, how. This conundrum presents an interpretative hurdle for anyone concerned 
with Strauss’s oeuvre. It is necessary to address Strauss’s understanding and possible use 
of a multilayered art of writing in order to digest his writings on Hobbes after World War 
II. A full exposition of Strauss’s understanding and use of esotericism is not offered in 
this chapter, however. My focus instead is on Strauss’s gradual discovery of an esoteric 
tradition in the history of philosophical and religious texts that alters both Strauss’s 
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interpretation and presentation of Hobbes. I unpack this aspect of Strauss’s thought with 
a focus on Hobbes’s role within it, as well as his criticism of liberalism and modern 
natural right. 
To counter the assessment that Strauss remained hostile to liberalism after he left 
Europe, Shell has suggested that the time spent in England changed Strauss “from a harsh 
critic of liberal democracy to an unhesitating supporter.”509 The evidence for this she 
draws mainly from a talk on “German Nihilism” that Strauss gave in the General Seminar 
of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social 
Research in 1941. This lecture grounds Shell’s case that, during his time in England, 
Strauss gained an appreciation for Churchill and a liberal rule of law tradition.510 While I 
would not go as far to call Strauss an “unhesitating supporter of liberal democracy,” I will 
suggest that Strauss does come to see merits with, and give his support to, a liberal 
democratic constitutional regime, but not without notable reservations that led him (as I 
will return to in the concluding chapter of the dissertation) to try to limit the democratic 
influence as much as possible and advocate for the restraint of some civil rights and 
freedoms. Given this shift in Strauss’s thinking on liberalism, one might imagine that 
Hobbes, who remains in Strauss’s view the founder of “liberalism,” would also have been 
granted some grace. I will argue that the opposite is true. 
The criticism of liberalism continues in Strauss’s post-war writing on Hobbes 
from the perspective of a recuperation of a Socratic-Platonic conception of human nature 
and natural law. In Natural Right and History, Strauss builds on the criticism that he had 
first formulated in “Notes on Schmitt,” which portrayed Hobbes as the founder of liberal 
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rights, and what, after World War II, Strauss refers to as the doctrine of modern natural 
right. The case for Strauss’s qualified support of liberalism rests on his discovery of a 
liberal tradition that antedates and is distinct from Hobbes’s modern liberal natural rights 
doctrine. This is the Aristotelian tradition that Strauss refers to in “German Nihilism” as 
the “rule of law,” and in Natural Right and History as “rule, under law, of gentlemen, or 
the mixed regime.”511 Strauss thus makes a distinction between liberal theory, which he 
argues originates in Hobbes’s natural right doctrine, and a liberal constitutional regime, 
defined by the rule of law. Following the 1940s, Strauss expands his definition of ancient 
liberalism to include the Socratic-Platonic philosophical tradition’s pursuit of excellence 
through the cultivation of the human virtues, highest of them being wisdom. It is in this 
light that Strauss speaks of ancient liberalism in regard to liberal education, and in 
particular the study of the great books — a curriculum that Strauss promotes until the end 








                                                
511  Strauss, “German Nihilism,” 363; Strauss, Natural Right and History, 143.  
512  First published, Leo Strauss, “What is Liberal Education?,” in Education for Social Responsibility, ed. 
Scott C. Fletcher (New York: Norton, 1961), 43-51; Leo Strauss, “Liberal Education and 
Responsibility,” Education: The Challenge Ahead, ed. Scott C. Fletcher (New York: Norton, 1962: 49-




4. 1. 1. Criticism of liberalism and the Nazi revolution 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Strauss discovers in Hobbes’s doctrine of the state 
of nature a ground for Schmitt’s concept of the political in the war of each against all. 
This natural inclination to fight one’s fellow humans is linked to a principle of human 
nature, vanity, which Strauss placed at the heart of Hobbes’s political theory. Vanity, 
understood as a moral evil, proved the need for a right-wing authoritarian dominion. This, 
I argued, was in part intended by Strauss to advance a critique liberalism, but also to 
counter the relativism he identifies at the heart of Schmitt’s immanent definition of the 
political, which requires bellicose nationalism (political disassociation) against internal 
and external enemies for political association to form. In Schmitt’s concept of the 
political, political association, like political Zionism, lacks a positive identity/ground, and 
is formed negatively in relation to an enemy, i.e., by political dissociation.  
Two decades later, Strauss would name anti-Semitism as the National Socialists’ 
only coherent principle. 513  During the war, however, Strauss had identified a 
contradictory twin movement behind the support of National Socialist among his 
philosophical right-wing peers: the destruction of reason and the belief that a socialist 
society was the only rational and historical conclusion to liberalism or liberal civilization. 
In order to make sense of Strauss’s criticism of Hobbes and liberalism after the war, it is 
necessary to identify where Strauss sees Hobbes’s thought overlapping with, and 
departing from, Schmitt, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Strauss ties the source of Schmitt’s 
relativism to historicism and its destruction of reason as an authoritative standard for 
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science/philosophy and morality. To counter historicism’s destruction of reason (and by 
extension, Schmitt’s relativistic conception of politics), Strauss, as he had before the war, 
looks to human nature for a remedy. He looks at human nature, not in Hobbes’s 
anthropological observation of the passions, but in the Socratic-Platonic tradition’s 
conception of the human animal as a rational animal. 
In February 1941, less than a year before America would enter the war, Strauss 
analysed the philosophical roots of Nazism in a paper presented at a faculty seminar on 
the “Experiences of the Second World War,” at the New School.514 The paper is 
programmatic of Strauss’s post-war philosophy, that is, his return to and recuperation of 
ancient philosophy, or what Seyla Benhabib has called his “mature position.”515 In this 
presentation, Strauss investigates the philosophical origin of the National Socialist 
movement by engaging Hermann Rauschning’s The Revolution of Nihilism, and advances 
the hypothesis that “National Socialism is only the most famous form of German 
nihilism—its lowest, most provincial, most unenlightened and most dishonorable 
form.”516  German nihilism is another name that Strauss uses for the conservative 
revolutionary philosophical movement that had emerged in Germany at the turn of the 
19th century, and which had returned with added force after the Great War. 
Strauss suggests in this paper that the German nihilist does not seek the 
destruction of “everything,” but aims specifically to destroy the “Anglo-Saxon,” “modern 
civilization.” 517  Put differently, Strauss’s attack is directed at the “intellectual 
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development” that he argued starts with Hobbes and “exploded in the French 
Revolution.”518 The “motive” behind the attack on liberal civilization, Strauss argues, is 
“not itself nihilistic.”519 The radical conservative attack, like Strauss’s writing on Hobbes 
in the interwar era, is directed specifically at the liberal civilization’s “moral meaning.”520 
Contrary to the taste of the radical conservatives, the liberal civilization had “lower[ed] 
the moral standards,” as reflected in ideas such as “the identification of morality with an 
attitude of claiming one’s rights, or with enlightened self-interest, or the reduction of 
honesty to the best policy, or the solution of the conflict between common interest and 
private interest by means of industry and trade.”521 The non-nihilistic motivation that 
animates German nihilism, Strauss suggests, is also found in Plato, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche—namely, the protest against the lowering of the standards of morality. A non-
liberal moral life, for the German nihilist, “means serious life.”522 “Serious life” is the 
closed life of the nation—“oriented” at what Schmitt called the “Ernstfall [the state of 
emergence].”523 Against the general trend of the Hobbesian “debasement of morality,” 
and the ideal of civilization, German philosophy from its beginning opposed the equation 
of “the morally good” with “the object enlightened self-interest,” honesty with utility, and 
insisted in its place, “self-sacrifice,” and foremost, “courage.”524 It was a radical critique 
of modern liberal civilization that Strauss had pursued in his studies in the 1920s and 
1930s. He had sought to complete Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism by attaching the 
political to an unliberal moral aspect of human nature, but contra Schmitt, whose 
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immanent conception of the political the Nazis embodied, Strauss had used Hobbes to 
propose a political and moral ontology as ground for a right-wing authoritarian 
alternative to Nazism. 
Of “all philosophers,” Strauss proposes, “none exercised a greater influence on 
post-war Germany, none was more responsible for the emergence of German nihilism, 
than was Nietzsche. The relation of Nietzsche to the German Nazi revolution is 
comparable to the relation of Rousseau to the French revolution.”525 One main reason for 
this, Tanguay explains, is that Nietzsche, unlike the romanticists and early 18th century 
philosophy, radicalizes the atheism of the early enlightenment thinkers, into a “moral,” 
and not “theoretical,” aversion to Christianity and religion in general: “Nietzsche asserted 
that the atheist assumption is not only reconcilable with, but indispensable for, a radical 
anti-democratic, anti-socialist, and anti-pacifist policy: according to him, even the 
communist creed is only a secularized form of theism, of the belief in providence.”526 I 
argued in the previous chapter that Strauss, in his studies of Hobbes in the early to mid-
1930s, agrees with Nietzsche that a secularized religious belief in providence underpins 
the liberal and communist-anarchist view that human nature is good or educable, and that 
heaven on earth is possible. In response, Strauss constructed an authoritarian atheistic 
moral criticism of liberalism and socialism by arguing that human nature is evil. As I 
pointed out then, however, Strauss’s counter-position also presupposes Biblical 
morality.527 Nietzsche’s atheism opposes Hobbes’s atheistic materialist philosophy, and 
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with it the bourgeois (and socialist) theistic morality premised on the right to preservation 
and material pleasure.   
Strauss establishes beyond doubt that there was nothing the German nihilist 
disliked more than the egalitarian, materialist and hedonist strand found in Hobbes’s 
philosophy. In one of the paper’s most rhetorically fervent passages, Strauss suggests that 
it was the fear of an egalitarian socialist society that partly led to nihilism: 
[T]he conflicts inherent in the present situation would necessarily lead to a 
revolution, accompanying or following another World War—a raising of the 
proletariat and of the proleterianized strata of society which would usher in the 
withering away of the state, the classless society, the abolition of all exploitation 
and injustices, the era of final peace. It was this prospect at least as much as the 
desperate present, which lead to nihilism. The prospect of a pacified planet, 
without rulers and ruled, of a planet society devoted to production and 
consumption only, to the production and consumption of spiritual as well as 
material merchandise, was positively horrifying to quite a few very intelligent and 
very decent, if very young, Germans. They did not object to that prospect because 
they worried about their own economic and social position; for certainly in that 
respect they had no longer anything to lose. Nor did they object to it for religious 
reasons; for, as one of their spokesmen (E[rnst]Jünger) said, they knew that they 
were the sons and grandsons and great-grandson of godless men. What they hated, 
was the very prospect of a world in which everyone would be happy and satisfied, 
in which everyone would have little pleasure by day and his little pleasure by 
night, a world in which no great heart could beat and no great soul could breathe, 
a world without real, unmetaphoric, sacrifice, i.e. world without blood, sweat, and 
tears. What to the communists appeared to be the fulfilment of the dream of 
mankind, appeared to those young Germans as the greatest debasement of 
humanity, as the coming of the end of humanity, as the arrival of the latest man.528 
 
To the “intelligent,” “decent,” “atheists” and “very young, Germans,” the communists 
were Nietzsche’s last men. 
These young right-wingers, however, Strauss argues, committed a fatal mistake.  
They accepted the communist’s thesis “that the proletarian revolution and proletarian 
dictatorship is necessary, if civilization is not to perish.”529 They had wrongly agreed 
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with the Hegelian-Marxist view that the world society is the only rational conclusion to 
the liberal civilization.530 This led the young men to opt for what “they called ‘irrational 
decision’”: 
 
They did not really know, and thus they were unable to express in a tolerably 
clear language, what they desired to put in the place of the present world and its 
allegedly necessary future or sequel: the only thing of which they were absolutely 
certain was that the present world and all the potentialities of the present world as 
such, must be destroyed  in order to prevent the otherwise necessary coming of 
the communist final  order: the only thing of which they were absolutely certain 
was that the present world and all the potentialities of the present world as such, 
must be destroyed in order to prevent the otherwise necessary coming of the 
communist final order literally anything, the nothing, the chaos, the jungle, the 
Wild West, the Hobbesian state of nature, seemed to them infinitely better than 
the communist anarchist-pacifist future. Their Yes was inarticulate—they were 
unable to say more than: No! This No proved however sufficient as the preface to 
action, the action of destruction. This is the phenomenon which occurs to me first 
whenever I hear the expression German nihilism.531  
 
The fear of communism leads them to say “No” to civilization, and “Yes” to Hitler and 
the Nazi. What to put in place of the liberal-communist civilization they did not know.532 
It was the “reaction of a certain type of young atheist to the communist ideal,” which 
resulted in German nihilism.533 For this reason, these “young men,” Strauss suggests,  
were in need of teachers who could explain to them in articulate language the 
positive, and not merely destructive, meaning of their aspirations. They believed 
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to have found such teachers in that group of professors and writers who 
knowingly or ignorantly paved the way for Hitler ([Oswald] Spengler, Moeller 
van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, [Martin] Heidegger).534  
 
These teachers paved way for Hitler through their destruction of reason, and their faith in 
the authority of the new national socialist spirit. They welcomed Hitler:  
The less is said about him, the better. He will soon be forgotten. He is merely the 
rather contemptible tool of “History”: the midwife who assists at the birth of the 
new epoch, of a new spirit: and a midwife usually understands nothing of the 
genius at whose birth she assists; she is not even supposed to be a competent 
gynaecologist. A new reality is in the making; it is transforming the whole world; 
in the meantime there is: nothing, but—a fertile nothing. The Nazis are as 
unsubstantiated as clouds; the sky is hidden at present by those clouds which 
announces a devastating storm, but at the same time the long-needed rain which 
will bring new life to the dried up soil…”535 
 
Strauss suggests that the nihilist had adopted the modern belief in “progressivism” in that 
they aimed at something, even though it was unknown.536 The communists, on the other 
hand, aimed to establish a known egalitarian order and world peace (providence). What 
partly turned the young atheists into nihilists, in Strauss’s analysis, was that they allowed 
the enemy — the communist — to define the terms of the battle. The young right-wing 
atheists accepted the Marxist thesis that the communist classless world is the rational 
conclusion to the liberal civilization. In reaction, they said “No!” to civilization — 
defined “as the conscious culture of human reason, i.e., science and morals” — and opted 
for Hitler and the Nazis, without their end being defined. This was a mistake in Strauss’s 
eyes. It was a mistake he sets out to correct. 
Strauss not only counted himself as one among the young German right-wingers 
who criticized liberalism in the inter-war era, he still shared the motive — a moral 
criticism of liberal civilization — of the teachers who he identifies as having 
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philosophically paved the way to Nazism. In chapters two and three, I argued that Strauss 
in the early and mid-1930s philosophically dismisses both liberalism and communism on 
the grounds that they both conceive of human nature as good, and proposes a right-wing 
authoritarian regime grounded on a conception of human nature as morally evil. 
Furthermore, it is clear that, during the inter-war period, Strauss agreed with other right-
wingers that the liberal and communist notions of an ideal world were inherently 
undesirable.537 Strauss thus shared the nihilist underlying motive, and their aversion to 
communism. He did not, however, accept the Marxist thesis that communism is the only 
rational conclusion to liberalism. He therefore set as his task to devise a rational 
alternative to communism and Nazism. Just as in his study of Hobbes before the war, 
Strauss’s post-war writing turns to human nature to do so. This time around, however, 
Strauss reads nature together with reason, rather than vanity. He argues that “the lack of 
resistance to nihilism seems ultimately to be due to the depreciation and the contempt of 
reason, which is one and unchangeable or it is not, and of science.”538 To counter the 
perception of reason as changeable, that is, a product of historical and particular and 
national projects — as Spengler had influentially argued in The Decline of the West — 
Strauss seeks to tie reason to human nature as a “known and stable standard.”539     
Strauss’s first step in this strategy in the early 1940s — as seen in “German 
Nihilism” — is to divide reason into an ancient and a modern variety, in order to counter 
the destruction of the entire history of western metaphysics. Strauss agrees with 
Heidegger’s criticism of reason as applied to modern rationality only. Modern rationality, 
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as we saw in Strauss’s account of Hobbes in the previous chapter, rests on passion, on the 
fear of violent death, and is aligned with calculated self-preservation. Heidegger’s 
rejection of reason at large (including pre-modern rationality), as determined by history, 
is part of a greater problem that Strauss identifies as having accompanied German 
philosophy since its birth. German idealism, he argues in “German Nihilism”, was 
formed in reaction to the British and French enlightenment and, as a consequence, the 
romanticists return to “pre-modern ideal was not a real pre-modern ideal,” but was 
mediated by this criticism.540 According to this account, pre-modern philosophy had not 
gotten a fair hearing and should be granted an appeal. Paradoxically, it is Heidegger — 
whom Strauss recognized as the most radical of the historicists — who had led Strauss to 
reconsider ancient rationality. 
In a paper, “The Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy,” delivered at 
Syracuse University one year earlier, in the spring of 1940, Strauss wrote of modern 
philosophy in general: 
Modern philosophy has come into being as a refutation of traditional philosophy, 
i.e., of the Aristotelian philosophy. Have the founders of modern philosophy 
really refuted Aristotle? Have they ever understood him? They certainly 
understood the Aristotelians of their time, but they certainly did not understand 
Aristotle himself. […] He cannot have been refuted, if he has not been 
understood; And this was perhaps the most profound impression which the 
younger generation experienced in Germany during the period in question: under 
the guidance of Heidegger, people came to see that Aristotle and Plato had not 
been understood. Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle was an achievement with 
which I cannot compare any other intellectual phenomenon which has emerged in 
Germany after the war. Heidegger made it clear, not but by assertions, but by 
concrete analyses — the work of an enormous concentration and diligence — that 
Plato and Aristotle have not been understood by the modern philosophers; for 
they read their own opinions into the works of Plato and Aristotle...541 
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Heidegger’s philosophy had both opened a return to ancient philosophy and posed the 
greatest challenge to the possibility of an eternal human nature. Strauss describes the 
return to the ancients as having been primed by Heidegger: 
The turning to the texts themselves implies a profound distrust of the initial 
categories of interpretation, of the categories we use before having submitted 
ourselves to the test of the past. That distrust is directed especially against the 
term ‘culture’ which is the product of the Faustic soul. More elementary, less 
sophisticated terms are required if we want to give an accurate and adequate 
account of the thoughts and interests guiding the life of earlier people. We must 
get rid of the whole conceptual apparatus created by modern philosophy or 
science, and indeed by the older traditions of philosophy or science; we must 
return to a pre-philosophic or a pre-scientific language if we want to arrive at an 
adequate understanding of pre-philosophic ‘culture.’542 
 
It is a route Strauss follows up to a point. Unlike Heidegger, he does not at this time 
return to the pre-Socratic, and disagrees with Heidegger’s historicist conclusion: 
Whoever tried seriously to understand the past along these lines discovered 
certain basic facts and interests which have not changed and which are not subject 
to change. Therewith the historical interest turned into a philosophic interest, into 
the interest in the eternal nature of man. And that turn was backed by historical 
studies as distinguished from a general philosophy of history. Finally, it became 
clear that members of all ‘cultures’, being men may understand each other, 
whereas the ‘Faustic’ historicist understands none, because he does not see the 
eternal nature of man, 'because he does not see the wood for the trees.'543 
 
Strauss speaks of the transformational effect of this return for philosophy, as it liberates 
itself from historicism: “We become again, what we cannot be before, natural 
philosophers, i.e., philosophers who approach the natural, the basic and original question 
of philosophy in a natural, an adequate way.”544      
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His experience of Heidegger’s re-interpretation of Aristotle and Plato convinced 
Strauss that a return to ancient thought was possible. He thus insists that “La querelle des 
anciens et des modernes [the quarrel between the ancient and modern] must be 
renewed.”545 Against Heidegger, however, Strauss makes it his project to prove the 
existence of reason as an unchanging and authoritative standard through a return to the 
Socratic-Platonic tradition of political philosophy. It is in light of this return to the study 
of the “eternal natural man” that we must read the programmatic statement in “German 
Nihilism” that follows from Strauss’s judgment on Heidegger as a teacher (beside 
Spengler, van den Bruck, Schmitt, Jünger) — Strauss told his colleagues that what these 
young men need is a “traditional teacher.” It was the role of a traditional teacher Strauss 
filled after the war. It would not be redundant (i.e., too late), since Strauss soberly 
predicts: “the defeat of National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German 
nihilism. For that nihilism has deeper roots than the preaching of Hitler, Germany’s 
defeat in the World War and all that.”546 
It is important to note that with the description, “traditional teacher” Strauss does 
not mean a return to traditional conservatism as he explains in his essay on “German 
Nihilism”: “I believe it is dangerous, if the opponents of National Socialism withdraw to 
a mere conservatism which defines its ultimate goal by a specific tradition.”547 Instead, 
Strauss turns to “Aristotle” to describe the task at hand: to “seek what is good, and not 
what we inherited.”548 The tool for seeking the good in all places and times is Socratic-
Platonic rationalism. It is the pursuit for the good, independent of tradition (as formed by 
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history) that marks Strauss as a radical conservative in what followed after his work on 
Hobbes in the 1930s. Over two decades later, in his book, Liberalism: Ancient and 
Modern (1968), Strauss would write that the Socratic-Platonic quest for philosophical 
truth “cannot be simply conservative since it is guided by the awareness that all men seek 
by nature, not the ancestral or traditional, but the good.”549 And a decade earlier, in 1958, 
he had aligned the Socratic-Platonic tradition in an essay on liberal education with what 
he called “ancient liberalism,” or, “liberal in the original sense of the term” as 
“liberality.”550 In the early 1940s, however, Strauss’s mentioning of an ancient liberal 
tradition was primarily restricted to the political realm. During his stay in England (1934-
37), Strauss had, as Shell has pointed out, discovered a liberal political or practical 
tradition with ancient roots, which would alter his earlier quest to replace the liberal state 
with a non-liberal authoritarian regime. 
4. 1. 2. Ancient political liberalism 
At the end of “German Nihilism,” Strauss states his agreement with Nietzsche’s account 
and criticism of the ideals of the modern civilization as having an “English origin,” but 
adds that his experience living in England had led him to discover a liberal tradition that 
Nietzsche fails to account for: 
[T]he English almost always had the very un-German prudence and moderation 
not to throw out the baby with the bath, i.e. the prudence to conceive of the 
modern ideals as a reasonable adaptation of the old and eternal ideal of decency, 
of rule of law, and of that liberty which is not license, to changed circumstances. 
[…] Whatever may be wrong with the peculiar modern ideal: the very 
Englishmen who originated it, were at the same time versed in the classical 
tradition, and the English always kept in store a substantial amount of the 
necessary counter-poison. While the English originated the modern ideal — the 
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pre-modern ideal, the classical ideal of humanity, was no where better preserved 
than in Oxford and Cambridge.551 
 
Here we see Strauss pitting a classical understanding of liberalism against Hobbes’s 
definition of freedom as license, that is, of liberty defined as the absence of external 
impediments, as displayed in the state of nature. In Hobbes’s view, law is always an 
infringement on liberty, and what is not forbidden by law is permitted, as opposed to 
what Strauss two decades later describes as the “sternness and austerity which classical 
political philosophy shares with ancient law — a sternness which Aristotle expressed 
classically by saying that what the law does not command it forbids.“552 And however 
much the rule of law was suspended under Churchill’s war ministry — the conservative 
all-party coalition government that had been formed on May 10, 1940 to take Britain 
through the war — Churchill appeared to Strauss as a beacon of classical light. If they 
had not been blinded by their fervent nationalism in this period of national emergence, 
Strauss argues that the young German nihilists would have seen in Churchill the only 
vital alternative to Nazism, and a statesman who shared the young nihilists’ anti-
communist stand: 
Only one answer was given which has adequate and which would have impressed 
the young nihilists if they had heard it. It was not however given by a German and 
it was given in the year 1940 only. Those young men who refused to believe that 
the period following the jump into liberty, following the communist world 
revolution, could be the finest hour of mankind in general and Germany in 
particular, could have been impressed as much as we were, by what Winston 
Churchill said after the defeat in Flanders about Britain’s finest hour.553 
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These young men would have been impressed by Churchill’s speech, Strauss adds, 
because Spengler had taught them to see “that glory which was ancient Rome.”554 To 
disqualify the Nazis’s imperial ambitions, Strauss turns again to Virgil’s advice to Rome, 
just as he had in his letter to Lövith seven years earlier (that I discussed in chapter three), 
this time to account for why the English deserved to be victorious: 
The present Anglo-German war is then of symbolic significance. In defending 
modern civilization against German nihilism, the English are defending the 
eternal principle of civilization. No one can tell what will be the outcome of this 
war. But this much is clear beyond any doubt: by choosing Hitler for their leader 
in the crucial moment, in which the question of who is to exercise military rule 
became the order of the day, the Germans ceased to have any rightful claim to be 
more than a provincial nation; it is the English, and not the Germans, who deserve 
to be, and to remain, an imperial nation: for only the English, and not the 
Germans, have understood that in order to deserve to exercise imperial rule, 
regere imperio pupulos, one must have learned for a very long time to spare the 
vanquished and to crush the arrogant: parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.”555 
 
The German imperial ambition under Hitler was, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, 
organized around the doctrine of Germans as a superior ruler race (Volksgemeinschaft), 
whose natural right it is to colonize and enslave the land and people of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union—the Lebensraum doctrine. Strauss expresses the difference 
between the British Empire and the Third Reich in a bullet-point in one of the essay’s two 
outlines: “The English gentlemen as an imperial nation vs. the German Herren as a 
nation of provincial, resentful fanatics.”556 Unlike the Nazis, the British Empire was not 
primed on bellicose nationalism, but adhered to the belief that Strauss had noted in the 
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margin of his copy of Schmitt’s Concept of the Political: “National world-rule […] can 
be expressed without nationalism proper.”557 
In “German Post-War Philosophy,” Strauss returns to Schmitt’s conception of the 
political to account for how German bellicose nationalism was a result of the historicist 
destruction of reason and any common moral standard due to the relativism it caused: 
Now, every human community needs some degree of agreement at least as 
regards the basic moral questions. […] If mutual understanding as regards the 
practical basis of common life cannot be reached by reason and argument, people 
had no choice but to turn away from reason to authority. // The most visible kind 
of authority — most visible at least in Germany — is the State. In [On the 
Concept of the Political], Carl Schmitt indicated the following chain of thought: 
there is not one ideal, but a variety of conflicting ideals; therefore, ideals cannot 
have an obligatory character; more precisely, any value judgment is a free 
decision, which concerns exclusively the freely deciding individual himself; it is 
essentially a private affair; therefore, no one can expect of any other man that that 
other man sacrifice anything for the first man’s ideal; but no political community 
can exist without asserting that there are obligations which can overrule any 
private decision; whatever may be the ultimate source of these obligations, they 
cannot be derived from free decisions of the individual, or else they could be no 
more than conditional obligations, not absolute obligations, the obligation to 
sacrifice life itself. For, Schmitt asserts, if we analyse political obligation, and 
above all the meaning of ‘political,’ we find that we mean by ‘political’ any fact 
which is related to the distinction of friend and enemy of the group to which we 
belong, that distinction originating in the possibility of war. The basic fact of the 
possibility of war sets an absolute limit to all freedom of decision: it creates 
authority and therewith it gives all members of the community a generally valid 
guidance.558 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Strauss shares with Schmitt the anti-liberal view that state 
authority should win over individual rights. I argued that Strauss’s neo-Hobbesian 
political ontology that places vanity at the root of political antagonism, as the 
precondition for dominion, provides an alternative to Schmitt’s collapse of political 
authority with bellicose nationalism. To counter what he here sees as the historicist roots 
of Schmitt’s immanent and relativistic conception of the political that sees war as that 
                                                
557  Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 242. 
558  Strauss, “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy,” 127-28, emphasis added. 
 185 
which creates a common standard for the community, Strauss turns again to human 
nature to look for a non-relativistic foundation for political dominion, for an authoritative 
standard for common life/normative order. 
This time around, however, it is no longer in Hobbes’s pre-scientific observation 
of human passion in which Strauss finds an alternative, but the Socratic-Platonic 
essentialist view of the human animal as the rational animal. Drury and Laurence 
Lampert have argued that Strauss follows Nietzsche in that he thinks that human nature is 
not fixed and the natural order is created anew through the will to power.559 Robert 
Pippin (following Stanley Rosen, and in his turn, Kojève), on the other hand, opposes 
Lampert’s and Drury’s thesis by pointing out that Strauss’s appeals to human nature as 
something permanent.560 Pippin’s reading of Strauss appears the correct one in respect to 
those of Strauss’s texts that I have examined up-close. As in the inter-war era, Strauss 
continues to make an appeal to the idea of an unchanging human nature after the war. I 
uncover the specific features of this appeal in this chapter. 
In the same paper on “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy,” 
Strauss also points out that some reacted to historicism, “which had led to the turning 
from reason to authority,” by returning to the Hobbesian tradition of natural law: 
The urgency of a convincing, generally valid moral teaching, of a moral teaching 
of evident political relevance, was clearly felt. Such a moral teaching seemed to 
be discernible in the natural law doctrines of the 17th and 18th centuries rather than 
in later teaching[s]. (Troeltsch had asserted time and again that the political 
superiority of the Anglosaxons was due to the fact that that natural law tradition 
had not been superseded, to the same extent as in Germany, by historicism.) For 
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the natural law teachers of the 17th and 18th centuries had spoken of laws and 
obligations, and not merely of ideals and values.561 
 
In Strauss’s eyes, the natural law doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
are precisely the wrong places to turn to in order to counter historicism and moral 
relativism. The first modern natural law teacher among the Anglo-Saxons was Hobbes 
and it is he, in Strauss’s account (as examined in chapter two and three), who causes the 
crisis of obligation/authority in the first place. Both during and after the war, Strauss 
advances, the view that Hobbesian natural law (rational and moral precepts) is predicated 
on safeguarding each individual's unconditional natural right to self-preservation.562 He 
also holds that the obligations derived from this unconditional right are conditional, and 
thus lead to the unintended consequences of undoing unconditional obligation to the 
state. Strauss also comes to blame Hobbes for the rise of historicism in Natural Right and 
History, as we shall see in the second part of this chapter. So, while Schmitt turns to war 
as that which re-establishes authority to the state, and other compatriots to 17th and 18th 
century natural law tradition, Strauss returns to the Socratic-Platonic conception of 
human nature and reason to try to tease out a non-relativist theory of obligation. 
To make such move possible, Strauss recognizes that the attack on the liberal 
civilization in general, and the Weimar Republic specifically, while necessary for 
philosophical investigations, resulted in a political disaster:  
German philosophy implies a more or less radical criticism of the very idea of 
civilisation and especially of modern civilisation — a criticism disastrous in the 
political field, but necessary in the philosophical, in the theoretical field. For if 
civilisation is distinguished from, and even opposed to, what was formerly called 
the state of nature, the process of civilisation means an increasing going away 
from the natural condition of man, an increasing forgetting of that situation. And 
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perhaps one must have a living knowledge, an acute recollection' of that situation 
if one wants to know, i.e. to understand in its full meaning, the natural, the basic 
problems of philosophy.563 
 
The philosophical criticism of liberal civilization, morals and rights had catastrophic 
effects in the field of politics. In order to avoid the “disastrous” political consequences of 
the necessary philosophical criticism of liberal civilization, Strauss recovers a way to 
insulate philosophical criticism from the political field from medieval and ancient 
thinkers. In a 1954 paper,  “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” Strauss explains: 
Philosophers or scientists who hold this view about the relation of philosophy or 
science and society are driven to employ a peculiar manner of writing which 
would enable them to reveal what they regard as truth to few, without endangering 
the unqualified commitment of the many to the opinions on which society rests. 
They will distinguish between the true teaching as the esoteric teaching and the 
socially useful teaching as the exoteric teaching; whereas the exoteric teaching is 
meant to be easily accessible to every reader, the esoteric teaching discloses itself 
only to the very careful and well-trained readers after long and concentrated 
study.564 
 
4. 1. 3. Philosophical esotericism  
Strauss’s discovery of an art of writing that shielded politics from philosophy was a 
gradual process that begins in the 1920s. The research culminated in the publication of 
Persecution and the Art of Writing (henceforth, Persecution) in 1952, which collects one 
essay on the general theme of esotericism, and four case studies in the practice of 
esotericism—all papers which Strauss had published throughout the 1940s.565 In the 
                                                
563  Strauss, “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy,” 115. In The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, Strauss had noted that unlike developed liberalism, Hobbes never forgot the state of 
war/nature. What Strauss’s Hobbes repressed due the adoption of natural science was that human are 
evil. The scientific Hobbes still remembered the state of nature unlike developed liberalism.  
564  Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, 221-22. 
565  Leo Strauss, “Farabi’s Plato,” in Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, American Academy for Jewish 
Research (1945): 357–393, was revised and abbreviated for Persecution’s Introduction; “Persecution 
and the Art of Writing,” Social Research 8, no. 4 (1941): 488–504, was revised for chapter two by the 
same name, “Persecution and the Art of Writing”; “The Literary Character of the Guide for the 
Perplexed,” in Essays on Maimonides, ed. by S. W. Baron (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1941): 37–91, was revised for chapter three by the same name, “The Literary Character of the Guide for 
 188 
second chapter, from which the book takes its name, Strauss writes that “persecution” 
“gives rise to a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a peculiar type of 
literature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively between the 
lines.”566 This is only part of the story, as philosophers also wrote esoterically in order 
not to endanger the normative order on which society rests:  
After about the middle of the [17th] century an ever-increasing number of 
heterodox philosophers who had suffered from persecution published their 
books not only to communicate their thoughts but also because they desired to 
contribute to the abolition of persecution as such. They believed that 
suppression of free inquiry, and of publication of the result of free inquiry, was 
accidental, an outcome of faulty construction of the body politics, and that the 
kingdom of general darkness could be replaced by the republic of universal 
light. They looked forward to a time when, as a result of the progress of popular 
education, practically complete freedom of speech would be possible, or — to 
exaggerate for purpose of clarification — to a time when no one would suffer 
any harm from hearing any truth. They concealed their views only far enough 
to protect themselves as well as possible from persecution; had they been more 
subtle than that, they would have defeated their purpose, which was to 
enlighten an ever-increasing number of people who were not potential 
philosophers. It is therefore comparatively easy to read between the lines of 
their books.567 
 
Strauss identifies persecution and the danger of truths for the social fabric as the reason 
behind esotericism. For these heterodox or enlightenment philosophers, the conflict 
between philosopher and society can be resolved by popular education, which in turn 
nullifies the need of esoteric writing. 
It is not these enlightenment philosophers, however, that Persecution is about. 
The book’s introduction makes use of an article on the Muslim philosopher Farabi, and 
the other chapters are case studies on the esoteric art of three Jewish thinkers, 
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Maimonides, Halevi, and Spinoza — while Spinoza counts among the enlightenment 
philosophers, Strauss argued that this designation thus not apply to his view on 
esotericism and human reason. In the book’s “Preface,” Strauss notes that he discovered 
esotericism when “studying the Jewish and Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages.”568 
These thinkers were part of a group of pre-modern esoteric writers. 569  Strauss 
differentiates between what Frazer has referred to as “modern” and “ancient” 
esotericism.570 This is a useful heuristic distinction if the terms ancient and modern are 
not understood strictly with respect to the time period in which these thinkers lived and 
wrote, but rather with respect to the underlying rationale behind their esotericism. 
These ancients, contrary to the moderns, Strauss writes in his 1948 book On 
Tyranny “believed that the gulf separating ‘the wise’ and ‘the vulgar’ was a basic fact of 
human nature which could not be influenced by popular education; philosophy, or 
science, was essentially a privilege of ‘the few.’”571 The difference between the few 
philosophers and the many vulgar is thus predicated on a natural difference in their 
intellectual ability, and because of this natural and permanent condition, it cannot be 
transcended. According to ancient esotericism, the difference between the few 
philosophers and the many vulgar is irreconcilable, while the conflict between the two is 
manageable. In the case of the modern, the difference between the few philosophers and 
the many vulgar is due to societal circumstances only, and can therefore be 
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transcended.572 The preconditions and social aims of ancient and modern esotericism are 
thus mutually exclusive. One must choose one. Strauss sides with the ancients against the 
moderns. To substantiate this claim, I will now unpack Strauss’s discovery of esotericism 
chronologically, with emphasis on Hobbes role as the representative of modern 
esotericism. 
4. 1. 4. The discovery of ancient esotericism 
Already in the mid- to late-1920s, in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Strauss identifies a 
qualitative difference between the numerically “few wise” and the “ignorant many” at 
play in Aristotle’s work. He writes: “contemplation or theory, and theory is accessible 
only to the few who are wise, special precautions are needed for the guidance of the 
ignorant many, for the sake of social law and order.”573 Strauss’s understanding of 
esotericism at this point in time amounts to a conception of an exoteric-esoteric division 
between the numeric few and many, based on a qualitative difference between the wise 
(capable of contemplation) and ignorant. He is not yet aware of an art of writing — a 
double rhetoric — that simultaneously communicates an esoteric teaching to the few and 
an exoteric doctrine to the many. The use of esotericism is to maintain law and order: 
wisdom is separated from the moral doctrine required to maintain order in the city/state. 
In 1935, the same year that Strauss finished his Hobbes manuscript, Strauss writes 
in Philosophy and Law that Maimonides, like his “predecessors and successors” 
(medieval Jewish and Islamic rationalists), “had in mind a certain enlightenment of all 
men,” since they  
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were precisely Enlighteners in the proper sense; for them it was not a question of 
spreading light, of educating the multitude to rational knowledge, of enlightening; 
again and again they enjoin upon the philosophers the duty of keeping secret from 
the unqualified multitude the rationally known truth: for them — in contrast to the 
Enlightenment proper, that is, the modern Enlightenment — the esoteric character 
of philosophy was unconditionally established.574  
 
Strauss finds in Maimonides, just as he had in Aristotle, a tradition that shielded an 
esoteric teaching from the political or moral realm. 
Tanguay and Lampert have each respectively argued that, in Philosophy and Law, 
Strauss had not yet figured the full extent of the esoteric nature of Maimonides’s 
prophetology. Lampert shows, in an exposition of a series of letters that Strauss sent to 
Klein (January 1938 to November 1939), that it is during these years that Strauss for the 
first time fully dissects Maimonides’s esotericism and arrives at the “explosive” insight 
that the most “important prophet” in Judaism was an atheist.575 Out of this insight, 
Lampert argues, Strauss arrives at the realization that Maimonides’ Jewish predecessor, 
Halevi, and his Islamic precursors, Averroes and Farabi, and ultimately, Aristotle and 
Plato, had also concealed their atheism. Lampert argues that their separation of wisdom 
from morality moved them beyond good and evil, and thus describes them as 
“immoralists.”576 Tanguay, on the other hand, argues that it is in Farabi that Strauss 
discovers the strongest case for the esoteric practice of “prophetology” and it signalled 
his “shift” to “genuine Platonism.”577 He dates this “Farabian turn” to 1935. 578 
In Persecution, Strauss argues that prophets were the medium through which God 
had communicated the divine law. Whatever difference in their teaching on the relation 
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between philosophy and religion, Averroes, Avicenna, Farabi, Halevi, and Maimonides’s 
esoteric commentaries on revealed law show that they are political philosophers in 
disguise. Their interpretations of the law of the Torah and the Koran are Platonic lies that 
approximate philosophical truths about the natural order. The law, as in the Platonic 
tradition, is separated from philosophy. The principle of rule that most closely 
approximates the order in nature is identified by the philosopher and handed down to the 
many as the right interpretation of revealed law. These moral commands, Strauss argues 
are, according to Averroes, Farabi, Halevi, and Maimonides, not rational laws of nature 
(nomoi). The religious laws are not believed to reflect the rational laws of the universe (a 
divine or metaphysical order), but are exoteric moral laws. Christian theologians in the 
Thomistic tradition (influenced by Aristotle), on the other hand, believed that the rational 
commandments corresponded with the Christian notions of “the natural law,” “the law of 
reason,” and “the moral law” of the universe.579 Unlike the private role of philosophy in 
Judaism and Islam (as practiced by Maimonides, Halevi, Farabi and Averroes), Strauss 
argues that the medieval Christian tradition popularized philosophy as a handmaid for 
religion.580  
4. 1. 5. Esotericism and Hobbes 
In Natural Right and History, Strauss makes the case that Hobbes turns to philosophy, as 
popularized by Christianity, against religion. Strauss points out that no pre-modern 
philosopher would have questioned the social utility of religion to secure social order: 
“No pre-modern atheist doubted that social life requires belief in, and worship of, God or 
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gods.”581 Philosophy was not sufficient to secure a moral order. Prior to Hobbes, Strauss 
notes that atheists were a non-enterprising faction that kept their unbelief to themselves. 
Hobbes breaks with the Epicurean tradition and popularizes philosophy as a “weapon” 
against theology: “[s]ince the [17th] century, philosophy has become a weapon, and hence 
an [ideological] instrument.”582 Hobbes uses philosophy against religion, and not, like the 
mediaeval scholastics, religion as an exoteric rhetoric to secure social order.583  
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Hobbes’s proposed political contract is 
impotent without the affective provision of the fear of violent death, and Strauss repeats 
this insight in Natural Right and History: 
There was only one fundamental objection to Hobbes's basic assumption which he 
felt very keenly and which he made every effort to overcome. In many cases the 
fear of violent death proved to be a weaker force than the fear of hell fire or the 
fear of God. The difficulty is well illustrated by two widely separated passages of 
the Leviathan. In the first passage Hobbes says that the fear of the power of men 
(i. e., the fear of violent death) is ‘commonly’ greater than the fear of the power of 
‘spirits invisible,’ i.e., than religion. In the second passage he says that ‘the fear of 
darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears’ Hobbes saw his way to solve this 
contradiction: the fear of invisible powers is stronger than the fear of violent death 
as long as people believe in invisible powers, i.e., as long as they are under the 
spell of delusions about the true character of reality; the fear of violent death 
comes fully into its own as soon as people have become enlightened. This implies 
that the whole scheme suggested by Hobbes requires for its operation the 
weakening or, rather, the elimination of the fear of invisible powers. It requires 
such a radical change of orientation as can be brought about only by the 
disenchantment of the world, by the diffusion of scientific knowledge, or by 
popular enlightenment. Hobbes's is the first doctrine that necessarily and 
unmistakably points to a thoroughly ‘enlightened,’ i.e., a-religious or atheistic 
society as the solution of the social or political problem.584 
 
For the actualization of his political proposal, Hobbes must replace the object which his 
contemporaries fear is attached from afterlife to violent death. Through public education, 
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Hobbes attempts to wrestle the fear individuals have for invisible powers to the fear of 
death in the hands of others. Hobbes’s social contract does not presuppose a 
transcendental creator as absolute authority/Sovereign. In Natural Right and History, 
Strauss places Hobbes in the Epicurean tradition, but unlike any (including the 
Epicureans) pre-modern thinkers, he argues that Hobbes does not think “social life 
required belief in, and worship of, God or gods” and is therefore the founder of “political 
atheism.”585 
4. 1. 6. Rational capacity as the ground for ancient esotericism 
Hobbes stands out in Strauss’s account as the anti-esoteric thinker par excellence. The 
reason for this is that Hobbes, in Strauss’s view, subscribes to rational equality, which is 
contrary to the natural ground on which Strauss argues ancient esotericism rests, namely, 
the natural difference between the rational capacity of the few wise and the vulgar many. 
It is the view that humans are by nature unequal that establishes the permanent need for 
an esoteric hermeneutics. 
In Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Strauss observes that Hobbes’s understanding 
of every human’s capacity for reason makes redundant the need for a religious exoteric 
doctrine: 
According to Spinoza, the command ‘thou shalt love thy neighbor’ takes its force 
as commandment for the multitude only from the belief that the commandment is 
the directly ‘revealed’ word of God, but from Hobbes’ position this 
commandment is sufficiently binding upon man by virtue of the fact that God has 
created men as reasonable beings. The distinction between the wise men and the 
vulgar does not enter into the matter at all. Because that distinction does not come 
into consideration, there is no necessity for recourse to religion.586 
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With respect to his view of rational ability, the use and role of religion (as discussed in 
chapter two and three) belong to the pre-moderns, for whom religion is seen as an 
exoteric mean to assure obedience of the many. For Hobbes, subjects do not need to be 
steered into the commonwealth by divine command because the individuals’ reason 
alone, developed out of fear, is sufficient to persuade them of the benefits of belonging to 
a state. While Strauss has Hobbes dismissing the necessity of a revealed commandment 
due to his egalitarian view of human rational capacity, he still does not assert that Hobbes 
is an atheist. So much is clear from Strauss’s point at the end of the above passage that 
for Hobbes, it is “God” who “created men as reasonable beings.”587 Strauss concludes 
that Hobbes is agnostic:  
An atheist in the theoretical sense of the term Hobbes is not. However, his ‘true 
religion’ is no more than a fringe phenomenon, which exercised no great 
influence on his way of thinking and feeling. The positive mind, for which reason 
itself is modesty, is content with those matters which are truly accessible to the 
finite mind.  Only this world yields some answers. His mind and imagination do 
not go roaming into the infinite and eternal. From an agnosticism such as that of 
Hobbes, it is only a step into atheism, a step which this philosopher himself 
however never took.”588  
 
Strauss explains in his unfinished manuscript on Hobbes’s Critique of Religion (which he 
abandoned in 1934), why he had overlooked Hobbes’s atheism in Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion: 
Even though the English Leviathan contains the frankest presentation of the 
Hobbesian critique of religion, this is not to say that in that work Hobbes sets 
forth his actual view undisguisedly. Hobbes generally proceeds by beginning with 
fully or mostly orthodox-sounding statements, in order to lead these statements 
afterward, in a more or less veiled manner ad absurdum. In the further course of 
the investigation, however, he often makes no explicit use of the result of his 
critique, but rather avails himself of the previously rejected opinions as though 
they were self-evidently correct, in order to refute other traditional teachings 
covertly. In order to get to know his actual view, one must therefore attempt to 
                                                
587  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 101. 
588  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 100-101, emphasis added.   
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collect, as Hobbes no doubt intentionally neglected to do, the results of his 
critique, which are strewn among many passages of the work. This depends not so 
much on the completeness of the collection or even on the selection of the most 
offensive heresies as such on connecting the central thoughts in the critique of 
religion.589 
 
In the second half of the manuscript, Strauss adds that Hobbes is careful not to endanger 
himself to the “suspicion of atheism,” by refraining from denying “resurrection,” “the 
inner distinction between true and false prophets,” and “miracles.”590 Hobbes’s thinly 
veiled esotericism was sufficient enough to deceive Strauss at the time that he wrote 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion. Two decades later, in Persecution, Strauss notes that in 
his book on Spinoza he had mistakenly rejected the view “that Hobbes was an atheist.”591 
Far more important than the discovery of Hobbes thinly concealed atheism for 
Strauss’s understanding of esotericism and his use of Hobbes after World War II, 
however, is Strauss’s disagreement with Hobbes’s egalitarian understanding of the 
human animal's capacity for reason. Already before the war, in The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes, Strauss wrote: “Because all men are equal, i.e., because there is no natural 
order in general, and therefore no natural gradation of mankind, the difference between 
the wise minority and the unwise majority loses the fundamental importance it had for 
traditional political philosophy.”592 The traditional esoteric-exoteric division between the 
wise minority and the unwise majority is opposed by Hobbes’s claim that “[b]y nature all 
men are equally reasonable.”593 What really troubles Strauss is thus not Hobbes’s 
rebellion against God, but his revolt against human nature and, more precisely, against 
the hierarchical view of individuals’ natural capacity for rational pursuits. 
                                                
589  Strauss, Hobbes’s Critique of Religion, 32-33.     
590  Strauss, Hobbes Critique of Religion, 80-81, 84, 86. In the first of two parts, Strauss argues that Hobbes 
first criticized the theological tradition from the view of the highest authority—the bible. 
591  Strauss, Persecution, 28n 10. 
592  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 101-102. 
593  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 159, emphasis added.  
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Strauss counters Hobbes’s conception of rationality with an appeal to classical 
rationalism at the end of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Just as with Hobbes’s 
egalitarian rational foundation for popular and modern sovereignty, ancient rule, Strauss 
suggests, is also legitimized by reason. But unlike Hobbes’s view of reason or wisdom 
(he notes that Hobbes perverts the meaning of the latter by reducing it to the former), 
Strauss argues that for the ancients, wisdom is only attainable by the few. Strauss 
enforces the rule of the wise over the many. “The view of classical rationalism” is “that 
only reason justifies dominion,” which means, Strauss explains, that “the rational should 
rule over the irrational (the old over the young, the man over the woman, the master over 
the slave) and therefore law over men.”594 Strauss is perfectly aware that Hobbes argues 
that “allegedly natural gradation concerning the faculties of the mind proceeds from ‘a 
vain conceipt of ones own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater 
degree, than the Vulgar’.”595 And further, Strauss suggests that Hobbes’s perception of 
intellectual vanity (the belief in one’s own intellectual superiority) is the main cause 
behind the war of all against all. Despite Hobbes’s warning, Strauss insists on a natural 
gradation of rational capacity against Hobbes’s modern enlightenment view. Strauss thus 
sides with the pre-modern rationale behind esotericism. Or as one of Strauss’s students 
puts it: 
It was this permanent distinction between the elite and the vulgar that the modern 
Enlightenment denied was necessary. Strauss thought that it was necessary, and 
hence preferred the medieval Enlightenment to its modern counterpart, as he had 
worked out in Philosophy and Law. […] In contrast to the modern Enlightenment, 
the medieval rationalists took for granted the elitist and esoteric nature of 
philosophy. According to the medieval rationalists, the great divide between the 
elite and the many was a permanent feature of human societies, and no amount of 
education or human advancement could change it. Hence, all proper philosophical 
                                                
594  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 161, 158. 
595  Strauss, The Political philosophy of Hobbes, 167n 2. 
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writing had to be exoteric. In contrast, most Enlightenment thinkers believed that 
human beings can progress through education and the development of their 
rational facilities.596  
 
Does it then follow from Strauss’s belief in an ancient/ medieval division of intelligence 
that Strauss also practiced the art of writing between the lines? Is there, in other words, 
more to his excavation of esotericism than a hermeneutical guide to reading past (and 
some modern) philosophers? 
4. 1. 7. Strauss’s esotericism 
That Strauss wrote esoterically is commonly agreed in the secondary literature. For 
example, Lampert, Sheppard, Kraemer, and Geoff Waite all argue that Strauss practiced 
ancient esotericism. 597 Indeed, only the ancient rationale for the practice of esotericism 
makes sense in a liberal society—the need to enlighten the masses and protect the 
philosopher from the city is less of an existential necessity in regimes in which freedom 
of speech is guaranteed by statute. Or as Jacques Lacan (another well-known student of 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel in the 1930s) pointed out after Persecution was 
published: “paradoxically,” the book was written in “the land [US] that traditionally 
offered asylum to those who have chosen freedom.”598 Anticipating Lacan’s question, 
Strauss duly asked: “of what use” is the esoteric art “in a truly liberal society”?599 
The first part of Strauss’s “simple” answer is a reference to Plato's Symposium.600 
The exoteric art teaches the few potential philosophers how to find the most “beautiful” 
                                                
596  Kraemer, “The Medieval Arabic Enlightenment,”165, 150. 
597  Kraemer, “The Medieval Arabic Enlightenment”; Lampert, “Strauss’s Recovery of Esotericism”; 
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598  Jacques Lacan, Écrits, ed. and translated by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 421.  
599  Strauss, Persecution, 36.  
600  Strauss, Persecution, 36. 
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hidden part within an esoteric text, as a way to lead a naturally gifted non-philosopher to 
philosophy. It is along these lines that Smith, Frazer, Zuckert and Zuckert, Kerbal and 
Arthur Melzer have suggested that if Strauss wrote esoterically, it was, in Frazer’s words, 
as “pedagogic” device to “design to seduce students into a life of philosophy.”601 Esoteric 
argument forces the readers/students to reason on their own. Strauss replaces Plato’s 
dialogues with incomplete and paradoxical statements, or as Zuckert and Zuckert point 
out, he admits in On Tyranny that he does not “dot all the i’s,” which forces the reader to 
put together the puzzle of truth on their own.602 Zuckert and Zuckert have suggested 
Strauss wrote esoterically only to prove that it was indeed possible to write esoterically, 
and not in order to hide secrets. 
The view of esotericism as a pedagogy relates to the second part of Strauss’s 
answer, an answer which echoes the reported discovery of classical liberalism in 
“German Nihilism”: “Education, they [ancients] felt, is the only answer to the always 
pressing question, to the political question par excellence, of how to reconcile order 
which is not oppression with freedom which is not license.”603 If the question is always 
pressing, then it is also Strauss’s question, and education, the ancients’ answer, is also his 
answer. It was largely to education and the making of a school of thought (Straussianism) 
that Strauss dedicated his later life. In On Tyranny, Strauss points to the separation 
between the political and the philosophical in his interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero: 
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“Ultimately, the dialogue serves the purpose of contrasting the two ways of life: the 
political life and the life devoted to wisdom”.604 Drury has suggested that Strauss thought 
of himself as a teacher of scholars (possible philosophers) on the one hand and 
“gentlemen” (civil servants, possible statesmen) on the other.605 By education, however, 
Strauss has in mind more than a teacher/philosopher-student relation that leads students 
to philosophy and statecraft respectively. It also concerns political education of the many 
(“common man”) through an exoteric doctrine. The ancient understanding of a regime 
emphasized education of its citizenry more than its institutions, Strauss notes in Natural 
Right and History: 
The classics had conceived of regimes (politeiai) not so much in terms of 
institutions as in terms of the aims actually pursued by the community and its 
authoritative part. Accordingly, they regarded the best regime as that regime 
whose aim is virtue, and they held that the right kind of institutions are indeed 
indispensable for establishing and securing the rule of the virtuous, but of only 
secondary importance in comparison with ‘education,’ i.e., the formation of 
character.606 
 
To “reconcile order which is not oppression” with liberty in the modern era, Strauss holds 
that the principle of rule should be based on the consensus of the ruled (I return to this 
question in this chapter’s final section). In his role as a writer and teacher, Strauss never 
sought to reach the many directly; his audience was small, but influential. The 
popularization of his ideas was left for others. 
So how should Strauss’s final pieces on Hobbes, which follow the full discovery 
of esotericism, be read? So far, I have established that Strauss’s new findings on Hobbes 
cannot be due to his esotericism, as he had already uncovered the thinly veiled 
esotericism that concealed Hobbes’s atheism by the early- to mid-1930s. What I have not 
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yet addressed is how Strauss presents his final insights on Hobbes. Is there a double 
rhetoric at play in his post-war texts on Hobbes? Does Strauss write the way he 
reads?  And if he does, is it to hide beautiful parts for the philosopher-to-be, and present 
an easily available doctrine of natural right for future civil servants? Or is it simply a 
pedagogical tool to lure potential philosophers? I think that there is more to it than this, as 
I will now explain. 
Let us return to Persecution for some more clues. In this passage, Strauss speaks 
of ancient esoteric written and oral communication: 
[Philosophers] must conceal their opinions from all but philosophers, either by 
limiting themselves to oral instructions of a carefully selected group of pupils, or 
by writing about the most important subject by means of ‘brief indication.’ […] 
Those to whom such books are truly addressed are, however, neither the 
unphilosophical majority nor the perfect philosophers as such, but the young men 
who might become philosophers [...] All books of that kind owe their existence to 
the love of the mature philosopher for the puppies of his race, by whom he wants 
to be loved in turn: all exoteric books are ‘written speeches caused by love.’607  
 
If we account for Strauss’s forms of communication outside of his publications, this 
allows us to see if there is a discrepancy between the two, which could reveal an esoteric-
exoteric distinction, either between the published and unpublished material, or among the 
published texts. The difference between Strauss’s publication and his classroom teaching 
is examined in detail in the next chapter, where I take a close look at Strauss’s 1964 
seminar on Hobbes. At this stage, it suffices to say that although Strauss explains his last 
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and major insight on Hobbes in much greater detail in the seminar than he does in any of 
his publications, no essential point is absent from his publications.608 
The same seems to hold true of his letters. Kraemer observes that Strauss, 
depending on the addressee, “conveyed his thoughts in plain, uncoded language.”609 
Strauss, as Lampert has shown, is more straightforward in his correspondence with Klein 
(January 1938 to November 1939) about his discovery of esotericism than in his 
subsequent publications.610 What I have found in the archive shows that nothing that he 
writes about Hobbes in his letters is absent from his publications. However, his thoughts 
on Hobbes are presented, as Lampert has suggested about his writings on Maimonides, 
Halevi, Farabi and Averroes, in a less forthright way. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Strauss hides away his final major insight in a footnote in What is Political Philosophy 
(1959) and in a short 1964 review of Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke. In these texts, he never explicitly indicates that 
this is a final major discovery. He does, however, point to the Hobbes footnote from 
What is Political Philosophy in a later preface to Natural Right and History (1970) and 
the German edition of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1965). 
Thornier is Rosen’s claim — Rosen had been one of Strauss’s doctoral students in 
the early 1950s — that Strauss communicated esoteric truths in private gatherings away 
from the classroom as it is impossible to verify what exactly Strauss said in private.611 
This conundrum is, however, inconsequential if Kerbal is correct that it is unnecessary to 
                                                
608  Strauss outlines the crux of his final insight in a footnote in chapter seven, “On the New Basis of 
Hobbes”, in What is Political Philosophy (1959), and again in his “Review of C. B. Macpherson: The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism”, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 45, no.1 (June 
1964): 69–70. 
609  Kraemer, “The Medieval Arabic Enlightenment,” 138. 
610  Lampert, “Strauss’s Recovery of Esotericism,” 63-76. 
611  Stanley Rosen, “Leo Strauss in Chicago,” Daedalus 135 (2006): 104-113.   
 203 
chase the goose beyond the written word if Strauss wrote in the way he read the pre-
moderns: 
Orality, while being the original form of philosophic communication and 
therefore a conceivable option for the transmission of the esoteric teaching, has 
major defects: Not only does oral communication require permanent political 
stability and perfect comprehension on the part of each successor, it also limits the 
potential audience to those who happen to be a link in the chain of the tradition. In 
a word, oral traditio is very unlikely to achieve the goal of preserving over time 
an undistorted traditium for the intended audience.612  
 
If it is correct, as I have argued, that Strauss subscribed to the ancient natural ground for 
esotericism, he believed in and likely would want to communicate his most important 
ideas across generations to a wide scope of potential philosophers without the risks 
inherent to oral communication. Be this as it may, I do not have access to Strauss private 
conversations (there are no such recordings in the archives), and I have decided not to use 
as evidence recollections of his past students.613 My conclusion is that Strauss’s core 
views are accounted for in his publications, but that his final major insight on Hobbes is 
not easily detectable, and it is virtually impossible to unpack without the aid of his 
seminars. 
Strauss’s final insight on Hobbes, which I will discuss at length in the following 
chapter, were articulated in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, at which point in time 
Strauss’s extra-textual interpretative intentions were kept to a minimum, and his approach 
was that for which he has become known: to understand a thinker as he understood 
himself. In this chapter, however, I consider Strauss’s first text on Hobbes after the war 
(“On the Spirit of Hobbes” and its reappearance as part one of chapter five, “Modern 
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Natural Right”, in Natural Right and History), in which Strauss’s main intention is to fit 
Hobbes into a larger view of the history of political philosophy. The question is, is there 
an esoteric dimension to this work? One way to find out is to apply the keys of what 
Strauss identifies as esoteric ways of writing to Strauss’s own text. Throughout 
Persecution, Strauss lists different ways to read and write “between the lines.”614 Since 
these interpretative keys mostly concern pre-modern philosophical dialogues or treatises, 
or other styles of writing that do not apply to, or match Strauss’s own writing, few of 
these tricks apply to his Hobbes essay. What does apply is that there are “certain 
obtrusively enigmatic features in the presentation,” such as “obscurity of the plan, 
contradictions, pseudonyms, inexact repetitions of earlier statements…”615 The esoteric 
question is if these inconsistencies are, in Strauss’s words, “blatant enough to shame a 
schoolboy”; that is to say, are they intentionally designed to separate between an exoteric 
doctrine and esoteric teaching?616 
I suggest below that the most significant obtrusively enigmatic features do not 
disguise an esoteric teaching, but rather, reveal Strauss’s extra-textual philosophical 
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615  Strauss, Persecution, 36. 
616  Strauss, Persecution, 30. 
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motives at the time. That is, to place Hobbes’s thought in Strauss’s account of the history 
of political thought as a quarrel between the ancients and the moderns and show that 
Hobbes’s views and modern philosophy are contrary to human nature. An esoteric 
interpretation of “Spirit of Hobbes,” in comparison, would be less exact. In Persecution, 
Strauss indeed cautions and instructs a reader prepared to undertake an esoteric 
interpretation: 
Reading between the lines is strictly prohibited in all cases where it would be less 
exact than not doing so. Only such reading between the lines as starts from an 
exact consideration of the explicit statements of the author is legitimate. The 
context in which a statement occurs and the literary character of the whole work 
as well as its plan, must be perfectly understood before and interpretation of the 
statement can reasonably claim to be adequate or even correct.617 
 
I do, however, consider not only Strauss’s explicit statements, but also what is not said 
(i.e., what is omitted). And again, not because they expose an esoteric teaching, but 
rather, because they speak to how Strauss tacitly abandons his earlier disclosure of a pre-
scientific Hobbes that reveals human evil. The contradictions and silences reveal 
Strauss’s new extra-textual political philosophical motive: that is, to fit Hobbes into the 
role of the founder of modern natural right in Strauss’s history of political thought. The 
same holds true of Strauss as what he himself says of Hobbes in his preface to the 
German edition of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: while Hobbes’s conclusions are 
clear, his “presuppositions are shrouded in obscurity.”618 Strauss’s criticism of Hobbes 
and liberalism is built on the Socratic-Platonic philosophical view on reason and natural 
law. The main challenge to Strauss’s philosophical position remains historicism. 
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4. 1. 8. Esotericism and historicism 
Beyond reproach is the fact that Strauss wrote more about the existence of philosophical 
esotericism than any previous writer in the history of political thought. What is left to 
consider before we turn to Strauss’s criticism of Hobbes in Natural Right and History, is 
why Strauss would write about openly about the art of esotericism if now philosophical 
truths (such as the criticism of modern civilization/liberalism) were dangerous to society? 
Is it explained by the fact that while Strauss’s general thesis that ancient and modern 
philosophers wrote esoterically for different reasons is quite easily digested, the 
dissection of the esoteric teaching of a specific philosopher requires not only a great deal 
of time, but also a natural capacity, which few have at their disposal. This argument, 
however, appears rather unconvincing in light of the fact that, in Persecution, Strauss not 
only guides the reader through the work of unpacking the specific esoteric teaching of 
Farabi, Maimonides, Halevi and Spinoza, but also reveals that the hidden agenda — 
albeit in somewhat sugar-coated form, as Lampert has shown in contrast to his letters — 
of the first three philosophers is in essence the same: they were all philosophical atheists, 
for whom religion was not only incompatible with philosophical truths, but a rhetorical 
trope to bring an order to the commonwealth that approximated the order in nature, and 
preserved philosophy as a private pursuit.  
Strauss’s decision to go public about the tradition of philosophical esotericism 
added little fuel to the fire since the dangerous truth was already out: Nietzsche’s 
declaration that God is dead, hand in hand with the radical historicist thesis that there is 
no metaphysical or supra-human foundation for a moral-political order. As we shall see 
below, Strauss agrees with the historicist claim that a metaphysical ground for a moral 
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law/natural law does not exist, or rather, has not yet been proven to exist. He, however, 
refuses to concede to historicism that there is no human rational faculty that provides a 
trans-historical authoritative standard. In other words, Strauss’s case for rationalism is not 
that nature (the universe) is structured according to rational laws — whether non-
teleological physical laws or those of a teleological design — but that nature is rational 
insofar as some individuals have an inborn rational capacity. With the historicist 
challenge in mind, some scholars have suggested that there is a philosophical motivation 
for Strauss’s decision to spill the long-kept secret about the practice of esotericism. 
The fundamental philosophical question concerns whether or not ancient Platonic 
philosophy escapes Heidegger’s destruction of the Western metaphysical tradition. 
Addressing this concern, Lampert, Melzer and Zuckert and Zuckert have all 
independently proposed that Strauss’s recuperation of philosophical esotericism should 
be considered a proof against historicism.619 The excavation of the largely forgotten 
tradition of philosophical esotericism revealed that past philosophers wrote against the 
predominant thought of their time, and thus escaped the historicist cave. According to 
Strauss, the historicists fail to read exo/esoterically insofar as they read philosophers 'of 
all times' through a strict modern historicist lens and not in the way these thinkers 
understood themselves or intended their work to be read, namely in a twofold manner: 
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exoterically and esoterically. The mark of a true philosopher is precisely that he 
transcends the time in which he lives.620 Lampert puts this in the context of Strauss own 
intellectual trajectory: 
The judgment about our age underlying Strauss’s innovations in esotericism 
seems previewed in his Zionist writings of the 1920s and his essays and letters of 
the early 1930s: they attest to his extreme opposition to the modern 
Enlightenment, his contempt for it, and his judgment that its disastrous failure, 
most visible intellectually in the radical historicism of Heidegger, required a new 
beginning for philosophy. Strauss judged his age the logical completion of the 
modern Enlightenment, its theoretical self-destruction. That judgment sent him 
back to the medieval enlightenment and then to the Greek enlightenment to 
investigate, as a man of enlightenment, their treatment of philosophy. Strauss’s 
innovations in esotericism seem to be what he judged a responsible preparation 
for philosophy’s place in a postmodern, post-Enlightenment world. […] In the 
face of the most powerful sophism of the present age, the belief that philosophy 
itself is bound to its time and place in what it thinks — that philosophy in its 
classical sense is impossible — Strauss’s recovery of the philosophers’ 
esotericism proves philosophy to be possible by showing it to be actual. Insight 
into the philosophers’ esotericism makes it evident that the great philosophers 
transcended their time and place in thought and then descended, as it were, 
reporting their gains exoterically by accommodating them to the prevailing 
prejudices of their time. Strauss’s recovery of esotericism is nothing less than the 
recovery of the possibility of philosophy.621 
 
Lampert presents the discovery of esotericism as a recovery of the possibility of 
philosophy and a necessary preparation for philosophy’s place in a post-enlightenment 
world. In the context of the historicist assault on philosophy in the 20th century, Strauss 
thinks it necessary to make people aware of its existence. I would like to suggest that if it 
is the prospect of the “end of philosophy” that prompts Strauss to broadcast the existence 
of an esoteric philosophical tradition, he does so in order to ground the classical view 
that there is an intellectual order of rank among humans. Beside it being a natural fact 
that necessitated ancient esotericism, as we shall see below, intellectual elitism is also the 
                                                
620  Leo Struass, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo 
Strauss: Essays and Lectures by Leo Strauss, selected and introduced by Thomas L. Pangle (University 
of Chicago Press, 1989), viii. 
621 Lampert, “Strauss’s Recovery of Esotericism,” 89, 76. 
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foundation for the Socratic-Platonic natural right tradition that Strauss adopts, and against 
which he assesses Hobbes’s doctrine. In Natural Right and History, however, Strauss 
does not explicitly mount esotericism as a challenge to the historicist thesis that reason 
and human nature change over time. Instead, he turns historicism on historicism to point 
out a logical fallacy in the historicist thesis. This allows him to account for both the rise 






















4. 2. 1. Historicism and natural right 
In Natural Right and History’s “preface,” Strauss suggests, in the words of Ernst 
Troeltsch, “that what became the order of the day in German in the 1930s, is now true in 
America, ‘natural right’ and ‘humanity’ have ‘become incomprehensible.’”622 The reason 
for this, as Strauss had pointed out to his colleagues at the New School back in the winter 
of 1941, is that German nihilism exceeded National Socialism and as such “the defeat of 
National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German nihilism.”623 Strauss 
now confirms this prediction: “it would not be the first time that a nation [Germany], 
defeated on the battlefield, and, as it were, annihilated as a political being, has deprived 
its conquerors of the most sublime fruit of victory by imposing on them the yoke of its 
own thought.”624 Historicism puts into question both modern and ancient natural right: 
“The view that truth is eternal and that there are eternal standards, was contradicted by 
historical consciousness, i.e. by the opinion that all ‘truths’ and standards are necessarily 
relative to a given historical situation, and that, consequently, a mature philosophy can 
raise no higher claim than that to express the spirit of the period to which it belongs.”625 
The destruction of metaphysical systems, rational and divine, leads to the rejection of 
modern universal natural right. For it follows from historicism that “[i]f our principles 
have no other support than our blind preference, everything a man is willing to dare will 
be permissible. The contemporary rejection of natural right leads to nihilism—nay, it is 
                                                
622  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 2. 
623  Strauss, “German Nihilism,” 357. 
624  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 2. 
625  Strauss, “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy,” 132. 
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identical with nihilism.”626 The war, or more precisely, the intellectual war, over the 
hearts and minds and the overall intellectual horizon or Zeitgeist was not over.   
In the “Introduction” to Natural Right and History, Strauss appears to call for a 
defense of the American constitution against German historicism. The Declaration of 
Independence, adopted by the 2nd Continental Congress on July 4, 1776, prescribed 
inalienable universal rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and stated that 
government authority derived from the consent of those it governed. Strauss’s book as a 
whole, however, reads as a defense, not of modern universal human rights, but rather of 
what Strauss defines as the “classical,” or “Platonic-Socratic” tradition of natural right. It 
is impossible not to note the intricacy in the fact that Strauss’s attack on modern natural 
right was first delivered as a lecture in the same country and year in which the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was ratified by the United Nations General Assembly, in 
light of what he had identified as the unfathomable consequence of such philosophical 
criticism in Weimar Germany.   
From the viewpoint of ancient philosophy (accounted for in chapter three and four 
in Natural Right and History), he first criticizes what he identified as an ancient 
egalitarian and hedonistic tradition that foreshadows Hobbes’s modern natural right 
doctrine. In his fifth chapter on Hobbes and Locke, Strauss examines universal modern 
natural rights from the perspective of classical natural right, and accepts consent (popular 
sovereignty) as a necessary element for an orderly and non-tyrannical regime, or to put it 
in Strauss’s words from Persecution, he proposes a regime that “reconcile[s] order which 
is not oppression” with liberty. 627 In the book’s final chapter, Strauss opens an additional 
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front against Hobbes in a discussion of Rousseau’s criticism and appropriation of 
Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature, and Burke’s attack on the French Revolution and 
the Rights of Man, arguing that Hobbes’s natural right is not only defective, but resulted 
in historicist relativism. Historicism, in effect, Strauss argues, turns on its own origin, 
undoing the basis for modern natural right. This is why Lampert writes that Strauss 
“judged his age the logical completion of the modern Enlightenment, its theoretical self-
destruction.”628  
Strauss sets out to criticize modern natural right, not from the vantage point of 
historicism, but from that of ancient Greek philosophy and classical natural rights. He, 
however, cannot ignore historicism, as the historicist thesis not only puts into question 
modern natural right, but also ancient philosophy and natural right. I will now summarize 
the essential aspect of Strauss’s case against historicism, and for Socratic-Platonic 
philosophy and natural law as succinctly as possible. The most important point to keep in 
mind is that Strauss, at the end of the day, employs what he defines as Socratic-Platonic 
philosophy and natural right, as the measure against which to judge Hobbes’s natural 
right doctrine, independent of the historicist thesis. 
4. 2. 2. Historicism against historicism 
In Natural Right and History, Strauss both accounts for the rise of historicism and 
investigates philosophy and natural right from a non-historicist philosophical perspective. 
Or, as Strauss puts it: “We need, in the first place, a non-historicist understanding of non-
historicist philosophy. But we need no less urgently a non-historicist understanding of 
historicism, that is, an understanding of the genesis of historicism that does not take for 
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granted the soundness of historicism.”629 Addressing the second need — accounting for 
the rise of historicism — Strauss argues that historicism arises as a conservative reaction 
to the French revolution, and that it is “[Hobbes’s] natural right doctrines that had 
prepared that cataclysm.”630 
In short, the modern natural right doctrine advances the idea of the universal 
principles of equality and freedom. People use these rights to judge the reality in which 
they live and to seek, and put in praxis politics that would transcend the present situation 
insofar as it falls short of such ideals, as with the French and American Revolutions. The 
conservative reaction to the rights of man, in turn, points to the tradition that challenged 
the idea that human beings are equals and have inviolable rights, which Strauss argues, 
results in the belief that “[t]he local and temporal have higher value than the 
universal.” 631  This reactionary form of historicism eventually results in “radical” 
historicism. Radical historicism annuls tradition as an authoritative value standard. 
Historicism views not only thought but also human nature as malleable and conditioned 
by history. Strauss shows how Rousseau's use and criticism of Hobbes leads to this view. 
Strauss points out that Rousseau adopts Hobbes’s “a-social” view of human 
nature, while Hobbes in fact reads civilized behavior and passions into the state of nature. 
According to Rousseau’s criticism, the state of nature that Hobbes describes is thus not 
pre-cultural. In Rousseau’s recovery of the real state of nature, Strauss writes that 
“human nature” is “almost infinitely malleable.”632  Strauss defines the pre-rational 
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humans that Rousseau depicts in the state of nature as “subhuman.” 633  Strauss’s 
evaluation of Rousseau’s noble savage as a subhuman, by which he means that the 
creature in the state of nature is not yet human qua rational human says a great deal about 
Strauss’s own perspective. He adopts from the classical political philosophy the insight 
that what “distinguish[es] man from the brutes, is speech or reason or understanding.”634 
Against the historicists, who read together human nature and reason with history and 
condition the former to the latter, Strauss reads together human reason with a Socratic-
Platonic conception of human nature. Another point that Strauss makes through Rousseau 
is that Hobbes’s natural laws (i.e., rational precepts) are not rational since they are 
conditioned by a passion: fear.635 Platonic rationalism, on the other hand, holds the view 
that reason is part of our natural constitution. Strauss dismisses Hobbes’s, or modern 
mathematical (calculative) reason/logic as grounded in the passions. Historicism, 
however, remains an obstacle to Strauss’s classical understanding of human nature and 
reason, as it also claims that ancient reason is historically specific and contingent. 
At the outset of Natural Right and History, Strauss brackets the historicist 
challenge by applying the historicist logic to itself. He argues that if the historicist thesis 
is subjected to its own claim, the historicists cannot foreclose the possibility that the 
historicist outlook itself could in the future be replaced by a different paradigm, or as he 
puts in “The Living Issues of German Post-War Philosophy” a few years earlier: 
The liberation from historicism requires that historical consciousness be seen to 
be, not a self-evident premise, but a problem. And it necessarily is a historical 
problem. For historical consciousness is an opinion, or a set of opinions, which 
occurs only in a certain period. Historical consciousness is, to use the language of 
that consciousness, itself a historical phenomenon, a phenomenon which has 
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come into being and which, therefore, is bound to pass away again. Historical 
consciousness will be superseded by something else.636 
 
Strauss points out that the historicist claim that all knowledge is historically relative is 
contradictory, since it exempts itself from that verdict (i.e., the claim that all knowledge 
is historical is not relative to history).637 So while the historicists agree that the historicist 
thesis appeared at a particular point in history, it transcends that moment as a truth claim 
about all human consciousness — past, present, and future. This “absolute moment” or 
truth is suspended into the future, or at least until the end of human self-consciousness. 
The historicist thesis is thus predicated on a trans-historical claim, which Strauss equates 
with a philosophical truth claim; if not, it is itself one historical viewpoint among others, 
and destined to be superseded. 
This contradiction, Strauss claims, leaves the “issue” between historicism and 
non-historicist philosophy unsettled, and allows the question of natural right to remain 
“an open question.”638 Chapters three, four, five and six (on ancient and modern natural 
right), are written as if history will have liberated the world from historicism. Strauss, 
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638  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 33. Sentence in full: “If the existence and even the possibility of 
natural right must remain an open question as long as the issue between historicism and nonhistoricist 
philosophy is not settled, our most urgent need is to understand that issue” (Strauss, Natural Right and 
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however, does not prove that human nature and philosophical truths are not conditioned 
by the historical horizon. In other words, he does not prove philosophically that there is 
an essence in human nature that defines human qua human, which extends across 
historical horizons and societies. Pippin has claimed that Strauss never provides such 
proof: “Strauss is not engaged in a metaphysics of nature or any account of how there 
could be historically immutable value properties in reality, and he proposes no 
epistemology that would demonstrate permanently possible, presumably noetic access to 
such properties.”639 He merely operates as if this position was valid in Natural Right and 
History (and in Persecution); however, in his 1964 seminar on Hobbes, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, Strauss explores why he thinks that a specific human ability for rational 
thought constitutes the essence of human nature. While the proof of this postulate of 
human nature is left hanging in Natural Right and History, it is nevertheless this 
understanding that serves as the basis for Socratic-Platonic natural right.  
4. 2. 3. Modern natural right and science 
In Natural Right and History, Strauss confronts one additional obstacle to his acquired 
ancient philosophical position on natural right. He writes, “The period between Hooker 
and Locke witnessed the emergence of modern natural science, of nonteleological natural 
science, and therewith the destruction of the basis of traditional natural right. The man 
who was the first to draw the consequences for natural right from this momentous change 
was Thomas Hobbes.”640 Modern science claims to have generated non-teleological 
universal timeless laws, deducted through mathematical rationality, whereas, 
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Natural right in its classic form is connected with a teleological view of the 
universe. All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which 
determines what kind of operation is good for them. In the case of man, reason is 
required for discerning these operations: reason determines what is by nature right 
with ultimate regard to man’s natural end. The teleological view of universe, of 
which the teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been 
destroyed by modern natural science.641 
 
Natural right in its classical form concerns what is just or good in light of human beings’ 
natural end. Modern science and right denies that there is such an end or orientation for 
beings and the universe. There is thus not a standard in nature to determine what is right 
or wrong. To Strauss, modern science answers why or what something is, or how it 
became that way; it does not answer why it ought to be that way. For that to occur, there 
must exist a natural end in mind against which to judge something. Strauss writes, “an 
adequate solution to this problem of natural right cannot be found” until there is a way to 
bridge the modern “dualism of a non-teleological natural science and a teleological 
science of man.”642 For natural right to exist, there must be an answer to the question of 
how the entirety of the universe is structured, or the “whole” as he also calls it. Strauss, 
however, does not offer an alternative model of the universe that would resolve this 
impasse. 
The only instance in which the whole is discussed is in a brief commentary on 
Socrates. Strauss writes that “to be” something is to be part of a whole, while at the same 
time different from other parts of a whole. The whole itself, on the other hand, has 
nothing that is different from it, but instead contains all different parts: “To understand 
the whole then means to understand all the parts of the whole or the articulation of the 
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whole.”643 In Natural Right and History, there is no articulation of the whole or of all its 
parts. Strauss defined philosophy as a quest for truth, as a way of life, or as he writes in 
“Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization”: “philosophy is 
meant — and that is the decisive point — not as a set of propositions, a teaching, or even 
a system, but as a way of life, a life animated by a peculiar passion, the philosophic 
desire, or eros; it is not understood as an instrument or a department of human self-
realization.”644 This has led Tanguay to categorize Strauss’s philosophy as “zetetic” — 
meaning that “philosophy is not wisdom but the quest for wisdom, it cannot settle the 
fundamental problems beyond appeal.”645 As Tanguay explains, philosophy is possible if 
there are permanent questions; natural law, however, is only possible if there are 
permanent answers to the permanent questions (i.e., knowledge of all the parts or the 
whole): “The possibility of philosophy is [therefore] only the necessary and not the 
sufficient condition for natural right.”646 Strauss does not prove that ancient natural right 
exists, and that for Strauss natural right remains a philosophical problem. In Strauss’s 
words: “Therefore, the right way of life cannot be established metaphysically except by a 
completed metaphysics, and therefore the right way of life remains questionable.”647 
Instead, Strauss proceeds with the Socratic-Platonic view that human beings by nature are 
rational animals and have natural ends. He does not claim, however, that the universe is 
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structured according to rational laws. The only thing that Strauss takes as certain, and 
accepts as a priori is that the human animal is the rational animal, and that some 
individuals have a higher cognitive ability than others. It is on these premises that he 
builds an ancient natural right.  
4. 2. 4. Ancient philosophy and Socratic-Platonic natural right 
Addressing the first need he had identified — a non-historicist understanding of non-
historicist philosophy — Strauss returns to the origin of philosophy and natural right 
prior to the rise of historicist thought. The idea of a natural right arises from the discovery 
of nature by philosophy, as that which is different from convention: “the discovery of 
nature is identical with the actualization of a human possibility which, at least according 
to its own interpretation, is trans-historical, trans-social, trans-moral, and trans-
religious.”648 Philosophy and the idea of a natural right both arise with the possibility of 
distinguishing between what exists purely by nature (physis) and what is conventional 
(nomos).649 Philosophy is the investigation of the natural “principles” of all things by 
means of human rationality. The Socratic dialectical method begins with conventional 
everyday opinions and successively, by engaging discussion with others, replaces the 
doxa with knowledge about the “natural constitution” of things.650 This understanding of 
reason is different from Hobbes’s understanding of reason as a mathematical calculation. 
The “natural constitution” is what sets humans apart from other entities in the whole. It is 
the capacity for rational thought and understanding that distinguishes humans from 
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animals (i.e., from other beings in the whole), and it is the defining feature that remains a 
permanent part of the human animal.  
One of Strauss’s two examples of how the ancients discerned the essence of a 
thing is Aristotle’s distinction between natural and artificial slavery. This example is 
telling, since Strauss, like his Aristotle, holds the view that different humans have 
qualitatively different rational capacities. Strauss is primarily concerned with the 
difference between the few able philosophers and the many less capable. For Aristotle to 
make the distinction between who is by nature a slave and who is not, he must first have 
considered “man’s natural constitution.”651 The natural constitution, which separates 
human from other species in the whole, is the very ability that makes it possible for some 
humans to raise and pursue the question of “man’s natural constitution” in the first place: 
“that which distinguishes the human soul from the souls of the brutes, that which 
distinguish man from the brutes, is speech or reason or understanding.”652 For Strauss, as 
I showed in my discussion of esotericism above, the fact that the human animal is 
distinguished by its ability for reason is not the same as the claim that all individual 
possess reason, or at least not in equal capacity. In other words, reason not only separates 
humans from animals, it is also the attribute that separates humans from humans, and 
most importantly, the few that are capable of philosophy from the many that are not. 
In Strauss’s account, natural difference is intimately tied to the question of ancient 
natural right. He writes, “To determine what is by nature good for a man or the natural 
human good, one must determine what the nature of man, or man’s natural constitution, 
is. It is the hierarchic order of man’s natural constitution which supplies the basis for 
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natural right as the classics understood it.”653 The Socratic-Platonic natural right doctrine 
aims at the actualization of the highest good in all of human nature. Through the use of 
reason, the Socratic-Platonic tradition arrives at the insight that the highest human end is 
the rational pursuit of wisdom. The fact that not all individuals are equally equipped to 
pursue wisdom, affects the way in which duties and rights should be distributed: 
since the classics viewed moral and political matters in the light of man’s 
perfection, they were not egalitarians. Not all men are equally equipped by nature 
for progress toward perfection, or not all ‘natures’ are ‘good natures’. While all 
men, i.e., all normal men, have the capacity for virtue, some need guidance by 
others, whereas others do not at all or to a much lesser degree. […] Since men are 
then unequal in regard to human perfection, i.e., in the decisive respect, equal 
rights for all appeared to the classics as most unjust. They contended that some 
men are by nature superior to others and therefore, according to natural right, the 
rulers of others.654 
 
According to Socratic-Platonic law, rights should be distributed in accordance to each 
individual’s natural capacities. Strauss identifies an ancient egalitarian and hedonistic 
tradition that pre-shadowed Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine. This egalitarian pre-
Socratic right doctrine opposes the idea of a gradation in human nature, and for this 
reason, Strauss argues, “pre-Socratic natural right” is “rejected” by the “Socratic,” or 
“classical,” natural law tradition. 655  Strauss thus criticizes the egalitarian basis of 
Hobbes’s natural right before he arrives at the chapter on Hobbes and modern natural 
right. 
Contrary to the pre-Socratic egalitarian natural law, classical natural law holds 
that society should be structured to enable the highest good of the community:  
The good life is the perfection of man’s nature. It is the life according to nature. 
One may therefore call the rules circumscribing the general character of the good 
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life ‘the natural law.’ The life according to nature is the life of human excellence 
or virtue, the life of a ‘high-class person,’ and not the life of pleasure as 
pleasure.656  
 
At the end of chapter four, Strauss makes a distinction between the Aristotelian and 
Socratic-Platonic natural right over the relation between natural right and the laws of 
society. Strauss follows Socrates in believing that justice is one thing for philosophers 
and something else for the city. This position — and one he argues is shared by Jewish 
and Islamic medieval rationalists — holds that there is a difference,  “between the justice 
of natural right, which is independent of law, and the justice of the city, which is of 
necessity dependent on law.”657 The Aristotelians disagree; for them, “there is no 
fundamental disproportion between natural right and the requirements of political 
society.”658 Strauss adheres to what he understands as the Socratic-Platonic distinction, 
which is shown in the way he employs the words “justice” and “just” in the relevant 
sections of Natural Right and History. Justice is used in respect to the moral law of the 
city, and if good, it permits for the cultivation of natural excellence overall. The just, 
according to nature, is the cultivation of the highest of the human attributes/virtues — 
wisdom. The just or good life according to nature is the life of the philosopher. 659 Natural 
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law should enable the highest good of the community, the life of the philosopher, as well 
as the rule of the wise: “The classical natural right doctrine in its original form, if fully 
developed, is identical with the doctrine of the best regime.”660 The contemplative life is 
the highest human activity/end according to Strauss’s ancient view of human nature and 
thus the supreme title to rule, which corresponds to the best regime—the rule of the wise. 
4. 2. 5. Hobbes’s philosophy  
Up to this point, I have unpacked Strauss’s conception of classical or Platonic-Socratic 
natural right, to be used as the criterion against which Strauss assesses Hobbes’s natural 
and political philosophy. Earlier, we saw that Hobbes figures as the counterpoint to 
Strauss’s own position on human reason and esotericism; now we shall see how this 
difference includes natural right as well.  
In part one of chapter five, “Modern Natural Right,” in Natural Right and History, 
Strauss uses Hobbes to draw the line between modern and ancient, Socratic-Platonic 
natural right. In the chapter (which in large is a reproduction “On the Spirit of Hobbes”), 
Strauss restates the “basic premises” of the ancient Socratic-Platonic natural right that he 
outlines in in chapter three and four, and against which Hobbes’s natural right is 
weighed:  
[T]he noble and the just are fundamentally distinguished from the pleasant and 
are by nature preferable to it; or, there is a natural right that is wholly independent 
of any human compact or convention; or, there is a best political order which is 
best because it is according to nature. […] The predominant tradition [the 
Socratic-Platonic] had defined natural law with a view to the end or the perfection 
of man as a rational and social animal.661 
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It is against this standard that Strauss will compare and contrast Hobbes’s modern natural 
right along the following points:   
• Social vs. a-social. Hobbes adopts the Epicurean understanding of the human 
animal as an a-social or a-political animal, in contradistinction to the 
Socratic-Platonic view of man as a social animal. 
• Hedonistic vs. noble. Hobbes favors individual bodily pleasure over noble 
ends, such as the highest societal pursuit — philosophy. The aim of Hobbes’s 
social whole is not to strive for the highest human virtue, but the preservation 
of life, and the attainment of bodily pleasures. 
• Right vs. obligation. Hobbes places individual right before obligation/duty to 
the state. This is a shift from the ancient social conception of morality, from 
the highest good to individual rights. The shift from the primacy of duty to 
right is the key mark of the doctrine Strauss defines as liberalism. 
• Teleological vs. non-teleological. Unlike Socratic-Platonic natural right, 
Hobbes’s non-teleological doctrine of rights does not strive to transcend its 
beginning or basic nature. The end or purpose (the preservation of life and 
pleasure) of the state is to secure peace. Teleological natural right is directed 
at the good — and the highest good is the pursuit of theoretical knowledge. 
Modern natural right is inferior to the Socratic-Platonic tradition, because it is 
contrary to human nature. 
• Will vs. nature. Classical Socratic-Platonic natural right is independent of 
human convention (i.e., there is right according to nature outside of human 
will), and the state should be ordered in accordance to hierarchical order in 
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human nature. Hobbes’s natural right is secured artificially by the contract and 
thus is humanly willed. 
• Best regime vs. public law/folly. Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty is the regime 
of folly vs. the best political order according to nature, the rule of the wise, or 
the most practical regime, the mixed regime, in which gentlemen rule. 
Overall, Strauss’s first account of Hobbes’s thought after the war reflects the agenda of 
renewing the quarrel between the ancient and modern. He reconsiders Hobbes’s natural 
and political philosophy as the counterpoint to his resurrection of a Socratic-Platonic 
rationality and natural right/best regime. In his persistence to show how Hobbes’s natural 
right is contrary to human nature and classical natural right, Strauss makes two 
incompatible claims: First, by turning to Hobbes’s natural philosophy, Strauss argues that 
Hobbes’s natural right is constructed as fully detached from human nature. Secondly, in 
order to show that Hobbes’s natural right is inferior to the Socratic-Platonic tradition, 
Strauss argues that the doctrine is grounded in the lowest part of human nature (passion), 
as opposed to a classical natural right, which is prescribed with the highest human end in 
mind (reason). These two mutually exclusive claims cannot be simultaneously correct. 
4. 2. 6. Hobbes’s materialist view and method 
Recall that in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss had detached Hobbes’s science 
from his political philosophy, arguing that the latter is an add-on that convoluted the real 
basis for Hobbes’s political thought (a bourgeois morality and a pre-scientific 
understanding of human nature). In Natural Right and History, Strauss seems to overturn 
his earlier view on the relation between Hobbes’s political science and natural science. 
He now introduces Hobbes’s natural right doctrine as reflective of modern natural 
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science—a non-teleological mechanistic view of the whole (the universe). Hobbes, he 
suggests, is the first philosopher to draw out the consequence of modern non-teleological 
natural science for natural right.662 
In the first of a few unexpected and contradictory turns of this essay, Strauss 
qualifies Hobbes’s natural science as not fully modern. Hobbes, he argues, adopts the 
non-teleological “materialistic-mechanistic” physics from the Democretian-Epicurean 
tradition, and his method of geometrical deduction from Plato.663 While Hobbes rejects 
Plato’s idea that the universe is ruled by divine intelligence, he agrees with Plato’s view 
that “mathematics is ‘the mother of all natural science.””664 Strauss here builds on his 
argument in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion that Hobbes’s philosophy is steeped in the 
tradition of skepticism. Hobbes, he writes, arrives at the conclusion that only 
mathematics passes the test of radical skepticism.665 That means that only what is 
deductively derived from known causes abides by the laws of mathematical certainty.666 
Strauss then suggests that Hobbes’s materialist and mechanical understanding of the 
universe cannot be substantiated, since not all the natural causes can be known. As a 
result, a rift arises between Hobbes’s mathematical method and his materialist-
mechanical conception of the universe.  
The mathematical model cannot generate reliable knowledge about the universe, 
and thus his materialist view of the universe as operating after non-teleological laws 
cannot be verified. As a consequence, Strauss concludes that Hobbes’s “notion of 
                                                
662  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 166. 
663  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 170. 
664  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 170.  
665  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 171. 
666  Recall that Hobbes arrives at these known causes or axioms, Strauss had argued in The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, through observation of self and others. 
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philosophy or science has its root in the conviction that a teleological cosmology is 
impossible and in the feeling that a [non-teleological] mechanistic cosmology fails to 
satisfy the requirement of intelligibility.”667 Thus, Strauss concludes that Hobbes has a 
“desire to be a ‘metaphysical’ materialist” (i.e., to have an understanding of the cosmos 
and human nature), but must limit himself to “‘methodical’ materialism.”668 If true to his 
mathematical method, Hobbes should have abandoned his model of a non-teleological 
materialist universe. On one hand, Hobbes’s materialist view does not allow for the 
existence of God; on the other, the limit of his method cannot foreclose the existence of 
an incorporeal mind—be it Plato’s divine mind or a single God. As Strauss adds in a 
footnote: “I cannot prove here that Hobbes was an atheist, even according to his own 
[materialist] view of atheism.”669 Nevertheless, Strauss holds onto the view that Hobbes 
was an atheist, and stresses that what was most important to Hobbes at the end of the day, 
was not his methodology, but his non-teleological view of the universe.  
What his methodical materialism allows for, however, Strauss argues, is the 
construction of an artificial universe. It is the unintelligibility of both human nature and 
the universe that becomes the precondition for an artificially constructed natural right 
doctrine. It is only in what humans make from scratch, in its entirety, that all causes can 
be known: 
                                                
667  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 176, emphasis added. 
668  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 174. 
669  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 199n 43. Strauss explains: “The discovery or invention of that 
island seemed to guarantee the possibility of a materialistic and mechanistic philosophy or science, 
without forcing one to assume a soul or mind that is irreducible to moved matter. That discovery or 
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between materialism and spiritualism. Hobbes had the earnest desire to be a ‘metaphysical’ materialist. 
But he was forced to rest satisfied with a ‘methodical’ materialism” (Strauss, Natural Right and 
History, 174-75). Hobbes’s materialist view does not allow for God: “Whatever may have been 
Hobbes's private thoughts, his natural philosophy is as atheistic as Epicurean physics” (146).  
 228 
Man can guarantee the actualization of wisdom, since wisdom is identical with 
free construction. But wisdom cannot be free construction if the universe is 
intelligible. Man can guarantee the actualization of wisdom, not in spite of, but 
because of, the fact that the universe is unintelligible. Man can be sovereign only 
because there is no cosmic support for his humanity. He can be sovereign only 
because he is absolutely a stranger in the universe.670 
 
Hobbes constructs an artificial commonwealth with mathematical precision, estranged 
from human nature and the universe as a whole. Hobbes’s doctrine of natural right 
provides this artificial island with morality and order. 
4. 2. 7. Hobbes’s modern natural right 
Strauss introduces Hobbes as the founder of modern natural right (and by extension, as 
we shall in the section below, liberalism), but new to his account in Natural Right and 
History that Machiavelli has replaced Hobbes as the first modern philosopher. Due to his 
discovery of the esoteric dimension of Machiavelli’s Discourses, Strauss re-evaluates his 
earlier take on Machiavelli: “Classical political philosophy had taken its bearing by how 
man ought to live”; Machiavelli, on the other hand, maintains that “the correct way of 
answering the question of the right order of society consists in taking one’s bearing by 
how men actually do live.”671 Machiavelli “deliberately” lowers the goal of politics “in 
order to increase the probability of its attainment.”672 Furthermore, Strauss points out that 
for Machiavelli there is “no superhuman, no natural, support for justice.”673 Unlike 
Strauss’s medievalist who designs a religious exoteric natural law in place of a non-
existent support for justice, Machiavelli replaces “morality” with “patriotism.”674 
                                                
670  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 175. 
671  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 
672  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 
673  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 
674  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 
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Hobbes agrees with Machiavelli that ancient natural law is not applicable, and 
thus also rejects the classical tradition as “useless.” 675 However, as Tanguay points out, 
Strauss goes on to argue, Hobbes is unsatisfied with Machiavelli’s amoral patriotic 
political alternative, and tries to restore, in Strauss’s words, “the moral principle of 
philosophy, i.e., of natural law, on the plane of Machiavelli’s ‘realism.’”676 Hobbes 
“presents his novel doctrine as the first truly scientific or philosophic treatment of natural 
law; he agrees with the Socratic tradition in holding the view that political philosophy is 
concerned with natural right,” or with what is just.677 Hobbes sets out to make natural 
right applicable, which the classical natural tradition had failed to do. The way Hobbes 
does this is by separating the doctrine of natural right from the classical “idea of man’s 
perfection.”678 Or, as Strauss puts it, Hobbes “abandoned the original meaning of wisdom 
in order to guarantee the actualization of wisdom.”679 For “only if natural law can be 
deduced from how men actually live, from the most powerful forces that actually 
determine all men, or most men most of the time, can it be effectual or of practical value. 
The complete basis of natural law must be sought, not in the end of man, but in his 
beginnings,” not in his highest virtue but in his most basic nature.680 Strauss then restates 
his pre-war insight on Hobbes: “What is most powerful in most men most of the time [for 
Hobbes] is not reason but passions. Natural law will not be effectual if its principles are 
distrusted by passion or not agreeable to passion. Natural law must be deduced from the 
most powerful of all passions.”681 The view that Hobbes’s natural law is axiomatically 
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677  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 168. 
678  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 180, emphasis added. 
679  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 
680  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 180, emphasis added. 
681  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 180, emphasis added. 
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deduced out of the most powerful human passions, contradicts Strauss’s earlier 
methodological claim that Hobbes constructs his political philosophy independently of 
knowledge about human nature and the universe. Strauss makes an attempt to outwit this 
contradiction in his discussion of the fear of violent death. 
4. 2. 8. Fear of violent death 
In his brief discussion of the fear of violent death, Strauss seeks to show that Hobbes’s 
commonwealth is constructed independently of human nature: 
But the most powerful of all passions will be a natural fact, and we are not to 
assume that there is a natural support for justice or for what is human in man. Or 
is there a passion, or an object of passion, which is in a sense antinatural, which 
marks the point of indifference between the natural and the nonnatural, which is, 
as it were, the status evanescendi of nature and therefore a possible origin for the 
conquest of nature or for freedom? The most powerful of all passions is the fear 
of death and, more particularly, the fear of violent death at the hands of others: 
not nature but ‘that terrible enemy of nature, death’... 682 
 
Despite the effort, Strauss cannot avoid the objection that fear — whether it takes as its 
object violent death, or something else — is still a human passion and considered a part 
of human nature. He says as much himself in the chapter.  
Strauss also uses fear of violent death to show how Hobbes’s natural right is 
different from Socratic-Platonic teleological natural right. “Premature death,” Strauss 
notes, is to be “avoided” at all cost, and thus death “supplies the ultimate guidance. Death 
takes the place of the telos.”683 In Hobbes’s non-teleological natural right doctrine, there 
is no progression from the lower to the higher, but the beginning/premises of natural right 
coincide with the end (i.e., violent death is avoided by what the social contract aims at, is 
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formed to establish, which is civil peace). Ancient natural right, on the contrary, strives to 
perfect the condition of its existence, turning reason into wisdom. 
An insight thus shared between “Notes on Hobbes,” The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes and Natural Right and History, is that it is the fear of violent death that brings 
man to reason, to the rational decision to enter a covenant, and establish natural law. In 
line with this view, Strauss stresses, just as he had before the war, that reason is 
“impotent” on its own, but can become “omnipotent” in collaboration with the strongest 
of passions, and from this concludes: “the strongest passion [fear of violent death] is the 
most rational passion.”684 Hobbes breaks with Platonic-Socratic natural right in that he 
deduces natural right and reason from human passion: “Man can guarantee the 
actualization of the right social order because he is able to conquer human nature by 
understanding and manipulating the mechanism of the passion.”685 Not only does Strauss 
suggest in this sentence that the passions are part of human nature, but also that human 
passion is “understood,” which contradicts Strauss’s claim that, in accordance with 
Hobbes’s methodology, the universe and human nature are unintelligible and that the 
very construction of Hobbes’s natural right doctrine is predicated on it being artificially 
conjured out of thin air. The reason for this is that Strauss wants to use fear of violent 
death to support his argument that Hobbes breaks with ancient natural right on three 
mutually exclusive grounds: (i) Hobbes’s artificial state is estranged from human nature; 
(ii) the social contract is constructed by appeal to the lowest in human nature (passions); 
(iii) the end of modern natural right mirrors the baseness of its beginning. This 
contradiction reveals Strauss’s extra-textual motive to show that Hobbes’s modern non-
                                                
684  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 201. 
685  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 194. 
 232 
teleological conception of the universe is methodologically unfounded, and that Hobbes’s 
natural right is estranged from human nature, or at best, built around what classical 
natural right considered the lowest in human nature. 
4. 2. 9. Vanity 
Recall from chapter three that, in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss introduces 
fear of violent death as the antithesis to vanity (as the only passion that tames vanity), and 
that which defines the consciousness of the bourgeoisie. He makes the distinction 
between human and animal by an appeal to human vanity, which unlike animal desire, he 
argues, is infinite, irrational and self-originating. This is contrary to Strauss’s later 
adoption of the classical tradition’s view that it is the faculty of reason that defines 
human qua human. Strauss tacitly moves away from his earlier position, as he no longer 
points to vanity as the innate primordial desire that defines the human animal and marks 
humans, unlike animals, as non-innocent and evil by nature.   
The only time Strauss mentions vanity in the part on Hobbes in Natural Right and 
History — he returns to the nature of vanity in the section on Rousseau, which I will 
discuss at length in the next chapter — is when he describes it not as evil, but in 
accordance with his adoption of ancient virtue ethics, as a “vice”:  
If virtue is identified with peaceableness, vice will become identical with that 
habit or that passion which is per se incompatible with peace because it 
essentially and, as it were, of set purpose issues in offending others: vice becomes 
identical for all practical purposes with pride or vanity or amour-propre rather 
than with dissoluteness or weakness of the soul.686 
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 The philosophical explanation for Strauss’s revaluation of vanity is his adoption of 
Socratic-Platonic philosophy, its definition of the human animal as the rational animal, 
and its separation of philosophy from morality. The political explanation for it is that 
Strauss no longer sought a moral ontological foundation (i.e., human nature being by 
nature evil) for a non-liberal regime (i.e., a right-wing authoritarian regime). Instead, as 
will be discussed in more detail below, it is with a view to rationality that Strauss 
proposes his new preferred regime.  
The question of the separation between human and animal remains at the center of 
Strauss’s philosophy. The basis for ancient natural right requires the differentiation of 
humans from other beings in the whole. As we have seen in this chapter, Strauss moves 
from his neo-Hobbesian insight that it is vanity (passion) that sets human apart from other 
animals, to the Socratic-Platonic view that it is reason that sets humans apart from other 
animals. This shift enables Strauss to argue that Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine, 
unlike the ancient tradition, is not grounded in what constitutes human qua human. 
Instead, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s “natural law must have its roots in principles which 
are anterior to reason, i.e., in passions which need not be specifically human.”687 This 
non-specific human passion (i.e., one shard with other animals) is self-preservation.  
4. 2. 10. Natural right and liberalism 
To make the case that Hobbes’s natural right doctrine is estranged from what is 
specifically human and that his natural right doctrine is the theoretical core of liberalism, 
Strauss must shift his discussion from the fear of violent death, for fear of violent death, 
like vanity, is exclusively a human passion, to self-preservation—an instinct shared with 
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animals. Identification of self-preservation as the basic human desire, as opposed to 
vanity, is what Strauss had dismissed as Hobbes’s mature scientific view in The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, and identified as that which conceals the real moral basis of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy. It is telling that Strauss does not mention in Natural Right 
and History his argument in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes that the defining mark of 
liberalism is the fear of violent death, repressing human nature (vanity), and defining the 
bourgeois consciousness. Instead, building on his argument in “Notes on Schmitt,” 
Strauss now defines liberalism, as Tanguay argues, solely as the doctrine that places 
individual rights over obligations to the state.688  Strauss argues that Hobbes made self-
preservation the one and only unconditional right. Life itself, in Strauss’s rendition of 
Hobbes in Natural Right and History, becomes the standard for morality. 
Strauss’s account of the relation between the fear of violent death and self-
preservation is far less elaborated than in his previous studies. Only one sentence 
accounts for it: “to preserve the ambiguity of Hobbes’s thought, let us say that the fear of 
violent death expresses most forcefully the most powerful and the most fundamental of 
all natural desires, the initial desire, the desire for self-preservation.”689 Strauss had 
previously tried to make Hobbes’s conception of fear of violent death square with the 
view that Hobbes attempts to construct his natural right regime as fully separated from 
human nature. After Strauss switches from the fear of violent death to self-preservation, 
he makes no such attempt. Instead, he insists, as he had in The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, that the desire for self-preservation is not uniquely human, but a passion shared 
with other animals.  
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It is from this “most powerful and the most fundamental” of all natural passions 
that natural law is derived: 
If, then, natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-preservation, if, in 
other words, the desire for self-preservation is the sole root of all justice and 
morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right; all duties are 
derivative from the fundamental and inalienable right of self-preservation. There 
are, then, no absolute or unconditional duties; duties are binding only to the extent 
to which their performance does not endanger our self-preservation. Only the 
right to self-preservation is unconditional or absolute. By nature, there exists only 
a perfect right and no perfect duty. Since the fundamental and absolute moral fact 
is a right and not a duty, the function as well as the limit of civil society must be 
defined in terms of man’s natural right and not in terms of his natural duty. The 
state has the function, not of producing or promoting a virtuous life, but of 
safeguarding the natural right of each. And the power of the state finds its 
absolute limit in that natural right and in no other moral fact.690 
 
Strauss claims that Hobbes equates the desire for self-preservation with a right to self-
preservation. This right to self-preservation is the “moral fact” and the foundation of 
natural or moral law (i.e., the rational precepts after which the commonwealth is 
ordered). The right to life is “unconditional,” and the obligations/natural laws, which 
derive from the right to life, are conditional on this right. Natural laws are all derivatives 
from the natural right to life and thus, as Tanguay points out, different from ancient 
natural law: 
By nature, there exist only a perfect right and no perfect duty. The law of nature, 
which formulates man’s natural duties, is not a law, properly speaking […] The 
moral law, in its turn, was to be greatly simplified by being deduced from the 
natural right of self-preservation. Self-preservation requires peace. The moral law 
became, therefore, the sum of rules which have to be obeyed if there is to be 
peace.691 
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Strauss points out that Hobbes is the first to subordinate natural law to natural right. The 
transference of primacy from obligations/duties to rights is what prompts Strauss to 
declare that Hobbes is the founder of liberalism:  
If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the fundamental 
political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of man and which 
identifies the function of the state with the protection or safeguarding of those 
rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism was Hobbes.”692  
 
In this key sentence — the only instance in which Strauss names “liberalism” outside of 
the introduction — he equates Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine with liberalism, on 
one hand, and, on the other, leaves open the possibility of an alternative definition of 
liberalism: “if we may call liberalism….”  
This is where the liberal rule of law tradition that Strauss had discovered while 
living in England can be thought of as a different understanding of liberalism. 693 
Furthermore, in the decades that followed Strauss would introduce a conception of 
ancient liberalism as the pursuit of intellectual/natural excellence through the cultivation 
of the mind that he thought captured in present times by liberal education or the Great 
book approach.694 In other words, in addition to modern liberalism that originates in 
Hobbes’s natural right doctrine, Strauss elsewhere speaks of both a liberal republican rule 
of law tradition, and of ancient liberalism as liberal education. Despite this, Strauss 
asserts that the theoretical core of modern liberalism is the doctrine of individual right as 
primary to obligation/state power (over the greater good of the state) and the role of the 
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state to safeguard these rights. I will return to Strauss vision of a liberal regime in the 
concluding chapter. 
4. 2. 11. The state of nature 
A significant change from Strauss’s earlier work on Hobbes is his discussion of the state 
of nature. In the previous two chapters, I pointed to the centrality of the state of nature for 
Strauss’s understanding of politics (as the mirror to Schmitt’s conception of the political) 
and for philosophy more generally (as the site upon which the “eternal nature of man” is 
examined, undisguised from liberal or modern civilization or science). In “Modern 
Natural Right” Strauss does not link the antagonism in Hobbes’s state of nature with the 
political, as he does his earlier neo-Hobbesian adaption of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political. As we will see in the next chapter, Strauss does, however, hold onto the view 
that humans are by nature vain, and that it is this peculiar human passion that results in 
political antagonism and justifies the need for a “closed society,” as opposed to the open 
society promoted by liberals and socialists. The reason behind Strauss’s temporary retreat 
from the state of nature as a window into the ontology of politics is his concern to 
classify Hobbes’s natural right as contrary to classical natural right. Strauss suggests that 
according to the ancients, who thought that the regime should approximate the natural 
order as closely as possible, the state of nature would be the state that most closely 
corresponded to the best political regime, and not, as in Hobbes, the state that is negated 
by the political regime. 
Instead, Strauss focuses on the significance of the state of nature in Hobbes’s 
natural right doctrine: “The state of nature became an essential topic of political 
philosophy only with Hobbes, who still almost apologized for employing that term. It is 
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only since Hobbes that the philosophic doctrine of natural law has been essentially a 
doctrine of the state of nature.”695 Strauss argues that Hobbes adopts the view that the 
human animal is an a-social animal from the Epicureans; Hobbes however, departs from 
the Epicureans in that he places these autonomous individuals in the state of nature. The 
Epicureans have no need for a state of nature, for they are not concerned with the 
construction of the social order. The state of nature, for Hobbes, who is concerned with 
the construction of a social order, is a device necessary in order to place the individual, 
and his unconditional natural right to life, prior to the individual’s obligation to the state: 
One could not assert the primacy of [modern] natural rights without asserting that 
the individual is in every respect prior to civil society: all rights of civil society or 
of the sovereign are derivative from rights which originally belonged to the 
individual. The individual as such, the individual regardless of his qualities […] 
had to be conceived of as essentially complete independently of civil society. This 
conception is implied in the contention that there is a state of nature which 
antedates civil society.696 
 
It is by the use of the concept of the state of nature, Strauss argues, that Hobbes can 
portray the human animal as independent of society and counter the classical primacy of 
obligation: “The [classical natural law] tradition which Hobbes opposed had assumed that 
man cannot reach the perfection of his nature except in and through civil society and, 
therefore, that civil society is prior to the individual. It was this assumption which led to 
the view that primary moral fact is duty and not rights.”697 Individuals enter society first 
to secure self-preservation (avoid violent death). Strauss concludes that Hobbes’s “state 
has the function, not of producing or promoting a virtuous life, but of safeguarding the 
natural right of each.”698  
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Additionally, Strauss suggests that the aim of Hobbesian individual, and by 
extension, the function of the state, is not only to secure self-preservation, but also, to 
secure bodily pleasure. From this, it follows that Hobbes, in Strauss words, “radically” 
redefines the classical conception of the “good life,” from the quest for the virtuous life, 
to the attainment of bodily pleasure. 699  The “good [in Hobbes’s materialism] is 
fundamentally identical with the pleasant.”700 Opposing classical virtue ethics, Hobbes 
lifts the ancient moral restraints on the basic desires, with the exception of “those 
restrictions that are required for the sake of peace.”701 Since the bodily pleasure ranks at 
the bottom of the Socratic-Platonic hierarchy of human attributes, “the basic part of the 
classical natural right teaching is the critique of hedonism.”702 
Nevertheless, Strauss argues that Hobbes is the first to bring together aspects of 
both the Epicurean and the Socratic-Platonic tradition. From the Epicureans, he takes the 
equation of the good with pleasure, and sides with the Platonic tradition insofar as his 
political philosophy is “public spirited” or “idealistic” — i.e. concerned with what 
Hobbes understands as “the best regime or the simply just social order.” 703  The 
Epicureans on the contrary, do not concern themselves with the best regime, but only 
with how to attain private gain through society, as it already exists.704 The aim of 
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Hobbes’s commonwealth is to secure life and pleasure, and thus Strauss names him the 
inventor of “political hedonism.” 705  It is no coincidence that, as Strauss writes, 
“[p]olitical atheism” and “political hedonism” were born of the same mind.706 Hobbes’s 
“philosophy as a whole may be said to be the classic example of the typically modern 
combination of political idealism with a materialistic and atheistic view of the whole.”707 
Hobbes’s commonwealth, insofar as is it secures survival and the satisfaction of desire, is 
the antithesis of Plato’s beautiful city.   
4. 2. 12. Strauss’s favored regime at the time 
Just as in the 1930s, and as I argued in chapter two and three, Strauss reads a moral 
dimension into Hobbes’s state of nature. He argues that for Hobbes there are just and 
unjust acts prior to the social contract: only acts conducive to survival are just. Since it is 
up to each individual to judge what is conducive to his or her survival, everything can be 
considered just in the state of nature. The only standard of justice that remains is thus the 
judgment of each individual; Strauss called this a “natural right of folly”: 
If everyone has by nature the right to preserve himself, he necessarily has the 
right to the means required for his self-preservation. At this point the question 
arises as to who is to be the judge of what means are required for a man's self-
preservation or as to which means are proper or right. The classics would have 
answered that the natural judge is the man of practical wisdom, and this answer 
would finally lead back to the view that the simply best regime is the absolute rule 
of the wise and the best practicable regime is the rule of gentlemen. According to 
Hobbes, however, everyone is by nature the judge of what are the right means to 
his self-preservation. For, even granting that the wise man is, in principle, a better 
judge, he is much less concerned with the self-preservation of a given fool than is 
the fool himself. But if everyone, however foolish, is by nature the judge of what 
is required for his self-preservation, everything may legitimately be regarded as 
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required for self-preservation: everything is by nature just. We may speak of a 
natural right of folly.708 
 
Hobbes’s Sovereign is thus not sovereign because of his theoretical or practical wisdom, 
but because his authority is formed by the decision of each individual to agree to the 
covenant as to secure their self-preservation.709 The “laws are laws,” Strauss writes, 
because of the authority given to the Sovereign by each individual. Hobbes’s principle for 
rule is thus not wisdom (based on nature), but authority (based on individual will or 
folly). The shift from the primacy of obligation to right, Strauss points out, is also a shift 
from the natural order to human will. In classical natural law, nature is independent of 
human will:  
If the only unconditional moral fact is the natural right of each to his self-
preservation, and therefore all obligations to others arise from contract, justice 
becomes identical with the habit of fulfilling one's contracts. Justice no longer 
consists in complying with standards that are independent of human will. All 
material principles of justice — the rules of commutative and distributive justice 
or of the Second Table of the Decalogue — cease to have intrinsic validity. All 
material obligations arise from the agreement of the contractors, and therefore in 
practice from the will of the sovereign. For the contract that makes possible all 
other contracts is the social contract or the contract of subjection to the 
sovereign.710 
 
It is out of the principle of survival that Hobbes deduces a natural law that fully reflects 
that moral fact. Strauss differentiates between a moral fact and justice in Hobbes. In 
Strauss’s account, for Hobbes, preservation of life is that which provided the moral 
foundation; justice is observing the social contract. 
                                                
708  Strauss, Natural Right and History, 185-86; see Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An intellectual Biography, 107. 
709  Consent then becomes the only source of legitimacy and wisdom is dismissed. Consent is made truly 
effective through the submission of individual wills to the sovereign. Will takes the place of reason in 
legitimizing the political order: the sovereign is not sovereign because he is deemed to be reasonable, 
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Strauss then argues that Hobbes’s proposed commonwealth is constructed to hold 
under all times and circumstances. He speaks of Hobbes’s theory as a “natural public law 
regime” that forecloses any difference between “political theory” and “statesmanship.”711  
Classical political philosophy had recognized the difference between the best 
regime and legitimate regimes. It asserted, therefore, a variety of types of 
legitimate regimes; that is, what type of regime is legitimate in given 
circumstances depends on the circumstances. Natural public law, on the other 
hand, is concerned with that right social order whose actualization is possible 
under all circumstances. It therefore tries to delineate that social order that can 
claim to be legitimate or just in all cases, regardless of the circumstances. Natural 
public law, we may say, replaces the idea of the best regime, which does not 
supply, and is not meant to supply, an answer to the question of what is the just 
order here and now, by the idea of the just social order which answers the basic 
practical question once and for all, i.e., regardless of place and time. Natural 
public law intends to give such a universally valid solution to the political 
problem as is meant to be universally applicable in practice. In other words, 
whereas, according to the classics, political theory proper is essentially in need of 
being supplemented by the practical wisdom of the statesman on the spot, the new 
type of political theory solves, as such, the crucial practical problem: the problem 
of what order is just here and now. In the decisive respect, then, there is no longer 
any need for statesmanship as distinguished from political theory. We may call 
this type of thinking ‘doctrinarism’.712 
 
The natural public law tradition that grows out of Hobbes’s philosophy leaves little 
flexibility to the governing statesmen. For this reason, Strauss writes, Hobbes lowers the 
standards for politics: “Hobbes's teaching on sovereignty in particular […] implies the 
denial of the possibility of distinguishing between good and bad regimes (kingship and 
tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, democracy and ochlocracy) as well as of the 
possibility of mixed regimes and "rule of law.” 713 “Accordingly,” those who follow 
Hobbes in the public law tradition, “deliberately lower the goal of politics; they are no 
longer concerned with having a clear view of the highest political possibility with regard 
to which all actual political orders can be judged in a responsible manner. […] The 
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‘natural public law’ school replaced ‘the best regime’ by ‘legitimate government.’”714 
Hobbes natural public law makes rules to apply under all circumstances and thus “natural 
law becomes independent of the best regime and takes precedence over it.”715   
According to the classical natural law tradition, the best regime according to 
nature is the “rule of [wise] men;” however, Strauss notes, such rule is highly unlikely. In 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss charges Hobbes with having made the 
likelihood of the rule of the wise ever more difficult in present/modern times by denying 
the natural gradation of intelligence—the many would hardly be convinced of the virtue 
of the intellectual superior few. The reason for this is that a regime ruled by the wise 
requires that the inferior “recognize” the “superiority” of those fit to “rule,” which is all 
good in theory; but in practice, the few run into trouble trying to convince the many 
ignorant why they are entitled to rule.716 The rule of the wise easily falls into despotism 
since a tyrant is better equipped than the wise to convince the many vulgar of his right to 
rule and will thus easily topple the rule of the wise.717 In On Tyranny, published the year 
before he delivered his lecture on Hobbes, Strauss compares tyrannical teaching or the 
rule of the wise with the rule by law: 
The ‘tyrannical’ teaching, we shall answer, serves the purpose, not of solving the 
problem of the best political order, but of bringing to light the nature of political 
things. The ‘theoretical’ thesis which favors beneficent tyranny is indispensable in 
order to make clear a crucial implication of the practically and hence theoretically 
true thesis which favors rule of law and legitimate government. The ‘theoretical 
thesis’ is a most striking expression of the problem, or of the problematic 
character, of law and legitimacy: legal justice is a justice which is imperfect and 
more or less blind, and legitimate government is not necessarily ‘good 
government’ and almost certainly will not be government by the wise. Law and 
legitimacy are problematic from the highest point of view, namely, from that of 
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wisdom. […] We have stated that according to that teaching beneficent tyranny is 
theoretically superior and practically inferior to rule of laws and legitimate 
government.718   
 
The rule of law is preferable to the rule of the wise as it restrict the actions of the unwise: 
“We have stated that according to that teaching beneficent tyranny is theoretically 
superior and practically inferior to rule of laws and legitimate government.”719 The rule 
of law is inferior from the perspective if wisdom — from the perspective of the 
philosopher. This problem, Strauss writes, results in that “the classical natural right 
teaching […] culminate in a twofold answer to the question of the best regime: the simply 
best regime would be the absolute rule of the wise; the practically best regime is the rule, 
under law, of gentlemen, or the mixed regime:”720  
The classics devised or recommended various institutions which appeared to be 
conducive to the rule of the best. Probably the most influential suggestion was the 
mixed regime, mixed of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. In the mixed 
regime the aristocratic element — the gravity of the senate — occupies the 
intermediate, i.e., the central or key position. The mixed regime is, in fact — and 
it is meant to be — an aristocracy which is strengthened and protected by the 
admixture of monarchic and democratic institutions.721 
 
Is the mixed regime translatable into the modern regime of Strauss’s adopted country, 
Unites States, or a liberal constitutional regime in general? If we begin with the 
aristocratic and democratic element, is it possible that Strauss saw the Senate as the 
aristocratic institution, in the presidency, Kingship, and viewed the House as an 
institution closer to the people, as the democratic element in a mixed regime. Or is the 
democratic element simply that the sovereignty is supposedly vested in the people insofar 
as there are free public elections on a regular basis?  
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This democratic element is the one thing that Strauss seems to have retained from 
Hobbes’s contract theory, namely the insight that publicly expressed consent is a 
necessary evil for a modern regime, and a way to “reconcile order which is not 
oppression with freedom which is not license.”722 Strauss writes in Natural Right and 
History that “[t]he political problem consists in reconciling the requirement for wisdom 
with the requirement for consent. But whereas, from the point of view of egalitarian 
natural right consent takes the precedence over wisdom, from the point of view of classic 
natural right, wisdom takes precedence over consent.”723 Strauss proposes a classical 
solution to this problem that fits with a constitutional regime: 
According to the classics, the best way of meeting these two entirely different 
requirements — that for wisdom and that for consent or for freedom — would be 
that a wise legislator frame a code which the citizen body, duly persuaded, freely 
adopts. The code, which is, as it were, the embodiment of wisdom, must be as 
little subjected to alterations as possible; the rule of law is to take the place of the 
rule of men, however wise.724 
 
So unlike Hobbes’s sovereign, Strauss classical answer is constitutionalism, where also 
the sovereign is subjected the law. The code or constitution is the exoteric natural law 
that the citizens duly accept. The aristocratic element of the mixed regime is secured by 
the code or constitution. Strauss seems not to support infringement on the vote here; he 
simply says that the many would freely adopt the constitution the code. Or as Strauss 
would write a few years later in “Liberal education and Responsibility”: “the gentlemen 
share power with the people in such way that the people elect the magistrate and the 
council from among the gentlemen and demand an account of them at the end of their 
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term of office.”725 However, the elected official should legislate little away from the 
constitution as originally formed by the wise. Besides theoretical wisdom, Strauss 
appeals to Aristotelian phronesis (practical wisdom) to describe the type of people, 
“gentlemen,” to implement the law that he finds more suitable than the wise: 
The administration of the law must be entrusted to a type of man who is most 
likely to administer it equitably, i.e., in the spirit of the wise legislator, or to 
‘complete’ the law according to the requirements of circumstances which the 
legislator could not have foreseen. The classics held that this type of man is the 
gentleman. The gentleman is not identical with the wise man. He is the political 
reflection, or imitation, of the wise man. Gentlemen have this in common with the 
wise man, that they ‘look down’ on many things which are highly esteemed by 
the vulgar or that they are experienced in things noble and beautiful. They differ 
from the wise because they have a noble contempt for precision, because they 
refuse to take cognizance of certain aspects of life, and because, in order to live as 
gentlemen, they must be well off.726 
 
In the American liberal democratic representative regime, the “gentlemen” are 
presumably represented by the president, members of the Senate and possibly the House, 
and officials in other state institutions, such as the judiciary. The gentlemen, in short, are 
the elected representatives and statesmen of a certain wealth.  
4. 3. 1. Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that Strauss shares with the German nihilists their 
philosophical criticism of liberal civilization. In Strauss’s view, however, the young 
German nihilists threw the baby out with the bath water; following Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Schmitt, they rejected not only modern rationality, but also ancient rationality. 
Responding to this rejection, Strauss defends classical rationalism — reconsidering 
medieval and ancient philosophy — against historicism. I have argued that Strauss’s 
discovery of both ancient esotericism and classical natural right are premised on a 
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hierarchical view of the individual’s rational capacities in particular, and overall 
capabilities in general. Hobbes appears as the counterpoint to Strauss’s Platonic-Socratic 
view of the human animals as the rational animal. Strauss begins his study of Hobbes in 
the 1920s and 1930s by coupling morality with nature. As I argue in this chapter, Strauss 
gradually moves beyond a biblical conception of good and evil. Having separated 
morality from philosophy, with an appeal to Socratic-Platonic tradition, Strauss argues 
that what sets humans apart from animals is reason, not vanity, and that it is reason that 
provides the definitive title to rule.  
The few wise cannot not secure obedience, however, as most people will not be 
persuaded by reason. Strauss suggests that the solution to this political impasse lies in the 
design of a public moral doctrine and constitution or code that can secure a social order. 
The principle for obedience remains morality; but, as I argue in my discussion of 
Strauss’s rediscovery of esotericism, the moral code for society is political rhetoric (i.e., 
an exoteric doctrine). But how then do we explain the fact that Strauss openly attacks 
modern natural right doctrine in Natural Right and History? Why can the modern or 
liberal universal individual right to life not serve as an exoteric moral doctrine in 
Strauss’s eye? Is it because Hobbes’s modern natural right results in historicism and 
moral relativism? Or is it because a regime based on the preservation of life and pleasure 
works toward inferior ends that are not reflective of the natural constitution of the human 
animal, as the rational being in the universe, with the capacity for greatness? For Strauss, 
the answer seems to be both: Strauss opposes Hobbesian, modern and liberal, egalitarian 
rights, since they are contrary to his classical understanding of human natural right. He 
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also opposes Hobbesian, modern and liberal, egalitarian rights because they resulted in 
historicism, and by extension relativism and nihilism. 
 In England, Strauss discovered a pre-modern constitutional tradition. Having 
arrived in New York, Strauss appears to support liberal constitutionalism, while still 
criticizing the liberal doctrine he argues originates in Hobbes. He defines “rational 
liberalism” as the doctrine that originates with Hobbes and places individual right over, 
and prior to duty/obligation to the state. In Natural Right and History, Strauss appears to 
sanction a mixed regime under the rule of law that was appropriate for the time in which 
he lived. This regime adjusts Hobbes’s liberal/modern natural right doctrine as the right 
of folly. It is rule by the gentlemen, but allows for the pursuit of the best—philosophy. It 
is a regime that is not defined by the expressive aim to transcend popular sovereignty on 
the one hand, or liberal constitutionalism on the other. Strauss no longer aims to move 
beyond the liberal state—at least not in the case of the United States where he lived until 
he died. 
In the concluding chapter, I will return to Strauss’s later thoughts on a liberal 
democratic regime in more detail. In the 1950s, Strauss begins to distinguish between 
modern and ancient liberalism along the lines of education, the pursuit of theoretical 
excellence or virtue he argued is a form of ancient liberalism.727 He considers philosophy 
or wisdom the highest achievement of the human collective. The life of the mind, 
however, he argues, can only be pursued by the few capable, and only their life is just and 
good according to nature. In this regard, Strauss seems to view the modern era as being 
more suitable to the perfection of virtue than ancient Greece in one respect, since he 
thought that industrialization allows more people to become educated, and the chance 
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that a potential philosopher receives an education “for which they are fitted by nature” is 
greater.728 For the attainment of the highest end, natural intelligence is in most cases not 
enough, but requires education in the great books. Strauss devoted the remaining years 
his life to this liberal education, partly to defend ancient rationalism against historicism, 
and partly to reinforce an intellectual order and rank. We shall now turn to Strauss last 
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Strauss’s Last Thoughts on Hobbes 
 
5. 0. 1. Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to examine Strauss’s final studies of Hobbes. A year after the 
publication of Natural Right and History, Strauss wrote a final longer review essay 
relating to Hobbes, which was followed, over the next ten years, by a series of seminars 
and two short book reviews directly concerned with Hobbes’s thought.729 During this 
period, Strauss lived and taught in the High Park neighborhood in Southside Chicago, 
with the exception of a couple of leaves at different universities. In Chicago, he became 
one of the main intellectuals of the neoconservative movement, which had its epicenter at 
the university — Strauss counted as his colleagues Hans Morgenthau and Friedrich 
Hayek, among others. This was the height of the Cold War, and Strauss sided strongly 
with his new home country, and the liberal capitalist west in general against the 
communist bloc. Though some of his findings on Hobbes still informed Strauss’s politics, 
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his final studies of Hobbes had to do less with his own politics and overall philosophical 
project than his earlier work. In these final studies, we find Strauss finally following the 
interpretative method that he champions after his arrival in the United States: he tries to 
understand Hobbes as Hobbes had understood himself, something that is especially 
prevalent in the seminars.  
Strauss records his final major insight into Hobbes thought in the seventh chapter 
of his 1959 book, What is Political Philosophy, entitled “On the basis of Hobbes’s 
Political Philosophy” (henceforth, “On the Basis”). This chapter was initially published 
in French translation five years earlier, as “Les fondements de la philosophie politique de 
Hobbes,” in the Parisian journal Critique.730 The English reprint in What is Political 
Philosophy includes a notable addition to the chapter’s second footnote.731 I reproduce 
the addition to the footnote in full here and dissect it in detail in part two of the chapter:  
—According to Hobbes, the only peculiarity of man’s mind which precedes the 
invention of speech, i.e., the only natural peculiarity of man’s mind, is the faculty 
of considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, as distinguished from the 
faculty of seeking the causes or means that produce “an effect imagined,” the 
latter faculty being “common to man and beast”: not “teleological” but “causal” 
thinking is peculiar to man. The reason why Hobbes transformed the traditional 
definition of man as the rational animal into the definition of man as the animal 
which can "inquire consequences" and hence which is capable of science, i.e., 
"knowledge of consequences," is that the traditional definition implies that man is 
by nature a social animal, and Hobbes must reject this implication (De Cive, I, 2). 
As a consequence the relation between man's natural peculiarity and speech 
become obscure.  On the other hand, Hobbes is able to deduce from his definition 
of man his characteristic doctrine of man: man alone can consider himself as a 
cause of possible effects, i.e., man can be aware of his power; he can be 
concerned with power; he can desire to possess power; he can seek confirmation 
for his wish to be powerful by having his power recognized by others, i.e., he can 
be vain or proud; he can be hungry with future hunger, he can anticipate future 
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dangers, he can be haunted by long-range fear. Cf. Leviathan, chs. 3 (15), 5 (27, 
29), 6 (33-36), 11 (64), and De homine X, 3.732  
 
This addition represents the first published instance of Strauss’s final thought on Hobbes. 
Strauss directs his readers to the footnote in the 1965 preface to the first German edition 
of his 1936 The Political Philosophy of Hobbes with the words: “only there did I succeed 
in laying bare the simple leading thought of Hobbes's teaching of man.”733 And five years 
later, in the 1970 preface to the seventh impression of Natural Right and History, he 
refers in particular to the footnote as that which he “wrote on the nerve of Hobbes's 
argument.”734 It is not the case, however, that Strauss intentionally withheld from his 
French readers the “leading thought of Hobbes’s teaching of man,” as he did not make his 
final discovery until 1956, two years after the publication of the original French version.   
Knowing where to look, however, is just the beginning; Strauss’s final insight on 
the nerve of Hobbes’s political philosophy is not easy to decipher. Only two scholars — 
Meier and Stauffer — have tried to do so in print. Meier, in a recent book on Machiavelli, 
refers to the extended footnote in a footnote of his own, reading the footnote in line with 
Strauss’s layers of esoteric arguments in Thoughts on Machiavelli.735 Meier argues that 
Strauss’s footnote concerns Hobbes’s critique of revealed religion in general, and 
specifically the difference between the “political” or “Napoleonic strategy” (i.e. moving 
beyond the orthodox grip on public imagination on the basis of transforming society 
politically and materially, in the absence of any philosophical critique), and Hobbes’s 
philosophical attempt to show that “Biblical revelation is against reason,” with respect to 
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the difference between natural theology and natural religion.736 In this chapter, I will give 
a detailed account of this, Strauss’s final major finding on Hobbes, for the first time and 
discuss its implications for his earlier interpretations of Hobbes.  
In the chapter that the footnote accompanies, “On the Basis of Hobbes’s Political 
Philosophy,” Strauss revisits, as the title suggests, the basis for Hobbes’s political 
thought. As I discussed in chapter three, in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss 
identifies the basis of Hobbes’s thought in the pre-natural scientific anthropological 
observation of the human passion, as informed by a bourgeois morality. In “On the 
Basis,” Strauss builds on, while also altering his understanding of the relation between 
Hobbes’s natural and political science that he previously developed in Natural Right and 
History. In that earlier work, Strauss had maintained the view that Hobbes’s natural 
scientific view of the whole (the physical universe in its entirety), however faulty, 
supports his political science (i.e., his modern natural right doctrine). In “On the Basis,” 
however, Strauss argues that the main contradictions in Hobbes’s thought (i.e. the 
incompatibility between his political theory/natural right doctrine and his account of 
human nature and behavior), arise first when Hobbes applies his natural science to the 
study of the physical nature of humans, as opposed to the physical universe as a whole. 
Strauss suggests, as he does in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, that the natural 
scientific view that human nature cannot account for the antagonistic behavior described 
in the state of nature. Instead, he upholds his argument from the 1930s that the reason 
each individual in the state of nature incessantly seeks for ever more power over others is 
vanity. And he arrives at the conclusion that Hobbes’s view of the human animal as a 
uniquely vain animal has its origin in the pre-modern philosophical view of human 
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nature, as opposed to Hobbes’s natural scientific perspective.  
This theory concerning Hobbes’s political philosophy is put into question in the 
extended footnote that accompanied the inclusion of this essay in Strauss’s 1959, What is 
Political Philosophy. Besides not knowing where to look, the absence of any 
comprehensive account of Strauss’s final insight, and consequently, no account of its 
bearing on the relation between Hobbes’s political science and natural science, is 
explained by the fact that Strauss states his final insights as conclusive statements, bereft 
of any explanation. It is therefore left for the readers of the footnote to make out Strauss’s 
comment on causal thought as best they can. The chapter that the footnote accompanies is 
of little help here. The reason for this is that Strauss arrives at the discovery two years 
after that he had completed the article, while teaching a seminar on Hobbes’s Leviathan 
at the University of Chicago.737 Unfortunately there are no existent audio recordings or 
transcripts from this seminar.  
The only other place in his published works that Strauss, refers to causal reason is 
in a short review of Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: 
From Hobbes to Locke (henceforth, “Possessive Individualism”), published in June, 
1964. In 1962, Macpherson had offered a rival and highly influential interpretation of 
Hobbes's thought. Strauss repeats the definition of causal reason in the central sentence 
around which the short review turns: “man” is “distinguished from brutes by the faculty 
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at the University of Chicago,” in Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime, ed. Kenneth 
L. Deutsch & John A. Murely (Maryland – Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 14-18).   
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of considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, and therefore by awareness of 
potentiality and power.”738 In the same section of the essay, Strauss faults Macpherson 
for not having fully accounted for Hobbes’s understanding of human nature and its 
relation to why the state of nature is a state of war. Strauss implies that these factors lead 
Macpherson, to argue that there is in Hobbes’s philosophy an implicit external cause to 
account for the antagonism in the state of nature. In his criticism of Macpherson, Strauss 
is simultaneously directing the readers’ attention to an oversight in his own earlier work 
on Hobbes, including the essay in which the footnote appears. It is an oversight amended 
by the extended footnote in What is Political Philosophy. The review was published a 
few months after Strauss concluded a winter seminar on Hobbes at the University of 
Chicago, which besides the Leviathan and selections from De Cive, included as required 
reading Macpherson’s Possessive Individualism. There exists an audio recording and a 
transcript of this seminar. 739 In the seminar, Strauss discusses at length his final insight 
that concerns Hobbes’s understanding of causal reason and vanity. 
                                                
738  Strauss, “Review,” 230. The review is short — comprising four paragraphs that address Macpherson’s 
chapter on Hobbes only. 
739  Strauss, Leo, “Winter Quarter 1964: “Seminar in Political Philosophy: Seminar on Hobbes”, University 
of Chicago. I have corrected the existing transcript after the audio recording from the time available as 
digital copies < https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/course/hobbes-leviathan-and-de-cive-winter-
quarter-1964> The seminar met twice a week for a total of eight weeks (sixteen sessions in total), 
during the winter semester of 1964. When I quote from a session, I will refer to the session by its 
number (from 1 to 16). The recording gives us the words of Strauss the teacher. He did not read from 
pre-written lectures; instead, he spoke freely from notes. He had singled out the passages to be read out 
loud beforehand, what themes to explore and explain, and which questions were to be raised. The 
participants in the seminar were mainly students; however, in attendance was also at least one 
theologian. Strauss took the opportunity to reconsider positions, and not, as he told his students on the 
first day of class, to be a “prisoner” of his own publications. Most of the seminars began with one or a 
few students presenting a paper on the assigned reading, and on a few occasions, the students were 
asked to present some time into the session. He commented on the paper, which had been submitted 
before the class, judging its merits (in terms of “good” or “very good”) and asked the presenters to 
clarify certain aspects of their case. Subsequently, Strauss turned to comment on the assigned reading. 
With the aid of a student, primarily Charles Butterworth (Today Emeritus Professor of Political 
Philosophy at Maryland University) selected passages from the assigned texts were read out loud. 
Throughout the sessions, the participants asked questions, and periodically, Strauss himself engaged the 
floor with questions. The final section of the seminars was generally devoted to question. In past 
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The other scholar who has discussed this footnote is Stauffer, who devotes a 
chapter to “On the Basis” in a recent collection of essays on What is Political 
Philosophy.740 However insightful Stauffer’s article is in outlining Strauss’s essay’s 
argument, he stops short of unpacking the final insight tucked into the extended footnote; 
Stauffer’s comment on the content of the extended footnote is brief:  
Strauss suggested that Hobbes’s very abandonment of the traditional definition of 
man as the rational animal in favor of the definition of man as the animal that can 
imagine the possible effects of potential causes was guided by the necessity, for 
Hobbes, of rejecting the implication of the traditional definition that man is a 
social animal.741  
 
As I will argue in this chapter, Stauffer is both right and wrong: right in suggesting that 
Strauss argues that Hobbes looks to the “definition of man as the animal that can imagine 
the possible effects of potential causes,” or what he called “causal reason,” in order to 
assert that man is an a-social animal; wrong in that Hobbes’s definition of the human 
animal as capable of causal reason is an abandonment of the ancient definition of humans 
as rational animals. As Strauss tells his students in 1964, “He [Hobbes] always repeated 
the traditional definition, man is a rational animal. But as we have seen, it meant 
something very different in his doctrine than what it meant in the tradition.”742 This 
different meaning of the human animal as a rational animal for Hobbes is our ability for 
causal reason; as he explains to his students, “What is peculiar to man is to consider 
things as possible causes of effects, whereas finding means for ends is common to men 
                                                                                                                                            
seminars, Strauss had, according to his own account, “devoted each seminar to a single text, and to each 
text in its entirety”, but the 1964 Hobbes seminar was different. “For some dubious reasons,” Strauss 
told his students, he “decided for the first time to deviate from that and to take two texts and not to read 
either of them in its entirety” (Strauss, Session 1). 
740  Devin Stauffer, “Leo Strauss’s ‘On the Basis of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,’” in Leo Strauss's 
Defense of the Philosophic Life: Reading What Is Political Philosophy?, ed. and introduction by Rafael 
Major (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 137-152. 
741  Stauffer, “Leo Strauss’s: ‘On the basis of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,’” 148. 
742  Strauss, Session 4. 
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and brutes. It means causal reason.”743 Strauss further suggests that power, vanity and 
fear are all derivatives of causal reason. Strauss’s reconceptualization of how Hobbes 
understands causal reason from his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1930) has “major” 
consequences for how the basis of Hobbes’s political thought is conceived. The reason 
for this is that the definition of causal reason belongs to Hobbes’s natural science, not his 
pre-scientific understanding. As a consequence, Strauss’s final insight links vanity, as 
well as power — conceived of as connected to, but also distinct from, vanity — to 
Hobbes’s natural scientific description of human nature. Strauss’s argument about the 
relation between Hobbes’s political science and his natural science is thus fundamentally 
altered. In this lengthened footnote, then, Strauss accounts for a new relation between 
Hobbes’s natural science and his political science. This is a major change in Strauss’s 
understanding of Hobbes: it rejects all previous separations of vanity from Hobbes’s 
natural science, and it reverses the causal relation between vanity and reason.  
Strauss’s response to Macpherson also prompted him to return to the question 
why mortal enmity arises in the state of nature one last time. On the first day of his 1964 
seminar, Strauss tells his class that the main contention between Macpherson and himself 
boils down to the question on which his study of Hobbes in the 1930s had turned: “What 
causes the antagonism between each individual in the state of nature?”744 Over the course 
of this semester, Strauss discusses why each individual incessantly seeks ever more 
power over others, responding to Macpherson’s competing interpretation, while also 
reconsidering his own earlier answers. In the seminar, Strauss aims to give Hobbes his 
full due, not only with respect to Macpherson’s interpretation, but also with respect to his 
                                                
743  Strauss, Session 5. 
744  Strauss, Session 1. 
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earlier writings. As he tells the students, “We must seek for more, we must begin at the 
beginning and see how it looks there.” 745 It is when he begins at the beginning that he 
uncovers his final insight on Hobbes: the discovery of causal reason. 
So, what has thus far been at stake politically in question of why the state of 
nature is a state of war of all against all? In his earlier work in the 1930s, Strauss treats 
Hobbes’s state of nature as a ground zero for politics. In chapter two, I pointed out, as 
Meier did before me, that Strauss argues that Hobbes’s state of nature in the most 
important respect is analogous to Schmitt’s conception of the political. In chapter three, I 
showed that this correlation allows Strauss to seek an answer in Hobbes’s anthropological 
view of human nature (beyond the liberal thought horizon) as to why the political 
antagonism arises in the first place. Strauss’s answer, vanity, allows him to claim that 
human beings are by nature evil, and which in turn provides Strauss with an unliberal 
moral-ontological foundation for a right-wing authoritarian theory of the state. The 
foundation for this hypothetical right-wing authoritarian regime is first conceived by 
Strauss as an alternative to liberalism and socialism, and in time, to National Socialism as 
well. In chapter four, I outlined how Strauss, in his return to Hobbes after World War II, 
steers clear of a discussion of the state of war and its causes. His extra-textual intention 
lies elsewhere during this period. Strauss’s central aim after the World War II is to show 
that Hobbes’s egalitarian modern natural right doctrine is contrary to human nature and 
the Socratic-Platonic natural right tradition. I showed how Strauss came to support liberal 
constitutionalism, while still criticizing the liberal theoretical doctrine that he argues 
originates in Hobbes.  
The quest to understand Hobbes’s philosophy in its own right becomes the 
                                                
745  Strauss, Session 1. 
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dominant goal of interpretation in his final essay and the 1964 seminar. In the former, 
“On the Basis,” Strauss makes the same claim as he had in Natural Right and History: 
that an atheist worldview is central to both Hobbes’s natural and political science. If there 
is any other major philosophical concern that Strauss indirectly touches upon in the essay, 
besides establishing beyond any doubt that Hobbes was an atheist, it is over Heidegger’s 
existentialist rejection of rationalism by making reason a prisoner of language. Polin 
argues that Hobbes makes reason/science dependent on the arbitrariness of language. 
This is something that Strauss’s reverses in his final insight on Hobbes: making the case 
that Hobbes’s ontology of human nature places reason prior to language and the 
passions—Strauss’s final discovery present Hobbes as a classical rationalist. 
5. 1. 2. Hobbes revisited 
The occasion for Strauss’s final article on Hobbes was the 1952 release of a book on 
Hobbes by the French philosopher, Raymond Polin.746 Just as in his first freestanding 
article on Hobbes two decades earlier, “Notes on Hobbes,” Strauss’s final essay on 
Hobbes, “On the Basis,” is an extensive review-essay, ostensibly on Polin’s book. In the 
beginning of “On the Basis,” Strauss suggests that the question “why should we study 
Hobbes?” implies that we “doubt whether Hobbes’s teaching is the true teaching.”747 
Having alerted the reader to the notion — one that Strauss believes in — that there is 
such a thing as a true and trans-historical teaching, he rephrases the question to primarily 
bear on his times: “Why then is Hobbes important for the present generation?”748   
In “Notes on Hobbes” published as the Weimar era came to a close, Strauss spells 
                                                
746  Raymond Polin, Politique et philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1952). 
747  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 171. 
748  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 170. 
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out (as I examined in chapter three) the political subtext of his having turned to Hobbes in 
the 1930s: to find an alternative to liberalism and socialism. In “On the Basis,” he begins 
with an account of the rehabilitation of Hobbes in the 19th and 20th century. Only after 
Nietzsche, Strauss writes, does Hobbes’s atheism become “respectable;” only after 
Nazism and communism, does Hobbes’s morality appear “decent,” and his ruler, the 
“enlightened and human King,” preferable in comparison with modern tyrants, like Hitler 
and Stalin.749 This account, however, overlooks the philosophical hazard that Strauss had 
previously exposed in Natural Right and History: that Hobbes’s modern natural right 
doctrine results in historicist relativism, of which Nazism appears as its most vulgar 
political symptom.  
In “On the Basis,” Strauss suggests that he is not alone in reassessing Hobbes in 
light of modernity’s perils:  
Modernity has progressed to the point where it has visibly become a problem. 
This is why respectable people […] turn again to a critical study of the hidden 
premises and hence the hidden origins of modernity—and therefore to a critical 
study of Hobbes. For Hobbes presents himself at first glance as the man who, for 
the first time, breaks completely with the pre-modern heritage, the man who 
ushers in a new type of social doctrine: the modern type.750  
 
The main problem with Polin’s book, Strauss notes, is that it assesses Hobbes against 
later modernity, not the ancients. As a consequence, Polin’s analysis leaves 
unacknowledged the way in which Hobbes’s “[m]odern philosophy emerged in express 
opposition to classical philosophy. Only in the light of the quarrel between the ancients 
and moderns can modernity be understood.”751 Strauss recommends his own approach in 
Natural Right and History: to study both the way Hobbes’s understands the ancient 
                                                
749  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 171. 
750  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 172. 
751  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 172. 
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tradition and classical philosophy on its own merit. Hobbes, Strauss notes critically, 
points out the deficiencies in ancient philosophy as the “lack of exactness,” and the 
overestimation of the “power of reason,” which Hobbes holds results in “anarchy.”752 It is 
anarchy — in the form of civil-religious wars — that confronts Hobbes as the political 
problem of his time. As we saw in the previous chapter, Strauss, on his end, appeals to 
ancient reason to counter German relativism and nihilism in post-war America. 
In “On the Basis,” Strauss spends little time on the ancients, but suggests that 
Hobbes does not fully break with the ancients, insofar as his account of human behavior 
in the state of nature continues to reflect a pre-modern conception of human nature. 
Strauss revisits the question of the basis of Hobbes’s thought and suggests, as he had in 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, that the contradictions in Hobbes’s thought are the 
result of having adopted a natural scientific perspective of human nature. It is Hobbes’s 
non-natural scientific conceptualization of human nature that is required for (the basis of) 
his natural right doctrine, as well as being reflected in the state of nature. Strauss, 
however, adjusts this thesis to fit with his suggestion in Natural Right and History that 
Hobbes’s natural science plays a role in his political theory. In Strauss’s final essay, there 
are thus three different meanings of natural science at play. I will discuss them in order 
and explain how they relate to Hobbes’s political theory, and also offer explanatory and 
conclusive references to Strauss’s earlier studies. I present the transition of Strauss’s 
scholarship first in diagram form before I present it in prose, as it might be helpful for the 
reader to return to the diagram as a memory-guide: 
 
 
                                                
752  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 172. 
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Strauss’s three different conceptions of Hobbes’s natural science: 
(1) The materialist and mechanical understanding of the whole physical universe. 
(2) The mathematical/analytical/deductive method. 
(3) The natural scientific understanding or “naturalistic” view of the human animal (as 
one part in the whole).  
 
The distinction between the first and third of these meanings is first introduced in “On 
the Basis”. The key question for Strauss is over the relation of these conceptions of 
natural science to Hobbes’s political theory. There are two main parts to Hobbes’s 
political theory in Strauss’s account: 
(4) The state of nature and human behavior and the passions on display therein. 
(5) The modern/liberal natural right doctrine/theory of obligation. 
 
In “Notes on Hobbes,” The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, and “On the Basis,” Strauss 
argues that the human behavior described in the state of nature does not correspond with 
the scientific description of human nature. In these three studies, Strauss argues for an 
alternative view of human nature in Hobbes’s thought that corresponds to the behavior 
in the state of nature:  
(6) The non-natural scientific description, the “humanistic interpretation,” or the ancient 
understanding of the human animal.  
 
In “Notes on Hobbes,” The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, and “On the Basis,” he 
argues that the contradiction in Hobbes’s thought is caused by the fact that (3) does not 
reflect (4) (i.e. the natural scientific view of human nature does not reflect the behavior 
and passion displayed in the state of nature that leads to war of all against all). The two 
axioms of his political theory, vanity and fear, are not compatible with the natural 
scientific view of human nature. Vanity accounts for (4) why the state of nature is a state 
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of war of all against all and fear is required to move from (4) to (5). A brief summary of 
the relations between these components in Strauss’s freestanding published work on 
Hobbes follows: 
 
- In “Notes on Hobbes” and The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936) all three 
meanings of natural science (1, 2, 3) are mainly considered as one and the same, as 
Strauss argues that Hobbes’s political philosophy is independent of natural science. 
Instead, it is (6) that informs (4) and (5) (i.e., the view of the human animal as the vain 
and fearful animal that informed Hobbes’s doctrine of the state of nature and his 
political theory of political obligation). 
 
- In “On Hobbes’s Political Philosophy” (“Modern Natural Right” in Natural Right and 
History (1949/1952), only the first two understandings (1, 2) of science are in play. 
Strauss argues that (5) reflects (1) (i.e., that Hobbes’s natural right doctrine reflects a 
non-teleological view of the universe). And that (5) is deduced by the use of (2) (i.e., 
Hobbes’s natural right doctrine is deduced by his mathematical method).  
 
- In “On the Basis” (1954), he retains the view that (5) reflects (1) (i.e., that Hobbes’s 
natural right doctrine reflects a non-teleological view of the universe). But he argues 
that (6), not (3), must inform (4 & 5) Hobbes’s political theory in order for it not to be 
contradictory. 
 
- In the final insight in What is Political Philosophy (1959) and the 1964 Seminar on 
Hobbes, Strauss suggests that (6 & 4) are in fact informed by (3) (i.e., that vanity and 
fear are derivative of Hobbes’s scientific description of the human animal as the animal 





5. 1. 3. The view of the whole natural universe 
In chapter three, I argued that Strauss, in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, advances 
the hypothesis that Hobbes’s adoption of natural science is the source behind the main 
contradictions in his work. Hobbes’s natural scientific description of human nature cannot 
account for why the state of nature is a state of war as it portrayed individuals as simply 
selfish, not peculiarly vain. In other words, Hobbes’s anthropology of the passions, on 
display in the state of nature, does not square with his natural scientific account of the 
human animal. Strauss separates Hobbes’s natural science from a pre-scientific view of 
human nature, and argues that it is the latter that constitutes the real basis for his political 
science. His pre-scientific view of the human animals as vain does explain why each 
individual engaged in a struggle for ever more power over others.  
In Natural Right and History, Strauss alters his view and suggested that Hobbes’s 
natural science plays an important role for his political science. First, he contributes to the 
argument, first articulated in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, in which Strauss places 
Hobbes in the tradition of skepticism, that only mathematics can pass the test of radical 
skepticism. The method by which Hobbes builds his edifice therefore becomes axiomatic 
logic (reason understood as a mathematical calculation). Second, Hobbes’s materialist 
view of the universe, Strauss points out, cannot pass the test of skepticism since all the 
causes of nature cannot be known. Axiomatic certainty applies only to human affairs, for 
the reason that the political order is an artificial construct built on first causes that are 
created by humans, barren of any natural segmentation, and therefore all known. If he 
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had been true to his methodology, Hobbes should have abandoned his model of a non-
teleological mechanical universe. Nevertheless, his non-teleological model of the 
universe informs Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine.  
In his final essay, “On the Basis,” Strauss reconfirms the insight from The 
Political Philosophy of Hobbes that the everyday experience of self and others is 
sufficient to build Hobbes’s political science/natural right doctrine. 753  The method 
Hobbes applies to deduce his theory of obligation is mathematically deductive, while the 
irrefutable axioms are inductively (but not systematically) established through 
observation of self and others. He points out that Polin agrees with him that the two main 
axioms on which Hobbes’s political theory is built are vanity and fear.754 The former is 
the reason why the state of nature is a state of war, the latter is its remedy. And just as in 
Natural Right and History, Strauss points out, in in his discussion of Polin’s interpretation 
of Hobbes that Hobbes’s materialistic and mechanical theory of the whole physical 
universe, in which all that exists is matter in motion, is not provable by his own method.  
In “On the Basis,” Strauss explains why this is the case, with reference to Polin’s 
discussion of the relation between language and rationality: “Hobbes radically transforms 
the traditional understanding of man as the rational animal: man is the animal which 
invents speech, and most important: ‘the faculty of reasoning [is] consequent to the use of 
speech.’”755 Reason is built on speech. Speech is based on arbitrary definitions, and 
therefore reason is relative. He also argues that since natural science is made up of words, 
                                                
753  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 180. 
754  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 192. 
755  Strauss, ‘On the Basis,” 174. Just as in Natural Right and History, the claim that Hobbes’s non-
teleological view of the natural and constructed universe is not verifiable fits Strauss’s larger political-
philosophical project (ancient vs. modern) that contests the grounds of modern philosophy as a 
reflection of a non-teleological universe (Strauss did not address the theoretical physicists and 
astronomers of his time). 
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not material bodies and, in accordance to Hobbes’s materialism, only bodies exist, 
therefore what is not corporeal, like natural science, is “‘phantastical.’” 756  The 
uncertainty over the structure of the physical universe also applies to human artificial 
constructions: “In the light of Hobbes's natural science, man and his works become a 
mere phantasmagoria.” 757  Despite Hobbes’s inability to establish comprehensive 
knowledge about the human and physical universe, Strauss nonetheless insists on what he 
concludes in Natural Right and History: Hobbes’s mechanical non-teleological model of 
the universe remained important to Hobbes’s political theory of obligation, or what 
Strauss, in Natural Right and History, refers to as the modern natural right doctrine.  
Strauss now uses an allusion to theology to explain the relation between Hobbes’s 
political science and natural science:  
While Hobbes's political science cannot be understood in the light of his natural 
science, it can also not be understood as simply independent of his natural science 
or as simply preceding it. […] The relation between his political science and his 
natural science may provisionally be compared with that between theological 
dogmatics and theological apologetics. 758  
 
What Strauss has in mind is that whereas Hobbes’s two postulates (vanity and fear) upon 
which he builds his political theory are extracted “from his [non-natural scientific] 
experience of man” and “are put forth as indubitably true”, these postulates, however, 
“must be defended against misconceptions of man which arise from vain opinions 
[religious accounts] about the whole.”759 The most important function of Hobbes’s 
natural science for his political science is the atheistic view of the universe. Hobbes’s 
natural science is thus a rational defense (this is what Strauss means by theological 
                                                
756  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 178. 
757  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 178. 
758  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 180, emphasis added. 
759  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 180. 
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apologetics) against “vain [religious] opinions of the whole.” 760  The theological 
dogmatism refers to the axioms (vanity and fear), which Strauss argues Hobbes discovers 
by direct experience, and the theory of political obligation deduced from these axioms. 
The need for a rational or theological apologetics is, in other words, due to what Hobbes 
thinks is the gravest of all problems caused by human vanity, revealed religion, as first 
discussed by Strauss in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion: “The blinding passion par 
excellence is then glory or presumption or pride. The most extreme form of pride which a 
man can have is the belief that the first cause of the whole has spoken to him.”761 
Hobbes’s natural science is thus a rational defense of his political theory against 
theological worldviews, especially those promoted by monotheistic accounts, just as 
theological apologetics provide the dogmas of the church (theological dogmatics) with a 
rational defense.  
The defense of a non-teleological and an anti-theological model of the universe, is 
also, Strauss points out, the main function of Hobbes’s exegesis of the scriptures (more 
important than Hobbes’s exegetical catering to stubborn believers to obey a civil 
Sovereign until Christ’s return): “The most important element of Hobbes's view of the 
whole is his view of the deity. Polin states without any ambiguity that Hobbes was an 
atheist. Since his thesis is by no means universally accepted, it will not be amiss if we 
indicate how it can be established.”762 Strauss devotes a good third of the essay to 
Hobbes’s critique of religion, and ends with the conclusion that “unbelief” is imperative 
for the doctrine of the state of nature on which Hobbes’s political science rests in so far 
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as the overcoming of the state of nature depends on the fear of violent death.763 In a letter 
to Strauss, Alexandre Koyré wrote: “I don’t quite understand why you took such pain to 
supplement P[olin’s] insufficient demonstration of Hobbes’ atheism. After all, nobody 
has ever doubted it, as far as I know.”764 Strauss replies:  
As for my criticism of Polin, you are mistaken if you think that no one doubted 
Hobbes’ atheism. The respectable Anglo-Saxon scholars today did hesitate to say 
that. This is a very general phenomenon. The decline of religious belief is 
accompanied by an increase in the belief of former generations. This is a kind of 
vicarious faith which I think has never been studied by the professionals in the 
field of psychology of religion.765  
 
The atheistic outlook is imperative for Hobbes’s philosophy for two reasons, the first one 
is related to the applicability of Hobbes’s political theory of the state of nature: fear of 
violent death secures obedience to a corporeal Sovereign. Only if people are convinced 
that God is dead, is it possible for the fear of a violent death to outmaneuver the fears 
generated by religious accounts of the universe. Hobbes’s scientific materialism is thus 
designed to work on two levels, as Strauss had argued since the 1930s: it is both 
demonstrative and rhetorical. The natural scientific non-teleological view of the whole 
universe is an actual fact, and if effective, provides the affective function that would 
replace rival theological doctrine and which would be required for Hobbes’s theory of 
political obligation. The atheist view of the whole, therefore, Strauss claims, is a 
prerequisite for Hobbes’s theory of natural right. The religious criticism, as he discovered 
in his uncompleted manuscript of Hobbes’s critique of religion, is not central to the inner 
logic of Hobbes’s science or political philosophy, but is historically relevant for Hobbes 
in that religion remained the obstacle that had to be countered for Hobbes’s political 
                                                
763  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 189. 
764  Letter from Alexandre Koyré to Leo Strauss, April 17, 1954. Leo Strauss Papers; Box 2, Folder 8.   
765  Letter from Leo Strauss to Alexandre Koyré, April 27, 1954. Leo Strauss Papers; Box 2, Folder 8.  
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theory of political obligation to be effective. Hobbes’s considered his theory to be 
analytically consistent without a critique of religion, but it would not be politically 
efficacious in the world if he did not confront religion’s grip on the human psyche. 
However, during Hobbes’s life, his philosophy (or enlightenment atheism) did not 
replace religion’s grip over most people, and thus he made his political theory compatible 
with an idiosyncratic exegesis of the bible and argued that the civil sovereign should be 
the head of the church as well as the commonwealth. 
5. 1. 4. Natural right and justice 
The second reason that Hobbes’s non-teleological view of the universe, which informs 
his doctrine of the state of nature, is imperative for his natural right doctrine relates to the 
question of justice: 
That teaching [on the state of nature] is the authentic link between his natural 
science and his political science: it defines the problem which political science 
has to solve by inferring from the preceding exposition of the nature of man, and 
especially of the human passions, the condition concerning felicity and misery in 
which man has been placed by nature. More specifically, the teaching about the 
state of nature is meant to clarify what the status of justice is prior to, and 
independently of, human institution, or to answer the question of whether, and to 
what extent, justice has extra-human and especially divine support. One may 
express Hobbes's answer by saying that independently of human institutions, 
justice is practically non-existent in the world: the state of nature is characterized 
by irrationality and therewith by injustice. But Hobbes has recourse to the state of 
nature in order to determine, not only the status or manner of being of justice or 
natural right, but its content or meaning as well: natural right as determined with a 
view to the condition of mere nature, is the root of all justice.766 
 
In Hobbes’s natural scientific view of the universe, which encompasses the question of 
the state of nature, there is no God, nor any other teleological or theological principle; as 
a consequence, there are no teleological or theological foundations for morality. Instead, 
as the final sentence of the above quotation suggests, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s 
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modern natural right doctrine builds on “mere nature”—the only principle that remains 
once teleological accounts of the universe are rejected.  
With mere nature Strauss has in mind the preservation of nature. The principle of 
justice is immanently derived from the principle of self-preservation:  
We have said that in Hobbes's state of nature justice is practically non-existent. 
This does not mean that it is simply non-existent in the state of nature: the root of 
justice must be found in the state of nature, and it reveals itself with perfect clarity 
only in the state of nature. The root of justice is the right of nature, a ‘subjective’ 
natural right.767  
 
What is by nature just is the preservation of life. Just as in all his previous studies, Strauss 
adds that the right to self-preservation implies the liberty to undertake whatever actions 
individuals see fit to preserve their life. He repeats his insight from Natural Right and 
History that the right is “subjective,” or that of “folly,” in that each individual is the sole 
and highest authority to judge what means are required for survival.  
Nevertheless, as in his earlier studies, Strauss suggests that there is a moral 
distinction at play in Hobbes’s definition of freedom/right and the state of nature: just 
acts are rooted in self-preservation (or otherwise stated, the fear of a violent death), and 
unjust acts are rooted in vanity. Polin, he points out, shares his view:  
Man has the natural power to act in the spirit of fear of violent death, i.e., of 
concern with his self-preservation, and he has the natural power to act in the spirit 
of glory, i.e., of concern with the gratification of his vanity. Yet, as Polin noted, 
fear is always legitimate, whereas glory is not. Fear is the natural root of justice 
and glory is the natural root of injustice. Unlike Spinoza, Hobbes does distinguish 
between what is natural and what is by nature right.768  
 
The principle of survival is translated into a moral right. Strauss thereby reaffirms the 
interpretation he introduced in the 1930s, which reads liberal or bourgeois’ morality back 
into Hobbes’s Godless and non-teleological state of nature. 
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It is on this indefeasible right to self-preservation — and this right alone — that 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty is based. Strauss suggests, as he had in the exchange with 
Schmitt, that Hobbes makes sovereignty (sovereign power sanctioned by the citizens) 
derivative of the individual’s indefeasible right to life. Citizens agree to obey a 
Sovereign, and hand over their right to act in whatever manner they seem fit, since their 
unlimited freedom results in a solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short life. The logical 
contradiction in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty arises from the fact that, on the matter of 
state security (internal and external — sending citizens to war, or punishing citizens with 
death), the absolute sovereign’s power stands in conflict with, and is limited by, the 
natural right of citizens to preserve their life:  
According to Hobbes, the rights of sovereignty, which are natural rights of a 
certain kind are derivative from the laws of nature, and the laws of nature in their 
turn are derivative from the right of nature: without the right of nature there are no 
rights of sovereignty. The right of nature, being the right of every individual, 
antedates civil society and determines the purpose of civil society. More than that: 
the fundamental right of nature persists within civil society, so much so that 
whereas the right of the sovereign is defeasible, the fundamental right of the 
individual is indefeasible.769  
 
The fact that the natural right to life is “indefeasible,” whereas the power of the 
Sovereign — due to its being conditioned by this right — is “defeasible,” results in the 
conflict between the liberal right of the individual and the Sovereign’s exercise of power.  
Following this line of argument, Strauss concludes his final essay with an insight 
he first introduced in “Notes on Hobbes”: Hobbes unsuccessfully tries to circumvent the 
natural right limit on Sovereign power by introducing justice in the second law of nature 
(it is unjust to break the contract). So, despite Hobbes’s insistence that it is citizens alone 
who form, and are bound by the covenant (thus excluding the Sovereign from the 
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contract and its bound), Strauss argues that the Sovereign’s power is nonetheless 
potentially limited by, or in conflict with, each individual’s indefeasible right to life for 
which protection they formed a civil society. Strauss argues that Hobbes is the first 
liberal in that he bases the political contract on an indefeasible individual right to life. It 
is thus with the criticism that he had thrown at Schmitt in the 1930s, now directed at 
Polin, that Strauss ends his final essay on Hobbes.  
Strauss thus holds on to his insight from the Weimar era that Hobbes founds the 
bourgeois doctrine of rights — or what in Natural Right and History he calls modern 
natural right — which undermines the authority of the state. To make the state 
conditional on each individual’s right to life remains a mistake in Strauss’s eyes for two 
reasons: first, Hobbes’s non-natural scientific view of human nature as vain and nasty 
proves the need of a coercive state, not its dissolution (I will return to this point below). 
Second, it lowers the quest for human excellence. With respect to the second, recall that 
in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss argues that it is out of his dissatisfaction 
with ancient rationalistic and moral philosophy’s failure to secure obligation that Hobbes 
turns to the study of history, but that Hobbes returns to philosophy or political science 
subsequent to this when he discovers unchanging principles among the human passions, 
upon which he could deductively construct a theory of political obligation that secures 
peace under all conditions, including the most extreme. In Natural Right and History, 
Strauss adds to this analysis the idea that the attainment of this result comes at the 
expense of human perfection. Hobbes, Strauss suggests, follows Machiavelli in lowering 
the standards of what to ask from citizens, and what kind of regime is possible.  
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5. 1. 5. The natural scientific understanding of the individual 
As I pointed above, in “On the Basis,” Strauss restates this insight from Natural Right 
and History that Hobbes’s natural science (both his non-teleological mechanistic view of 
the universe and his mathematical deductive/analytical method) plays an important role 
for his political theory. Nevertheless, Strauss insists that a student of Hobbes must choose 
either to “understand Hobbes's political science by itself or he is going to understand it in 
the light of Hobbes’s natural science.”770 How do we explain this blatant contradiction 
between Strauss’s statements that Hobbes’s natural science stands in relation to his 
political theory as “theological dogmatics” to “theological apologetics,” and the claim 
that we must understand Hobbes’s political theory independently of his natural science?  
I will suggest that this contradiction is resolved when we realize that what Strauss 
has in mind when he speaks of natural science as incompatible with his political theory is 
Hobbes’s natural scientific theory of human nature only (as one part in the whole), and 
not the whole physical universe, or the mathematical model of deduction that he applies 
in his political theory. The contradiction between Hobbes’s natural science and his 
political science arises first when the scientific view of the whole includes under its 
purview human nature. In other words, human nature must be exempted from the natural 
scientific worldview for his political theory to hold. Strauss tells his students in 1964 that 
the “fundamental difficulty,” in coming to grip with Hobbes’s thought, “concerns his 
[Hobbes] definition of man.”771 The main contradiction in Hobbes was due to the fact 
that Hobbes fluctuated between two contradictory views of human nature: the modern 
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natural scientific perspective and the phenomenological view based on self-experience 
and on display in the state of nature. 
It is these two contradictory views of human nature that Strauss has in mind when 
he faults Polin for not providing an explanation as to why Hobbes never gave a non-
contradictory “account of his teaching.”772  Strauss does, however, credit Polin for 
displaying the ambiguities in Hobbes’s thought as it helps someone else to fit together the 
last pieces of the puzzle. There is one open slot but two pieces remaining, and only one 
fits. The two pieces are Hobbes’s two different views on human nature, the natural 
scientific or “naturalistic” view and the non-natural scientific or “humanistic 
interpretation” of human nature.773 The natural scientific piece does not fit the puzzle 
according to Strauss, which is to say, Hobbes’s political theory does not square off with 
the natural scientific view of human nature. The reason being that Hobbes’s theory of 
political obligation stands or falls with the insight that the human animal is a distinctively 
proud creature. This explains how Strauss can, on one hand, suggest that the natural 
scientific view of the whole physical universe stands in relation to Hobbes’s political 
theory as “theological dogmatics” stands in relation to “theological apologetics,” and, on 
the other hand, how the scientific understanding contradicts his political science. Hobbes 
does not fully free himself from a pre-modern view of human nature, or from his 
conviction that it is this view that forms the real basis of his political philosophy. This 
latter claim is investigated at length in a class Strauss gave on Hobbes in the winter 
semester of 1964, in which he discusses Macpherson’s alternative account of why the 
state of nature is a state of war. 
                                                
772  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 174. 
773  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 177. 
 275 
5. 1. 6. Macpherson and social assumptions 
In addition to the Leviathan and selections from the De Cive, Strauss assigned 
Macpherson’s book Possessive Individualism as a required text in his 1964 seminar on 
Hobbes. In Possessive Individualism, Macpherson engages Strauss’s work on Hobbes, 
and follows Strauss in arguing that antagonism in the state of nature cannot be deduced 
from Hobbes’s natural scientific description of human nature, but rather offers a rival 
explanation as to why the state of nature is a state of war. The cause behind the 
antagonism in the state of nature is not accounted for in Hobbes’s philosophy, but reflects 
Hobbes’s unstated assumptions about the social structure of the time, which Hobbes 
reads into the state of nature. Contrary to Strauss, Macpherson insists that the denizens of 
nature was not motivated by eternal principles of human nature. Rather, Macpherson sees 
Hobbes’s “natural man” as a social construction, the historical product of bourgeois 
market society. Macpherson’s contextual interpretation prompts Strauss to revisit the 
question of what causes the state of nature, as well as the question of his own conception 
of vanity.  
I pointed out in the previous chapter that Strauss becomes foremost a textualist in 
his approach to the study of political philosophy when he returns to Hobbes after World 
War II. By the time Strauss addresses Macpherson’s work, then, the two represent stark 
interpretive alternatives in their respective approaches to Hobbes. While Macpherson 
draws mostly from Strauss’s argument in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, he 
confuses the method of that book (in which Strauss had contextualized/historicized 
Hobbes’s thought) with Strauss’s textual approach in his later work — specifically, in On 
Tyranny and Natural Right and History. This is evident from Macpherson’s claim that 
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Strauss and his different accounts of why the state of nature is a state of war reflect their 
rival methods of interpretation. Strauss told the students:  
he [Macpherson] says in his “Introduction” [to Possessive Individualism], that the 
alternatives are these: Either we admit that the great political theories are based on 
social assumptions, on assumption in which the orders are not necessarily 
available, or the way in which I proceed. In other words, assuming in the case of 
great men and powerful minds that the contradictions are deliberate.774 
  
As I have shown in the previous chapters, what Strauss identifies as the main 
contradiction in Hobbes’s doctrine — that between his natural scientific description of 
human nature and human behavior in the state of nature — is not a contradiction by 
design (i.e., due to esoteric considerations).  
Recall that in chapter four, I showed that Strauss’s believes that Hobbes writes 
esoterically about religion only, but that it is not prudence due to church power that lies 
behind the main contradiction in Hobbes’s doctrine. Strauss indicates this much to his 
students early in the semester: “I would only say that there are surely in the case of 
Hobbes also contradictions which cannot be explained as deliberate concealments, and of 
which it is at least an open question for me whether they can be explained only by 
reference to the social assumptions which he [Macpherson] has made.”775 So, while 
Strauss agrees with Macpherson’s description of the different interpretative schools that 
Strauss and Macpherson championed, with regard to Hobbes’s doctrine, the key 
contradictions are not due to esotericism. Nor does Strauss think that they are due to 
social assumptions, as Macpherson suggests. Just as in The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, and “On the Basis,” Strauss tells his students that the contradictions in Hobbes’s 
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thought are due to the fact that Hobbes puts forth a modern natural scientific view of 
human nature that contradicts the view of the behavior on display in the state of nature.  
Contrary to his own dismissal of Hobbes’s natural scientific view of human 
nature, Strauss points out that Macpherson finds Hobbes’s natural scientific view of 
human nature to be a good description, at the same time that Macpherson agrees with 
Strauss that this natural scientific view of human nature is not sufficient to explain why 
each individual seeks ever more power over others in the state of nature. Strauss explains 
Macpherson’s position to his students: 
If we take Hobbes’ [natural scientific] definition of man, self-directing and self-
moving animal, this has one crucial implication. Man is radically selfish, by 
nature. His concern for others is due either to calculation or to such fundamentally 
selfish things as luck, or of course coercion, but there is no natural impulse 
towards that. But, and I try now to state the case for Macpherson as strongly as I 
can, that men are by nature selfish does not yet mean that they are by nature 
antagonistic. In other words, if they are selfish, then in case of any complications, 
they will of course get nasty to the other fellow, but they have not a basic 
nastiness in themselves.”776  
 
Or as he put it “On the Basis” a few months after the end of the seminar: “If Hobbesian 
men are indeed nothing but ‘self-moving and self-directing appetitive machines,’ one 
does not see why they should be by nature in a state of war of everybody against 
everybody.”777 Strauss agrees that the antagonism in the state of nature cannot be 
explained by Hobbes’s natural scientific description of human nature, or the least the way 
as Macpherson defines it; he nevertheless disagrees with Macpherson about how to 
explain it. As Strauss addresses the matter to his seminar, 
If we assume with Macpherson that the physiological model as he calls it is a 
model of a self-moving and self-directed being – man is by nature a self-moving 
and self-directed being – there is no reason on earth why they should be by nature 
in a war of everybody against everybody, why they should be by nature 
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antagonistic to each other. That is a good question. This part of the argument — if 
the premise is correct, if this is Hobbes’ physiological model, i.e., if this is 
Hobbes’ view of human nature, that he is a self-directed and self-moving animal. 
The antagonism, the natural antagonism, between men, this needs to be explained, 
and according to Macpherson does not follow from Hobbes’ psychological or 
whatever you call it, premise. And then he says, where did the antagonism come 
in?  By a great penetrating look at the market society.778  
 
Macpherson adopts Strauss’s view from The Political Philosophy of Hobbes that 17th 
century England was capitalist, and that market competition had permeated Britain in the 
17th century to the extent that it had become the dominant way in which labor was 
allocated. Market competition that was reflected in the state of nature. Strauss reiterates 
“Macpherson’s general thesis” to his students:  
The fundamental syllogism of Hobbes has two premises […] The major premise 
concerns man’s nature and as he says, man is a self-moving and self-directing 
animal, and then this would lead to the consequence that men are selfish by 
nature, but it would not lead to the consequence that they are antagonistic. The 
antagonism comes in through a minor premise, which states that society of men 
has necessarily this character of antagonism. What he calls the possessive market 
society, capitalistic society.779  
 
Strauss concludes Macpherson’s argument by pointing out that Hobbes’s major premise 
regarding the nature of human nature does not lead to his “political theory, except if we 
make one additional assumption, not explicitly made by Hobbes, regarding the character 
of society. But if we make the additional assumption, Hobbes’s doctrine is perfectly lucid 
and consistent.”780  
Macpherson thus argues that Hobbes’s political doctrine is not “monolithic,” 
meaning that the antagonism in the state of nature cannot be derived from his 
physiological postulate alone, but that the “social assumption,” the possessive market 
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society, is required.781 Strauss agrees that the natural antagonism cannot be deduced from 
Hobbes’s scientific description of human nature as Macpherson defines it. He disagreed 
with Macpherson, however, that the antagonism cannot be accounted for from within 
Hobbes’s corpus alone. He tells his students that Macpherson’s appeal to an external 
variable to account for the enmity is premature. Macpherson refers to the The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, when he agrees that 17th century was a capitalist society, and that 
labour at this time was viewed as a commodity among others. Strauss mentions this 
approvingly to his students, but adds: 
I must say that I am not the first to say that; it has been said by Tönnies before, 
probably by Marx himself, and I believe I quoted something from Behemoth in 
chapter 7 of my book [The Political Philosophy of Hobbes], I am familiar with it, 
but whatever mistakes I might have committed then, because I was much younger 
and had not liberated myself from what I now call historicism properly, surely this 
is not proper interpretation. You can refer to these social conditions only 
secondarily, after you have shown that Hobbes’ doctrine is unreasonable, 
untenable. Then you can say how come a man of such a good mind made this 
error? And then you can find the explanation for the error in the circumstances, 
that is possible. But you cannot use it as long as you try to understand what he 
meant. You see the point. And therefore the possessive market society, whatever 
you call it, something of this is a part of Hobbes’ teaching. To that extent I would 
agree with Macpherson. But the locus of it is not properly defined by him, it is not 
an independent postulate or premise, but a consequence of human nature as he 
understands it.782 
 
Contrary to Macpherson, Strauss suggests that capitalist society is a consequence of 
human nature and not the other way around.  
Strauss thus agrees with Macpherson that the human behavior on display in the 
state of nature reflects the behavior of individuals in a capitalist state. He tells his seminar 
students that it is Rousseau, in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, who first 
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suggests that the behavior described in the state of nature was “civilized.”783 Strauss 
agreed with Rousseau and Macpherson: “It is true that Hobbes speaks of present day 
society” in the state of nature. Strauss continues with the caveat that Hobbes “would say 
we can discover natural man in civilized society because if these things are natural, they 
can never be extricated.”784 Rousseau makes a mistake that Macpherson would repeat: he 
reads a non-existent distinction between “primitive” and “civilized man” into the state of 
nature. Whatever differentiated “primitive man” from “civilized man,” Strauss explains 
to his students, it is not Hobbes’s concern: what Hobbes looked for was the “natural 
quality” in both “civilized” and “primitive man”.785 It follows that:   
Hobbes’s analysis appears to be about man as such, not about civilized man. This 
in a way is true: Hobbes analysis is not about civilized man in particular, but is of 
course also concerned with civilized man, because civilized man is nevertheless 
still man. Yet, by the time the argument reaches the hypothetical state of nature, 
which is not hypothetical, it is about civilized man.”786  
 
The insight that it is individuals in a capitalist state who behave this way need not make 
their actions less natural in Strauss eyes: “If it is natural to man, it is always present; it 
may be modified, it may be controlled, it may be regulated, it may canalized, but it is 
fundamentally there, otherwise it wouldn’t be natural.”787 If what is “natural to man” is 
always present, it is also present in “civilized individuals.” It is this natural characteristic 
that is reflected in a market society. What exactly is it that Strauss thinks Hobbes sees as 
the natural human trait? And what is Strauss own view of what is “natural to man”? I will 
answer these two questions in that order. 
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5. 1. 7. Vanity 
In his 1964 seminar, Strauss points out that according to Hobbes’s materialistic and 
mechanical worldview, which breaks with Aristotle’s teleology, all entities (including 
both humans and animals) are self-directing automatons: “Let us then provisionally say 
Hobbes in his overall orientation replaces perfection, which doesn’t exist for him, by 
passion, and the reason is because he implicitly denies natural inclinations.”788 Later in 
the seminar, he continues: “natural inclinations direct man toward the perfection of his 
being; the passions do not. […] human desires are just responses to stimuli, there is no 
unique, there is no one basic inclination peculiar to man.” 789 Strauss challenges this 
Hobbesian or modern view of the passions with the observation that “all animals have 
desires and aversions,” and these “desires [are] simply a sequel of discontinued acts”; 
but, as Strauss had argued in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss points out that 
Hobbes thought that humans have a peculiar and infinite desire that contradicts this 
scientific description and is more akin to a natural inclination.790 Hobbes thus does not 
fully free himself from the pre-modern view of human nature, and it is this view that 
informs the basis of his political philosophy. For evidence of this, Strauss asks a student 
to read from Leviathan’s chapter ten: “In the first place, I put for a general inclination of 
all man-kind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in 
Death.”791 Strauss then explains his case:   
If man is that being of all beings which has this infinite desire forevermore to 
have superiority, from the moment of his birth […] man is that peculiar beast, 
which strives ever more, is an infinitely striving being, whereas other animals are 
not. A lion or a mouse, when their desires are satisfied they don’t desire more. 
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Hobbes says somewhere of man he is the only beast who is hungry from future 
hunger, i.e., man is never satisfied. Pride? I called it at the time when I wrote the 
book [The Political philosophy of Hobbes] vanity, because Hobbes is very much 
concerned that it has this petty element in it too. In other words, it is not the noble 
pride of which Hobbes will speak in the Leviathan in certain passages. Man wants 
to assure himself of his superiority by showing himself superior to others by acts 
of conquest. So the desire for ever more power is rooted in pride.792 
 
Strauss notes that Hobbes defines vanity or “pride in the wide sense,” adopting a 
definition that corresponds to that given in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: “man’s 
concern with superiority and his recognition by others” as superior.793  
Strauss also repeats his argument from The Political Philosophy of Hobbes that, 
over time, Hobbes de-emphasizes pride. This de-emphasis of pride, Strauss argues again, 
follows from Hobbes’s adopted natural scientific approach, which requires that he denies 
the difference between humans and animals. This is the reason why, Strauss argues, 
Hobbes excludes vanity from a list of human characteristics in the preface to De Cive:  
Again you see the affects which he mentions are all empirically known to be 
common in man and the other animals. Again, pride is not mentioned. Pride is 
therefore the issue between the two potential doctrines of Hobbes—the doctrine 
which is strictly reductionist, and links man as much as possible to the brutes; and 
the doctrine which tries to see man in his essential difference from the brutes. 
Forgetting about pride in one case, emphasis on pride in the other case. Hobbes 
never resolved this difficulty, which doesn’t mean that it is not solvable. 794 
 
Vanity is excluded from the scientific reductionist outlook for which the difference 
between humans and animal is a question of degree, and for which all animals are 
moving bodies responding to external stimuli. Hobbes’s political science, however, is 
compatible only with the view of the human animal in the state of nature, as a 
distinctively proud creature. 
 Macpherson challenges Strauss argument in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
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that vanity is a desire innate in every human being. In the seminar, Strauss asks a student 
to read Macpherson’s criticism: “Strauss points also to the fact that Hobbes found the 
striving for honour or precedence over others and recognition of this precedence to be a 
universal characteristic of man. So he did, but he did not say this was innate in all 
men.”795 Strauss summarizes Macpherson’s take on vanity: “pride is universal, although 
not universally innate.” 796  And tells his students that the “issue between him 
[Macpherson] and me” therefore becomes the question, “Do all men have an innate desire 
for ever more power or only some men?”797 Over the course of the semester, the question 
is broken down into two parts: whether vanity is a passion shared by all or only some 
individuals and whether vanity is innate or socially acquired?  
Answering the first question, Strauss first tells his student that he never argues 
that pride is universal, and that he knows of no such “evidence.”798 Yet, later on in the 
same class, Strauss calls to his defense the passage in the Leviathan that all children 
desire to be tyrants, and which Macpherson singles out as the only time Hobbes claims 
that vanity is universal.799 Later, he contradicts this view and asks a student to read from 
the description of the state of nature in Leviathan’s chapter 13; in this passage, Strauss 
identifies two different types of individuals in Hobbes: one group is driven by vanity, the 
other group engages in the struggle for ever more power over others out of self-
preservation. Strauss moves back and forth on this question: “So let us then say that this 
nasty irrational striving which we now call from its root pride is a universal human 
phenomenon, and I believe there is some evidence for that because people can be 
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extremely modest and this modesty is a clear sign of ambition. I mean I wouldn’t assert 
that it is universal.”800 At the end of the semester, Strauss seems to have settled with the 
interpretation that Hobbes’s conclusive view is that the majority of individuals are vain 
by birth, that vanity is not universally innate, but still all individuals act as if they are 
vain: “We are then at this proposition: pride is universal, although not universally 
innate.”801  
The key point with respect to Strauss’s dispute with Macpherson is that 
irrespectively of whether every individual strives for ever more power due to their vanity, 
or whether some individuals strive for ever more power due to the systemic antagonism 
caused by some individuals’s vain pursuit for ever more power, vanity is sufficient to 
account for the natural antagonism in the state of nature:  
The mere fact that some men desire innately ever more power is sufficient for 
explaining the universal antagonism, the universal antagonism, because these few 
create such an insecurity that all the others are affected by that, and they do not 
know when they see someone for the first time, is he one of these giddy or dull or 
messy or other things, but must immediately use his gun or at least (take) cover 
himself. So in other words the recourse to a special model of society is absolute 
not necessary.802  
 
If only some individuals have an inborn desire for ever more power, there is still no need 
for a capitalist market model of society to deduce that every individual seeks ever more 
power over others, including those who have no innate desire for power. Strauss thus 
goes to some length in the seminar to refute Macpherson’s claim that an external cause is 
required to account for the antagonism in the state of nature, irrespectively of whether or 
not the desire for power is innate in some, the many, or everyone. 
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Strauss also addresses the objection that if vanity is not a human universal 
characteristic, how can it be one of the traits that sets human apart from other animals? 
He answers that the natural inclination which defines human essence does not need to be 
shared by every member of the species. Like Hobbes, Strauss tells his students, he takes 
his standard from the “best human beings,” not from the “inferior” beings. 803 This stands 
in contrast, he said, to Macpherson, “who is a working man.”804 It is not necessary for 
vanity be shared by all humans (all elements in the set), but only by the higher type. The 
reference to a higher type appears somewhat inconsistent with Strauss reminding his 
students what Hobbes has in mind was everyday vanity — i.e. the desire for the 
recognition of one’s superiority — which, however, does not sound so noble. 
5. 1. 8. Strauss’s view of human nature and vanity 
In the fifth class, a student asks Strauss if he subscribes to Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
The answer Strauss gives is limited to whether or not humans developed out of non-
humans, and leaves the theory of natural selection aside. Strauss answers in his own voice 
(i.e., not in Hobbes’s name) that evolution does not disqualify the pre-modern view that 
there exists a qualitative distinction between animals and humans:  
Strauss: I think one cannot make sense in the things with which we are concerned 
with, human things, without presupposing and therefore making clear the essential 
difference between men and brutes. And even if one would had to assume, in a 
wholly unintelligible way, that the human species has come into being out of non-
human, then we would have to say at that moment an essential change was taking 
place and not merely a quantitative change. In other words, this in itself is 
compatible with something like evolution […]. Man is a mysterious creature, and 
by seeing how much in common he has with other animals, the mystery is, how 
should I say, blurred to some extent, but it is not abolished.  
 
Student:  But when we talk of things like man or whatever species, are you saying 
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then that you take the medieval view that this is given to us by nature, that this is 
not something at some point where we draw an arbitrary line and say, this makes 
man? 
 
Strauss:  Just the mere crude fact that the borderline cases are really very rare and 
crudely speaking [inaudible word], and since man exists we know only of clearly 
separated species. [Inaudible words]. We have to accept that the whole consists of 
essentially different parts. And the modern project is fundamentally based on the 
view that this essential difference can be reduced to quantitative differences or 
differences of degree. 805   
 
The difference that Strauss draws between the modern and ancient or medieval view is 
delineated by how they differentiate between human and animals, as a difference of 
degree (modern philosophy) or of kind (ancient philosophy). Strauss sides with the pre-
modern view, which he opposes to Hobbes’s natural scientific view. It is a view of 
humans as qualitatively different from animals. Hobbes’s natural scientific view portrays 
the difference between humans and animals as a matter of degree, not kind. The whole, 
and its entities, as non-teleological, are material bodies in constant motion, and the 
human animal is self-directing, responding to external stimuli through a pleasure and pain 
calculus. The natural scientific view of the human animal is inconsistent with the petty 
proud animal described in the state of nature. As we have seen in this dissertation, in all 
his discussions of Hobbes, Strauss confirms that there is a qualitative difference between 
humans and animals. It is only the configuration of this binary that shifted over time.  
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss asserts through the young Hobbes 
that vanity is what marks the qualitative difference between human and other animals. It 
is this distinction, he argues, that the later natural scientific Hobbes obscures. In Natural 
Right and History, Strauss argues that it is reason that differentiates humans from 
animals. In his final essay and seminar on Hobbes, Strauss speaks of vanity and reason 
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(as well as language, but since language is an invention, it’s not a natural distinction) in 
order to mark the distinction. My observation in this thesis that, in all his work on 
Hobbes, Strauss defines the human animal as qualitatively different from other animals is 
in agreement with scholars such as Bloom, Zuckert and Zuckert, Pippin, Meier.806 The 
same position puts me in disagreement with scholars like Drury, Lampert and John 
Gunnel.807 The latter group argues that Strauss is Nietzschean, or someone who adheres 
to a post-modern viewpoint (as opposed to a pre-modern view) of human nature as 
created anew.808  
So, what is Strauss’s final word on the ontological status of vanity? He adopts 
Hobbes’s definition of vanity, but amends it with some help from Rousseau and Aristotle. 
Against “Hobbes [who] believed he could prove that man is by nature not a social animal 
by showing that man is by nature anti-social,” Strauss argues that Hobbes’s “anti-
sociality is only a mode of sociality.”809 Despite Hobbes’s claim to the contrary, Rousseau 
“proved absolutely that Hobbes understood man as a social animal because both pride 
and fear of violent death, i.e., hence of other men, self-preservation, are both social 
phenomena.” Strauss affirms that “pride is clearly a passion which has to do with the 
others,” as it depends on asserting one’s “superiority to others:”810  
Hobbes says in effect that man is not by nature a social animal. But if pride is of 
man’s essence, then he must be by nature a social animal. That was the critique of 
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Rousseau. He said you cannot have it both ways; either man is asocial, and then 
pride cannot be in man’s constitution; and then he said pride doesn’t belong to 
man at all, to natural man; that is a consequence only of man in civil society. This 
point is of great importance.811  
 
Strauss thus agrees with Rousseau that vanity is a social attribute, but sides with 
Aristotle’s view, against both Hobbes and Rousseau, that “man is by nature a social or 
political animal,” and could on this basis uphold Hobbes’s insight that humans are by 
nature vain. Vanity is thus both social and natural.812 Reading Rousseau together with 
Aristotle, Strauss resolves the contradiction from The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
regarding the source of vanity as a non-social self-originating quality, on the one hand, 
and its fulfilment as social value, as requiring the recognition of others, on the other.  
5. 1. 9. Vanity and morality: the good, the bad, and the evil 
In the section above, I argued that Strauss’s understanding of human nature as 
qualitatively different from that of other animals fits the ancient Greek philosophical 
tradition, but is the same true of his take on morality? In chapter three, I showed that 
Strauss in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, casts Hobbes as the founder of a new 
morality, a bourgeois morality, defined by the death/life horizon. In chapter three, I 
argued that he uses Hobbes’s pre-scientific view of human vanity to point beyond liberal 
morality by asserting that humans by nature are evil. In other words, for the criticism of 
liberalism not to be immanent like Schmitt’s, Strauss maintains that humans are morally 
evil by nature. Humans, he points out, are by nature morally evil because they are vain: 
because they seek to harm other individuals for the pleasure derived from contemplating 
one’s own supremacy. Vanity marks humans, unlike animals, as non-innocent by nature. I 
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suggested that this moral-ontology remains trapped in a biblical morality insofar as it 
relies on a conception of guilt. In chapter four, I suggested that Strauss, with his adoption 
of a Platonic-Socratic philosophy and virtue ethics, drops the moral-ontological claim 
that humans are by nature morally evil when he returns to Hobbes after World War II. It 
is no longer the greatest moral evil, but the greatest good that primarily informs the 
regime that Strauss wishes to see in place. The best regime would reflect that natural 
order of rank of intellectual capacities. He opposes this to Hobbes’s absolutist and 
egalitarian regime. Hobbes’s natural right doctrine is contrary to Strauss’s ancient 
conception of human nature. This pre-modern outlook reduces morality to an exoteric 
moral code that secures order in the city. The way that Strauss speaks of vanity in the 
seminar supports his post-war take on morality, and the hypothesis that he has come to 
adopt a standpoint in which he no longer holds that humans are by nature morally evil.  
In his final studies of Hobbes, Strauss repeats his insight from The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes that vanity is a peculiar human inclination, but he no longer 
suggests that humans, due to their pride, are morally evil (i.e., non-innocent/guilty). And 
while he still refers to vanity as “evil” in the seminar, he uses the term interchangeably 
with the morally neutral terms “bad” and “nasty.”813 The main example is found when 
Hobbes addresses the classic locus for the question of moral evil. Strauss tells the 
students that in the preface of De Cive, Hobbes “rejects the thesis that man is by nature 
bad. The reason he gave was because that cannot be said without impiety, meaning, man 
is created by God, and as a creature of God he can’t be bad, by nature bad. But the 
question of course is how far Hobbes accepted the biblical teaching and therefore how 
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difficult it would be for him to admit that men are by nature bad.”814 If we add to this 
equation Strauss’s view of Hobbes as an atheist, any acceptance of the biblical teaching 
has to be exoteric. In other words, Hobbes disguises his esoteric view that humans are by 
nature bad, since it is “opposed to the opposite [Biblical] thesis that man is by nature 
good.” 815  
In addition, Strauss tells his student that the first modern philosopher to advance 
the Christian thesis that man is by nature good is Rousseau, who opposes Hobbes: “I 
think it is generally known this nasty animal [Hobbes] from Malmesbury who taught that 
man is by nature nasty and this lover [Rousseau] of mankind from Geneva who taught 
that man is by nature good.”816 Rousseau, as Strauss points out in Natural Right and 
History, argues that humans are by nature good, but made vain/bad by socialization. 
While Strauss drops his claim that humans are by nature morally evil, he still insists with 
Hobbes that humans are by nature bad/nasty, and this remained a core part of Strauss’s 
post-World War II political ontology.   
5. 1. 10. The political dimension 
I suggested in chapter three that Strauss’s identification of vanity as the primary cause of 
the antagonism in the state of nature has political and philosophical implications that 
exceed scholastic disagreement over the correct interpretation of Hobbes. Still 
unanswered is the question of whether there is a political dimension to Strauss’s answer 
to what causes the state of war of all against all in his final studies of Hobbes.   
In “Notes on Hobbes” and The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss uses 
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vanity to argue that humans are morally evil by nature in order to argue against the 
anarchist position (within which he subsumes both liberalism and socialism) that human 
nature is either good or educable. The anthropological insights about human nature that 
Strauss extracts from Hobbes — the view that the human animal is a proud and nasty 
creature, if no longer morally evil — still proves that coercion is required to assure 
political obligation. One example of how Strauss’s Hobbesian view on vanity still 
informs his contemporary view on the political is found in Strauss’s The City and Man 
(1962). In the book’s preface, Strauss writes that liberals should by this point have 
learned from the actions of communists that human nature is not good: “no bloody or 
unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in man: as long as there will be men, 
there will be malice, envy and hatred, and hence there cannot be a society which does not 
have to employ coercive restraint.”817 Following his post-war project to alter the liberal 
regime from within (as discussed in the previous chapter), Strauss argues that liberals 
should abandon the view of human nature as good. Moreover, in light of our nasty nature 
(among other reasons), “liberalism” should abandon the “ultimate goal” which it shared 
with communism: “The goal may be said to be the universal and classless society or, to 
use the correction proposed by Kojève, the universal and homogeneous state of which 
every adult human being is a full member.”818 Both liberals and Marxists, such as 
Macpherson, Strauss pointed out, oppose the nation state as the limit of the political 
community. He asks: “what is his [Macpherson’s] standard of judgment?”  
Fundamentally, the needs [economic equality] of today which are not fulfilled by 
liberal democracy classically understood, and this means the whole issue raised 
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by socialism in the 19th and 20th century; that’s one key point, and the second is 
the bomb, atomic and nuclear bombs, meaning, the national state, which is taken 
as the normal political unit by Locke and Hobbes of course does no longer have 
significance. Man’s loyalty can no longer be limited to the single national state. 
We all know this notion. Macpherson is a revisionist, Marxist, one could say. A 
very mild revisionist, a very mild man, but still the Marxism is absolute there […] 
This is of some importance of course for the background and will naturally affect 
his interpretation. What a man regards as good or desirable does affect his 
interpretation and not only casually but fundamentally. This is unfortunately the 
case.819 
 
Both Strauss and Macpherson come to view Hobbes as the founder of a flawed strand of 
the liberal tradition: for Strauss it is “rational liberalism,” for Macpherson, “possessive 
individualism”. As we saw in chapter three and four, Strauss’s insight that Macpherson’s 
political alliances tilt his interpretation of Hobbes, is also true of his own studies — 
Strauss’s politics, or what he regarded as “good” or “desirable,” informs his interpretation 
of Hobbes. It is also true that both Strauss’s and Macpherson’s different takes on 
Hobbes’s contradictory remarks on human nature inform their respective views on 
politics and the state. Strauss believes that the nation state cannot (due to human vanity) 
be transcended. Macpherson thinks, since human nature is not antagonistic, that the 
nation state can be transcended. It is this that Strauss has in mind when he wrote in his 
review of Macpherson’s book that there is a political subtext behind Macpherson’s 
interpretation of Hobbes: “Macpherson’s standard of judgment [against which he 
measures Hobbes] the idea of freedom as a concomitant of social living in an 
unacquisitive [socialist] society — in a kind of society which, to say the least, transcends 
the boundaries of any ‘single national state.’”820   
In the “Review,” Strauss suggests moreover that Possessive Individualism “reads 
as if it were meant to show (or rather to contribute toward showing) the rationality of his 
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ideal [socialism] by laying bare the logical failures of the early theorists of possessive 
individualism and by tracing those failures to the contradictions of bourgeois society 
itself.”821 What Strauss has in mind here is Macpherson’s claim that the contradiction in 
Hobbes’s political theory is caused by the possessive view of individuals in equal 
competition with each other, while the Marxist view of a class division of the market is a 
more accurate picture of the actual conditions of a capitalist economy. Hobbes’s state of 
nature accounts for individual competition, but not class extraction, which divides 
individuals into two distinct groups. In a developed capitalist economy, Macpherson 
argues that it is evident to most people that individuals, depending on which class they 
belong, are more unequal than they are equal. This awareness, he argues, has resulted in a 
crisis for liberal democracy, since the liberal theory of obligation is based on equality. 
Macpherson’s extra-textual intention is to show that a socialist economy is more 
conducive to a liberal democratic theory than a capitalist economy. If you remove the 
possessive aspect of the economy, as reflected in the state of nature, the contradiction in 
liberal theory is dissolved since individuals will be equal again. Macpherson’s diagnosis 
of the crisis of liberal democracy thus has a built-in solution: change the economic 
system and the liberal democratic crisis will be resolved. In other words, the 
contradiction in liberal theory can only be resolved by resolving the social contradictions. 
The social contradiction is resolved by changing the economy. 
Macpherson’s case for a socialist theory of political obligation requires that he de-
naturalize the possessive individualist behavior described in the state of nature. To that 
end, Macpherson argues that the incessant struggles for ever more power over others in 
Hobbes’s state of nature is not due to some intrinsic character of human nature, but an 
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effect of historically changing economic structures. The competitive behavior described 
in Hobbes’s state of nature is thus not a reflection of human physiological nature as such, 
but of individuals subjected to market rules. In contrast, Hobbes’s natural scientific or 
physiological postulate of human nature reflects non-possessive individualists, which is 
compatible with a socialist theory of obligation.822 What Macpherson adopts from 
Hobbes’s philosophy is not the antagonistic behavior described in the state of nature, but 
exactly that which Strauss argues is the faulty link in Hobbes’s philosophy — the natural 
scientific description of self-moving and self-directing individuals. 
Strauss’s theoretical disagreement with Macpherson thus evolves around 
Hobbes’s teaching on human nature. Macpherson denies what Strauss, following Schmitt, 
had affirmed in the 1930s:  that the political is an autonomous realm. For Macpherson, it 
is capitalist relations that cause the antagonism in the state of nature, as well as divide the 
liberal capitalist state. Strauss thinks that human behavior described in the state of nature 
accurately reflected the basis for Hobbes’s political theory, while Hobbes’s natural 
scientific view of human nature, and the view that Macpherson adopts, do not. His 
disagreement with Macpherson is not, however, over the description of the 17th century as 
a “possessive [capitalist] market society,” or that Hobbes’s political theory was at heart 
capitalist individualist. In the 1964 seminar, Strauss tells his students that he agrees with 
Macpherson: “there is some evidence […] you know that modern capitalism begins more 
or less there [17th century], and a [Macpherson’s] statement about labor, a commodity like 
any other, is very revealing.”823 But that he would put it “the other way around” from 
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Macpherson: Hobbes’s non-natural scientific doctrine of human nature, which portrays 
humans as a vain creature, is not an effect of a capitalist market society, but that which is 
most conducive to a market or capitalist society and human well-being:  
Hobbes’s doctrine of human nature is generally speaking favorable to the 
possessive market society. The reason for this, however, is not that the English 
society of his time had ‘become essentially a possessive market society’ or 
because he thought that that kind of society is ‘here to stay’ but that he [Hobbes] 
held that kind of society to be most conducive to human well-being. Nor is 
Hobbes' view of men's natural competiveness a reflex of the emerging market 
society; Hobbes found or would have found clear signs of that competiveness not 
only in the market but in the courts of kings, in the most backward villages, 
among scholars, in covenants, in drawing rooms, and in slave pens, in modern as 
well as ancient times.824  
 
Strauss thinks that our competitive nature transcends capitalism. Strauss tells his students 
that neither is he convinced by Macpherson’s explanations of the inconsistencies in 
Hobbes’s thought, nor is he fully satisfied with all of his own earlier accounts of 
Hobbes’s natural science and its relation to the state of nature and to Hobbes’s natural 
right doctrine. 
[Hobbes’s] analysis was surely insufficient, and I would grant Macpherson gladly, 
and I can do it so easily because I have said it before in print […] Hobbes time 
can loosely be described as the theory of capitalist society is undoubtedly true. 
Labor is a commodity like any other and many other things like this kind. By the 
way I was by no means the first to say this, Tönnies, and Marx must have known 
that too. But the question is, if I try to understand Hobbes, I want to speak—
Hobbes asserted his doctrine is the true political doctrine, never said there is any 
extraneous premise, like the character of the particular society, which enter. Now I 
must at least give him this benefit and try to see whether he was not in his way 
right.825  
 
Strauss gives Hobbes one last hearing: Starting from what Hobbes thinks he has 
accounted for; namely, his natural scientific description of human nature accounts for 
why every individual incessantly seeks for ever more power over others.  
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Part II.  
5. 2. 11. Strauss’s final insight 
In the key sentence of Strauss’s review of Possessive Individualism, Strauss faults 
Macpherson for not “having even attempted to show that the natural antagonism of all 
men does not follow from Hobbes’s ‘understanding of man as distinguished from brutes 
by the faculty of considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, and therefore by 
awareness of potentiality and power.’” 826  In other words, Strauss suggests that 
Macpherson does not sufficiently justify his contextual reach to account for the enmity in 
the state of nature. For he “fails to show that it is necessary to have recourse to a certain 
notion of society [the possessive market society] in order to ‘understand Hobbes’s way 
from man’s nature to the state of nature.”827 Before we turn to the seminar to help unpack 
what exactly it is that Strauss has in mind when he writes about Hobbes’s understanding 
of “causal reason,” we must first stop and reflect on the fact that Strauss, in all of his own 
studies of Hobbes, including his final 1954 essay, does not himself “attempt to show that 
the natural antagonism of all men does not follow from Hobbes’s ‘understanding of man 
as distinguished from brutes by the faculty of considering phenomena as causes of 
possible effects.’”828 Strauss thus also fails to “show that it is necessary to have recourse” 
to the pre-scientific Hobbes, in order to “understand Hobbes’s way from man’s nature to 
the state of nature.”829 
In 1965, the year after his seminar and the publication of the “Review,” Strauss 
writes in the preface to the first German publication of The Political Philosophy of 
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Hobbes: 
As far as the defects of the present book are concerned, I have tacitly corrected 
them, so far as they have become known, in Natural Right and History (chapter V, 
section A), and in my critique of Polin’s Hobbes book (What is Political 
Philosophy?, 170-96). Only in the latter publication (176, note) did I succeed in 
laying bare the simple leading thought of Hobbes’s teaching about man. For 
obscure reasons Hobbes himself never did this; his famous clarity is limited to his 
conclusions, while his presuppositions are shrouded in obscurity. His obscurity is, 
of course, not in every respect involuntary.830 
 
It is in the footnotes to What is Political Philosophy that Strauss for the first time 
suggests that the “natural antagonism follows from” the human “ability of considering 
phenomena as causes of possible effects.”831 In his criticism of Macpherson, Strauss is 
thus simultaneously directing the reader’s attention to an oversight in his earlier work on 
Hobbes, including his own essay, “On the Basis,” which became chapter seven in What is 
Political Philosophy. It is an oversight that Strauss sought to amend with the added part 
to the footnote in the book version of the essay.  
In the first version of the footnote that accompanied the 1954 French publication 
of the essay, Strauss projects Hobbes’s two incompatible views on human nature as 
dependent on whether one views it from the standpoint of (i) Hobbes’s natural science, or 
from (ii) the pre-natural scientific/humanistic/vitalistic/ancient perspective. He writes, 
“We are driven toward the delights of society, i.e., the gratification of vanity, ‘by nature 
i.e., by the passion inborn in all living beings.’”832 The claim that “all living beings,” 
including animals, are vain is in accord to the naturalistic or natural scientific 
interpretation of Hobbes. Yet, before the sentence ends, Strauss inserts a mutually 
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exclusive claim within another set of closed brackets: “(vanity is distinctly human).”833 
That vanity is distinctively human follows from Hobbes's pre-natural 
scientific/humanistic/vitalistic/ancient view of human nature.834 Strauss thus reproduces 
Hobbes’s two contradictory perspectives on human nature in the part of the footnote that 
accompanies the first version of the essay.  
In the sentence to which the footnote refers (which remains the same in both 
versions), Strauss discusses Polin’s take on the difference Hobbes’s draws between 
humans and animals:  
For while it may be true that the distinction between the natural mechanism and 
the social mechanism, or between natural bodies and political bodies, presupposes 
an essential difference between the nature of man the nature of brutes, it is also 
true that Hobbes tends to conceive of the difference between the nature of man the 
nature of brutes a mere difference of degree.835  
 
I showed above that Strauss thinks that the only perspective from which Hobbes’s 
teaching is consistent is the view of humans as the uniquely vain animals. In the essay to 
which the footnote is appended, Strauss tells his reader, as I stated earlier, that a student 
of Hobbes “must decide for one or the other, unifying will of Hobbes's thought.” 836 In the 
body of the essay, Strauss writes that it is better to say that the student of Hobbes “must 
make up his mind whether he is going to understand Hobbes’s political science by itself 
or whether he is going to understand it in the light of Hobbes’s natural science.”837 I also 
showed that Strauss comes to understand Hobbes’s political by itself, apart from the 
natural scientific view of human nature. The first part of the footnote is thus a rehearsal of 
earlier insights. 
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In the 1959 extension of the footnote, Strauss breaks with the above account and 
indicates a new way of understanding the relation between the natural scientific view of 
human nature and Hobbes’s political science. Demarcated by a long dash, Strauss puts 
forth his new insight on the leading thought of Hobbes. I have reproduced the extended 
part of the footnote in its entirety, before I dissect its parts — four main propositions — 
with the aid of the seminar:  
[1] –According to Hobbes, the only peculiarity of man’s mind which precedes the 
invention of speech, i.e., the only natural peculiarity of man’s mind, is the faculty 
of considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, as distinguished from the 
faculty of seeking the causes or means that produce “an effect imagined,” the 
latter faculty being “common to man and beast”: not “teleological” but “causal” 
thinking is peculiar to man.  
 
[2] The reason why Hobbes transformed the traditional definition of man as the 
rational animal into the definition of man as the animal which can "inquire 
consequences" and hence which is capable of science, i.e., "knowledge of 
consequences," is that the traditional definition implies that man is by nature a 
social animal, and Hobbes must reject this implication (De Cive, I, 2). 
 
[3] As a consequence the relation between man's natural peculiarity and speech 
become obscure.   
 
[4] On the other hand, Hobbes is able to deduce from his definition of man his 
characteristic doctrine of man: man alone can consider himself as a cause of 
possible effects,  
 
[4a] i.e., man can be aware of his power; he can be concerned with power; 
he can desire to possess power; he can seek confirmation for his wish to be 
powerful by having his power recognized by others, 
 
[4b] i,e., he can be vain or proud; he can be hungry with future hunger, he 
can anticipate future dangers,  
 
[4c] he can be haunted by long-range fear. Cf. Leviathan, chs. 3 (15), 5 
(27, 29), 6 (33-36), 11 (64), and De homine X, 3.838  
 
I will now treat each of these propositions with the help of the seminar to shed some 
more light on this enigmatic footnote: (1) definition of causal reason; (2) the reason why 
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Hobbes redefined human causal reason; (3) the relation between speech and causal reason 
becomes obscure; (4a) causal reason is the precondition for the existence of power; (4b) 
causal reason is the precondition for the existence of vanity. Vanity and power are 
considered separate and both are deduced from the definition of man as capable of causal 
thought; and lastly (4c), causal reason is the precondition for fear. 
 
(1) Causal reason 
In the fourth session of his 1964 seminar on Hobbes, Strauss asks a student, 
Butterworth, to read from the description of causal reason in chapter three of the 
Leviathan: 
The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect 
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it:  and this is 
common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing 
whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; 
that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it.  Of 
which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a 
curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no 
other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.839  
 
Strauss comments on the passage: 
So man may have passions other than sensual passions. Other passions. 
And what is the rule of that? Here he speaks for the first time quite clearly 
of what we might call an essential difference between men and brutes. 
Now what is it? It is not regulated thought as such, as the brutes do have, 
but a kind of regulated thought. Now how can we describe it: “When of an 
effect imagined, we seek the causes, or means that produce it:  and this is 
common to Man and Beast.” In other words, the things of which they talk 
now, a monkey or whatever it is, would like to get out of the cage. An end, 
to get out of it. The means, walking around trying to find an opening. This 
kind of finding means for ends, is not peculiarly human. If I may use a 
common term which has been used [inaudible word] in the literature, 
analogical thought is common to man and brute. Thinking, looking for 
means to ends. In other words, if we go from end to means, there is no 
difference, but if we go the other way around, from cause to effect, then 
that is peculiar to man. So if we use the time-honored distinction between 
                                                
839 Strauss, Session 4; quotation from Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 3. 
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teleological and causal thought, causal thought is peculiar to man. That’s 
the point.840 
 
Here, Strauss locates the definition of causal reason in one of Hobbes’s natural 
scientific chapters (Leviathan’s chapter three). It is the ability that humans have to 
reason from cause to effect that Strauss calls “causal thought,” and which Strauss 
opposes to the ability to reason from a wanted effect to a cause, which he called 
“teleological thought.” The distinction between humans and animals thus turns 
around causal and teleological thought. Humans have the capacity for both 
teleological and causal reason, animals only the former. A student asks Strauss to 
further clarify the difference between teleological and causal thought:  
Let us state it perhaps more simply — if some animal seeks, moves, for an 
end, it is not aware of the reversibility of its purpose. That it could say, now 
I know — I can now regard the means, whatever it may be based upon, and 
figure out, regard it as a cause of possible effects. The whole notion of 
possibility, which is the key difference. Therefore, also power is absent. 
What Hobbes is trying to understand is the peculiar limitation of animal 
thinking compared with human thinking. And one can state the result as 
follows: man is the only being which is capable of thinking in terms of the 
possible, whereas thought of the possible doesn’t arise when the beast is 
trying to find a way out of the cage by probing here and there.841  
 
(2 & 3) Causal reason, the social and the place of language 
Strauss suggests that the reason that Hobbes transforms the ancient definition of 
“man as the rational animal” into the animal that is capable of causal thought “is 
that the traditional definition implies that man is by nature a social animal, and 
Hobbes must reject this implication.”842 Rationality in the ancient sense required 
that human beings are social by nature. Hobbes describes the state of nature, and 
                                                
840 Strauss, Session 4, emphasis added; quotation from Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 3. 
841  Strauss, Session 4.   
842  Strauss, ”On the Basis,” 174. 
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the “natural man” as asocial. Hobbes therefore needs a definition of reason that is 
asocial. For this reason, Strauss suggests that the role of language in Hobbes’s 
theory becomes obscure: “causal thinking as distinguished from teleological 
thinking is the fundamental peculiarity of man. That is natural, but speech is 
invented by man.” Causal reason does not require the social or language. The 
ability for causal reason precedes speech. Strauss’s final discovery of causal 
reason presents Hobbes’s philosophy as rationalistic in the ancient philosophical 
sense that causal reason is natural and speech is an invention. The question of the 
relation between language and reason is central to Strauss’s concern with 
Heidegger’s existentialism. In Liberalism: Modern and Ancient, Strauss points out 
that ancient philosophy “was rationalistic because it denied the fundamental 
dependence of reason on language.”843 Strauss here suggests, against Polin, that 
this is a view that Hobbes shares. 
 
(4) Power 
Strauss suggests that Hobbes holds that both humans and animals have the 
capacity of “teleological reason,” but only humans have the distinct capacity for 
“causal reason.”844 From the definition of causal reason, the conception of power 
arises. Strauss writes in the footnote: 
Hobbes is able to deduce from his definition of man his characteristic 
doctrine of man: man alone can consider himself as a cause of possible 
effects, i.e., man can be aware of his power: he can be concerned with 
power; he can desire to possess power; he can seek confirmation for his 
wish to be powerful by having his power recognized by others. 845 
 
                                                
843  Strauss, Liberalism: Modern and Ancient, 27. 
844  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 176. 
845  Strauss, Session 5.  
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It is from the ability to reason from cause to a potential effect that Strauss argues 
we can become aware of power. 
What is peculiar to man is to consider things as possible causes of effects, 
whereas finding means for ends is common to men and brutes… But to 
see the thing the other way around—to consider a thing as what can I do 
with it?  What effect can I produce with it?  And therefore also sense of 
power, because of power of the thing, which is clearly is my power, and 
therefore power is human and power-consciousness is specifically a 
human thing.846  
 
It is because we can consider ourselves as cause for any possible effects that we 
are aware of ourselves as power. Power is not simply the means to an end. 
Animals think of the particular means to achieve a specific end but not of the 
means as power. Humans, on the other hand, are aware of themselves as causal 
agents:  
If some animal seeks, moves, for an end, it is not aware of the reversibility 
of its purpose.  That it could say, now I know—I can now regard the 
means, whatever it may be based upon, and figure out, regard it as a cause 
of possible effects.  The whole notion of possibility, which is the key 
difference.  Therefore, also power is absent.  What Hobbes is trying to 
understand is the peculiar limitation of animal thinking compared with 
human thinking.  And one can state the result as follows--man is the only 
being which is capable of thinking in terms of the possible, whereas 
thought of the possible doesn’t arise when the beast is trying to find a way 
out of the cage by probing here and there. […]  
 
The dog is hungry. He seeks food, and seeking food means of course 
seeking the means, the means in the wide sense of what includes, first of 
all, the place—where is it. And also it’s locked somewhere, how do you 
get it? That, the dog can do.  But the dog cannot do this, say how can I, by 
arranging things, have food whenever I wish to have it again. The dog 
cannot be hungry of future hunger, as man. That I think is the point. The 
brutes are bound to the present situation, whereas man is not. This is only 
another way of saying man can be aware of power and possibility. For the 
animal there are no possibilities. When we say in Latin potentia, which 
means potency, power.847  
 
                                                
846  Strauss, Session 5.  
847  Strauss, Session 4, emphasis added. 
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Strauss concludes that “[t]he future hunger is a passion derivative from the fact 
that man has reason in the sense here defined.” 848 Power does not simply arise 
from man's peculiar ability to reason from cause to effect, but from the ability to 
consider himself a cause for future effects. “A possible cause, and you consider 
what cause of what possible effects it can mean, and that means that only man can 
consider himself as possessing power.” 849 Our ability to be concerned with power 
explains why the state of nature is a state of war, which brings us to vanity. 
5. 2. 12. Vanity revisited 
Strauss repeats his earlier interpretation that in Hobbes analysis humans seek power for 
the sake of power: 
I am sure that if one takes this rationality in the way in which Hobbes takes it, one 
can deduce from that the antagonism of man. Man is the only being which can be 
concerned with power, and can therefore be concerned with contemplating himself in 
his power.  Now that this latter, this contemplating of power, is foolish, silly, does not 
do away with the fact that it is essentially a possibility belonging to man as the only 
beast that is hungry from future hunger, i.e., which seeks power for power.850  
 
This insight links back to Strauss’s discussion in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion in which 
Strauss separates in Hobbes’s teaching the vain striving for “reputation” from “power”.851 
The difference is that Strauss no longer suggests that vanity is “irrational,” instead it is 
derivative of causal reason.852 The vain striving for reputation is gratified only by the 
attainment of the extra power one holds over another individual.853 Thus, the desired end, 
the striving for reputation is inseparable from the means (the power) to attain it. This, 
Strauss had argues in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, is a “reversal” of a “natural 
                                                
848  Strauss, Session 4. 
849  Strauss, Session 4. 
850  Strauss, Session 7. 
851  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 88. 
852  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 89; Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,10. 
853  Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 89.  
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relationship” between means and ends, in that it is the power itself that brings happiness; 
power is no longer a means to an end (happiness), but has transformed into the end for 
which it was a means to attain. The end has become the perpetuation of power for the 
sake of reputation qua power. Acquired reputation is differential power: the extra power 
one holds over another individual. Therefore, the striving for reputation is always for 
power over others.854  
Causal reason is the precondition for both power and vanity. Vanity is an outcome 
of the self-awareness of one’s own self as cause/power: 
Say you have this thing here, a possible cause, and you consider what cause of 
what possible effects it can mean, and that means that only man can consider 
himself as possessing power. Power means one’s ability to produce effects. And 
therefore man alone can be concerned with power, with power as power, whereas 
the brutes are not concerned with power as power.  They [animals] want to 
achieve certain things, but they do not think of power as power. And because man 
can be concerned with power, must be concerned with power, he can also make 
the mistake, as it were, of forgetting the use of power and be satisfied with 
contemplating his power. That is vanity or pride; so vanity or pride is derivative 
from man’s nature, and man’s nature as we have seen up to this point, is causal 
thinking. 855 
 
The satisfaction of vanity arises first in the contemplation of oneself as cause, in one’s 
awareness of one’s own power: “of his superiority to other man and his power.” Vanity is 
a “derivative” of causal thinking. If vanity is a derivative of causal reason, it follows that 
vanity cannot be animal passion since animals lack the ability of causal reason. Insofar as 
we can place or contemplate ourselves as causes of possible effects, i.e. as potentia, and 
compare our power to other men’s power, we are vain.  
                                                
854  In Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Strauss also gives a reason to why the struggle after power is over 
other individuals: while the striving after the “means of enjoyment over [material] things” can be 
“increased by mutual aid. Nevertheless, the one in sole possession has the advantage over those who 
share. Thus the striving after power over means of enjoyment over things develops by its very nature 
into a striving after power over other men” (Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 94). 
855 Strauss, Session 4, emphasis added. 
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5. 3. 1. Conclusion: the consequences  
I will conclude by considering the consequences of Strauss’s discovery of the 
“fundamental thought of Hobbes” for his earlier studies of Hobbes?856 In the fifth class, 
Strauss tells his students: 
Hobbes’ fundamental change—man is not a social animal by nature but man 
remain rational animal. […] The specifically human rationality consists in 
considering things as causes of effects, and therefore of course in considering 
himself as a cause of effect. If you consider, let say, a stone as a possible cause of 
effect, by implication you consider yourself, by throwing the stone or doing 
something with it, as a cause and effect. Therefore, man is the being capable or 
consciously capable of power, becoming concerned with power, and therefore 
also secondarily, but not unimportantly, losing himself in the mere contemplation 
of his power; of his superiority to other man and his power. This, I believe, is the 
fundamental thought of Hobbes and it took me about thirty years until it became 
clear to me in the last seminar of Hobbes when I saw it for the first time, but it is 
not entirely my fault because Hobbes himself has never set forth clearly this 
thought. Although he is rightly famous for his clarity, but not in every respect. 
And of course from this follows necessarily against Macpherson that man’s pride, 
or whatever we call it, is an essential consequence of man’s constitution. Man 
can’t beat pride. An essential possibility is a property of the being.857  
 
First, the absolute distinction that Strauss draws between humans and animals in his 
commentaries on Hobbes is altered with the discovery of causal reason. In The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss delineates the human-animal binary through the pre-
scientific anthropological observation of Hobbes of the human animal as the vain animal, 
which unlike other animals has an irrational passion that is internally caused and infinite. 
In What is Political Philosophy, and the 1964 seminar, Strauss argues that Hobbes holds 
that both humans and animals have the capacity for “teleological reason,” but only 
humans have the distinct capacity for “causal reason.”858 The human animal binary is 
delineated within the faculty of reason alone, between “teleological reason” and “causal 
                                                
856 Strauss, Session 5.   
857 Strauss, Session 5, emphasis added.    
858  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 176. 
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reason.”859 It is not clear if Strauss accepts Hobbes’s argument that vanity is derivative of 
causal reason.  
Secondly, Strauss’s final observations alter his previous take on Hobbes’s 
understanding of the relation between rationality and passion/irrationality. Early on in the 
seminar, a student asks Strauss: “I suppose by the end of the course it will become clear 
[…] whether pride comes before reason.”860 Strauss responds: “I hope it is not yet clear 
to anyone because we want to find about that. We can only become aware of questions; 
we haven’t viewed the discussion of passions. But I believe when you have read the first 
twelve chapters of the Leviathan, you should have an idea.” 861  In The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss defined vanity as the “infinite” and “irrational” desire.”862 
Vanity, the passion, results in irrational behavior, while fear of violent death results in 
rational behavior. Reason is dialectically derived out of the fear of violent death. If pride 
is the root of man’s irrational conduct, and fear of death the root of his rational conduct, 
unreasonableness precedes reasonableness. In his final insight, Strauss argues the 
diametrically opposite view: both vanity and fear are derivative of causal reason. Vanity 
as derivative of causal reason is still internally caused and infinite. Unlike Strauss’s 
Kojèveian-Hegelian interpretation in the 1930s, violent death is now a derivative of 
reason (causal thought). Strauss ends the footnote by pointing out that individuals 
become aware of the possible violent death because of their capacity for causal reason, 
humans are capable of “anticipat[ing] future danger,” and can “be haunted by long-range 
                                                
859  Strauss, “On the Basis,” 176-177n 2. 
860  Strauss, Session 3. 
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862  Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 9, 111. 
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fear.”863 The final insight marks a re-orientation in Strauss's interpretation of Hobbes that 
re-ordered passion and reason.  
The third and final major consequence of this pertains to the relation between 
Hobbes’s political and natural science. The first cause behind the natural qua political 
antagonism in the state of nature has changed from vanity to causal reason — vanity is a 
derivative of causal reason. The new ground for the natural or political antagonism is the 
human ability for causal reason.864 It is causal reason that enables vanity and fear of 
violent death — what Strauss identifies elsewhere as the basis of Hobbes’s philosophy. 
Strauss traces causal reason to chapter three of the Leviathan, part of the first twelve 
natural scientific chapters. Strauss’s reflection on the peculiar human ability of causal 
reason is thus derived from Hobbes's natural science. Both vanity and fear of violent 
death are derived from causal reason, and therefore they are also a derivative of Hobbes’s 
natural science. If the antagonism of the state of nature can be explained with reference to 
Hobbes’s natural scientific explanation of human nature, then Strauss locates the root of 
the antagonism precisely in the place he had rejected in his previous studies. In The 
Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss argues that all essential contradictions in 
Hobbes’s thought come down to Hobbes’s natural scientific view, which is divorced from 
Hobbes’s political theory in order for the latter to be consistent. Later, in Natural Right 
and History, Strauss argues that the natural scientific view of a non-teleological universe 
reflects his liberal and modern natural right doctrine. In his final essay on Hobbes, 
Strauss modifies this further due to the scientific view, not of the whole, but the scientific 
perspective of human nature. The second footnote in “On the Basis,” chapter seven in 
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What is Political Philosophy thus puts his account of the non-natural scientific basis of 
Hobbes’s political theory into question. 
At the end of his life, Strauss remained concerned with what is permanent and 
what sets human nature apart from animal nature, against Heidegger’s (and 
Macpherson’s) historicity of being. Strauss argues that there is something in human 
nature that is trans-historical — what he identifies, against Hobbes’s theory of the 
passions, as a natural inclination. Macpherson argues that competition is socially 
acquired, structurally caused. Strauss maintains a pre-modern understanding of the 
human animal as qualitatively different from other animals. We can see the continuity of 
his thought over the course of time even though the emphasis changes. In his writings on 
Hobbes, Strauss defines this essence in human vanity and causal reason. The later Strauss 
agrees with the young Strauss that it is vanity that set humans apart from other animals, 
and that the description of the human animal as the vain animal does not fit with 
Hobbes’s natural scientific view, but is more akin to what Aristotle’s describes as a 
human inclination. The later Strauss disagrees with the younger Strauss over the moral 
status of vanity. Beginning with Natural Right and History, he stresses with Rousseau 
that vanity is a social attribute; but unlike Rousseau, this does not disqualify vanity from 
being a natural attribute (i.e. having a place in the state of nature), since Strauss sides 

















Stepping back and reviewing the narrative journey of Strauss's Hobbes scholarship 
presented in this study is to reiterate its two core preoccupations: on one hand, the 
evolving connection linking Strauss's Hobbes scholarship and his critique of liberalism; 
and, on the other, the place of Hobbes in Strauss’s larger political philosophical project. 
The method of proof adopted throughout the dissertation has been that of close textual 
analysis of Strauss’s Hobbes texts in light of Strauss’s biography and the historical 
context. In order to conclude this work with some consideration of the place of my study 
in the broader context of Strauss’s oeuvre as a whole and the full scope of the scholarship 
on Strauss demands that I break with this method and offer general remarks about 
Strauss’s texts without providing comprehensive textual evidence at every step. The 
words of Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft remind us of the complexities at play here: “Strauss’s 
books are usually commentaries on other texts rather than systematic arguments — they 
can be extraordinarily difficult to unpack. Furthermore, and frustratingly, to write on 
Strauss today is also to navigate the labyrinth of his incredibly politicized reception.”865 
My general and concluding remarks here should therefore not be viewed as fully 
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substantiated claims about the rest of Strauss’s corpus and the secondary literature, but 
rather as a provisional sketch of the intellectual background from which Strauss’s studies 
of Hobbes emerge.  
I will first provide a basic summary of the gist of the dissertation’s theoretical 
movement before I situate my findings in relation to Strauss’s corpus more broadly and 
the scholarship that addresses it. We have seen throughout the foregoing chapters that 
Strauss returns to Hobbes several times throughout his career, revising and refining his 
understanding of Hobbes’s thought. I have argued that Strauss’s criticism of liberalism 
from the 1920s until the mid-1960s is key to understanding his evolving scholarly views 
on Hobbes, and that Strauss uses Hobbes’s philosophy to criticize liberalism and modern 
philosophy against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic and post-War United States.  
My interpretation of Strauss’s earlier texts in the first two chapters weaves 
together text and context to the degree that Strauss’s own approach dictated. The 
historicist method is part of Strauss’s own approach in his 1936 monograph on Hobbes 
— but only part, as he had already begun to pursue his own philosophical project through 
his interpretation of Hobbes: that is, I argue, his quest for a moral-ontological or 
anthropological insight about the human being qua Being. Strauss reads Hobbes in light 
of his biography, and his philosophy as reflective of the economic, cultural, religious and 
political context of the time. I read Strauss’s thought less as a symptom of the social 
context of his time, arguing instead that Strauss’s scholarship on Hobbes in the inter-war 
era represents one important lens through which he theorizes the political situation of his 
moment. More specifically, I have shown how Strauss’s approach to Hobbes at this stage 
is influenced primarily by his engagement with Zionism and liberalism.  
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While Strauss’s Hobbes studies continued to be influenced by the politics of the 
day also after World War II, I argue in chapter four and five that the development of his 
analysis of Hobbes results rather from the influence of pre-modern philosophy on his 
thinking; that is, from his attempt to distinguish between ancient and modern natural right 
and law, as well as his reaction to the historicist paradigm. In other words, while 
everyday contemporary politics becomes less of an immediate concern for Strauss after 
World War II, Hobbes comes to play a central role in Strauss’s larger political-
philosophical project as the founder of modern natural right. In Strauss’s theoretical 
narrative of the history of political thought, Hobbes is cast in the role of the philosopher 
who invents liberalism insofar as his modern theory of natural right forms the essence of 
liberal theory. Strauss also suggests that Hobbes’s theory of natural right ultimately 
evolves into historicism, relativism and nihilism—on display in its most extreme form in 
the philosophy of Heidegger and the politics of the Nazi’s. In his American writings, 
Strauss adopts an understanding of Socratic-Platonic rationalism and human ontology to 
counter this double-edged modern trend — modern natural right and historicism — that 
Hobbes instigates. Strauss argues that Hobbes’s individual right and democratic 
egalitarianism are contrary to the Socratic-Platonic ontology of human nature and an 
ancient rationalist approach to philosophy, which he in turn advances as a defence against 
historicism and relativism. 
Despite this apparent retreat from much direct commentary on his contemporary 
political situation after World War II, the political and ideological struggle between 
capitalist West and communist East did concern Strauss. Strauss sided with liberal 
capitalist West in general, and the United States in particular, over the Soviet Union and 
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other communist regimes. This preference appears in Strauss’s Hobbes scholarship in his 
distinction between Hobbesian or theoretical liberalism, liberal constitutionalism and 
liberal education. While he dismisses the first, he supports the latter two. In Strauss’s 
view, the republican regime in the United States would allow for the preservation of the 
philosophical and political philosophical tradition and the establishment of a civil service 
and scholarly community with Straussian ideals. In texts from the 1950s and 1960s, 
Strauss advises a curtailment of the excess of freedoms and democratic influence over 
political institutions. What Strauss retains from Hobbes is the necessity for popular 
sovereignty — or at least the belief thereof, as will be discussed further below — in 
contemporary politics.  
In chapter five, I have accounted for Strauss’s attempt to understand Hobbes as he 
understood himself in his final writing and seminar on Hobbes. His studies of Hobbes at 
this stage follow their own path of discovery. This late approach to Hobbes reflects the 
mature Strauss’s conviction that philosophical themes and questions transcend the time in 
which the thinker lives. I nevertheless also note that Strauss still points to a few lessons 
from Hobbes’s observation about human nature that could inform politics of his day, 
especially for liberalism to separate itself from socialism. Yet Strauss’s main argument 
during this period remains that Hobbes locates reason (or more precisely, “causal reason” 
as opposed to “teleological reason”) as the essential feature distinguishing human nature. 
According to Strauss’s later work on Hobbes, both vanity and fear are derivative of 
causal reason. This final insight marks a re-orientation in Strauss's interpretation of 
Hobbes that re-ordered the causal relation between passion and reason. Since vanity and 
fear of violent death are derived from causal reason, they are also a derivative of 
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Hobbes’s natural science. Since the antagonism of the state of nature can now be 
explained with reference to Hobbes’s natural science, Strauss locates the root of the 
antagonism in the very place he had rejected in all his previous studies. As a 
consequence, Hobbes’s natural science is suddenly and plausibly seen as compatible with 
his political philosophy: the main contradictions in Hobbes’s thought are thus resolved 
without any appeal to a pre-scientific Hobbes or extra-textual explanations. 
6. 1. Religion, politics and philosophy 
Throughout his life, Strauss published fifteen books and around one hundred articles on a 
variety of thinkers and topics in the tradition of religious and philosophical thought. His 
overall body of work in the secondary literature is generally divided into thematic 
quarrels. The two main ones are: that between the ancients and the moderns, also referred 
to as the “modernity problem,” which passes through a series of variations, such as 
historicism versus philosophy or natural right; and that between reason and revelation, 
also referred to as the “theologico-political problem” or “Jerusalem” versus “Athens.” 
Whereas it is around the first of these two themes that this dissertation ultimately turns in 
chapter three and four, it is the latter quarrel that has received most attention over the last 
few decades. For example, in their respective studies of the theologico-political problem 
in Strauss’s work, Batnitzky, Meier and Tanguay point to the preface to the German 
edition of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1965), in which Strauss states that the 
“theologico-political problem has since [his first book on Spinoza] remained the theme of 
my studies.”866 As we saw in chapter two and three, it was indeed the correlation between 
religion, politics and philosophy with which the young Strauss was primarily concerned.  
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The relation between politics and religion is at the core of the second chapter’s 
discussion of Strauss’s Zionist texts. In his dissertation on Jacobi, Strauss investigates the 
relation between religion and philosophy as it pertains to the soundness of the 
Enlightenment’s refutation of religion. There Strauss discusses how Jacobi holds that also 
enlightenment rationality rests on an irrational decision. Meier has suggested that the 
study of Jacobi, together with his study of Spinoza, “aroused the suspicion [in Strauss] 
that the Enlightenment was based merely on a ‘new belief’ rather than on a ‘new 
knowledge.’”867 What this meant, both Meier and Tanguay have explained, is that Strauss 
thought in the 1920s that religious orthodoxy was defeated not by theoretical 
philosophical arguments but by a praxis, or what they refer to as the “Napoleonic 
strategy”:  
The goal of this [Napoleonic] strategy was to make man master and possessor of 
the world, the creator of a world that would forever make the world as simply 
given—the natural world—disappear. Remaining manifestations of orthodoxy 
would henceforth appear as relics of a bygone age long since surpassed by the 
progress of science and civilization. This new civilization does not rest content 
with promising men an improvement of their condition in some hypothetical 
beyond, but actively works to transform the world so as to make completely 
habitable and in the service of human needs. From the moment they are united in 
the same faith in science, progress, and civilization, men will understand the vain 
and useless character of persecutions and massacres carried out in the name of 
religion. But, above all, the modern Enlightenment would deliver humanity from 
the continuous threat weighting over it of an omnipotent God who inspires fear 
and humility.868  
 
Strauss views the Enlightenment commitment to progress as a new religion, a 
commitment based on a belief in reason. Strauss’s observation of the irrational 
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preconditions of enlightenment rationality as uncovered by Jacobi, and of the inadequate 
positivist critique of revelation by Spinoza, might leave a window open for the existence 
of God or gods, but this opening does not turn Strauss into a believer.  
Sheppard and Tanguay have both argued that Strauss was unconvinced at the time 
by the existentialist religious revival of the inward-oriented neo-orthodox theology of 
Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. Tanguay and Meier argue that even after Strauss 
returns to the battle between the early enlightenment thinkers (Hobbes and Spinoza) and 
orthodoxy in the late 1920s, disqualifying the theoretical victory of the former over the 
latter, he sides with the atheistic outlook of the German radical conservatives. The “new 
atheism” of the radical conservatives, Tanguay explains, 
represented the position of the Enlightenment with a radicalism hitherto unknown. 
Nietzsche had turned the critical arms of the Enlightenment against itself. He 
rejected the moderate Enlightenment’s soft synthesis of religion and philosophy, as 
well as the ambiguous respect for religious faith shown in the age of Romanticism.  
[…] According to atheism from probity, the genuine motive of belief or unbelief is 
not theoretical, but moral.869  
 
The atheism introduced by Nietzsche is based in moral probity, not consolation, as 
Strauss argues that religion had become a source of comfort (the security of an eternal 
order and meaning to life) rather than anxiety since the 18th century. Dissatisfied with 
belief as the foundation for politics, Strauss turned to human nature in his first Hobbes 
studies, searching for a moral foundation for politics in human nature. In chapter three, I 
show how, in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936), Strauss replaces God with 
human nature as the metaphysical (recall that metaphysics is referred to here not as a 
metaphysical structure of the whole but instead referring to an essentialist view of human 
nature) basis for moral evil. 
                                                
869 Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, 47, emphasis added. 
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In order to arrive at this position, however, it was necessary to unpack — as I do 
in chapter two — the manner in which Strauss’s interpretation of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political, like political Zionism, is dependent on an enemy for political unit to form, as 
the political itself lacks a metaphysical foundation. Schmitt argues that it is the existential 
necessity and willingness to kill and die that marks conflicts between groups — friends 
and foes — in various cultural spheres of life as political. In absence of a religious 
cosmology, death is the ultimate horizon. Strauss, in turn, observes that the moral motive 
behind Schmitt’s concept of the political is to transcend liberalism, but due to its 
orientation towards death, Strauss argues, as Meier points out, the morality of the 
Schmitt’s conception is simply the inverse of liberalism’s preference for life and thus 
Schmitt’s theorization of the political remains trapped within a liberal moral horizon. In 
chapter two, I argue that Strauss sets out to complete Schmitt’s critique of liberalism (i.e., 
to transcend the moral liberal horizon) by attaching the political antagonism to an 
unliberal moral aspect of human nature. Vanity, the political substance that Strauss 
extracted from his engagement with Hobbes in the 1930s, is the desire that Strauss argues 
fundamentally spurred individuals and sets apart humans from other animals. He argues 
that this substance is distinctively moral: due to their vanity — the desire to be 
recognised by others as superior — humans by nature are evil. I concluded that Strauss 
builds on Hobbes to extract a political moral ontology that could ground a right-wing 
authoritarian alternative to liberalism, socialism and Nazism. 
In chapter four, I argue that Strauss does not side with religion due to the 
shortcomings of enlightenment rationality, nor does he revert to a nihilist position after 
World War II; instead, I suggest that Strauss’s foray into the limits of modern thought 
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foreshadowed what becomes his rejection of modern rationalism. Strauss argues that was 
Hobbes’s philosophy exemplifies a distinctly modern rationalism, defined as the 
orientation towards survival, as grounded in passion/fear and instrumental rationality. It 
is his rejection of this modern rationalism that primes Strauss’s return to classical 
political philosophy. The mature Strauss sides instead with the Socratic-Platonic rational 
and natural right and law tradition, or in the terminology of the late Strauss and school of 
thought (Straussianism) that he established in the United States, with the “ancients” over 
the “moderns.” It is Strauss’s return and adoption of a pre-modern and esoteric political 
philosophy, and his portrayal of Hobbes as the quintessential modern enlightenment 
exoteric thinker and founder of theoretical liberalism to which I turned in chapter four.  
In my discussion of esotericism in chapter four — the subject in Strauss’s 
scholarship that has generated the greatest controversy — I arrived at a similar 
conclusion as Lampert, Tanguay, Sheppard and Zank before me: Strauss preferred the 
medieval Islamic and Judaic tradition rational approach to philosophy and religion. 
Exoteric rhetoric (religious or otherwise) so understood provides the normative 
dimension of political philosophy for the many who need guidance by moral precepts, 
while the few philosophers with supreme rational ability adopt esoteric communication 
over dangerous philosophical insights. Here, I argue, as Tanguay before me, that both 
Strauss’s discovery of ancient esotericism and his discovery of the possibility of classical 
natural right are premised on a hierarchical view of individuals’ rational capacities. I 
suggest that the reason why Strauss writes more openly about esotericism than anyone 
before him is as much to reinforce a hierarchical view of human capacities against 
Hobbesian egalitarianism, as it is to counter historicism. Speaking of esotericism openly 
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also serves to create an aura of secrecy and a promise of a path of discovery that lured 
some people to the Straussian fold and repelled others.   
When Strauss scholars speak of a “turn” or “change in orientation” (as Strauss 
himself named it) in Strauss’s thought they usually have in mind the moment when he 
realized that a return to the ancients is possible. There are, however, disagreements over 
when exactly this turn occurred. In his preface to the translation of Spinoza’s Critique of 
Religion, Strauss dated this realization to his 1932 review of Schmitt’s The Concept of 
the Political. 870 While it is plausible that Strauss had understood that a return to the 
ancients was possible at this point in time, in chapter three and four I argue that it is first 
later that Strauss first comprehensively adopts an ancient ontology and ethical outlook. If 
it is correct that he realizes that a return to the ancient is possible in 1932, this realization 
does not coincide with the discovery of an esoteric style of writing, which I argue, 
following Tanguay and Lampert, occurred in the second half of the 1930s. In chapter 
four, I showed that Strauss’s discovery of esotericism is a gradual process, as was his 
adoption of his Socratic-Platonic outlook. I am therefore inclined to follow Zank in 
arguing that Strauss’s “change in orientation” is best described as a series of “stages.”871 
As I have mentioned above, Strauss’s exposure of the esoteric tradition is part of his 
laying the foundation of an egalitarian conception of nature. Intellectual order of rank 
thus becomes the foundation for the Socratic-Platonic natural right tradition that Strauss 
adopts, as well as the standard against which he assesses Hobbes’s doctrine. Strauss casts 
Hobbesian modern natural right as contrary to human nature in his effort to reinforce a 
hierarchical view of the rational intellect contra Hobbes’s egalitarian rationalism. Most 
                                                
870  Strauss, “Preface,” 30. 
871  Zank, Leo Strauss: The Early Writings, 13. 
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significant for unpacking Strauss’s overall studies of Hobbes, I argue that the discovery 
of esotericism does not drastically alter his interpretation of Hobbes — this is not to 
downplay Strauss’s gradual realization that Hobbes was an atheist — what it does do, 
however, is alter his presentation of his final insight on Hobbes.  
When Strauss returns to Hobbes after World War II, it is his project of creating a 
narrative of the history of political philosophy that guides his interpretation. Rather than 
being a result of a planned esoteric design (although this element is also at play), it is his 
effort to place Hobbes near the dividing line between ancients and moderns that produces 
the contradictions in Strauss’s presentation of Hobbes’s philosophy. The stakes for 
Strauss were both epistemological — the defence of an ancient rational epistemology — 
and ontological — the defence of an ancient conception of human nature. Put differently, 
Strauss refuses to let Heidegger close the door on Plato. He continues to toil in the 
Platonic metaphysical tradition as zetetic despite Heidegger’s destruction of “Being.”  
Like Pippin and Rosen before me, I argue that Strauss founds his philosophical 
ground in human nature. In chapter two and three, I present evidence that Strauss is the 
first to put forth human vanity as the ontological/metaphysical (“Being”) ground for 
morality (biblical morality) and politics. In chapter four and five, I argue that, after World 
War II, human reason (Socratic-Platonic philosophy) becomes Strauss’s new 
metaphysical/objective ground — one detached from scriptural morality and attached to a 
Platonic inspired virtue-ethics. While Schmitt’s political ontology is groundless or 
immanent, Strauss’s political philosophical ontology appeals to metaphysics: first by 
means of a phenomenology similar to a basic empiricist (inductive) understanding of 
human nature (individuals as consumed by vanity from birth); and later to a 
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phenomenology understood as an ancient conception of human nature (as rational) in that 
the philosopher engages in a dialog that ascends from common opinions to knowledge.  
I also observed that in accordance with Strauss’s later world-view, theoretical 
wisdom is only accessible to the few who by nature have exceptional rational abilities. In 
Natural Right and History (1952), Strauss agrees with Plato and Aristotle that the pursuit 
of wisdom is the highest of ends. I observed that what Strauss writes of as just – the only 
just according to nature – in Natural Right and History is the pursuit (often esoteric) of 
wisdom by means of Socratic questioning (i.e., in the few philosophers’ way of life). In 
chapter four, I pointed out that in his Natural Right and History, Tanguay proposes that 
Strauss thinks that only knowledge of the whole can ground a natural right. The idea of a 
natural right is thus only tentative until such knowledge can be attained. Tanguay argues 
that Strauss as an Alfarabian doubted that such knowledge could ever be attained. 
However, in his adoption of a pre-modern eso-exoteric approach to philosophical and 
political life, Strauss maintains that political philosophy nevertheless should endorse 
moral precepts as the exoteric or rhetorical part of philosophy. His adoption of Socratic 
philosophy is thus compatible with a moral or civic philosophy.872  
The egalitarian basis of Hobbesian liberalism or modern natural right is contrary 
to Strauss’s Socratic-Platonic virtue ethics that rests on an anti-egalitarian perception of 
natural inequality. Yet, liberal regimes, such as the one that Strauss discovered in the 
United States, allow for an education in the great books and the pursuit of wisdom. 
                                                
872  Along these lines, Meier has suggested that Strauss propped up the religious position as an esoteric 
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celebrated in public. As a result, Drury has observed, Strauss’s double rhetoric allowed for the fight to 
continue in the coastal areas after his death — a battle that, for example, Harry Jaffa led on the West 
Coast against Pangle on the East Coast — as to muddy the waters.  
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Strauss also considered classical liberal constitutionalism and liberal educations as 
instruments to limit the democratic element of liberal democracy. Unlike Schmitt then, 
whose theorization of the political Strauss builds on in his attempt to transcend liberalism 
in the 1930s, Strauss ends up supporting some liberal democratic institutions in and after 
World War II. I will discuss Strauss’s standpoint on liberal democracy after World War II 
in more detail below, but for now, we should stay with the question of Strauss’s anti-
liberal authoritarianism in the inter-war era. 
6. 2. Strauss’s authoritarianism 
I am not the first to suggest that the young Strauss was a radical-conservative 
authoritarian. This view is today common among Strauss scholars, including, but not 
exclusively, Sheppard, Zank, Meier, Xenos, Altman, Shell and Lampert. There are 
similarities across our various interpretations of Strauss’s texts that support this view, but 
also important ways in which we disagree. These differences are not hair splitting.  
Xenos builds his case that Strauss was an authoritarian throughout his life around 
the letter that Strauss wrote to Löwith in 1932 and discussed in chapter three. In Xenos’s 
words, Strauss philosophically “embraces […] a premodern notion of […] human nature” 
that supports, in Strauss’s words to Löwith, “fascist, authoritarian, imperial principles” of 
the political Right.873 Xenos claims that the letter reveals Strauss’s political outlook; one, 
he argues, that Strauss maintained throughout his life. Altman takes this argument up one 
notch, claiming that Strauss, until the very end, was a Nazi in sheep’s clothing.874 On the 
opposite side, Howse dismisses Altman’s case without engaging it head-on, and argues 
                                                
873  Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue, 70. 
874  See Altman, The German Stranger, 1-28, 235-280. Altman argues that the most revealing letter in 
respect to Strauss politics and philosophy is not the Strauss wrote to Löwith in 1932; but rather, a letter 
Strauss wrote to Jacob Klein, London, 23 June 1934 (Altman, The German Stranger, 228. Original 
letter reproduced in Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften Band 3, 515-18. 
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against Xenos that Strauss’s letter to Löwith is a red herring. Howse suggests that the 
letter should be read as an exception — sent at a desperate time — that sought to identify 
a realistic opposition to Hitler, and not as an endorsement of fascist or authoritarian 
politics in general. Due to his flirtation with the ideas of Schmitt and Heidegger at a 
young age, Howse argues, Strauss’s mature embrace of liberalism and “peace” should be 
read as t’shuvah (Hebrew for “repentance”) for his youthful sins.875 
It is not unusual to write unsubstantiated or hyperbolic claims in letters (or these 
days, emails). My contribution to the debate over Strauss’s anti-liberal right-wing 
authoritarian stance has been to unpack how Strauss’s politics is grounded in his 
philosophical position as reflected primarily in his scholarship on Hobbes. I have 
proposed that Strauss’s philosophy and political position are mutually constitutive in the 
1930s. In chapter two and three, I arrive at a similar conclusion to that of Sheppard and 
McCormick, and as was first indicated by Meier, and here presented in the words of 
Xenos, Strauss politics are “predicated on the essential evil of the human being.”876 The 
moral-ontological view of human evil, Strauss posits as the anthropological ground for a 
non-liberal authoritarian political regime, as contrary to the anarchistic (liberal and 
socialist) conception of human nature as good or educable. The view of human nature as 
evil, Xenos suggests, is the “grounding he [Strauss] had struggled to find for his rejection 
of the rights associated with democracy and liberalism.”877  
In chapter three, I argue that Strauss excavates from Hobbes’s pre-scientific 
observation of human nature the specific characteristic that sat humans apart from 
animals and marks the human species as evil: namely, vanity. Xenos’s argument that 
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Strauss asserts that it is due to vanity that humans are morally evil is the same as my own. 
However, I dissect in greater detail than Xenos Strauss’s conception of vanity, and 
perhaps most importantly, answer the question of why Strauss deems vanity a moral evil. 
In so doing, I arrive at a conclusion that departs from Xenos’s claim that Strauss grounds 
an authoritarian politics on his understanding of moral evil after World War II. Along 
these lines, at the end of chapter three, I show that Strauss’s proposition that humans are 
by nature morally evil is incompatible with the kind of Socratic-Platonic virtue-ethics that 
he comes to adopt.  
I also question Xenos’s claim (who follows McCormick on this point) that Strauss 
adopts fear as the principle for rule in his preferred regime in the 1930s. My 
interpretation in chapter three suggests that McCormick and Xenos mistakes Strauss’s 
view of Hobbes’s politics for Strauss’s own in the early 1930s; that is, they think that 
Strauss attached legitimacy or obligation to fear, which is his interpretation of bourgeois 
consciousness. Against this view, I argue that, in his attempt to transcend the liberal 
horizon, Strauss attaches morality to vanity. Strauss’s justification for anti-liberal 
authoritarianism is that humans by nature are evil. It is the bourgeois moral attitude 
advanced by Hobbes, which Strauss attempts to move away from, that is ascribed by a 
moral legal right to self-preservation and defined by the fear of violent death. My 
objection to Xenos and McCormick’s case is thus that if Strauss had adopted fear of 
violent death as the principle of rule, then he would have accepted bourgeois 
consciousness as the reason of the state. My hesitation with this suggestion is that in the 
1930s Strauss seeks to move beyond liberalism; it would thus have been theoretically 
inconsistent for him to have adopted the same principle of rule that he had argued defines 
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bourgeois consciousness and morality. A possible way around this objection would to 
argue that Strauss adopts fear as disconnected from violent death as the principle for rule; 
as for example is the case in the Old Testament or the Hebrew bible, in which fear is 
attached to God and the afterlife. The underlying logic behind this claim is that the 
authoritarian view of the human animal as evil also requires fear as a tool or the principle 
of rule to secure obedience. In accordance to this interpretation, Strauss could then 
mobilize fear for a non-liberal regime.  
What then, if not, or beside fear, did Strauss think could serve as the principle of 
obedience that is in agreement with Strauss’s radical conservative critique of bourgeoisie 
liberalism before World War II? Strauss never answers this question fully. In his notes in 
the margins of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Strauss raises the question if it was 
not possible to let aristocratic vanity play out its course in the formation of an empire. At 
the very end of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss also entertains the Socratic-
Platonic conception of rule as based in reason/natural law despite Hobbes’s criticism of 
this tradition as insufficient.  
Does Strauss arrive at a place after World War II, in which he thinks fear — 
rather than fear of a violent death — is a good exoteric principle upon which to secure 
obedience among the many? In his often read posthumously published essay, “The Three 
Waves of Modernity,” Strauss states that for both Hobbes and Machiavelli, “there is no 
evil in men which cannot be controlled […] by institutions with teeth in them.”878 He 
contrasts Machiavelli and Hobbes’s reliance on fear, which he identifies as part of the 
first wave (of three) of modernity, with the pre-modern perspective that sees “divine 
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grace, morality” and “formation of character” as the basis for order in the state.879 Some 
scholars argue that Strauss not only admires, but is also closer to Machiavelli than he lets 
on, and that he teaches the lesson in the Prince that it is better for rulers to be feared than 
loved. However, as a professor of political science in the new continent after the war, 
Strauss seems to have been more engaged in the formation of his students and readers’ 
characters and intellectual horizon than in advocating for them to adopt fear as the 
principle for obedience for the many. Fear was certainly already one of the main 
ideological linchpins during the Cold War, but I don’t see any conclusive evidence that 
Strauss advocated for fear as the primary exoteric doctrine (for domestic and international 
policy) for the masses in his published work or seminars in the post-war era for his 
students and readers to adopt. It is worth noting that he preferred liberal arts to religious 
education, and that in post-war United States, the liberal arts was becoming mass 
education. Out of these reservations, Xenos and I differ over whether or not, or at least to 
what extent, Strauss adopts fear to secure obedience and order after World War II. And as 
stated above, I fully disagree with Xenos that Strauss remained an authoritarian after he 
had moved to the United States based on the belief that humans are by nature morally 
evil. The question that remains to be settled, however, is whether or not Strauss remains 
an authoritarian after World War II on different grounds. Or, to put the question more 
broadly: what political regime or regimes are reflected, or are compatible with Strauss’s 
philosophy after World War II? 
6. 3. Strauss’s criticism of liberal theory after World War II 
One benefit of a less detailed textual analysis than the one I have advanced throughout 
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this dissertation is that such an approach would have allowed me to cover a greater 
number of texts.880 The most relevant of Strauss’s works not discussed thoroughly in 
regard to the question of Strauss’s authoritarianism after World War II is his 1948 book, 
On Tyranny. In this close reading of Xenophon’s Hiero, Strauss applied his recently 
discovered esoteric hermeneutic of reading to a lesser-known classical dialogue. Xenos 
turns to On Tyranny to make the case that Strauss remains an authoritarian after the war, 
embracing an ancient form of tyranny as differentiated from the modern tyrannical 
regimes. In an often-quoted passage from the book that I referred to at the end of chapter 
four, Strauss discusses the difference between tyranny and rule of law:  
The ‘tyrannical’ teaching, we shall answer, serves the purpose, not of solving the 
problem of the best political order, but of bringing to light the nature of political 
things. The “theoretical” thesis which favors beneficent tyranny is indispensable 
in order to make clear a crucial implication of the practically and hence 
theoretically true thesis which favors rule of law and legitimate government. The 
‘theoretical thesis’ is a most striking expression of the problem, or of the 
problematic character, of law and legitimacy: legal justice is a justice which is 
imperfect and more or less blind, and legitimate government is not necessarily 
‘good government’ and almost certainly will not be government by the wise. Law 
and legitimacy are problematic from the highest point of view, namely, from that 
of wisdom. We have stated that according to that teaching beneficent tyranny is 
theoretically superior and practically inferior to rule of laws and legitimate 
government.881  
 
The rule of law is inferior from the perspective of wisdom — from the philosopher’s 
perspective. It is evident from the text, however, that Strauss thinks that both the liberal 
regimes and communist regimes are ruled by the unwise; and between these two, that the 
present constitutional liberal regimes are preferable to communist autocracies. Legitimate 
government is preferable to tyranny as it restricts the actions of the unwise. For the era in 
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which he lived, Strauss preferred constitutionalism, but at a different historical conjecture 
or locality, it is not inconceivable, as some Straussians argues, that he would side with his 
Xenos or Plato, and support beneficent tyranny or government by the wise. While others 
argue that the model of the rule of the wise, in the form of ancient tyranny, or better, an 
aristocracy of philosopher kings, is simply a utopian measure to judge imperfect, but no 
less legitimate, real-world regimes. 
As I mention above, my interpretation in chapter four and five contradicts 
Xenos’s claim that Strauss remained an “authoritarian” after the war based on the notion 
of human nature as moral evil and Strauss’s own concealment of this political ontology 
“by a pseudo-scholarly apparatus and the techniques of exoteric writing.”882 Instead, I 
argue that in both Natural Right and History and his final texts on Hobbes, Strauss 
abandons the Biblical presentation of human nature as morally evil, and instead adopts an 
ancient view of human nature as the foundation for his mature perspective on politics and 
philosophy in which evil is seen as a vice. His earlier perspective of human nature as 
moral evil does not fit with his adoption of a Socratic-Platonic virtue ethics. He thus 
comes to emphasise, just as with his scientific or mature Hobbes, reason over vanity as 
that which sets humans apart from other animals.  
My agreement with Xenos thus extends to his observation that, even after the war, 
the ground for philosophy remains human nature for Strauss, and that he furthermore 
understands “modernity or modern philosophy” as “a revolt against [ancient] human 
nature.”883 To repeat, where we disagree is over Xenos’s claim that Strauss remains an 
authoritarian based on a conviction that humans are morally evil. Instead, I suggest that 
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Strauss detaches this biblical moral conception from human nature as the ground for an 
authoritarian state when he returns to Hobbes in the late 1940s. I have shown that what 
began as a rejection of liberal thought and liberal morality, and a search for theoretical 
and political authoritarian corrective in the Weimar era, becomes over time a cautious 
endorsement of liberal institutions as found in the United States. 
To substantiate this position in chapter four, I first offer an interpretation of 
“German Nihilism” that differed from not only Xenos’s, but also Altman’s, who argues 
that the American Strauss “is and remains [throughout his life] a committed ‘German 
nihilist;’ his political leanings are and remain ‘pagan-fascist;’ and his writings aim not 
just at the articulation of a position beyond but at a destruction of democratic 
liberalism.” 884  Against this position, I argue that, in the light of Nietzsche’s and 
Heidegger’s destruction of the history of reason, Strauss understands his role in post-war 
United States as that of a teacher and defender of pre-modern or classical rationalist 
philosophy. Strauss also identifies and promotes classical liberal education, or as it is also 
called, the great books tradition. I also observed, like Shell before me, that in “German 
Nihilism,” Strauss identifies the constitutionalism that he later comes to endorse, first 
over Hitlerism and later, over communist authoritarianism. However, as I will discuss at 
more length below, Strauss argues for the throttle back the democratic component of the 
liberal democratic regime and supported a limited form of liberalism akin to classical 
republicanism or a mixed regime. The question to ask then is how authoritarian is the 
liberal democratic regime Strauss advocates for? Is it liberal democratic in any 
meaningful way? 
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6. 4. The case of the Weimar Republic 
In his first essay on Hobbes after World War II, I argue, Strauss isolates the principle of 
liberal theory to Hobbes’s modern natural right doctrine. While Strauss dismisses 
Hobbesian liberalism he endorses a constitutional regime.  In his well-known essay, 
“Liberal education and Responsibility,” the argument Strauss offers for the endorsement 
of classical constitutionalism is that  “wisdom” cannot be separated from “moderation”: 
Karl Marx, the father of communism, and Friedrich Nietzsche, the 
stepgrandfather of fascism, were liberally educated on a level to which we cannot 
even hope to aspire. But perhaps one can say that their grandiose failures make it 
easier for us who have experienced those failures to understand again the old 
saying that wisdom cannot be separated from moderation and hence to understand 
that wisdom requires unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution and even to the 
cause of constitutionalism.885 
 
In chapter four, I observed that Strauss realizes in the late 1930s that there are political 
reasons for not promoting Nietzschean nihilism or even classical scepticism: the criticism 
of liberal civilization in public had led to disastrous political consequences. The rise of 
Nazism and communism had taught Strauss that politics require moderation. That Strauss 
favors constitutionalism over tyranny is also apparent in his preface to the English 
translation of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1965). In the “Preface,” Strauss returns to 
the “Jewish-problem” that had preoccupied him throughout the 1920s.886   
In this text, Strauss, as Tanguay points out, identifies two modern solutionns to 
the Jewish question that he argues originated with Spinoza: liberalism and Zionism. I 
have argued in chapter two that, in the 1920, Strauss arrived at the insight that it is 
impossible to find a theoretical (or principled) justification for the foundation of a Jewish 
nation. What, in the 1960s, refers to as the “theological-political” predicament could not 
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be solved; in other words, a theoretical bridge cannot be built between the orthodox 
position (that provided Jews with their authentic identity) that waited for the return of the 
messiah to end the galut, and the political Zionists who evolve from liberal rationalism 
and advocate for human intervention for the creation of a Jewish state. There is, however, 
Strauss suggests, a more practical solution. In the “Preface,” Strauss partly mends the 
theoretical impasse by suggesting that it was clear to the political Zionists all along that 
while the “return to the land of Israel” is the most important “modification” of the galut 
since the Talmud, it is not the end resolution, “culminating in the building of the third 
temple and restoration of the sacrificial service.”887 The end of the galut is irresolvable 
from a human perspective as its resolution depends on divine intervention. Yet, Strauss 
states that the state of Israel is a “blessing for Jews everywhere,” not the least out of 
existential necessity as Strauss argues that the liberal state could not “solve the Jewish 
problem” either.888  
In the “Preface,” Strauss introduces Spinoza as “the first philosopher who was 
both a democrat and a liberal. He was the philosopher who founded liberal democracy, a 
specifically modern regime.”889 Spinoza promotes civic equality independently of faith, 
for which he aims to liberalize Judaism from its nationalist origin in Moses’s law. Cohen 
has accused Spinoza of an unfair reading of the Jewish prophets, foremost, Maimonides, 
and for having presented Christianity as more “universalist” and “spiritual,” compared to 
the “particularistic” and “carnal” Judaism, than it actually is.890 Against Cohen, Strauss 
argues that Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise carves his argument with a 
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Christian reader in mind, and thus he “fights Christian prejudices by appealing to 
Christian prejudices.”891 In short, Strauss presents Spinoza as the founder of a liberal 
democratic regime that he envisions to be ruled by “philosophers” and “artists,” not 
“priests,” and based on a universalistic and inclusive morality that transcends the 
particularistic states or religious tribalism in any form — be it Judaism, Christianity or 
Islam.892  
Most German Jews thought that liberalism had solved the “Jewish-problem”: 
Prior to Hitler’s rise to power most German Jews believed that their problem had 
been solved in principle by liberalism: German Jews were Germans of the Jewish 
faith, i.e. they were no less German than the Germans of the Christian faith or of 
no faith. They assumed that the German state (to say nothing of German society 
or culture) was or ought to be neutral to the difference between Christians and 
Jews or between non-Jews and Jews. This assumption was not accepted by the 
strongest part of Germany and hence by Germany. 893  
 
This brings us to anti-Semitism and Strauss’s assessment of how the Germans had dealt 
with the Jewish problem: “[the] German Jewish-problem was never solved. It was 
annihilated by the annihilation of the German Jews.”894 The Weimar Republic had been 
incapable of suppressing anti-Semitism effectively. This shortcoming, Strauss points out 
in the “Preface” is due to the architecture of the liberal democratic regime with its 
fundamental private liberties—most important of which is religious tolerance, for which 
faith is a private affair. Due to the liberal state’s separation between the public and the 
private, only legislation against public discrimination, not privately held beliefs, is 
possible.895 Echoing Marx on The Jewish Question, Strauss therefore observes that “legal 
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equality” does not entail “social equality.”896 Unlike Marx, Strauss, however, does not 
have economic equality in mind when he spoke of social equality, but anti-Semitism.  
The strongest part of Germany, Strauss suggests, was “old Germany,” with its 
longing for the mediaeval Christian unity of the late Holy Roman Empire (with its centre 
in Germany). Gallstone explains: 
For the majority, it was Christianity that defined German cultural identity. 
Although German Jews placed their hope in a republic whose political institutions 
were neutral regarding differences between Jews and Christians, most non-Jewish 
Germans rejected this neutrality outright. The Weimar Republic was weak then 
because key features of German life stood outside the scope of public law and 
contradicted the principles of the public realm. In the end, German society proved 
stronger than the liberal democratic state.897  
 
Strauss further notes that the Weimar Republic — the first German liberal democratic 
regime — does not get off to a good start as it was born out of the defeat of World War I, 
and blamed for the Treaty of Versailles.898 Old Germany was humiliated. Strauss plays 
down the economic crisis and monopoly capitalism of the late 1920s as the primary 
reason behind the weakness of the Weimar Republic and points to the fact that other 
nations were equally affected. That the days of the republic were numbered after the 1925 
“election of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg”, he writes, was clear to anyone with “eyes to 
see.”899 However, that the Third Reich would follow in its collapse, Strauss notes, was 
not inevitable: 
The victory of National Socialism became necessary in Germany for the same 
reason that the victory of communism had become necessary in Russia: the man 
with the strongest will or single-mindedness, the greatest ruthlessness, daring, and 
power over his following, and the best judgment about the strength of the various 
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forces in the immediately relevant political field was the leader of the 
revolution.900  
 
Even though the liberal Weimar Republic terminated in the hands of Hitler, Strauss 
stressed to his North American readers that a liberal regime is superior to the communist 
regime in regard to the Jewish-problem.901 Totalitarian regimes that lack constitutional 
barriers to prohibit privately held opinions do not fair better in Strauss’s account. While 
Strauss identifies anti-Semitism as the “only clear principle” of Nazism, the Soviet 
regime used anti-Semitism opportunistically and the gulags did little to improve their 
standing in Strauss’s description.902 Strauss concludes that the Jewish problem can never 
be fully resolved but needs not turn out as extreme as it had in Germany.  
He casts the Weimar Republic as an exception among liberal democratic states: 
“The weakness of liberal democracy in Germany explains why the situation of the 
indigenous Jews was more precarious in Germany than in any other Western country.”903 
There are, however, constitutional instruments in a liberal regime designed to prevent the 
tyranny of the majority over minorities and checks on the abuses of power. A central 
question that remains unanswered in the “Preface” is if Strauss believed that a more 
robust liberal constitutional architecture and institutions would have served as bulwark 
against the old Germany? Would Hitler’s seizure power and dismantling of the rule of 
law have been possible if an independent and strong judiciary had been in place? Or was 
it the constitutional clause that allowed for Presidential governing, i.e., too much power 
vested in the executive partly, to blame? Would corrections of one or all of the above 
been sufficient to curb the will of old Germany? We do not get answers to these questions 
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in the “Preface,” but more details of Strauss’s criticism of the pitfalls of liberal 
democracy — of both its democratic and liberal components — is found in his writing on 
the status and practice of political science in post-war United States.   
6. 5. Liberal democracy and philosophy in the United States  
 
The late Strauss is known as one of the main advocates for the revival of political 
philosophy in the decades after World War II, and as a stern critic of post-war positivist 
or “behaviourist” political science, or what he also called the “new political science.”904 
The new political science, Strauss suggests in “An Epilogue” (1962), was premised on a 
separation between facts and values. Whereas the new political science generates truth 
claims, it does not allow for value judgments (“ought”) to be derived from facts (“is”).905 
The new political science’s methodological objectivity thus comes hand in hand with a 
relativist position that value judgments are no longer scientifically valid and all values are 
of same order, such as Strauss’s often-mentioned double edge example that liberal 
democracy is superior to tyranny.906 In his chapter on Weber in Natural Right and 
History, “Natural Right and the Distinction between Facts and Values,” Strauss argues 
that a value-free social science is unattainable since a fact-value distinction is impossible 
to maintain. Strauss places this methodological relativism at the heart of the “crisis of 
liberal democracy,” which he sees as part of the decline of the West in general, on the 
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grounds that it lost confidence in its traditional values, which he argues, has “become 
concealed by a ritual which calls itself methodology or logic.”907 As a result of this, 
Strauss judges that the new political science “does not know that it fiddles, and it does 
not [even] know that Rome burns.”908  
Despite this blindness, Strauss concedes that the new political science “had 
learned certain lessons” from recent history — specifically, a wariness about the 
“irrationality of the masses,” and a recognition of the “necessity of elites.” 909  He 
nevertheless adds that if the new political science  
had been wise, it would have learned those lessons from the galaxy of 
antidemocratic thinkers of the remote past. It believed, in other words, it had 
learned that, contrary to the belief of the orthodox democrats, no compelling case 
can be made for liberalism (for example, for the unqualified freedom of such 
speech as does not constitute a clear and present danger) nor for democracy (free 
elections based on universal suffrage).910 
 
This goes some way to identify what Strauss might have thought had gone astray in the 
Weimar republic: democratic universal suffrage (which enabled the NSDAP to form a 
minority government) and liberal unqualified freedom of speech that allowed anti-
Semitic discourse to spew. These reflections also point to an answer to how democratic 
and how liberal (or alternatively, how authoritarian) is the constitutional regime that 
Strauss endorsed in the United States and elsewhere. 
In “What is Liberal Education?” a speech Strauss delivered in Chicago in 1959 
(and published in 1961), he defines democracy, from a mix of ancient and modern 
conceptions, as the rule of the many virtuous, not the majority simply, but a “universal 
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aristocracy.”911 While a universal aristocracy might have been the aspiration of moderns 
like Montesquieu and Rousseau, Strauss thinks that only a few have the capacity by 
nature to be wise and rule well and thus a universal aristocracy can never be actualized. 
Instead, Strauss suggests: “Liberal education is the ladder by which we try to ascend from 
mass democracy to democracy as originally meant. Liberal education is the necessary 
endeavour to found an aristocracy within democratic mass society.”912 To establish an 
intellectual aristocracy within a democratic mass society is of course not the same as 
establishing a universal aristocracy. So, would not such aristocracy, if it truly meant the 
rule of the best/wise undermine rather than support the rule of the majority? Or does 
Strauss think that it is possible to marry elite rule with a modern liberal democratic 
regime? Or did Strauss have in mind here merely an intellectual aristocracy divorced 
from the operation of the state? The answers are not readily available in the short 
pamphlet. Instead we must look for the answers in his follow-up essay, “Liberal 
Education and Responsibility,” commissioned by The Fund of Adult Education, who had 
asked Strauss to clarify the ambiguous relation between liberal education and democracy 
in the above quotation.913  
In this longer essay, Strauss first provides a definition of ancient democracy that 
aligned closer with a conventional view. Democracy in ancient Greece entailed that the 
collective majority rules or decides over matters deliberated by all male household heads 
in the polis or by those selected by lot. As a consequence, Strauss writes: “Roughly 
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speaking, democracy is the regime in which the majority of adult free males living in a 
city rules, but only a minority of them are educated.914 In his analysis of this regime, 
Strauss shifts from simple observation to an evaluation of democracy from a Platonic 
standpoint: “The principle of democracy is therefore not virtue, but freedom as the right 
of every citizen to live as he likes. Democracy is rejected because it is as such the rule of 
the uneducated.”915 In this judgment of democracy, Strauss adds a feature of modern 
liberal democratic states since a collective majority decision does not necessarily entail 
the right of every citizen to live as they like.  
In post-war United States, Strauss thought that pluralism defined present day 
liberalism in so far as individuals were left to choose their own ends — live as they like. 
These ends, he argued were limited by the influence of mass society, and were in most 
instances not virtuous ends. Liberal education or the study of the great books could serve 
as a counterbalance to this peril of mass society. Pangle explains: 
[Strauss] found in modern liberalism a native space for the highest ingredient of 
that older liberalism—the liberalism that consists in liberation of the mind 
through the study and debate of the alternative vision of human excellence 
developed in the great books. In the liberal university at its best the ancient idea of 
liberal education continues to shine as the crown jewel of modern liberalism.916 
 
Strauss notes that in ancient Greece, it was only the small class with landed property who 
had time to study, as they need not concern themselves with administrating their property 
(like the merchants), or engage in manual labour (like the peasants or wage-labourer). Or 
if we include also non-citizens in the analysis, Strauss explains that classical 
understanding of “liberal” plainly meant citizens that are not “slaves” — they are free to 
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spend their time as they wish.917 Strauss suggests that modern technological innovations 
allows for a larger number of people to have idle time to study and thus there is a larger 
pool to draw from and thus the chances that individuals that are more fitted by nature 
entered the educational system is higher. Strauss sees the role of liberal education not 
only in the training of an intellectual aristocracy, but also the schooling of statesmen, and 
thus education directly relates to the question of rule in present-day liberal democracies 
and not only isolated to the educational sphere.  
In chapter four, I suggest that in the late 1940s Strauss adopts from Hobbes the 
insight that popular and expressive consent is a necessary evil in the time in which he 
lived. Strauss’s description of the modern liberal doctrine in “Liberal education and 
Responsibility” is based on his studies of Hobbes’s (and to a lesser extent, Locke’s) 
doctrine without naming him: “The modern [liberal] doctrine starts from the natural 
equality of all men, and it leads therefore to the assertion that sovereignty belongs to the 
people; yet it understands sovereignty in such way as to guarantee the natural rights of 
each; it achieves this result by distinguishing between the sovereign [people] and the 
government and [Locke:] by demanding that the fundamental governmental powers be 
separated from one another.”918 Strauss does not believe in the “natural equality of all 
men,” and he advocates for minimizing the role of the many (the majority) in the 
decision-making process (i.e., the degree in which the “higher is responsible to the 
lower”) as the representatives are largely drawn from an educated (and economic) elite: 
“a regime in which the gentlemen share power with the people in such way that the 
people elect the magistrate and the council from among the gentlemen and demand an 
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account of them at the end of their term of office.”919 By popular consent, the liberal 
modern democratic regime is de facto ruled by an elite of well-educated statesmen. This 
is what Strauss has in mind when he writes in What is Political Philosophy: “liberal or 
constitutional democracy comes closer to what the classics demanded that any alternative 
that is viable in our age.”920 So what about the Lockean separation of powers? 
In chapter four, I suggest that in Strauss’s eyes the American republic and Britain 
resembled a mixed regime. Straussians disagree over Strauss’s assessment of the 
philosophy of the American founders and the constitution; more specifically, they 
disagree over how much Strauss believed the constitution owes to Locke and how much 
it owes to pre-modern ancient practical form of constitutionalism.921 If much is owed to 
Locke, it’s a regime that is inferior to ancient regimes but in comparison to contemporary 
regimes, good. If there is more of an ancient element to the constitution, it is a higher 
form of regime close to an ancient ideal. It seems to follow from Strauss’s argument in 
On Tyranny that the statesmen must be kept in check by the constitution (written by wise 
individuals) as these gentlemen, are not truly wise.922 One would then assume the 
constitution (or “code” as Strauss also calls it) is best safeguarded by an independent 
judiciary. However, Strauss says little concrete about the separation and checks on 
power.  
As we have seen, Strauss thinks that a modern democratic regime allows for 
rulers that are better educated than in ancient democracies, yet these statesmen are not 
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wise. So what is the role for the wise philosophers — the authors of the constitution — in 
the liberal democratic regime? Strauss is aware that aristocratic rule easily evolves into 
oligarchy or tyranny, and thus it seems that he sides with his Aristotle that the praxis of 
politics is better left for statesman, and the wise are better left as teachers of the liberal 
arts or left alone in their quest for wisdom.  
Strauss’s view on the place, or even, the possibility of philosophy in a liberal 
state, is nevertheless questioned in the secondary literature. In chapter two, I note that 
Strauss reads Schmitt in the early 1930s in order to argue that liberalism and economic 
rationality de-politicized the political. The late Strauss worried less about liberalism’s 
effect on politics than on philosophy. Lampert, suggests that for Strauss, the liberal 
democratic state presents a totalizing horizon, presaging the arrival of Nietzsche’s the 
last-man, and with that the end not only of history, but also of philosophy.923 On this 
basis, Lampert has questioned Strauss’s support for liberal democracy on the ground that 
Strauss ultimately sees the end of philosophy in Kojeve’s “rational and homogenous” 
liberal democratic state.924 Surely, Strauss opposes Kojeve’s Hegelian liberal regime, 
which he thinks is simply another expression of socialist or communist “universal and 
classless society”. 925 In Kojeve’s state, citizens, as individual and autonomous rational 
subject, are reflected in the rational state as the concrete manifestation of modern 
reason.926 In Lampert’s analysis, liberal education is thus not sufficient to counter this 
trend, i.e., to serve as the defence against the end of philosophy. In light of this, Lampert, 
like Altman, suggests that Strauss wrote for a future in which philosophy was again 
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possible—a future that could only come into being after the liberal democratic state had 
been transcended. On the contrary, I have suggested above that Strauss thought that the 
liberal democratic regime in the United States, as it was composed during the time he 
lived there, and which he attempted to modify, allowed for philosophy.  
 Furthermore, Lampert, like Drury before him, claims that Strauss does not reveal 
himself as the Nietzschean anti-metaphysical thinker he is.927 Should then Strauss’s 
ontological postulate of the natural constitution of human beings and natural hierarchy of 
human capacities be read along the lines of his assessment of Nietzsche’s eternal return 
of the same? 
For Nietzsche all genuinely human life, every high culture has necessarily a 
hierarchic or aristocratic character; the highest culture of the future must be in 
accordance with the natural order of rank among men which Nietzsche, in 
principle, understands along Platonic lines. Yet how can there be a natural order 
of rank, given the, so to speak, infinite power of the Over-man? For Nietzsche, 
too, the fact that almost all men are defective or fragmentary cannot be due to an 
authoritative nature but can be no more than an inheritance of the past, or of 
history as it has developed hitherto. To avoid this difficulty, i.e. to avoid the 
longing for the equality of all men when man is at the peak of his power, 
Nietzsche needs nature or the past as authoritative or at least inescapable. Yet 
since it is no longer for him an undeniable fact, he must will it, or postulate it. 
This is the meaning of his doctrine of eternal return. The return of the past, of the 
whole past, must be willed, if the Over-man is to be possible.928   
According to this line of reasoning, Strauss, like his Nietzsche, is then actualizing the 
doctrine of the eternal return by championing a natural order of rank along Platonic lines. 
While I argue in chapter four that it is in part the prospect of the “end of philosophy” that 
prompts Strauss to promote the existence of an esoteric philosophical tradition to ground 
the Platonic view that there is an intellectual order of rank among humans, it is not due to 
an agreement with Nietzsche’s ontology. 
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In contradistinction to the idea that Strauss’s is a closet Nietzschean, I argue 
throughout this dissertation that there are philosophical or anthropological differences 
between Strauss and Nietzsche. Strauss, in all his Hobbes studies, gives Nietzsche’s will 
to power a metaphysical (but not metaphysics of Plato’s ideas) footing; he finds the 
answer to what wills the will to power in human nature—in vanity. This analysis, which 
originates in Strauss’s pre-war interpretation of vanity in Hobbes’s thought, is also 
apparent in his comment on Nietzsche’s will to power in “The Three waves of 
Modernity”:  
Surely the nature of man is will to power and this means on the primary level the 
will to overpower others: man does not by nature will equality. Man derives 
enjoyment from overpowering others as well as himself. Whereas Rousseau's 
natural man is compassionate, Nietzsche's natural man [like individuals in 
Strauss’s Hobbes] is cruel.929 
 
In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss asserted through the young Hobbes that 
vanity is what marks the qualitative difference between human and other animals. The 
differences between Strauss and Nietzsche are ever more visible in Strauss’s adopted 
classical ontological conception of human as intrinsically rational, and for whom there 
exists a hierarchy of natural ends, and the epistemological status of Socratic-Platonic 
rationality/phenomenology. I argue in chapter four that in “German Nihilism,” Strauss 
sets out to resuscitate ancient rationality against Nietzschean nihilism (of which the Nazis 
were a crude political manifestation) and against liberals, and ultimately also against 
Marxists (like Kojève), who subscribed to the rational historical materialist world-view 
that liberalism evolves into a classless society. In his studies after World War II, Strauss 
defends a neo-classical ontology of Being and conception of reason against not only a 
Nietzschean, but also Heideggerian nihilism and relativism, or what he identifies as the 
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zeitgeist of a third wave of modernity. Before I turn to reflect on this third wave and 
Strauss’s relation to it, I will account for Strauss view of Hobbes’s role in the first two 
waves of modernity. 
6. 6. Strauss’s evolving interpretation of Hobbes: first and second wave of modernity 
In “The Three Waves of Modernity,” Straus presents Hobbes as representative of the first 
wave. In his book, Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), Strauss expanded on his presentation 
of Machiavelli as the first modern philosopher in his chapter on Hobbes and Locke in 
Natural Right and History. It was the secular struggle against orthodox, exemplified for 
Strauss in Machiavelli’s thought, that marked the first wave of modernity. Machiavelli 
introduces a radical new political philosophy that moves away from the ideals of ancient 
natural right and turns to how humans actually are. Strauss argues in his post-war 
writings that Hobbes follows Machiavelli in that he takes as first principle humans for 
what they are as opposed to what they ought to be.930 Human passions provide the axioms 
from which Hobbes deducts a commonwealth that secures peace, or at least, the end of 
civil-religious war, since Hobbes maintains that there can exist no single sovereign in the 
international realm.  
 As I accounted for in chapter four, Strauss argues that Hobbes brings the secular 
battle against religion into the open and grounds his modern natural right in human nature 
alone. Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza — who Strauss argues in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 
writes in the Averroist tradition — sees a natural difference between the wise and vulgar 
and therefore arrives at the conclusion that religion is required to secure obedience and 
form a social contract. By the mid-1930s, Strauss had concluded that Hobbes was an 
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atheist. While he makes note of Hobbes’s atheism in the late 1940s, it is first in his final 
essay on Hobbes in the 1950s, “On the Basis,” that Strauss presented the evidence for his 
readers.  
In chapter two and three, I point out, like others before me, that Strauss claims 
that what was new in Hobbes’s political science is not his application of a new science to 
the study of politics, but his normative project; that is, the introduction of a bourgeois 
morality — based on the preservation of life — as distilled in his introduction of an 
individual natural right to life prior to social obligation. As I note in chapter four and five, 
Strauss presents Hobbes as the first philosopher who attempts to build a new moral or 
scientific political philosophy on the new continent that Machiavelli had founded. 
Hobbes’s new morality is liberalism. As Strauss puts it in “The Three Waves of 
Modernity”: 
One can describe the change effected by Hobbes as follows: whereas prior to him 
natural law was understood in the light of a hierarchy of man's ends in which self-
preservation occupied the lowest place, Hobbes understood natural law in terms 
of self-preservation alone; in connection with this, natural law came to be 
understood primarily in terms of the right of self-preservation as distinguished 
from any obligation or duty—a development which culminates in the substitution 
of the rights of man for natural law (nature replaced by man, law replaced by 
rights).931  
 
Already in the inter-war period, Strauss had argued that Hobbes’s modern natural right 
positions individual right prior to, and above obligation to the state (the role of the state is 
to secure these rights) and, consequently, fundamentally alters the ancient conception of 
natural law. The Hobbesian natural is divorced from nature and dependent on human 
will. Strauss identifies this as the theoretical core of the liberal doctrine after World War 
II.  
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In “The Three Waves of Modernity,” Strauss argues that it was the political and 
philosophical reactions to Hobbes’s natural right that resulted in the second and third 
wave of modernity. According to him, it is Rousseau who instigates the second wave, in 
essence, by replacing human nature with history. Rousseau criticizes Hobbes’s portrayal 
of humans in the state of nature, specifically arguing (as Macpherson would two centuries 
later) that vanity is a socio-historical attribute that Hobbes mistakenly reads as essential 
to human nature as such. Rousseau attempted to go back further in time by peeling back 
the layers of civilization that had shaped and tainted Hobbes’s description of humans in 
order to uncover the authentic state of nature and the human savage that dwells there. In 
so doing, Strauss argues, Rousseau waters-down the essence that defines the human 
animal as rational animal in Natural Right and History. In “The Three Waves of 
Modernity,” Strauss restates this verdict: “Rousseau's natural man lacks not merely, as 
Hobbes's natural man does, sociality, but rationality as well.”932 In chapter five, I point 
out that Strauss believes that at a certain point in the evolutionary history of homo 
sapiens, humans acquired a kind of capacity for rational thought; this capacity, for 
Strauss, came to define the human animal as such, and as different in kind from other 
animals. This view aligns with Socratic-Platonic rationalism that holds the view that 
reason is part of our natural constitution. It is from this perspective that Strauss defines 
Rousseau’s “noble savage” in both The Natural Right and History and “The Three Wave 
of Modernity” as a “subhuman”:  
Man in the state of nature is subhuman or pre-human; his humanity or rationality 
have been acquired in a long process. In post-Rousseauan language, man's 
humanity is due not to nature but to history. […] The concept of history, i.e., of 
the historical process as a single process in which man becomes human without 
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intending it, is a consequence of Rousseau's radicalization of the Hobbesian 
concept of the state of nature.933  
 
In “The Three Waves of Modernity,” Strauss argues that for the thinkers of the second 
wave of modernity, history replaces human nature. Rousseau’s revolution, Strauss argues, 
culminates in Hegel’s understanding of history: 
The most powerful philosopher of history was Hegel. For Hegel the historical 
process was a rational and reasonable process, a progress, culminating in the 
rational state, the postrevolutionary state. Christianity is the true or absolute 
religion; but Christianity consists in its reconciliation with the world, the 
saeculum, in its complete secularization, a process begun with the Reformation, 
continued by the Enlightenment, and completed in the postrevolutionary state, 
which is the first state consciously based upon the recognition of the rights of 
man.934 
The liberal state is understood as a result of the historical process. As we have seen in 
chapter four, in Natural Right and History, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s modern 
conception of human rationality (as a method of mathematical deduction and based on an 
ontology of the human in their natural state as the passionate animal). Liberalism as 
rational, with its source in Hobbes, is thus based on a faulty ontology of human nature, 
and an egalitarian view of rationality that realizes itself in the post-revolutionary state. 
The basis for the social contract, and popular sovereignty, follows from the insight that 
each and every individual, independently of their natural abilities, agrees to a covenant 
due to fear of a violent death. This, Strauss concludes in Natural Right and History, is the 
modern regime of folly. 
In all his studies, Strauss argues that Hobbes believes he has discovered the 
passion that made the human animal rational, namely fear of violent death, and with that, 
made the modern and bourgeois doctrine of natural right possible. In the pre-scientific 
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Hobbes (or in his thinking of the human that is not tinted by his adoption of a scientific 
approach), Strauss identifies vanity as the primary cause behind the war of all against all. 
In Strauss’s final work, however, he argues that Hobbes in his scientific description of the 
human animal identifies human’s capacity for causal reason as the root of vanity. 
Strauss’s final insight is that the peculiar human ability for causal reason is causally prior 
to both power and vanity. By placing human reason at the root of both vanity and power, 
Strauss makes a case against the idea that the source of reason is passion, on the one 
hand, and against the notion that Hobbesian science is dependent on the arbitrariness of 
language, on the other. In so doing, Strauss brings us to nihilism and relativism and the 
third wave of modernity. 
6. 8. The third wave of modernity: relativism, fascism and the possibility of natural right 
It is Nietzsche, in Strauss’s account, who initiates the third wave of modernity. Hobbes, 
Strauss argues across all his studies, was convinced that he had discovered an absolute 
ground for a science of politics and a social contract in human nature. In Natural Right 
and History, Strauss argues that Hobbes’s position deteriorates into relativism over time. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Strauss diagnoses present liberal theory, and the West in general, 
as having lost its confidence in its own principles. Present liberal theory, he argues, 
suffers from the same illness that for him marked the third wave of modernity — 
relativism: 
The theory of liberal democracy, as well as of communism, originated in the first 
and second waves of modernity; the political implication of the third wave proved 
to be fascism. Yet this undeniable fact does not permit us to return to the earlier 
forms of modern thought: the critique of modern rationalism or of the modern 
belief in reason by Nietzsche cannot be dismissed or forgotten. This is the deepest 
reason for the crisis of liberal democracy. The theoretical crisis does not 
necessarily lead to a practical crisis, for the superiority of liberal democracy to 
communism, Stalinist or post-Stalinist, is obvious enough. And above all, liberal 
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democracy, in contradistinction to communism and fascism, derives powerful 
support from a way of thinking which cannot be called modern at all: the 
premodern thought of our western tradition.935  
 
Until the late 1930s, as I point out in chapter two and three, Strauss viewed liberalism and 
socialism as two sides of the same coin, both sharing the premise that humans are by 
nature good. In chapter five, I noted that Strauss in the 1950s and 1960s uses an amoral 
conception of human evil to instruct liberals to separate themselves from socialists. As 
seen in the above quotation, Strauss believes that liberal democracy, through its adoption 
of pre-modern thought, and with that the separation of modern/Hobbesian liberalism from 
pre-modern liberalism, offered another tool to distinguish liberalism from communism. 
He also asserts that liberal democracy is a viable practical political alternative. I will now 
conclude by investigating further Strauss’s claim that this third wave, as initiated by 
Nietzsche’s critique of modern rationalism, and as reflected in the politics of the fascists, 
hinders us from returning to modern reason or earlier waves of modernity, but does not 
preclude a return to an ancient kind of rationalism.  
In his lecture, “Introduction to Existentialism,” Strauss appraises Isaiah Berlin’s 
conception of negative and positive liberty as symptomatic of the crisis of contemporary 
liberal theory. Berlin’s value pluralism, Strauss contends, falls into a logical contradiction 
as it seeks to maintain a distinction between relative and absolute values. He reads 
Berlin’s position as evidence of a larger loss of confidence within the liberal tradition and 
the overall decline of the West. Liberal relativism, in Strauss’s account, is the soft side of 
existentialism: “The situation to which existentialism belongs can be seen to be liberal 
democracy, or, more precisely, a liberal democracy which has become uncertain of itself 
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or of its future. Existentialism belongs to the decline of Europe.”936 The hard side of 
relativism was reflected in Heidegger’s existentialism. The effect of Heidegger’s 
destruction of the history of Being, Strauss argues, had left the world without 
philosophical positions or schools, with the exception of “neo-Thomism and Marxism 
crude or refined. All rational liberal philosophic positions have lost their significance and 
power.”937 Strauss notes that “one may deplore this, but I for one cannot bring myself to 
clinging to philosophical positions which have been shown to be inadequate.”938 And 
little hope remained: “I am afraid that we shall have to make a very great effort in order 
to find a solid basis for rational liberalism. Only a great thinker could help us in our 
intellectual plight. But here is the great trouble: the only great thinker in our time is 
Heidegger.”939 The question over the survival of theoretical or Hobbesian liberalism then 
becomes, Strauss continues, whether Heidegger is right or wrong. The question is not 
easily answered because only a great philosopher can judge another great philosopher and 
Strauss does not think he is competent to be that judge, presenting himself as merely a 
scholar of the history of political thought. Yet, Strauss, as several scholars have argued, 
may have thought higher of himself than he let on: Strauss was a philosopher who, as 
Meier points out, offered his philosophy through his textual commentaries. Even so, 
Strauss did not consider himself on par with Heidegger, nor in his view was anyone else 
alive.940 Heidegger, he further notes, had not yet been fully understood by any of his 
contemporaries i.e., the jury is still out on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. However, 
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this, as I have argued in the second half of the dissertation, was not Strauss’s last word on 
the matter. 
In the lecture, Strauss mentions the political reason why one might not want to 
consider Heidegger’s philosophy in the first place: “Heidegger became a Nazi in 
1933.”941 This statement does not only refer to his political deeds; Heidegger’s decision 
to join the National Socialists was not simply a political miscalculation by a philosopher 
removed from society, but a decision Strauss sees reflected in his philosophy — and the 
third wave of modernity in general — or as he put it a few years later:  
Heidegger, who surpasses in speculative intelligence all his contemporaries and is 
at the same time intellectually the counterpart of what Hitler was politically, 
attempts to go a way not yet trodden by anyone, or rather to think in a way in 
which philosophers at any rate have never thought before. Certain is that no one 
has questioned the premises of philosophy as radically as Heidegger.”942  
 
It was Heidegger’s “contempt for reasonableness,” besides the praise of “resoluteness,” 
that “encourage[d]” the Nazi “movement.”943 In chapter four, I argue that Strauss, at the 
outset of World War II, identified as his task to recover ancient reason as a defence 
against Heidegger’s destruction of reason. Until the end of his life, Strauss worked 
tirelessly to defend ancient rationality among the pre-moderns in his many studies of 
ancient and pre-modern thinkers — as seen in his books Liberalism: Ancient & Modern, 
City and Man, What is Political Philosophy and the posthumously published, Studies in 
Platonic Political Philosophy — and perhaps kept alive the possibility of a natural right 
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grounded in an eternal nature of the whole, where Heidegger identified only an “abyss” 
and the impossibility of any ethics.944  
I also argue in chapter four that Strauss does not prove that human nature is not 
conditioned by the historical horizon. In other words, he does not prove philosophically 
that there is an essence in the Being we are that defines the human qua human, extending 
across historical horizons and societies. Instead, he brackets the historicist thesis by 
arguing that it falls into a logical contradiction, and much like Spinoza’s Napoleonic 
(practical) strategy, Strauss goes on to argue in Natural Right and History as if 
historicism had been refuted and his basic proposition about human nature is sound. 
However, Hilail Gilden has suggested that Strauss did not think that the “objection” that 
he had raised against historicism in Natural Right and History refuted Heidegger’s 
radical historicism: 
The radical historicist faces the objection Strauss raises by ascribing his insight 
into the historicity of human existence to the unique and unprecedented historical 
situation of modern man. He claims that the manner in which his insight is 
achieved confirms the content of that insight. This claim is accompanied by an 
analysis that is meant to lay bare the ultimate assumptions which formerly guided 
and were thought to justify philosophy as the attempt to achieve comprehensive 
knowledge of eternal order. This analysis attempts to show that those assumptions 
are by no means ultimate in character, that they are derived from a deeper root to 
which earlier thought had no access, that their validity is derivative and severely 
limited, and that they lack the power to justify philosophy in the traditional sense 
of the term. A fundamental part of this analysis is a wholly new account of human 
existence. That new account is held to be superior to all previous accounts 
precisely because it is not based on the questionable assumptions which all 
previous philosophers are alleged to have taken for granted.945 
  
We saw in chapter five that Strauss, on the basis of an essentialist view of human nature 
that he found confirmed through the history of human evolution, he refused to abandon 
the Socratic-Platonic tradition and remained an outpost against the anti-metaphysical 
                                                
944  Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” 28. 
945  Gilden, “Introduction” to Strauss, Leo, An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays, xviii-xix.    
 353 
relativism of the third wave of modernity. In his talk on Heidegger, Strauss describes 
himself as someone “who sits at the feet” of the “old philosophers.”946 Indeed, I argue 
that Strauss in the late 1930s began to reach back in time for a mooring line with which to 
secure the philosophical enterprise within the historicist storm that pitted relativism and 
nihilism against eternity and rationality. My dissertation thus contributes to the debate 
over whether or not Strauss is a pre-modern or post-modern (i.e., in the camp of the third 
wave of modernity) thinker: Strauss sides with the pre-modern rational enterprise, but 
agrees with the thinkers of the third wave that that “the critique of modern rationalism or 
of the modern belief in reason by Nietzsche cannot be dismissed or forgotten.”947  
I also argue across the dissertation that Strauss came to differentiate his 
understanding of Socratic-Platonic and Aristotelian rationalism from Hobbes’s 
understanding of reason as a mathematical calculation and grounded in the passions, at 
least until his last insight on Hobbes. For Strauss, it is our capacity for rational thought, 
our natural constitution that sets humans apart from other animals in the whole. Strauss 
adopts the ancient view that human beings are by nature rational animals and have natural 
ends that are determined by their place in the hierarchy of cognitive abilities. This ancient 
view is different from moderns like Hobbes and Spinoza, for whom, Strauss argues, it is 
not nature that provides the standard but human will. Spinoza, however, arrives at the 
same position as Strauss that the highest end is the life devoted to philosophy:  
For Spinoza there are not natural ends and hence in particular there is no end 
particular to man. He is therefore compelled to give a novel account of man’s end 
(the life devoted to contemplation): man’s end is not natural, but rational, the 
result of man’s figuring it out, of man’s ‘forming an idea of man, as of a model of 
human nature’. He thus decisively prepares the modern notion of the ‘ideal’ as the 
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work of the human mind or as a human project, as distinguished from an end 
imposed by nature.948  
 
Strauss does not seek to demonstrate or claim, however, that the universe is structured 
according to rational laws as do Spinoza or Plato. The foundation for Strauss’s 
rationalism is not that the universe is structured according to rational laws — whether 
non-teleological natural laws or those of a teleological design — but that nature is 
rational insofar as humans have an inborn rational capacity and are oriented toward the 
perfection of this constitution of their being qua Being. 
 We have seen in the preceding pages that Strauss pursued his philosophical and 
political project primarily through textual commentaries — his extended study of Hobbes 
is exemplary of this approach. Strauss thought through political and philosophical 
problems by means of his engagement with Hobbes (as the founder of modern natural 
right and liberal rationalism), who, over time, appears more and more as the 
philosophical counterpoint to Strauss. In the American Strauss’s account of the history of 
political philosophy, the main difference between the ancients and the early or first wave 
moderns like Hobbes in their notions of the relation between philosophy, politics and 
religion lies in how the philosophers elect to pursue their philosophical and political 
enterprises. Socrates took the battle for truth to the streets and paid with his life — a 
lesson Plato never forgot. Plato and Aristotle’s medieval Jewish and Muslim disciples 
knew how to conceal their craft. For the founders of modernity and liberalism — 
Machiavelli and Hobbes — the war against theology was a central component of their 
political philosophies — indeed a war over the foundations of politics — and brought the 
struggle back into the open. Hobbes sought to establish a secular political order and 
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universal enlightenment without appeals to religion. Hobbes was of course forced to 
make amends, but yet, he was far too bold for Strauss’s taste. When questioning the 
foundational truths on which societies rest, or sought to instate a new social order, 
philosophers ought to employ an esoteric rhetoric—at once out of care for the moral 
fabric of society on the one hand and to protect themselves against persecution on the 
other.  
Yet, ironically, Strauss spoke openly about the esoteric art of writing and 
employed esotericism for more than the above stated reason. One reason for the candour, 
I argue, was to counter historicism and destroy Hobbes’s modern egalitarianism on which 
liberal individual rights rested. The use of esotericism was thus a weapon in this battle, 
i.e., Strauss’s openness about the esoteric tradition was part of enforcing a natural order 
of rank to serve as the foundation for Socratic-Platonic rationalism (and the possible 
philosophical quest for ancient natural law and right) and to counter liberal and 
democratic rights. In his studies in 1930s Weimar, Strauss approaches Hobbes’s state of 
nature as a ground zero for politics and the site to investigate the anthropological and 
moral nature of humans. In his last seminars and writings on Hobbes, he returns to the 
17th century philosophers’ investigation of human nature, which he no longer sees as the 
source of a moral ontology for an authoritarian alternative to liberalism, but rather now as 
an enduring site that still provides insights about human nature, rationality, and what 
political regimes are possible or advantageous. Until his last studies, Strauss argues that 
Hobbes’s liberalism, as the doctrine of modern natural right and a rational system, is 
faulty, but by then he had come around to support a practical and limited form of liberal 
democracy as a regime form for the times in which he lived. His engagement with 
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Hobbes, stretching over four decades, was thus as rewarding as it was combative. Strauss 
read Hobbes with great admiration, and later in life, even with fondness, as is ever 
evident by the words he chose to introduce Hobbes to his readers in Natural Right and 
History, and with which I end this text: 
Thomas Hobbes—that imprudent, impish, and iconoclastic extremist, that first 
plebeian philosopher, who is so enjoyable a writer because of his almost boyish 
straightforwardness, his never failing humanity, and his marvelous clarity and 
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